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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is a critical sociology of sociology in Soviet and post-Soviet 
Central Asia.  It explores the construction of sociology as a field of 
knowledge, academic discipline and professional practice in Kyrgyzstan 
(formerly the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic) from 1966 to 2003, focusing 
on the late and post-socialist project to transform sociology from a 
heteronomous to autonomous field of knowledge and practice.  It draws 
especially on the sociology of knowledge and science to explore the localised 
processes through which social scientific knowledge and political power have 
been co-constituted on the imperial periphery.  Through a comparative case 
study of sociology in Kyrgyzstani universities, as well as smaller case studies 
of ‘public science’ in the national press, it reveals how sociologists have 
negotiated a fundamental tension in the institutionalisation project—the 
separation of the production of sociological knowledge from the logic of 
political power, on the one hand, and their simultaneous association, on the 
other—to establish both scientific legitimacy and social relevance for 
sociology in the republic.  The types of sociology that emerge from this 
negotiation—the positivist, applied–professional model and the post-positivist 
liberal–critical model—are interpreted not as inevitable consequences of the 
Soviet collapse, but rather the product of decisions made by sociologists 
within particular intellectual and structural constraints and through the lens of 
partial bodies of theoretical knowledge.  The ascendance of positivist and 
empiricist sociology in the post-Soviet period is explained as a deliberate, if 
often extremely uncritical, attempt to reorganise the relationship between 
power and knowledge in Kyrgyzstani society and to democratise the latter.  
Finally, the dissertation demonstrates that academic debates about the 
possibility of scientific truth assume deep personal and political significance 
when conducted in the context of pronounced social fragmentation and 
inequality, specifically, in the contexts of authoritarianism and neo-
colonialism. 
 
Keywords: sociology of social science, sociology of knowledge, 
power/knowledge,  Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan, boundary–work  
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INTRODUCTION 
In our state, sociology must be a science and not an ideology. 
(Bakir-uluu 1997) 
 
The study of the truth must itself be true. (Isaev in Sydykova 
1998) 
 
This dissertation, a critical sociology of sociology in Kyrgyzstan (formerly the 
Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic1), can be read on two levels.  It is first and 
foremost an ethnographic case study of the institutionalisation of sociology in 
Soviet and post-Soviet society, with particular focus on the way in which 
conceptions of social scientific knowledge and truth have historically been 
constructed, legitimised and contested.  As such, it contributes to 
contemporary debates about the development of social science in the former 
Soviet Union, Soviet and post-Soviet higher education reforms, and the 
comparative history of sociology.  This local empirical study, however, also 
bears on three broader theoretical themes: the relationship between social and 
political domination and the project of science, the role of scientific 
knowledge in colonised and neo-colonial societies, and the relationship 
between power and knowledge in the formation of scientific disciplines more 
generally.    
 The dissertation integrates these empirical and theoretical dimensions by 
mapping the way in which shifting boundaries between power and knowledge 
have impacted upon the definition and development of social scientific 
knowledge and practice in Soviet and post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  While 
recognising hegemony and continuity in the experience of Soviet sociologists, 
it challenges the notion that Soviet social science can be understood as a 
monolithic institution.  It draws instead on scholarship about centre-periphery 
relations in colonised societies and recent developments in post-Soviet 
ethnography to explore the localised processes by which sociology actually 
became integrated into the exercise of political power in the imperial 
periphery, how it was legitimised in this context, and how and why it has been 
repoliticised during the post-Soviet period.  It also demonstrates that academic 
debates about the possibility of scientific truth assume deep personal 
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significance when conducted in the context of pronounced social 
fragmentation and inequality, specifically, in the contexts of authoritarianism 
and neo-colonialism. 
 
Truth, power and social science through the lens of Soviet sociology 
The relationship between truth and power is central to the role and legitimacy 
of the social sciences in any society.  Since the early nineteenth century, 
Western European social scientists have debated the extent to which the study 
of social life can be made ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ and, simultaneously, 
whether it can and should be applied to social and political action.  From 
Weber to Habermas, they have sought to reconcile an apparent contradiction 
between the quest for truth about social reality and the project to transform it.  
A number of approaches have emerged in lieu of reconciliation.  Positivism, 
for example, reifies the boundary between truth and power by defining them 
as mutually exclusive.  Critical theory collapses this boundary by asserting 
that the subjective and political nature of social scientific knowledge actually 
enables social scientists to construct a more holistic, if always contingent, 
truth.  Although the debate continues, it has been institutionalised as a 
theoretical distinction between competing schools of thought: positivism, post-
positivism, constructivism, critical realism, critical theory.  The contours of 
contemporary social science are, in fact, drawn in large part along this 
boundary.   
 The example of Soviet social science offers an excellent illustration of 
how culturally contingent these epistemological parameters actually are—and 
exposes the extent to which they are influenced by concerns about the 
relationship between knowledge and power.  The social sciences were among 
the most politicised fields of academic knowledge in the Soviet Union, deeply 
integrated into state and Communist Party domination and grounded in 
theories of social engineering and scientific development.  Marxist–Leninist 
sociology, dominant in the USSR from the early twentieth century until the 
mid-1980s, blurred the boundary between truth and politics in a different way.  
While arguing that truth is always political, it also asserted this as a scientific 
epistemology (as opposed to positivism, which it defined as unscientific in its 
assertion of value neutrality).  This, ostensibly, circumvented the tension 
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between truth and power in social science.  As this dissertation demonstrates, 
however, many Soviet sociologists found this uncompelling in practice and 
sought to develop their own understanding of the relationship between 
political power and scientific truth.  
 The final disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 largely delegitimised 
the Marxist–Leninist philosophy of power/knowledge and spawned a quest for 
a new politically potent, non-political truth in the social sciences.  In 
Kyrgyzstan, where sociology was institutionalised as part of a larger imperial 
project and has never been autonomous from political power or social 
planning, this has been characterised by the embracing of positivist, empiricist 
and applied social research, seen by many Kyrgyzstani sociologists as a 
radical corrective to the ideological politicisation of social science under 
Soviet rule.  In addition, because sociology’s organisation and raison d’être 
were heavily intertwined with the very institutions that were brought into 
question with the Soviet collapse, the social sciences were dislocated from 
their institutional and epistemological foundations and relocated within new 
hegemonic discourses of democratisation, development and westernisation in 
Kyrgyzstan.  They have since therefore become prominent sites for the 
renegotiation of the boundary between science and power in the post-Soviet 
era. 
 The story told in this dissertation begins from the establishment of the 
first sociological laboratory in Soviet Kirgizia in 1966 and extends to 2003, 
but focuses on the ‘boundary–work’ done by sociologists to define the field of 
sociology during the late socialist period (1985–91) and in the decade 
following national independence (1991–2001).  The title, ‘from truth in 
strength to strength in truth,’ is adapted from one of many articles on 
sociology published in the Kyrgyz press during the 1990s.  It reflects growing 
public concern about the need to realign the relationship between social 
scientific knowledge and power in post-Soviet society; to wrest the privilege 
of knowledge production away from power elites and place scientific truth at 
the service of ‘the people.’  In the Kyrgyzstani academy, this imperative has 
been manifested in projects to transform the discipline of sociology from a 
heteronomous field of knowledge and practice into an autonomous one, or 
from a field of knowledge whose development is dominated by external socio-
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political and economic forces to one that is self-producing and reproducing 
and which can exert influence in the political sphere.2   
 Although these projects assume different form and content in different 
institutional and historical contexts, there is a common denominator: they 
revolve around the need to negotiate a boundary between truth and politics 
which can enable social scientists to work within the competing, often 
contradictory logics of scientific legitimacy and social relevance, or between 
the production of scientific knowledge and its application.  This negotiation is 
fundamental to the types of sociological theorising and practice which have 
historically emerged in Kyrgyzstan.  The power/knowledge problematic is a 
key factor affecting the outcome of attempts to institutionalise and 
professionalise sociology in the republic, where a modernist ideal of scientific 
politics has long existed alongside of, and in permanent tension with, deep 
scepticism about the politicisation of scientific knowledge.   
 Following critical theories of knowledge production (Bourdieu 1975, 
1988; Foucault 1980, 2001; Gieryn 1983; Mannheim 1936), this dissertation 
argues that the ascendance of positivism, empiricism and applied sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan, and by extension in other post-Soviet societies, must be analysed 
within the historical, socio-political and epistemological contexts in which the 
approaches emerge and are legitimised.  They are, in the words of Thomas 
Popkewitz (1991: 24), ‘the result of a conjunction—not of evolution or 
necessity;’ not natural evolutions of knowledge, but the outcome of struggles 
to establish scientific authority and social relevance in highly politicised 
academic fields.  
 
Overview of the dissertation 
Part 1 of the dissertation (Chapters 1 and 2) lays out the theoretical context 
and framework by discussing the politics of sociology in newly independent 
societies and critical theories of power/knowledge in the sociology of social 
science.  After describing the main problematic of the thesis—the two-
pronged project to link sociology with legitimate power and distance it from 
illegitimate power in Kyrgyzstan—it demonstrates how critical theories of 
power/knowledge can be used to analyse how certain forms of truth arise and 
are contested in particular socio-historical contexts.  It also introduces a 
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heuristic theoretical concept, ‘boundary–work,’ which is used throughout the 
dissertation to deconstruct how sociologists define the borders of legitimate 
scientific knowledge and practice.  This section also explicates the 
methodology used in this research, including considerations of power and 
knowledge in the field. 
 Part 2 (Chapters 3 to 5) establishes the historical background for the study 
by providing a brief history of early Russian and Soviet sociology (1916-36) 
and of the development of sociology in Central Asia more specifically (1917–
54).  It posits three distinctive features of the discipline’s emergence in Soviet 
Kirgizia which have been critical factors in its overall development: 
intellectual colonialism, academic dependency and orientalism/occidentalism.  
Chapters 4 and 5 comprise two narratives.  The first details the establishment 
of the republic’s first sociological laboratory and the rise of industrial 
sociology within the republic, and the second explores the transformation of 
sociology during perestroika.  Both explore how and why Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists developed normative standards for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sociology in 
order to negotiate competing loyalties to scientific and political value systems, 
and explores the impact that these categories had on the discipline’s 
institutionalisation. 
 Part 3 (Chapters 6 to 9) is dedicated to the analysis of Kyrgyzstani 
sociology after national independence in 1991, with particular emphasis on 
boundary–work and the institutional contexts and consequences of its 
discursive practices.  The chapters focus on the rise of ‘national’ sociology, as 
well as on divisions that have emerged within the sociological community 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  By drawing on recent scholarship in 
the sociology of academic disciplines, it highlights the importance of local 
departmental conditions in these processes.  Chapters 7 and 8 present an 
empirical comparative case study of the conceptualisation of sociology in two 
separate universities (the state-run Bishkek Humanitarian University and the 
private American University–Central Asia).  The cases, chosen for their 
theoretical significance, explore how different conceptualisations of sociology 
are contingent not only upon institutional opportunities and constraints, but 
also on the type of boundary–work that sociologists do to enhance their 
professional agendas within local contexts.  Chapter 9 departs from this local 
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institutional framework to analyse how boundary–work in sociology has been 
conducted in the mass media from 1989–2003. 
 Part 4 (Chapter 10) concludes the dissertation with a theoretically based, 
empirically informed framework for understanding the politics of social 
scientific truth in Kyrgyzstan and beyond.  By mapping out the shifting 
boundaries of the field, it assesses how the negotiation of contingent 
boundaries between truth and politics impacted upon the conceptualisation, 
practice and institutionalisation of sociology in Kyrgyzstan.  It also explores 
the implications that this study has for theories of power/knowledge more 
generally, and how it may facilitate an improved and empathetic 
understanding of scientific knowledge production in colonised and neo-
colonial societies—including, but not limited to, former Soviet societies—as 
well as in ‘western’ sociology.   
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1 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIOLOGY AS  
AN INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL PHENOMENON 
 
The politics of sociology in newly independent societies 
These questions are not unique to Kyrgyzstani society.  Since the mid-
twentieth century, concerns about the politics of social scientific knowledge 
have been particularly prominent on the intellectual landscape of newly 
independent states worldwide (Eisemon 1982; Fernandes 1967; Wagner et al. 
1990).  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, social science is often 
perceived as a practical instrument for the realisation of broader social reforms 
and planning strategies which accompany decolonisation and national 
independence (Gendzier 1985; Hulme and Turner 1990).  The form this takes 
depends on how notions of social reform are constituted, as well as on 
variations in schools of social scientific thought.  In many of the anti-colonial 
movements of the 1960 to 1980s, for example, Third World sociologists often 
produced critiques of intellectual dependency and developed indigenous 
theories of colonialism, underdevelopment, and alternative approaches to 
national development (Ake 1982; Clinard and Elder 1967; Joshi 1995: 22).  
Kyrgyzstan, however, has had a different trajectory, as the intellectual 
foundations of Marxism–Leninism have been reconstituted as part of a ‘new 
type of administratively-oriented knowledge’ or scientific politics oriented 
toward the creation of a modern, post-Soviet, capitalist, liberal nation state, 
and as a scientific ‘corrective’ to the manipulation of definitions of social 
reality by power elites (Bekturganov et al. 1994; Ismailova 1995; Isaev 1995 
Isaev et al. 1994e; Migration 1992).  Regardless of its form, however, the 
close, seemingly organic association of social science with social reform in 
newly independent societies naturalises what is in fact a very complex 
relationship between social scientific knowledge and political power. 
 This relationship is further complicated by the fact that social science 
frequently assumes symbolic value as an indicator of modernisation and 
westernisation or, conversely, nationalisation and indigenisation (Pertierra 
1997).  The development of sociology in post-Soviet societies accordingly 
cannot be divorced from its broader associations with both western modernity 
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and national sovereignty and identity.  For example, whereas claims to 
universal scientific authority (represented by ‘western’ or ‘civilised’ science) 
are often invoked to legitimise research methods or choice of research topic, 
Kyrgyzstani sociologists also refer to national specificity to appeal for social 
and political authority and professional relevance.  Similarly, random 
sampling techniques are defined not only as ‘objective,’ but also apolitical and 
democratic.  This characterisation of quantitative method is, in turn, associated 
with idealised images of ‘western democracy’ and contrasted to methods used 
by sociologists in what are defined as traditional, ‘unscientific’ and backward 
societies (Baibosunov 1993).  In referring to each other’s theories, methods 
and professional ethos as either ‘European’ or aksakal-like (a word meaning 
‘elder’ in Kyrgyz and generally referring to the patriarchs of traditional 
society), for example, members of the Kyrgyzstani social scientific 
community reinforce symbolic parameters for the geopolitical scope of 
sociological knowledge in Kyrgyzstan (see, e.g., Bakir Uluu 1994; Ryskulov 
1998).    
 Finally, as an institution endowed with responsibility for defining social 
reality, social science can be a site for elaborating and negotiating competing 
theories of society, and a potential source of legitimacy for translating these 
theories into practical programs for social change (Ake 1982; Bourdieu 1975: 
36; Bujra 1994; Eades and Schwaller 1991; Gosovic 2000).  The quest for 
scientific authority is highly visible in Kyrgyzstan’s academic and media 
institutions, where vigorous debates about the definition and role of sociology 
have been integrated into discourses about national independence, revival and 
possibilities for development.  Discussions of content and methods in 
Kyrgyzstani sociology, as well as its professional ethics and the organisation 
of social scientific teaching and research, are tied to deeper concerns about the 
fate of truth and role of social scientific knowledge in a society which believes 
it can and should restore the progressive promise of a scientific truth which 
has been hijacked by illegitimate power. 
 
Sociology, knowledge and power in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan   
The concept of power/knowledge in this dissertation refers both to the general 
relationship between social scientific knowledge and socio-political power as 
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outlined in the sociology of knowledge (Chapter 2), and to the more 
specifically Foucauldian theory that knowledge is to varying degrees 
constituted by power and implicated in establishing social discipline—
including the intellectual discipline of the epistemological boundaries within 
and between academic fields (Danaher et al. 2000; Foucault 1978, 1980, 
1989).  In Kyrgyzstani sociology, this has historically been manifested as the 
convergence, and sometimes conflict, of two interrelated intellectual and 
professional projects.  This first is to establish intellectual autonomy and 
scientific authority in a heteronomous field of power, and the second to 
establish social relevance for a discipline whose legitimacy is drawn largely 
from demonstrating scientificity and autonomy.   
The issue first emerged during the 1960s, as sociologists attempted to 
reconcile dual loyalties to science (‘truth’) and the Communist Party 
(‘politics’) in the post-Stalinist period.  The goal was not to establish 
autonomy for sociological knowledge, but rather to establish intellectual 
dominate within a heteronomous political field.  Later during perestroika, as 
elsewhere in the empire, Kirgizstani sociologists redesigned themselves as 
social reformers and scientific counterweights to the ‘distortions’ of political 
leaders.  At this point, the development of sociology became integrated with 
the movement to democratise the Communist Party and Soviet society.  This 
involved a much more conscious movement towards scientific autonomy, 
albeit still within the general system of power in the republic.   
After independence, the power/knowledge problematic re-emerged 
among social scientists who self-consciously aspire to transcend politics and 
yet to remain politically relevant in a society where ‘the political’ has come to 
symbolise unfreedom and ideological distortion and scientific knowledge has 
come to represent independence and objective reality.  In each period, the 
absolute knowledge of social reality (sociology’s purported object of study) is 
portrayed as a holy grail which has been denied to the people of Kyrgyzstan 
by power elites—but which could, if objectively apprehended, enable the 
realisation of social and political development.   
Debates about the nature of role of sociology therefore figure prominently 
in both scientific and political life in contemporary post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 
and concerns about its ‘ideologicisation’ and ‘de-ideologicisation’ have 
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shadowed the field since 1991.  While the discipline has been rather 
unproblematically promoted as a ‘vital element of democratic societies’ in 
both academic and public discourse (Isaev 1993; Isaev et al. 1996; Lokteva 
1991), the very definition of sociology and its relation to politics and other 
academic disciplines are in fact ambiguous, controversial and highly 
politicised.  This is visible at the level of official governmental funding and 
support as well as in popular discourses on social science, which are often 
oriented toward garnering political and popular legitimacy.   
The Kyrgyz government’s formal commitment to developing social 
scientific research capabilities, for example, is contradicted by its de facto 
inability to support research and educational institutions and by its continued 
suppression of critical research (Sievers 2003: 272).3  Furthermore, the 
government’s initial enthusiasm for sociological research plummeted as then-
President Akaev tightened his monopoly on power during the mid-1990s.4  As 
the director of a major sociological research centre in the capital city of 
Bishkek (formerly Frunze) remarked in 2003, 
when Askar Akaev came [to power] he had an interest in 
sociological research. […] But now we talk about the early 
Akaev and later Akaev.  Now we already have the later Akaev 
and, to be honest, as I recall he is not very interested in public 
opinion. […] Now all this mass information works only for 
Akaev to show that everything is fine with us, that everything is 
in order.5   
This trend is exacerbated by the economic reorganisation of the Soviet science 
and educational system according to ‘market principles’ that privilege 
capitalist-oriented disciplines such as management, marketing and business 
administration. 
As socialist-based rationales for state-sponsored science and education 
were abandoned after independence, Kyrgyzstani sociologists began appealing 
for governmental and non-governmental support on populist and moral 
grounds.  They argued that sociology could be organised to serve ‘the people’ 
and not a minority of the political and economic elite (Blum 1991; Isaev 
1991a); that it is a ‘path to development’ (Isaev 1993, 1998a, 2003); that it can 
be a source of reliable information for people living through a period of great 
collective unease and insecurity (Bekturganov 1997; Blum 1990; Isaev et al. 
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1994e); that it can and should be employed in the service of human freedom 
and not social control (though it must be understood that these are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive categories in this context) (Isaev 1998a; Isaev 
et al. 1994e); and that it is possible to establish a national sociology which 
meets certain ‘modern’ and ‘international’ standards but that also accounts for 
the socio-historical specificities of Kyrgyz history and culture (Isaev 1993b; 
Isaev et al. 1994b; Ryskulov 1998).   
Through this rhetoric, post-Soviet social scientists have elaborated a 
mission to rescue legitimate truth, as it were, from the abuses of illegitimate 
power; to transform the practice of power–writing–truth as ideology into one 
of social scientists–managing–truth as power.  These symbolic and affective 
platforms, which have been central in recent movements to reform and 
institutionalise sociology in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, reflect the intimate 
relationship between social science and conceptions of power, politics and 
truth.  This relationship has shaped both the contours and boundaries of 
sociology as a field of knowledge and the particular forms of its 
institutionalisation in the republic. 
 
The problem with no name 
Despite its importance, and despite the fact that foreign governments and 
international organisations have invested considerable sums of money to 
‘develop’ the social sciences in the region since the Soviet collapse, the 
power/knowledge relationship has not been subjected to substantial analysis 
either within Kyrgyzstani social science or in the more Anglo-American-
dominated discipline of Central Asian Studies.6  While sociology has 
undergone sudden and totalising structural changes in institutional 
organisation, funding and support, political orientation, social role and 
theoretical underpinnings, the causes of these changes and their implications 
for the future of the discipline have not yet been systematically investigated.  
Even less interrogated are the reasons why positivism and empiricism have 
dominated other possible conceptions of sociological knowledge in the post-
independence period.  Instead, the emergence and growth of any type of 
sociology in post-socialist space are often uncritically interpreted as signposts 
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or preconditions of independence, democracy, ‘modernisation’ and even 
‘civilisation.’   
  Foreign-produced reports on the social sciences in Central Asia (e.g., 
Glenady 1995; Council of Europe 1998) generally depict sociology as either a 
means to a predetermined goal (such as ‘the transition to the market 
economy’) or evaluate it as an end in itself without problematising it as an 
object of study.  While they offer insight into the current conditions of the 
academy and social scientific work within the region, none provide 
theoretically grounded explanations of the relationship between the production 
of social scientific knowledge and effects of power in the region.  Most begin 
with brief and often statistical overviews of the ‘status of the profession’ and 
quality of social research, and end by suggesting how these might be improved 
to meet ‘world standards.’  They seldom if ever ask critical questions about 
sociologists’ ontological and epistemological assumptions, the role of social 
research, or the motivation and viability of the very project to institutionalise 
sociology as an autonomous science in the republic. 
  Domestically, while Kyrgyzstani social scientists have reflected upon the 
general development of the discipline since the late socialist years, it has often 
been framed as a debate of knowledge versus power (Blum 1990; Fanisov 
1990; Isaev 1991; Isaev 1991a) or knowledge for power and sociology as a 
technique of power (Abazov 1989; Sorokina 1989; Tishin 1980).  However, it 
has never been formulated as a problem of power/knowledge in the sense of 
exploring how these fields may be mutually constitutive, or how processes of 
institutionalisation have been shaped by attempts to differentiate them.  
Furthermore, few scholars have considered how recent social events have 
impacted on the organised forms of social knowledge they themselves use as 
tools to analyse this very reality.   
The emergence and formation of sociology in Kyrgyzstan is instead 
framed almost exclusively as a problem of disciplinary institutionalisation; a 
functional process which can be measured quantitatively and qualitatively at 
the level of formal institutions.  There is, for example, a great deal of 
discussion about when and where sociological laboratories and centres were 
established in educational, industrial and political institutions in the republic, 
when various decrees relating to social science were passed by the Communist 
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Party or Soviet government, when something was published or taught, or 
when a conference was held.  Stages of institutionalisation are measured by 
counting the number of departments, students, associations and publications 
that exist in the republic (Isaev 1993; Ismailova 1995; Zarlikbekov 1998), 
enumerating functionalist indicators of its credibility such as how much 
legitimacy the discipline is afforded by political leaders and international 
donor organisations (Blum 1993; Isaev et al. 1993b), and drawing 
comparisons of indigenous sociology with the discipline in its more ‘mature 
stages’ of development in the US, France, Germany and Russia (Blum 1993; 
Isaev 1993).   
The following excerpt from a newspaper article entitled ‘Problems with 
the institutionalisation of our sociology’ (Isaev 2000) represents the prevailing 
view on what factors facilitate the institutionalisation of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan: 
As shown by the experience of other countries, the 
institutionalisation of sociological knowledge depends on the 
appearance of specialist–professionals, the achievement of a 
mature status, the formation of a particular infrastructure, a 
calling to support the reproduction and translation of 
knowledge, investment in scientific associations, and etc. 
Missing, however, is an explanation of the underlying forces and factors that 
make these particular phenomena possible: deeper structural relationships 
between socio-economic forces and sociological theory and research, 
sociology’s role as a ‘branch of social technology’ (Greenfield 1988: 99), the 
impact of international relations on Kyrgyzstani social science, the transfer of 
sociologists’ dependence from the state to international organisations and 
zakazchiki (commercial clients), and epistemological issues such as the 
perceived relationship between truth and power, the role of social science in 
society, and notions of ‘the scientific.’  
Functional interpretations of the development of disciplinary knowledge 
are not unique to Kyrgyzstan; in fact, according to Wagner and Wittrock 
(1991: 3), 
the historical development of the social sciences is often seen in 
terms of a gradual liberation from traditional bonds which 
prevented them from realizing their full potential as producers 
of true, undistorted knowledge of society.  The emancipation of 
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social science is then regarded as a process of institutional 
autonomization to be accompanied by, and enhancing, 
scientific maturation in epistemological and methodological 
terms. 
These narratives of linear and progressive liberalisation, however, obscure the 
processes by which different conceptions of truth are legitimised in society.  
In Kyrgyzstan, the imposition of a functionalist, linear theory of 
institutionalisation is made even more problematic by the fact that the model 
is an idealised amalgamation of socially specific cases in the history of social 
science (e.g., German, British, American, and French sociologies), which have 
been redefined as universal within a discourse of westernisation and sanctified 
by ideologies of modernisation.   
 This idealised model, however, is meaningful for many scholars in the 
region who believe the Soviet legacy per se to be the enemy of intellectual 
development and ‘scientific sociology’ to be its salvation.  From this view, the 
way forward appears unproblematic: social scientific knowledge can and must 
be divorced from power and made objective, as it is assumed to be in the 
‘civilised countries of the world’ (Sydykova 1998).  In this logic, the 
purification of subjectivity and intentionality from scientific inquiry is an 
uncomplicated and historically proven answer to the power/knowledge 
problematic.  It also reduces the threat of the re-politicisation of social science 
in post-Soviet society; it seems an obvious solution for scholars living in a 
society which defines itself as ‘democratising.’  Once considered the 
handmaiden of Soviet power, sociology has been redefined as a ‘scientific’ 
defence against the abuse of knowledge by opportunistic academics and elites, 
being democratic in its neutral methodologies and ‘equidistant from all power 
structures’ (Isaev 1998c; Isaev et al. 1994b).  In this discourse, the presumed 
power of social scientific knowledge has shifted from being owned and 
managed by the verkhnye (‘upper’ or ruling class) to being directly accessible 
to the nizhnye (‘lower’ or people) by providing them with impartial 
‘information’ that they can use to make personal and political decisions, and 
making political leaders accountable for their actions.  This promise has 
acquired particular value in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, where the breakdown of 
law and order, rise of  corruption and informal networks, and widespread 
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collapse of public trust have created an urgent demand for ‘true’ and 
‘accurate’ information about social processes.  
However, many people—including social scientists—are uncertain about 
what sociology is, if it is no longer an empirical branch of Marxism–Leninism 
or ‘bourgeois ideology,’ as it was known during the Soviet period.  They fear 
that its ‘subjective’ and unscientific status makes it uniquely susceptible to 
politicisation and ideological manipulation.  At the same time, there is a 
widely held belief that sociology does influence social consciousness and 
actions, that it has ‘a direct impact on the formation of public opinion’ 
(Bekturganov et al. 1994); that, in the words of one sociologist, 
[t]he trajectory of planetary movement does not change 
depending on the progress of astronomers, but the level of 
sociological knowledge, as world experience shows, actually 
influences the direction and result of social transformation 
(Isaev 2000). 
This dual perception of extreme ambiguity and immanent relevance has led to 
heated controversies about the viability and terms of sociology’s very 
existence, and to struggles within the scholarly community to determine how it 
is defined.  It has also led to the rise of what Herbert Marcuse (1964: 114) 
termed ‘ideological empiricism,’ or the methodological exclusion of the 
critical political perspective from empirical research.   
The current predominance of positivist approaches to sociological 
research in Kyrgyzstan is in part a response to these demands for scientific 
certainty.  It is also a reply to contemporary uncertainties about the role of 
knowledge in the society: what constitutes legitimate social knowledge and 
who qualifies as a legitimate knower, if and how this knowledge can be 
applied to political decision making and social development, whether social 
information is important for human development, and what the ultimate goals 
of a science of society—indeed, of that society—should be.  In order to 
establish legitimacy for the discipline, Kyrgyzstani sociologists are pressed to 
prove that it is not susceptible to political perversion and that it is relevant to 
public concerns in Kyrgyzstan.   
While portrayed in a post-Soviet context here, this can also be understood 
as a more general tension between establishing ‘sociological relevance’ and 
‘social relevance,’ or between criteria used to measure the intellectual validity 
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of social scientific knowledge and those used to evaluate its societal 
significance (Joshi 1995: 82).  A new breed of positivist–empiricist sociology, 
grounded in modernist philosophies of social science that are adapted to the 
Kyrgyz context, has become central in attempts to reconcile these dual 
demands.  Like its Marxist–Leninist predecessor, the new sociology is defined 
as true, universal, objective and neutral; it is opposed to ‘ideology’ and 
‘politics’ which are seen to be false, particular, subjective and interested.  
Since independence, ‘sociology’ and ‘Marxism–Leninism’ have swapped roles 
in the power/knowledge debate: what was once true is now ideology, what 
was once ideology is now true.  What has been celebrated as a Copernican 
revolution in social science—its ‘liberation from class ideology’ and 
Communist Party domination (Isaev 1998c)—may also be interpreted as a 
more moderate shift in emphasis.  In the quest for truth in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstani sociology the politics of truth are deliberately bracketed, not least 
of all because the sociology of knowledge has its roots in the Marxian 
tradition of ideology critique which has, since the Soviet collapse, been 
declared ‘unscientific’ among social scientists.  The demise of Communist 
Party hegemony and Soviet rule over social science, as well as the subsequent 
decentralisation of power and the predominance of neoliberal ideologies, are 
thus taken to mark the end of the power/knowledge problematic in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
 However, the continuing intersection of sociology, knowledge and power 
means that the development of sociology in Kyrgyzstan and other post-Soviet 
societies must not be taken for granted as ‘inherently progressive and truth-
producing’ as it is often presented in reformist discourse (Beliaev and Butorin 
1982; Popkewitz 1991). Social science reform must be analytically defined as 
the practice of institutionalising new relations between social knowledge and 
socio-political power in both its epistemological and institutional forms (Ake 
1982; Bujra 1994; Eades and Schwaller 1991; Gosovic 2000).  The varieties of 
sociology that do or do not become ascendant within a society and the 
institutional relationships that are established between sociologists and other 
social actors and forces are important products and indicators of the cultural 
and political meaning of organised social knowledge within that society (Mills 
1959).   
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  As Central Asian writer Karybek Baibosunov has noted (1993), ‘the so-
called social sciences are enduring major cataclysms [as they are] freed from 
an ideological path and seek to raise influence on new trends.’  It is also 
necessary to understand, however, how these upheavals are influencing the 
production of social scientific knowledge itself, and to critically evaluate the 
new ideological paths which have replaced the old.  The two-pronged nature 
of the project—to affiliate power with knowledge (in the construction of 
communist society during the Soviet regime and in the realisation of capitalist 
reforms after independence) and to separate social scientific knowledge from 
‘illegitimate’ power—makes it difficult to untangle the mutually constitutive 
relations between sociology and power at various stages of the discipline’s 
historical development.  Ironically, the study of knowledge, power and 
Kyrgyzstani social science is necessary not in small part because it is the 
relationship most often neglected in contemporary post-Soviet sociology itself. 
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2 
THEORY AND METHOD: 
THE CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
What are the social conditions which must be fulfilled in order 
for a social play of forces to be set up in which the true idea is 
endowed with strength because those who have a share in it 
have an interest in truth, instead of having, as in other games, 
the truth which suits their interests? (Bourdieu 1975:  31) 
 
Theoretical framework 
This study draws on two related fields—the sociology of knowledge and the 
sociology of social science—to establish a theoretical foundation for the 
sociological analysis of sociology in Kyrgyzstan.  The sociology of knowledge 
opens up possibilities for examining the dialectical relationship between 
existential factors and the production and legitimation of knowledge about 
society, while the sociology of science offers analytical categories (e.g., 
boundary–work, heteronomy and autonomy) and comparative data with which 
to explore the manifestation of this relationship in academic disciplines.   
 These fields encompass a wide variety of theoretical approaches.  This 
dissertation, however, is primarily informed by critical, post-positivist 
approaches to knowledge production which view social scientific truth claims 
as potentially contingent, negotiable and socio-historically specific, and 
therefore in need of analysis as social phenomena in their own right.7  Such 
approaches generally take a critical view of the authority often bestowed 
unquestioningly upon scientific knowledge, particularly when it is taken for 
granted as naturally emerging or when it is used to justify certain social 
positions and relationships.  They are also methodologically sceptical of 
arguments that truth progresses in a cumulative fashion according to its own 
internal logic, and of foundationalist explanations for the legitimacy of truth 
claims.8  A post-positivist approach to the sociology of sociology does not 
foray into the more general debate about whether sociology is a positivist or 
anti-positivist science (see Ritzer 1992), but rather begins from the assertion 
that it is the latter. 
 Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu’s work is particularly influential in 
this research because it offers coherent theoretical frameworks for analysing 
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the production of social scientific and cultural knowledge, specifically within 
academic disciplines.  Foucault’s inquiries into the historical construction of 
scientific knowledge, particularly psychiatry, criminology and the human 
sciences more generally, have exposed deep relationships between ‘expert’ 
knowledge and the exercise of power in society (Foucault 1967, 1973, 1985, 
1989, 2001). He was one of the first modern social scientists to explore how 
and why people come to accept as natural truth claims that are contingent and 
political, and why we often take for granted classifications of experience 
which may under other circumstances have been otherwise contrived.   
Bourdieu’s work in the sociology of science and institutions of cultural 
knowledge production (universities, the arts, literature) begins from a similar 
assumption that ‘the objective truth of the product—even in the case of that 
very particular product, scientific truth—lies in a particular type of social 
conditions of production, or, more precisely, in a determinate state of the 
structure and functioning of the scientific field’ (Bourdieu 1975: 19).  Whereas 
Foucault’s work focuses on looking at how authoritative truths are 
institutionalised by nebulous and discursive power relations within society, 
Bourdieu’s is more a social structure of truth: it looks concretely at how 
institutional structures and power relations—particularly class relations— 
within knowledge-producing institutions shape ultimate definitions of truth 
(see Bourdieu 1975, 1988, 1993).  For him, ‘the “pure” universe of even the 
“purest” science is a social field like any other, with its distribution of power 
and its monopolies, struggles and strategies, interests and profits, but it is a 
field in which all these invariants take on specific forms’ (Bourdieu 1975: 19).   
In the academic milieu that Bourdieu focuses on, the French academy, 
power relationships are manifested in efforts to monopolise scientific authority 
or competence.  Here, the quest for scientific truth is inherently political even 
when not deliberately politicised:  
Every scientific ‘choice’—the choice of the area of research, 
the choice of methods, the choice of the place of publication, 
the choice…between rapid publication of partially checked 
results and later publication of fully checked results—is in one 
respect…a political investment strategy, directed, objectively at 
least, toward maximisation of strictly scientific profit, i.e. of 
potential recognition by the agent’s competitor-peers (Bourdieu 
1975: 23).   
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As he later points out, the ‘most disputed frontier of all is the one which 
separates the field of cultural production from the field of power’ (Bourdieu 
1993: 43).  Bourdieu reintroduces critical normativity to the sociology of 
science by asserting that autonomous fields of cultural knowledge are superior 
to those which remain heteronomous, or subordinate to economic and political 
logics of practice.  This is an example of Bourdieu’s theory, reminiscent of 
Karl Mannheim’s ‘new kind of objectivity’ (1936), that greater subjectivity in 
fact results in ‘epistemological vigilance’ and thus to more accurate social 
scientific knowledge (Bourdieu 1988: xiii, 1999). 
 Following Foucault and Bourdieu, it may be argued that the production 
and legitimation of social scientific knowledge is political, both in the way 
that contests for material and symbolic resources (including scientific 
authority) affect knowledge construction, and in the way that social scientific 
knowledge is politicised in its application.  Applying these hypotheses to 
Kyrgyzstan, it becomes clear that questions about the institutionalisation of 
sociology are inseparable from broader concerns about how sociological 
knowledge and practice are legitimated and embedded in institutional power 
relations.   
  These questions will therefore be addressed through the framework of the 
critical sociology of social scientific knowledge, which can be summarised in 
the following three propositions.  First, social scientific knowledge is not 
universal, objective or politically neutral, but contingent, historicised, 
existentially conditioned and political.  Second, it disciplinary reform is not 
necessarily evolutionary or progressive.  Rather, it must be seen as deliberate 
intervention into an existing situation, the normative value of which must 
always be determined through empirical analysis and theoretical critique.  
Ultimately, reform is a contingent response to social, political and economic 
circumstances, and ‘to view…reform proposals as objective, disinterested 
plans for action is to obscure the social significance and political implications 
of the discourse that spawned them’ (Pickel 1999; Popkewitz 1991: 2).  Third, 
the construction and legitimisation of sociological knowledge are inseparable 
from beliefs about the ontological and epistemological nature of truth and its 
role in society, and these beliefs are continuously negotiated in the 
institutional settings of academic and professional social science as well as in 
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the public sphere.  At the epistemological level, this process is manifested in 
debates over the definition of ‘good’ sociological knowledge and its proper 
boundaries with other disciplines, social practices and the field of political 
power.  This includes a critique of the basic concepts that underlie sociological 
work in general—‘truth,’ ‘objectivity,’ ‘science,’ etc.  At the institutional 
level, the process involves the creation of new sociology departments and 
research centres, scientific associations and groups, and conferences and 
projects, all of which forge alliances with and distances from the state, 
political parties, educational institutions, industry and, more recently, 
international organisations.  Together, these activities provide the backdrop 
against which boundary–work may—and often must—be employed to define 
the meaning and boundaries of sociology. 
 
Theory as analysis and critique 
The critical sociology of social scientific knowledge is an alternative to the 
main theory of scientific knowledge production now prevailing in Kyrgyzstan.  
It is also partly a critique of this dominant discourse.  The Kyrgyzstani 
discourse on the institutionalisation of sociology is based on a positivist theory 
of knowledge which maintains that there is a clear and ascertainable 
distinction between ideologies (distorted or mystified knowledges and false 
consciousness) and true, realistic and objective knowledge (Gieryn 1983: 783; 
Lincoln and Guba 2003); in other words, an unambiguous separation between 
knowledge and power.  Social science—indeed, all science—is seen to belong 
rather unproblematically to the latter category.  It is thus presumed that a 
‘good’ social scientist can and must be free from all interested thinking, bias, 
and subjectivity.  In this context, by dispensing with all ideologies, we can 
obtain a true and undistorted image of social reality, which can in turn be 
applied by ‘experts’ to make political decisions more ‘scientific’ and therefore 
more effective.9    
 Indigenous (Kyrgyzstani) theories of change in social scientific 
knowledge accordingly pay homage to the ideal of a ‘mature’ sociology in the 
likeness of Comte’s (1975) social physics or Durkheim’s (1938) sociological 
method, which can transcend the phenomenological subjectivities of politics 
and experience in order to contribute to the governance of both.  Here, the 
 30
 
 
definition of ‘mature science’ is synonymous with ‘autonomous science.’  
Although Soviet Marxism–Leninism was in principle opposed to what C. 
Wright Mills called ‘abstracted empiricism,’ Kyrgyzstani sociologists adhere 
to what Alexander and Colomy (1992: 30) call a ‘positivist persuasion.’  For 
example, they presume that ‘a radical break exists between empirical 
observations and non-empirical statements.’  This is one of the primary 
justifications for distinguishing between Marxist social philosophy and non-
Marxist sociology in Kyrgyzstan: while the first dealt in ‘speculative’ theory, 
the second is seen to be empirical and to ‘study life as it really is, without any 
ideology’ (Nurova and Shaimergenova 2000: 5).  Similarly, in the quest to de-
ideologicise and depoliticise sociology, sociologists accept that ‘the 
elimination of non-empirical referents is a distinguishing feature of the natural 
sciences and therefore a truly scientific sociology must follow suit if it is to 
assume an equally scientific stature’ (Alexander and Colomy 1992).  
Sociology in Kyrgyzstan, it is argued, has ‘its own methods of research and 
generalisation, but ideological stamps must not prevent its development’ 
(Fanisov 1990).  Finally, theories of disciplinary professionalisation are 
formulated around conventional models of knowledge development as linear, 
progressive and stable (e.g., Kuklick 1980: 202-203).  The development of 
Kyrgyzstani sociology is then carefully measured against this universalised 
standard of ‘mature’ social science, represented during the Soviet period by 
sociological practice in Moscow and Leningrad, and today by sociology in 
‘the west.’10
 The roots of this faith in the possibility of a genuinely scientific sociology 
extend equally deep into Marxist–Leninist theories of science in society and 
the non-Marxist positivist project to develop an existentially transcendent 
science of society.  Ironically, while Soviet Marxist philosophers levied 
totalising critiques against positivism, they maintained analogous distinctions 
between ‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ knowledge.  While positivism 
privileges empirical facts over theoretical supposition, Marxist philosophy 
began from the assumption that dialectical materialism was the most valid and 
reliable explanation for all social phenomena.   
 The intersection of these philosophies of science after independence in 
Kyrgyzstan has created a resilient set of intellectual parameters around 
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discourses on sociology.  For example, positivist theories and empirical 
research methods are particularly attractive because they are said to enable 
sociologists to discover social ‘laws’ and ‘regularities.’  The integration of 
Marxism–Leninism and positivism is also visible in the metaphors often used 
to describe the role of sociology in the republic: assertions, for example, that 
‘sociology not only reflects, mirror-like, the actual status of things within the 
jurisdiction [of the powers-that-be], but is capable, like an x-ray, of 
illuminating the most complex worm-holes and chronic illnesses inside an 
organism’ (Blum 1991).  Similarly,  
sociological research creates a real picture of society, both of 
its individual problems and the entire situation. […] You could 
say that sociology is a mirror of society: it gives an accurate 
reflection, and you can’t blame a mirror for [misrepresentation] 
(Fanisov 1990).  
In the context of such correspondence or representationist theories of truth 
(Bourdieu 1991), objectivity—understood as the elimination of subjective 
factors from all stages of intellectual work and sociological research in 
particular—is seen as vital to the successful appropriation of ‘social reality’ 
and its potential as a tool for social change.   
In post-positivist circles, this position may easily be interpreted as a 
resurgence of ‘naïve positivism’ (e.g., Fisher 1990: 5).  Far from being naïve, 
however, the positivist vocabulary is also sometimes used by Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists to cloak otherwise ‘dangerous’ social and political criticism in a 
mantle of scientific neutrality, thus making them more immune to reprisals 
from the subjects of their research, which are often national power elites—
after all, you ‘can’t blame a mirror’ for what it simply ‘reflects.’  Given the 
deep theoretical moorings of the positivist position and its political function as 
a smokescreen for social criticism, critique of this first principle is often 
interpreted as an intentional or misguided attack on the legitimate authority of 
social science and even an assault on truth itself.   
 Emic interpretations of the politics of knowledge are illustrated well in 
the following vignette.  During an interview, I presented a well-known Kyrgyz 
sociologist with two newspaper articles he had penned in recent years, one 
entitled, ‘Who benefits from populism in sociology?’ (Bekturganov et al. 
1994) and the other ‘A sociology of lies, or the lies of the sociologist?’ (Tishin 
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et al. 1998)  Each was part of a longer-running public debate about the proper 
relationship between sociology and politics, the importance of scientific 
method and the manipulation of data.  The professor, a long-time campaigner 
for sociology in both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, disagreed that these 
articles concerned the ‘politics’ of sociology.  He emphatically argued that his 
contribution to the debate was anti-political; that it was an attempt to 
demonstrate how other people had politicised sociology and an appeal for 
science to be ‘pure’ and free from political influence.  This direct association 
of ‘the political’ with illegitimate power and particular ideologies, and of 
science with truth, mean that the politics of sociological knowledge continue 
to go largely unexamined within the republic itself.  By introducing the critical 
sociology of social scientific knowledge as an alternative approach, this 
dissertation aims to fill this gap and expose the epistemological, institutional 
and political foundations of sociology in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The sociology of knowledge 
In contrast to the dominant theory of knowledge production in Kyrgyzstan, the 
sociology of knowledge takes foundational assumptions about truth and 
objectivity as its primary problematic.  It seeks to explain how and why 
‘certain forms of truth come to prevail, and be challenged, at different 
historical moments’ (Popkewitz 1991: 43); clarifies the ‘conditions under 
which problems and disciplines come into being and pass away’ in any 
society, particularly those experiencing great change (Mannheim 1936: 97); 
and inquires into the ‘role of knowledge and ideas in the maintenance or 
change of the social order’ (Wirth 1936: xxx).  In the post-Soviet context, the 
primary questions about sociology from the perspective of the sociology of 
knowledge are not why the discipline has failed to ‘mature,’ or what measures 
are needed to make it ‘world class’ (Isaev 2000), but rather how these 
conceptions of maturity and standard developed and what accounts for the 
ascendance of orthodox positivism in what is widely presumed to be a post-
positivist period.   
 The sociology of knowledge is a broad field, ranging from Karl 
Mannheim’s (1936) classical study of the ‘relationality’ of individually (i.e., 
class) positioned knowledges to the ‘new sociology of knowledge’ that is 
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more gestalt-oriented in its focus on how whole epistemic apparatuses are 
created (Swidler and Arditi 1994: 306).  Each of these approaches, however, 
begins from a central proposition that social thought ‘has an existential basis 
insofar as it is not immanently determined and insofar as one or another of its 
aspects can be derived from extra-cognitive factors’ (Merton 1996: 209).  In 
other words, the sociology of knowledge is based on a constructivist 
epistemology.  It asserts that much social truth is a social and political 
production, a cultural phenomenon—constructed, produced and negotiated, 
not simply discovered—and that the ideational world is not independent from 
the material conditions within which it is created (McCarthy 1996: 24).  This 
holds equally true for lay knowledge and ‘expert’ opinion, science and 
common sense: all ways of knowing are ‘political.’  The sociology of 
knowledge thus calls for the absolute democratisation of ideology critique, 
whereby all positions and truth claims may become subjects for critical 
analysis (Mills 1963: 457).      
 This project demands that we rethink our understanding of both 
‘ideology’ and ‘truth’ and make a heuristic shift from what the early twentieth 
century sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim referred to as a ‘particular 
conception of ideology’ to a ‘total conception of ideology.’  The former is 
defined as the ‘more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a 
situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with [one’s] 
interests.’  The latter is what he refers to as ‘the ideology of an age or of a 
concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class […] the characteristics and 
composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group’ 
(Mannheim 1936: 49).  While the ‘particular conception of ideology’ allows 
for the possibility of an entirely autonomous body of knowledge, the ‘total 
conception of ideology’ rejects it and instead argues that even knowledge 
which has not been politically ‘corrupted’ may be considered heteronomous.    
The total conception of ideology can also be understood as the logic 
behind Michel Foucault’s episteme, ‘the product of certain organising 
principles which relate things to one another (by classifying things, and by 
allocating meanings and values) and which, as a result, determines how we 
make sense of things, what we can know, and what we can say’ (Gadamer et 
al. 2000: 16).  Bourdieu’s  concept of habitus offers another way of 
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understanding ‘total ideology’ as a ‘system of durable, transposable structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in 
order to attain them’ (Johnson 1993: 5).  Even scientific knowledge, in other 
words, is consciously or unconsciously ordered.  The key to understanding the 
institutionalisation of sociology in Kyrgyzstan lies partly in understanding the 
network of tacit, unexamined assurances which underlie it—the positivist 
conception of truth, the objectivist understanding of validity, belief in the 
possibility of scientific politics, and faith in the classical promises of 
modernity.        
 When taken to its logical conclusion, Mannheim’s theory of total 
ideology critique means that we must subject even the foundations of social 
scientific knowledge to sociological analysis.  For   
as long as one does not call his own position into question but 
regards it as absolute, while interpreting his opponents’ ideas as 
a mere function of the social positions they occupy, the 
decisive step forward has not yet been taken. […] In contrast to 
this special formulation [of particular ideology], the general 
form of the total conception of ideology is being used by the 
analyst when he has the courage to subject not just the 
adversary’s point of view but all points of view, including his 
own, to the ideological analysis (Mannheim 1936: 68). 
In the words of Robert Merton (1996: 207), ‘the sociology of knowledge came 
into being with the single hypothesis that even truths were to be held socially 
accountable, were to be related to the historical society in which they 
emerged.’   
 This rigorous theory of the existential conditioning of social scientific 
knowledge has a number of important implications for sociological inquiry in 
Kyrgyzstan. At the most immediate level, it compels us to examine the 
relational and contingent dimensions of all truth claims about society, 
including those which claim to be scientific or objectively value-free, 
including efforts to autonomise sociology.  Significantly, claims to value-
freedom may often themselves be explained through sociological analysis.  
Such radical reflexivity has also stimulated the development of a relatively 
young branch of sociological inquiry—the investigation, analysis, and critique 
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of social scientific truth itself.  The sociology of social scientific knowledge 
takes social science itself as an object of sociological inquiry, which, like any 
other body of knowledge, ‘cannot be adequately understood as long as [its] 
social origins are obscured’ (Mannheim 1936: 2).   
 According to more contemporary theorists (Bourdieu 1975, 1988; Kuhn 
1970), these ‘origins’ often include power struggles to determine what 
becomes accepted as true and legitimate knowledge, both within scientific 
communities and in the public sphere.  We must therefore embrace the study 
of power and knowledge within the scientific field instead of seeking to escape 
it if we want to understand the meaning of social science in our societies.  In 
Kyrgyzstan, this means shifting from the particular ideology critique of 
competing truth claims in sociology to a more holistic sociological analysis of 
the institutional, intellectual and political fields that these claims are 
embedded within.   
 Such reflexivity need not, as is often feared in Kyrgyzstan, signify 
surrender to the distortions of power and harmful subjective influences.  It is 
better understood as a method for intellectual empowerment; as a way to 
reflect upon the partiality of privileged knowledges that often masquerade as 
universal and objective scientific truths.  In the words of Mannheim (1936: 
47), ‘relativism and scepticism compel self-criticism and self-control, and lead 
to a new conception of objectivity’.  And if we believe Bourdieu (1988: xii), 
this ‘sociological critique of sociological reasoning’ may in fact be the driving 
force behind the development of the discipline.     
  
Extending the sociology of knowledge to Kyrgyzstan 
Traditionally, the sociology of knowledge has been used to make sense of 
contradictory truth claims in historical periods where ‘disagreement is more 
conspicuous than agreement’ without falling prey to either absolutism or 
relativism, and in order to analyse the deep structural meanings of political 
rhetoric and ideology when these are naturalised in the public mind 
(Mannheim 1936: 5).  It is particularly useful in circumstances where ‘norms 
and truths which were once believed to be absolute, universal, and eternal, or 
which were accepted with blissful unawareness of their implications, are being 
questioned’ (Blume 1974: 2-25; Wirth 1991).   
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This is an apt description of contemporary perceptions of post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstani society, which are pervaded by images of chaos and crisis.  In 
fact, sociologists often portray the society as a mystery, some terra incognita 
and therefore something dangerous; the reading public is periodically 
reminded in ominous tones that ‘we do not know the society in which we live’ 
(Blum 1993; Isaev 1991a).  As one sociologist argued, 
in an independent Kyrgyzstan, as in other post-Soviet states on 
the eve of the twenty-first century, a new time has arrived, and 
with it new problems have emerged, which demand different 
ways of thinking and non-standard skills to resolve them.  It has 
become necessary in our time to understand what is going on in 
society and with people, by which vectors and in what 
parameters social changes are being realised in the process of 
transition to a liberal economy and democracy, and what effects 
will come from multifaceted modernisation and national revival 
(Isaev 2000). 
‘The crisis,’ as it is commonly referred to, is represented as a negative and 
undesirable phenomenon, something which was imposed by the Soviet 
collapse and which worsened considerably after independence.  While early 
sociological articles (1990–93) chronicle the intellectual and political anxieties 
of perestroika (e.g., Isaev 1991, 1991a; Zhivogliadov 1990), those published 
after independence tend to be more critical of the severe poverty, heightened 
corruption, ideological anomie, and everyday violence that followed national 
independence (e.g., Bekturganov 1997; Isaev 1993b, 1993c; 2003) as well as 
the loss of public trust in knowledge-producing institutions such as the media 
and academy.  The discrepancy between ‘reality’ and ‘ideology,’ or lived 
experience and official rhetoric, is a key problematic in sociological research 
conducted during this period.  The sociology of knowledge is equipped 
precisely to deconstruct the politics of truth in such conditions.       
 In addition to the emergence of competing truth claims, however, there is 
also an effort to debunk certain existing norms and belief systems (e.g. ‘the 
socialist way of life’) and replace them with others (such as concepts of 
‘democracy’ and ‘the free market’) which have not yet been clearly defined.  
This is most visible in discourses on ‘the transition,’ which, in opposition to 
‘the crisis,’ is defined as a clear and determinate progression from a 
‘totalitarian’ and ‘communist’ society to a ‘democratic’ and ‘capitalist’ one 
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(Isaev 1995; Isaev and Madaliev 1998; Isaev et al. 1994f).  Sociologists 
sometimes also argue that Kyrgyzstan is making a transition from being a 
‘backward’ and traditional society to a modern and ‘civilised’ one.  ‘The 
transition’ is the optimistic counterpart to ‘the crisis,’ the ideological promise 
of inevitable things to come, the vision of the foretold future.  Because the 
particular theory of development underlying images of ‘Kyrgyzstan in 
transition’ is evolutionary and teleological, democratic-capitalist transition is 
offered up as the most logical solution to the crisis of independence.  It serves 
to dispel people’s feelings of pessimism and disillusionment which in practice 
have translated into social apathy and political indifference; in fact, it even 
maintains that these reactions are ‘normal’ parts of depoliticisation and de-
ideologicisation.   
 The emerging discourse of transition therefore compels us to seek 
explanations of consensus-building and creation as well as fragmentation and 
disintegration.  Here too the sociology of knowledge can help us to understand 
the processes of knowledge construction and truth validation, for it asks 
specifically how certain forms of truth arise and are contested at particular 
historical junctures.  This is vitally important in Kyrgyzstani sociology, where 
the uncritical rejection of one set of truths and assumptions (those of Marxist–
Leninist sociology) and the uncritical acceptance of another (those embodied 
in discourses of positivist–empirical sociology) have intersected to create 
powerful new discourses of scientific sociology in Kyrgyzstan, and where 
emotive political symbolism attached to both philosophies presents obstacles 
to the critical examination of this phenomenon.     
 
The sociology of social science 
The sociology of social science, a sub-field of the sociology of knowledge, 
enables us to situate the general problems of the sociology of knowledge 
within the field of sociology itself.11  The main premise of the sociology of 
social science is elementary: social science is a socio-cultural phenomenon 
and neither the organisation nor product of scientific work can be fully 
understood outside the analysis of its surrounding socio-political and cultural 
contexts or the internal organisation of intellectual activity itself (Blume 1974; 
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Bourdieu 1975: 19; Reynolds and Reynolds 1970).  Within this general 
framework, there is considerable debate about the degree to which social 
scientific knowledge is socially determined or constructed and to what extent 
it may be autonomous.  There is no central problematic in the sociology of 
social science.  Instead, a variety of schools of thought address different 
problems and ‘dimensions’ of the field.  These are often classified into often 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ approaches (Cozzens and Gieryn 1990: 1-4; 
Shlapentokh 1987: 1).   
Using a ‘two-dimensional working model of social-scientific practice’ 
adapted from Ram (1991), we can actually identify four different approaches 
to the sociology of science: intellectual–internal/external, social–external, 
social–internal and synthetic,12 which differ according to the how they define 
relationships between different dimensions of an academic field, in this case, 
sociology.  According to this model, scholarship in the sociology of social 
science can be categorised in the following way.   
Internal–intellectual and external–intellectual approaches are concerned 
primarily with the cognitive substance of sociology.  Internally, this includes 
predominant assumptions, theories, concepts and images of society, the 
intellectual or ‘natural’ history of sociology in a bounded location, and the 
internal development of disciplinary ideas.  Externally, it consists of the 
‘cognitive or conceptual aspects of the scientific discipline which are 
“borrowed” from other disciplines [or from] inside the discipline but outside 
the boundaries of the local culture’ (Ram 1991: 6, italics in original).  The 
analytical categories used in this approach enable us to examine why different 
types of sociology emerge and to compare intellectual genealogies; it is 
similar in many ways to intellectual or conceptual history.  Generally 
speaking, the intellectually focused approach presupposes, more than the other 
approaches, a greater degree of autonomy in the production of social scientific 
knowledge.   
This approach has guided many different types of studies in the sociology 
of sociology.  During the mid-twentieth century, for example, the rapid 
internationalisation of sociology led to increased interest in the 
epistemological particularity or universality of the discipline as a field of 
knowledge and practice (Clinard and Elder 1967; Fisher 1966; Lewis 1964; 
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Mazur 1963; O’Hara 1961; Whetten 1957).  Similarly, the political 
radicalisation of the social sciences during the 1960s and 1970s spawned a 
large number of reflexive critiques of sociology that may also be considered 
internal or external–intellectual studies (Friedrichs 1968, 1970; Gouldner 
1962, 1970; Horowitz 1968; Reynolds and Reynolds 1970).   
Social–internal approaches, on the other hand, focus more on how ‘the 
institutional and communal aspects of the sociological discipline’ (Ram 1991: 
9), such as the organisation of knowledge production, media and 
communication, training and socialisation, power relations, prestige, funding 
and processes of institutionalisation and professionalisation, affect knowledge 
production itself.  Much of Robert Merton’s work on the sociology of science 
(1996) falls into this category, as do Abrams (1968), Abrams et al. (1981), and 
Barnes (1948).  It also includes recent ethnographic or ‘laboratory’ studies in 
the construction of natural scientific knowledge (Latour and Woolgar 1979; 
Knorr-Cetina 1981).  Studies in this tradition are particularly interested in the 
creation and maintenance of sociology as a social institution (Cozzens and 
Gieryn 1990).  Social–internal studies in the functionalist tradition are likely to 
analyse how scientific institutions may be organised so that truth will emerge; 
at its most radical, the social–internal approach concludes that ‘the empiricist 
notion of truth is a fiction since it is not reality but the social system of science 
that selects valid scientific constructions’ (Fuchs 1986: 138).  
Social–external approaches to the sociology of sociology are similar to 
social–internal approaches in that they also reject the possibility of 
autonomous social scientific knowledge production and are interested in the 
influence of ‘society in science.’  However, this has less to do with the 
institutional structures of science itself and more to do with the relationship 
between science and other social institutions (e.g., politics, the economy, the 
family, etc.).  Philip Abrams’ Origins of British Sociology (1968) exemplifies 
this approach.  Abrams suggests that a conjunction of institutional and 
intellectual factors created the conditions for the successful institutionalisation 
of sociology in Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.13  
While his study details many valiant efforts by individuals to define, promote 
and institutionalise the discipline, it is largely an investigation into their 
failure.  His final verdict on the role of individual agency in the development 
 40
 
 
of sociology reflects the emphasis on structural forces that characterises many 
studies of society-in-science: 
[t]he history of ideas was shaped by [institutional resistances to 
sociology which sociologists alone could not break] and 
opportunities.  What was needed for sociology to flourish in 
Britain was not a change of heart among Oxford professors but 
a social structure in which single political responses to social 
problems were less easily available and less plausible than they 
previously had been in Britain, and in which, conversely, social 
problems were more fundamentally problematic than they had 
yet been in British experiences (Abrams 1968: 153). 
Social–external approaches also emphasise the ‘science–in–society’ 
relationship, or the role of social science in society (Cozzens and Gieryn 
1990).  Such studies primarily engage with ‘the encounter between sociology 
and social groups and institutions, or between text and context’ (Ram 1991: 9), 
the role of sociology in social stability or change and repression or liberation 
(Aronowitz 1988; Halmos 1970; Silva and Slaughter 1984), and the political 
and economic dimensions of the emergence of new or ‘national’ sociologies, 
particularly on the periphery of the scientific world system (Moskos and Bell 
1967).   
The relationship between the internal development of sociological theory 
and research and external social forces is particularly important in the study of 
sociology in newly independent societies such as Kyrgyzstan, where problems 
of intellectual colonialism, academic dependency, and the politicisation of 
scientific knowledge are compounded.  The emergence and development of 
sociology in such societies therefore assumes a different character than in the 
western industrial societies that constitute the core of the scientific world 
system (Schott 1992).  Accordingly, the sociology of social science within 
these societies addresses a number of issues that are rarely raised in 
mainstream studies.  Although many prominent sociologists of sociology have 
neglected this point, a few have recognised its significance.  Oberschall, for 
example, suggests that his model of the development of sociology in core–
central countries was not necessarily relevant to the development of sociology 
in post-colonial societies.  He argued that it was valid only in cases where 
there are ‘a new role and discipline for which there are neither precedents nor 
sources of support outside the country.’  However,  
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the diffusion of already established role and discipline to other 
countries, for example, the establishment of sociology in Asian, 
African, and Latin American universities, might have to include 
further variables and processes.  The purposive adoption of an 
existing organizational model for a system of higher education 
and the provision of resources, both financial and manpower, 
from outside the country would have to be considered, among 
other things (Oberschall, cited in Filino 1990: 5).  
Galtung (1971) and Alatas (2000, 2003) take this a step further to focus 
specifically on patterns of dependency and imperialism in post-colonial 
knowledge production.  Galtung, for example, offers a ‘structural theory of 
imperialism,’ including ‘scientific imperialism,’ in which ‘the division of 
labor between teachers and learners is clear: it is not the division of labor as 
such (as found in most definitions of transmission of knowledge) that 
constitutes imperialism, but the location of the learners, in a broader setting.  
The Center always provides the teachers and definition of what is worthy of 
being taught…and the Periphery always provides the learners’ (1971: 93).  
More recently, Alatas has drawn on dependency theory to develop a less 
structuralist theory of intellectual colonisation and academic dependency that 
explores why ‘globalisation’ has increased rather than decreased intellectual 
dependency in some post-colonial societies (for more on academic 
dependency, see Chapter 3). 
This is also important in Kyrgyzstan, where the relationship between the 
intellectual content of sociology and social, economic and political forces in 
Kyrgyzstani society is highly asymmetrical.  The internal content and 
organisation of sociology here has been historically over-determined by 
external social forces and intellectual influences, while the larger social, 
political and intellectual fields have been only remotely influenced by the 
work of sociologists.  In fact, one of the defining features of Kyrgyzstani 
sociology is the decades-long project to reverse this imbalance.   
The theoretically synthetic approach as defined in this study combines 
these approaches in various ways to explore more nuanced interrelations 
between the internal–external and social–intellectual dimensions of the field of 
sociology, particularly the co-constitutive relationship between social 
scientific knowledge and social structures and forces, and the socio-historical 
contingency of social scientific knowledge (as opposed to its determination by 
 42
 
 
or autonomy from internal or external forces).  Such approaches, some of 
which are classified as ‘structuration’ (Hagendijk 1990) or ‘critical realist’ 
(Swidler and Arditi 1994) models, aim to ‘overcome the dichotomies of 
externalism and internalism as well as of micro and macro accounts, while 
bringing historicity back in, in a manner which is sensitive to particularities, 
yet [does] not shy away from the theoretical commitment of social science’ 
(Wagner and Wittrock 1991: 332; see also Cozzens and Gieryn 1990).   
Bourdieu’s (1988) critical study of the relationship between the structure 
of the French humanities and social sciences and the broader class structure in 
French society, and the relationship between the university, politics and 
intellectual life, is one example of this approach.14  It is based on 
understanding the effects of the tension between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
dimensions of social science, or what he calls the ‘two principles of 
hierarchisation’ in academic disciplines, heteronomy and autonomy.   While 
maintaining that knowledge is produced through agency, Bourdieu emphasises 
that social structures condition academics’ intellectual positions and 
professional strategies.  He looks at how distinctions and hierarchies in the 
academic world serve not only to create boundaries and legitimate certain 
truth claims, but also explores their role in establishing power relations that 
determine who is permitted to participate in and evaluate intellectual work.   
More recent studies of boundary–work in the development of scientific 
disciplines (Gieryn 1983; Gieryn et al. 1985; Good 2000; Kuklick 1980; 
Wright 1981) also place the relationship between social scientific knowledge 
and power at the centre of the analysis and seek to explain the complex 
relationships between institutional formations, socio-political and economic 
contexts, and knowledge production in the academic domain.  These studies 
emphasise the role of both structure and agency in the production of scientific 
knowledge and have exposed inherent ambiguities, or strains, in scientific 
knowledge. 
This dissertation uses the synthetic approaches of Bourdieu and Gieryn to 
explore the relationship between each of the dimensions of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan.  It focuses equal attention on intellectual developments in 
sociology, the internal structure of social science as an institution, and external 
factors such as political and economic forces.  The intersection of these 
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dimensions is most visible in the boundary–work done to define sociology in 
post-Soviet society. 
 
Boundary–work and the construction of scientific knowledge 
The notion of boundary–work is central to the critical study of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan.  Boundary–work, or the ‘rhetorical strategy of promoting 
particular ideologies of science’ (Gieryn 1983) is an analytical concept used 
by sociologists of science to illustrate how scientific disciplines (and 
knowledge units more generally) are constructed, legitimised, transformed and 
broken down, both within scientific communities (Fuchs 1986) and in the 
public sphere (Gieryn et al. 1985).  It builds on the theory that academic 
disciplines are socially constructed as opposed to naturally occurring, but 
extends it by exploring how and under what conditions they are formed and 
legitimised, by whom and with what intention, and how the definition of 
scientific truth is conditioned by the social and material relationships in which 
processes of validation are themselves embedded.   
 The primary assumption underlying the concept is that the borders of 
scientific fields (e.g., the definition of science, its distinction from non-science 
and pseudo-science, its alliances with or distances from other disciplines, and 
the differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scientific practice) and the 
determination of scientific truth are not fixed or universal, but rather fluid and 
negotiated in contests for professional legitimacy, scientific authority, and 
material resources (Gieryn 1983).  Boundary–work is often used in projects to 
professionalise academic disciplines, as well as in attempts to gain broader 
public or political legitimacy for certain truth claims or professional practices.  
Analysing boundary–work is essentially a way of understanding how and why 
knowledge is actually legitimised and contested, with a focus on the localised 
constituencies of people and institutions that have stakes in this process 
(Mulkay 1991).  Boundary–work analysis, in other words, is an approach to 
deconstructing the politics of truth in social science. 
 The particular strategies employed in boundary–work differ according to 
the overall project of those involved and the goals they aim to achieve.  Gieryn 
et al. (1985) argue that is used in three types of disciplinary projects: (1) when 
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members of a discipline want to extend their authority into domains claimed 
by other professions or disciplines, (2) when members of a discipline want to 
monopolise professional authority and resources and see other disciplines or 
practices as ‘competitive’ or rivals, and (3) when a discipline wants to protect 
its autonomy from outside encroachment upon its professional activities.15  
However, we can extend the notion of boundary–work to also include the 
cognitive distinctions, classifications, associations and categories that are used 
to order knowledge (ideas, perceptions and information) and make it 
meaningful.  It can also be extended to the political work that is done to make 
symbolic distinctions between different types of knowledge and practice as 
part of larger political projects such as social movements, revolution, 
colonisation and decolonisation, and nation building.   
 Kyrgyzstani sociology is unusual in that the three main types of 
boundary–work (expansion, monopolisation, and the protection of autonomy) 
have often been conducted concurrently.  In the 1960s, for example, 
academics promoting the establishment of sociology in Kyrgyzstan made 
conscious efforts to distinguish between the functions of sociology and already 
existing disciplines such as philosophy and historical materialism.  Attempts 
to extend the authority of sociology into these fields assumed an integrative 
rather than colonial character, as sociologists asserted their prerogative over 
analysis of the empirical aspects of social reality which were implicit within 
but not addressed by other more ‘theoretical’ disciplines.   
 At the same time, however, other new disciplinary fields such as social 
psychology and scientific management were vying for this same privilege 
within the established Soviet disciplines.  Sociologists therefore also drew 
distinctions between themselves and other newcomers, claiming that sociology 
was not only empirical but ‘scientific’ and holistic, and therefore deserving of 
exclusive authority over the empirical study of social life in Kyrgyzstan.  This 
assertion of rightfully exclusive authority, however, was also contingent upon 
the public image of sociology, in particular the discipline’s claim to scientific 
status and its presumed ability to transcend existential influences such as 
political power or personal prejudice in the pursuit of truth about ‘social 
reality,’ while being pragmatically relevant for legitimate uses of social and 
political power.  The effort to distinguish sociology from already existing 
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disciplines and assert its superiority over competitors was therefore combined 
with an attempt to establish the autonomy of sociological research and its 
‘distance’ from all illegitimate power relations in society, as well as from what 
contenders defined as ‘dilettantes’ and ‘pseudo-sociologists’ who presented 
threats to the legitimacy of the fledgling discipline.   
 Similar patterns of attempts to simultaneously expand, monopolise and 
protect the autonomy of sociology have remained consistent in the post-
independence period.  In Kyrgyzstan, the establishment, institutionalisation 
and professionalisation of sociology have been historically dependent upon 
both its autonomy and its social and political use value, thus necessitating the 
concurrent production of multiple types of boundary–work. 
 
Boundary–work and the political economy of science 
The notion of boundary–work as expansion/monopolisation/autonomisation is 
grounded in more general theories of the political economy of science itself.  
One is the ‘market model of professionalisation.’  Here, boundary–work is 
interpreted as a strategy for creating and monopolising new ‘markets’ for 
professional services in conditions where both material and social capital are 
scarce and in demand.  What can sociologists do, for example, that 
statisticians, economists and politicians cannot?  The popularisation and 
institutionalisation of a discipline are interpreted not as signs of the victory of 
truth or even professionalism, but rather as indicators of a successful 
occupational monopoly within a competitive market.   
Gieryn et al. (1985) have applied this model to the institutionalisation of 
academic disciplines, demonstrating how the ‘proper’ relationship between 
scientific and non-scientific (in their work, religious) knowledge was 
negotiated in two public trials to establish whether creationism or evolution 
should be taught in US schools: the 1925 Scopes ‘Monkey Trial,’ and the 
1981–82 McLean ‘Creation Trial.’  Both were cases of scientists struggling for 
power over the content of educational curricula, and both were instances of 
intense ‘public science,’ or ‘rhetoric, argument and polemic [designed] to 
persuade the public or influential sectors thereof that science…is worthy of 
receiving public attention, encouragement and finances’ (Gieryn et al. 1985: 
392).16
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 Bourdieu’s (1975, 1993) work on disciplinarity can also be seen as a 
study in boundary–work.  He challenges the belief that the scientific field is 
structured in a neutral way that will facilitate the discovery of ‘truth,’ asserting 
instead that the collective acceptance of truth claims depends heavily on how 
resources, power, and legitimacy or authority (‘scientific capital’ as he calls it) 
are distributed among practitioners: 
[t]he scientific field is the locus of a competitive struggle, in 
which the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific 
authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity and social 
power, or to put it another way, the monopoly of scientific 
competence, in the sense of a particular agent’s socially 
recognized capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an 
authorized and authoritative way) in scientific matters’ 
(Bourdieu 1975: 18, italics in original).  
In this context, the successful establishment of a field of knowledge (or the 
prestige of individual scholars within a single academic community) depends 
not on its ultimate truth or utility, but on how convincingly its practitioners 
can argue that they, not their ‘competitors’ or those with alternative versions 
of the truth, offer an exclusive, relevant and legitimate view of the world.  
This ability to define and monopolise the scientific field is in turn influenced 
by the social positions of the actors themselves; the logic of scientific 
discovery is pre-politicised by its very position within and relation to larger 
structures of social divisions and power in society.  For Bourdieu, therefore, 
power is a precondition of scientific knowledge, not an obstacle to it (see also 
Fuchs 1986).  Confronting the power/knowledge issue directly, Bourdieu 
argues that ‘the idea of a neutral science is a fiction, an interested fiction 
which enables its authors to present a version of the dominant representation 
of the social world, neutralised and euphemised into a particularly 
misrecognisable and symbolically, therefore, particularly effective form, and 
to call it scientific’ (Bourdieu 1975: 36).   
 At this point Bourdieu’s work crosses over into the second, more critical 
approach to the political economy of scientific knowledge: disciplinary 
institutionalisation as hegemony.  Although this is still concerned with the 
ways in which academic disciplines are distinguished, defined and 
professionalised, it devotes particular attention to the political origins and 
consequences of these delineations and to the reasons why certain truth claims 
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are included or excluded from legitimate knowledge.  While it still addresses 
the demarcation of boundaries between ‘good,’ scientific knowledge or 
method and that which is seen as pseudo-scientific, it also asks how these 
distinctions are implicated in larger projects of social control. 
 This approach is exemplified by Fisher (1990, 1993) in his work on the 
establishment of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and its creation 
as an organisation which he argues supported ‘social science for social 
control.’  In line with Gieryn (1983), Gieryn et al. (1985) and Camic and Xie 
(1994), Fisher defines boundary–work as ‘those acts and processes that create, 
maintain, and break down boundaries between knowledge units’ (1993: 13).  
He is particularly interested in exposing the deliberate conflation of existing 
disciplinary boundaries and the formation of a new  generic ‘social science,’ 
which was created in large part to serve the needs of the American 
philanthropic and political elite.   
 However, Fisher goes a theoretical step further and reinterprets the 
concept through a Gramscian lens of hegemony and power/knowledge, 
arguing that boundary–work is in fact ‘the production and reproduction of 
cultural hegemony.’  He argues that while SSRC academics were able to 
negotiate the boundaries established by the organisation’s elite sponsors, they 
were nevertheless constrained by them.  Their work, therefore, was moulded 
to the political and social agendas of the elite.  Fisher’s focus is not the 
intellectual consequences of the boundary–work itself, but rather on the power 
relations which are mediated through it, and on explaining ‘why power is 
attached to some ideas rather than others’ (1990: 98).  In this way, boundary–
work analysis draws ‘attention to the ways in which social forces are inscribed 
into boundaries’ (Fisher 1990: 112).  Fisher sees boundary–work less as a 
competition for professional resources, as do Bourdieu and Gieryn, and more 
as the exercise of hegemony, or the creation of ‘ideologies that disseminate the 
consciousness of the ruling class and organize the consensus of the population 
in line with the existing social order’ (1990: 102).   
 
Boundary–work in Kyrgyzstani sociology 
Approaches to boundary–work which bring together questions of academic 
knowledge and political hegemony are particularly useful for analysing how 
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the meaning of social scientific knowledge in Kyrgyzstan has changed as 
sociology shed its Soviet identity and was realigned with the rhetoric and 
realities of national sovereignty.  They go beyond structures and power 
relations internal to the scientific field itself (the ‘internal–social’ approach) to 
look at how these are enabled or constrained by external factors, particularly, 
the demands of the political system.   
 This is particularly important in the history of Soviet social science.  In 
the Soviet system, scientific authority was not exclusively a matter of 
academic communities or institutions.  Many scholars were also members of 
the Communist Party, and scientific work was considered part of political 
activity.  Similarly, because research activities were highly centralised, with 
the party ultimately making all formal decisions regarding funding and 
organisation, competition for symbolic capital such as professional prestige 
had a different meaning than it does in less centralised science systems where 
academics compete for individual grants, research ratings and the like.  This 
was even more extreme in the case of Soviet Kirgizia, as the authoritative 
institutions responsible for bestowing legitimacy and granting resources were 
located at a geopolitical distance in the scientific and political centres of 
Moscow and Leningrad.  The dynamics of boundary–work in Kyrgyzstani 
sociology in fact challenge Bourdieu’s assertion that scientific authority 
necessarily ‘owes its specificity to the fact that the producers tend to have no 
possible clients other than their competitors’ (1975: 23) and that internal 
competition is not as important as external demand.  In both Soviet and post-
Soviet periods, social demand for sociology and the acquisition of external, 
often commercial support have been vital factors in the discipline’s 
institutionalisation.    
 Thus, while the internal structure of the scientific field is a factor in the 
development of Kyrgyzstani sociology, its heteronomous nature makes the 
external science–society relationship extremely important.  The scientific field 
must still, as Bourdieu argues, be understood as a ‘locus of a competitive 
struggle’ for scientific authority, legitimacy and resources.  However, the field 
of sociology in Kyrgyzstan extends beyond the borders of scientific 
institutions and incorporates sites of political, economic and industrial power, 
as well as symbolic domains of collective identity.  It is mapped differently, as 
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‘the structure of the intellectual field of the social sciences varies considerably 
across nations [as they] have their roots in the specific intellectual, 
institutional, and political constellations under which “social scientists” have 
tried to develop discursive understandings of their societies’ (Wagner and 
Wittrock 1990: 6). 
 Overall, studies of boundary–work offer useful models for analysing the 
history and institutionalisation of Kyrgyzstani sociology, which has been 
historically shaped by recurring debates over what constitutes ‘good’ and 
‘relevant’ sociology, what reliable methodology looks like, whether social 
research should be funded and used by the state and/or foreign organisations, 
where sociology is located in relation to other social science disciplines (such 
as historical materialism and ethnology) and social practices (like market 
research and public opinion studies), and above all what relationship it is to 
have with politics (i.e. society’s ruling ‘power structures’) and social power 
more generally.  Sociologists in Kyrgyzstan have continuously sought to 
expand their legitimacy, monopolise the right to construct legitimate images of 
society, and establish themselves as suppliers of social information for the 
purposes of political decision-making and social development.  The remaining 
chapters of this dissertation explore the effects that this has had, over time, on 
the intellectual and institutional development of the discipline as a whole.       
      
Methodology: the ethnographic case study approach  
As the sociology of knowledge and sociology of science seek to explore the 
intersections of knowledge and social forces, the empirical study of 
knowledge production is most effectively achieved through (1) historical and 
contemporary case studies of institutions where knowledge is produced and 
(2) an analysis of the discourses and practices by which it is formulated, 
legitimated and contested (Popkewitz 1991; Torres 1999).  The latter are most 
clearly embedded in the former; here, in projects of social science reform that 
have occurred in a variety of institutional settings in Kyrgyzstan: the 
establishment of sociology departments, state and university-led programmes 
for curriculum development, the development of new research centres and 
agendas, the formation of professional associations, and the official and 
informal promotion of new disciplinary missions and identities for both 
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internal and public consumption.  Such initiatives not only reveal the 
relationship between knowledge production and its institutional context, but 
also shed light on the epistemological foundations of knowledge construction 
and legitimation.   
   The dissertation thus includes both an historical overview of the 
emergence and development of sociology in Soviet Kirgizia, and case studies 
exploring its reconceptualisation and re-institutionalisation in post-Soviet 
academic and media institutions.  The cases are based upon several different 
types of data: (1) primary and secondary institutional sources such as mission 
statements, minutes from faculty meetings, curricula and governmental 
resolutions relating to social science, (2) articles about sociology in the 
popular media and academic press, (3) on-site observations at the specified 
institutions and conferences, and (4) interviews with Kyrgyzstani sociologists.   
 These data are interpreted within broader historical and socio-political 
contexts, as ‘to explain why new knowledge emerges and to account for the 
social effects of ideas, scholars need to pay careful attention to factors that 
directly affect the institutions and actors that produce and distribute 
knowledge’ (Swidler and Arditi 1994: 322).  Epistemologically, the cases 
reveal which theoretical schools and methodological paradigms have been 
dominant in Kyrgyzstan, who has advocated them, why and how they have 
been institutionalised, and if they have complemented or contradicted one 
another.  From an institutional perspective, they illustrate the effects of the 
financing of social science research and teaching, its planning and 
administration, the production of didactic material, types of evaluation 
implemented, degrees of coordination with other governmental or non-
governmental institutions, and types of training programs organised for 
sociologists in the republic.17
 
Institutional case studies: sociology in state and private universities 
It has been argued that ‘much of what affects how newly emerging disciplines 
are defined may be found in the early departments in which they emerged’ 
(Small 1999: 659).  The degree to which this holds true cross-culturally is, of 
course, contingent upon a great variety of factors, including the nature of 
‘departments’ and the organisation of higher education in society.  As will be 
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explained in more detail below, the institutional factor grew in importance in 
Kyrgyzstan after national independence. 
 There are currently three major departments of sociology in Kyrgyzstan: 
one in the Bishkek Humanities University (founded in 1993), one housed in 
the American University–Central Asia (founded in 1998), and one located in 
the Kyrgyz National University (founded in 1999).  Smaller sociology 
departments or programmes have also been initiated in several other 
universities, including the Kyrgyz–Slavonic University, the Kyrgyz 
Architectural University, the Kyrgyz Technical University, the International 
University of Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz–Turkish Manas University, and the 
Atatürk–Alatoo University.  In addition, there are a number of research centres 
in the republic now dedicated to sociological study, most notably the National 
Academy of Science’s Center for Social Research.   
 This study focuses on two of the three major departments—the Sociology 
Department at the Bishkek Humanities University (BHU) and the Sociology 
Department at the American University–Central Asia (AUCA).  These cases 
(Chapters 7 and 8) were chosen for their theoretical significance, based on the 
hypothesis that the institutionalisation of sociology in Kyrgyzstan has been 
shaped by different configurations of internal (domestic) and external 
(foreign) sources of funding and social capital, its relationship with state and 
society and its political and ideological orientations as manifested in 
departments of sociology.     
  In these categories, the BHU and AUCA departments could not be more 
different, although both consider themselves to be the country’s leading 
sociology institution.  The BHU department is the post-Soviet successor of a 
previous Department of Sociology and Engineering Psychology that had been 
established by the prominent communist academic and ‘father of sociology’ 
Kusein Isaev to replace a Department of Scientific Communism.  The AUCA 
department was founded anew by one of Isaev’s younger, more westernised 
students named Ainoura Sagynbaeva, who aimed to ‘combine the best of 
sociological education from the Soviet and American systems.’  BHU is 
funded, albeit very poorly, by the Kyrgyz state and is integrated into the 
national higher education system; AUCA is funded rather generously by the 
American State Department and Hungarian/New York-based Soros 
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Foundation and enjoys a degree of autonomy from the Kyrgyz Ministry of 
Education.  The former employs almost exclusively ‘local’ instructors who 
teach primarily in Russian, while the latter is a mixture of permanent Russian-
speaking local and revolving English-speaking foreign faculty.  The BHU 
Sociology Department identifies itself with both the Kyrgyz state and the 
Kyrgyz people and thus promotes administrative and ‘national’ styles of 
sociology, while the AUCA department identifies with more universalistic 
values of ‘enlightenment’ and ‘liberal education’ and with a pan-American-
European or ‘western’ sociological community and tradition.  Unlike the BHU 
department, it is neither integrated into the state system nor seeking legitimacy 
from it.  The departments’ different faculty compositions and relations with 
the state also influence the organisation of undergraduate education at each 
institution.  While BHU has consistently implemented a standardised national 
sociology curriculum, sociologists at AUCA have successively introduced 
new, non-standard curricula over the years.   
 In addition to these differences, the cases also reveal a number of 
common themes that stem from the overall structure and organisation of social 
science in Kyrgyzstan, its symbolic relationship with state and society, broader 
discourses and practices of modernisation and development, and debates about 
the proper boundaries between scientific truth and power.  The case studies 
therefore provide an excellent opportunity to ascertain the degree to which 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors are influential in the development of sociology 
more generally, and the extent to which we can speak about general trends in 
the discipline as a whole.   
 Finally, the BHU and AUCA departments are the professional homes of 
many of the individual sociologists who produce the public representations 
and ideologies of social science which constitute the basis for public 
boundary–work in Kyrgyzstani sociology and the discourse analysis 
component of this study.  The cases therefore clarify how boundary–work 
within the sociological community has been shaped by its immediate 
institutional contexts.   
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Deconstructing public sociology: critical analysis of discourses on sociology 
Moving from institutional contexts to discourses and actors, the second set of 
case studies (Chapter 9) focuses on public debates about sociology in the 
national press and professional debates about sociology published in academic 
texts.  The analysis is based on a primary-source corpus of 65 academic 
articles on sociology published in Kyrgyzstan between 1965 and 2004 and 145 
articles published in republican newspapers between 1989 and 2003, which 
address the nature, role, scope and methodology of sociology in the late 
socialist and post-Soviet periods.  The corpus was selected from a more 
extensive body of materials gathered both systematically and 
opportunistically.  It includes all academic articles catalogued as ‘sociological’ 
in the national library from 1965 to 2003, published and unpublished academic 
works obtained from individual sociologists, and the bulk of newspaper 
articles on sociology published from 1989 to 2003 and indexed in the national 
library and institutional archives.  I have included as many articles from the 
original collections as possible while reducing the amount of factual and 
thematic redundancy in the texts, and have incorporated material which was 
excluded from official catalogues but that obviously belongs in the corpus.   
 Although this collection of texts is one of the most coherent on the topic 
to date, it should be seen as a working compilation rather than a complete 
archive.  The main reason for this is that the corpus is comprised primarily of 
Russian-language articles and includes few articles about sociology published 
in Kyrgyz during the specified time period.  While the Russian-language texts 
do provide a detailed and sufficient image of the field, they are not an 
exhaustive collection of the material on sociology produced in this multi-
lingual society.  This is not because Kyrgyz-language articles address entirely 
different themes or offer different pieces of information; by and large they do 
not.  What distinguishes Russian and Kyrgyz-language writing in Kyrgyzstani 
sociology, particularly in popular publications, is less the content than the tone 
and rhetoric of the texts, the cultural symbols to which they make reference, 
and the ethnically-specific audiences to which they are addressed.   
  Language is a highly political issue in Kyrgyzstan, woven tightly into 
issues of race and ethnicity, class, and national and international identity.  
Because Russian was the scientific lingua franca throughout the Soviet Union 
 54
 
 
and has remained dominant in the urban Kyrgyzstani academy, nearly all 
sociological work which dates from the mid-Soviet period and much of that 
written during late socialism and in the early years of independence—
including that written by and for ethnically Kyrgyz academics—is in Russian.  
By the mid-1990s, however, a discourse of ‘national revival’ had emerged in 
the humanities and social sciences, and a marginal group of sociologists began 
to promote the creation of a ‘national sociology’ and popularise sociology 
among the non-Russian-speaking populations of the republic.  These factors 
led to a gradual increase in the publication of Kyrgyz-language articles about 
sociology in the regional and national press, which are, unlike most of the 
Russian-language texts, addressed specifically to ethnically Kyrgyz audiences 
(it is assumed, unfortunately more or less accurately, that most ethnic Russians 
do not read the Kyrgyz-language press), and are more likely to combine ethno-
nationalist rhetoric with modernist scientific terminology.   
 The minimisation of Kyrgyz-language articles within the corpus of 
material used for this study means that the influence of ethnicities, languages, 
and nationalisms is likely to be underrepresented in the analysis.  Despite this 
limitation, however, the corpus is a reliable data set for this study insofar as it 
represents the dominant discourse of social science in the republic, much of 
which is reproduced in Kyrgyz-language texts, and because it is the primary 
medium with which Kyrgyzstani academics of all ethnic backgrounds interact 
with each another and their wider public audiences. 
 There are other hazards of archival research in post-Soviet Central Asia.  
Like much archival material in Kyrgyzstan, the vast body of sociological work 
is fragmented and disorganised and must be pieced together like a nationwide 
jigsaw puzzle, the pieces of which are dispersed through homes, offices, 
libraries, archives, bookshops and even waste bins.  For example, the ‘national 
bibliography’ division of the national library has two card catalogue drawers 
dedicated to sociology, in which a few anonymous librarians have diligently 
but unsystematically catalogued Russian-language newspaper articles that they 
subjectively classified as belonging in this category.  This includes 
sociological studies and official reports, as well as articles on the politics of 
social science, its relationship to the state and civil society, the relationship 
between communism and sociology, trends in theory and method, and 
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intellectual personalities.  Again, however, these catalogues seldom include 
Kyrgyz-language articles on the same themes, nor do they cover the entire 
range of newspapers, books and journals that have been produced in the 
republic.18   
 In another example, while it is possible to obtain records of academic 
meetings and official reports on science policy, many of the accessible sources 
are ‘public-consumption’ versions of texts that have insider editions buried 
deep within censored files.19  In addition, a great deal of information about 
early sociological research and institutions was destroyed during the Soviet 
period.  In the years immediately following independence, records that 
survived Soviet censorship often disintegrated along with the research centres 
and laboratories in which they were housed.  Such materials are now dispersed 
among individuals, not all of whom are easy to locate or approach.  
Nevertheless, many people are willing to donate or sell books and articles that 
they have published, which are not available in bookstores or libraries.  These 
materials do much to flesh out the historical skeleton that can be constructed 
from the publicly available body of information about sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Reflections on power and knowledge in the field 
This dissertation bears scars from familiar ethnographic pitfalls: culture shock, 
language barriers, problematic access to people and documents, strained 
rapport with interlocutors, role conflicts in the field, and uneven power 
relations between researcher and researched (Johnson 1975).  While the bulk 
of my fieldwork was conducted from January to July 2003, the case studies 
also draw on preliminary research I carried out while working in the AUCA 
Sociology Department from 1998 to 2000.  During this period, I was 
employed as a lecturer through the Soros Foundation’s Civic Education 
Project (CEP) and for one year served as the department’s Assistant Chair.  
The materials and observations that date from this period were therefore 
gathered under slightly different terms than those collected during my later 
fieldwork.  This distinction is noted where it is significant for interpretation of 
the information presented, as is the researcher effect of my well established 
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relations at AUCA, my ‘outsider’ status at the Bishkek Humanities University, 
and my ambiguous subject positions as a woman and US citizen.         
Scholars who have recently conducted fieldwork in former Soviet 
societies argue that there is ‘something peculiarly post-socialist about the 
inevitable complexity of fieldwork relations’ in these societies.  They cite, for 
example, the indelible impact of Cold War ideologies on mutual impressions 
of researcher and researched, the as–yet–untheorised differences of everyday 
social organisation in non-capitalist cultures, the way that people in these 
formerly closed societies interpret the intrusion of foreign observers, and the 
ambiguous relationship between detachment and engagement in the post-
Soviet field (Dudwick and Hermine 2000: 1-7).  However, if we are to make 
meaningful sense of this collective experience, it is necessary to move beyond 
recognition of this phenomenon and theorise how the particular features of 
post-socialist ethnography are related to broader issues of power and 
knowledge in the history and politics of social science in the region more 
generally.   
First and foremost is the problem of how to negotiate, if not deconstruct, 
the Orientalist and colonial subtexts of contemporary fieldwork in Central 
Asian societies.  Some literature frames this problem as a post-Cold War clash 
between ‘triumphant’ Western capitalist researchers and disappointed and 
defeated Soviet citizens (Zanca 2000: 153).  However, I suggest that it may 
also be linked to hegemonic structures of power and domination within 
Central Asian social science itself, many of which have been obscured by 
well-intentioned but misguided ‘post-power’ discourses of globalisation and 
international collaboration in recent years.   
The people of Kyrgyzstan are self-consciously observed and evaluated, 
and therefore often wary of the motives and intentions of foreign researchers.  
This is particularly true for many of the more elite members of the society, 
including the sociologists at the centre of this research, for whom national 
independence brought not only institutional dislocation but also severe losses 
of economic privilege and social and cultural prestige.  To many, the notion 
that Kyrgyzstani scholars were ‘liberated’ from the very social structures in 
which they were gaining status during the 1980s is a bitter irony.  Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the asymmetrical power relations between those 
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on the post-Soviet periphery and foreign researchers have become exacerbated 
by the emergence of new local and global hierarchies within post-socialist 
society. In many cases, scholars’ work and professional identities have been 
simplistically recast as naïve, illegitimate and ideological—to use the word in 
its contemporary four-letter sense, ‘Soviet.’ Many social scientists who once 
saw themselves as the architects of a formidable empire now feel as if they 
have become targets for those aiming to dismantle its foundations, and that 
they, once the observers of their own society and guardians of the truth about 
social reality, have become the observed.  This has obvious implications for 
research relations in the field, where interviews and textual analyses may also 
be seen as political engagements.  The issue of colonialism is dealt with 
further in Chapter 3, while illustrations of power relations in social research 
are embedded in the institutional case studies.    
 Second, this research has been an exercise in comprehending and 
accommodating the vast theoretical dissonances that are often revealed 
between researcher and the researched.  As foreign ethnographers of Central 
Asian societies have discovered, the success or failure of the interpretive 
endeavour depends not only on how well one can master the ‘epistemic 
negotiations’ that are vital for cross-cultural understanding, but also on how 
well the analyst comprehends the larger social and political contexts that 
ground the epistemologies and how well she ‘answers not for the impartiality 
or replicability of her research, but for the situated knowledge she has 
collaborated with her informants to produce’ (Adams 1999: 331).20     
In this case, many Kyrgyzstani sociologists neither understood nor 
respected my desire to include them in this study.  In addition to seeing it as a 
waste of time (most are abysmally paid and I could not afford to offer them 
material compensation for their participation), many did not find the project 
itself meaningful.  Critical and feminist approaches to research—attempts to 
democratise the research process, include interlocutors as partners instead of 
objectifying them as ‘subjects’ and inviting participants to comment on one’s 
tentative findings—were greeted with scepticism and sometimes hostility.  
Some were confused about why I would deliberately discredit myself by 
trying to minimise the authority bestowed upon me as a foreign ‘expert.’  In 
many respects, the dominant academic culture in Kyrgyzstan respects and 
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expects hierarchy and deference, expertise, and neutral objectivity; in short, it 
recognises as ‘science’ only that which I, coming from a critical post-positivist 
perspective, was deliberately bringing into question.  Some suspected that the 
‘interactive’ approach to research was some sort of manipulative and 
paternalistic experiment, similar to those conducted by international 
educational organisations which now specialise in ‘training’ local 
professionals.  Some saw my project as self-defeating and even insulting to 
their attempts to establish scientific authority during a period in which, as Karl 
Mannheim once put it, all truth claims have become suspect, and therefore as a 
threat to their own professional legitimacy.  A few people were even angry 
about the insinuation, however benign I initially imagined it to be, that their 
social scientific knowledge was in any way political and resisted being 
interpreted as political actors.  Finally, some Kyrgyzstani academics distrust 
foreign researchers, whom they fear will steal their ideas and slander their 
reputations in prestigious English-language journals that they can neither 
access nor read.  In short, I learned that while my methodological principles 
might be taken at face value in the relatively marginal circles of critical 
sociology, they were interpreted in a suspicious light in Kyrgyzstan and often 
cast a shadow on my relationships with sociologists there.     
 Finally, as a sociologist studying sociologists, I was constantly confronted 
with the problem of if and how to distinguish between ‘objectivity’ and 
‘engagement.’  It demanded that I carve out some position on the relationship 
between representation, interpretation, analysis and criticism in my own 
research, and make some decisions about my political role within the society.  
Ultimately, I never resigned myself to the advice of a trusted friend, a young 
Kazakh professor, who advised me to enter into power relations or face 
exclusion from the academic community I sought access to.  ‘Be 
instrumental,’ he said, ‘use your power. That’s how it works here.’  In many 
senses, he was right.  That, unfortunately, is rather ‘how it works’ there at the 
moment; power relations are an integral part of academic practice in 
Kyrgyzstan.   
 However, I decided—perhaps against all the rules of ‘good’ 
anthropology—that it wasn’t how I would work there, because I did not want 
to be bounded by this fatalistic essentialism.  I opted instead to maintain a 
 59
 
 
methodological faith in the possibility of democratising the research process, 
even in a hierarchical field, while attempting to scrutinise my own biases. As 
with all choices in fieldwork, this decision closed some doors and opened 
others, including to relationships with people and ideas that have been 
excluded from the traditional structures of academic discourse, but who are 
nevertheless playing major roles in the transformation of the social sciences in 
Kyrgyzstan.  It even helped me earn the trust of some of my most sceptical 
contacts. 
I have paused on these methodological problems not because they 
concern specific techniques of data collection or analysis, but because they 
have been central to the way in which I have constructed the relationship 
between theory, method, and practice in this study.  In addition, they 
contextualise the research process within the political, cultural and economic 
forces that both inspired and constrained it.21  These methodological problems 
are therefore incorporated as vital elements of the research itself, rather than 
being tacked on as auxiliary, post hoc concerns.   
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3 
SOVIET SOCIOLOGY:  
THE ROOTS OF ACADEMIC DEPENDENCY 
 
Sociology first emerged as a field of knowledge in Soviet Kirgizia during what 
is known as the ‘renaissance’ of Soviet sociology during the 1960s.  It was 
part of a more general re-emergence of sociology within the Soviet empire, 
which itself was part of broader reforms in Communist Party ideology and 
organisation (Remington 1988: 62).  The politically embedded nature of 
Kyrgyzstani sociology, as well as its structural and cultural dependency on the 
Soviet centre, influenced how it was imagined, organised and institutionalised 
in the republic both before and after the Soviet collapse.  In order to 
understand the historical development of sociology on the imperial periphery, 
it is therefore important to first understand the organisation and politics of 
sociology in the Soviet centre.  As there are already a number of excellent 
studies of the history of Soviet sociology (Beliaev and Butorin 1961; Ivanov 
and Osipov 1989; Matthews and Jones 1978; Myrskaia 1991; Shalin 1978; 
Simirenko 1966; Weinberg 1974; Zaslavsky 1977; Zestov 1985), I will 
concentrate on those aspects which are significant for understanding the 
history and politics of sociology in Kyrgyzstan.   
 
The rise and fall of Russian sociology, 1916-36 
While the post-Stalin period is often described as the ‘stagnation,’ the two 
decades following Stalin’s death in 1953 were nevertheless ones of 
considerable enthusiasm, debate and expansion in sociology throughout the 
Soviet Union (Simirenko 1969; Yanowitch 1989).  Both the Soviet 
Sociological Association and a section for sociological problems in the 
Moscow-based USSR Academy of Science (later the Institute for Concrete 
Social Research [1968] and then the Institute for Sociological Research 
[1972]) were established under Khrushchev in June of 1958.  This did not 
mark the birth of an autonomous discipline as much as it signalled an 
‘evolution’ in the intellectual atmosphere of the times, which eventually 
facilitated the emergence of sociology (Beliaev and Butorin 1961: 429; Shalin 
1990: 1019).  In 1965, fledgling sociological groups at Leningrad University 
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joined forces to form the Institute for Complex Social Investigations.  The first 
meeting of Soviet sociologists—many of whom claimed to have been 
conducting sociological research for several years already—was held in 
Leningrad in February 1966 (Simirenko 1969: 393).  The Central Committee 
of the Communist Party organised its own Academy of Social Sciences during 
this period, and government ministries, newspapers and industries began to 
commission sociological studies on issues such as ‘workers’ discipline,’ time 
budgets and labour management.  According to historians of Soviet sociology, 
‘by the mid-seventies no less than six hundred centres of one kind or another 
were said to be engaged in empirical work in 120 towns throughout the 
country’ (Matthews and Jones 1978: 8).    
 The intensive establishment of academic and scientific associations, 
sociological laboratories and research centres in universities, factories and 
educational institutions during this period was considered a ‘renaissance’  
because it was a sharp contrast to the severe and systematic repression of 
sociological research during the two previous decades, when, as Weinberg 
(1974: 8) argues, ‘sociology as an independent academic discipline virtually 
disappeared in the Soviet Union [and] Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism took its 
place.’  In fact, sociology had barely emerged as a field of knowledge in 
Russia when it was suffocated by the repressive policies which followed the 
October Revolution; it was later redefined entirely within the framework of 
Marxist–Leninist theory and reified into an instrument of Soviet ideology.   
 Until the early 1920s, however, Russian sociology had enjoyed a short  
grace period in the new political system: the Russian Sociological Society was 
founded in 1916, a Sociology Department was opened in the new Institute of 
Psycho-Neurology in Petersburg, the People’s Commissariat on Education 
approved the establishment of the Petrograd Socio-Bibliological Institute in 
1918, and translations of European social theorists such as Spencer, Comte, 
Durkheim, Weber and Simmel were available in addition to the works of Marx 
and Engels.  At this early stage of his political career, even Lenin believed that 
sociology might be instrumental in delineating the new Soviet republics, and 
in 1918 he founded a new Socialist (later Communist) Academy of Social 
Sciences to ‘make a series of social investigations one of its primary tasks’ 
(Matthews and Jones 1978: 3; see also Batygin and Deviatko 1994: 12; Urban 
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and Lebed: 19).  For a brief period, ‘the Bolsheviks seem to have believed, 
like their tsarist predecessors, that [sociology] favoured their cause’ (Matthews 
and Jones 1978: 4; see also Shalin 1990).   
 Within a few years, however, fears that ‘bourgeois’ sociological theory 
would threaten the legitimacy of the fledgling political establishment led to a 
sudden change in policy regarding scientific and intellectual life.  These 
heralded what Alex Simirenko (1969a: 6) calls the ‘period of decline’ in 
Soviet sociology.  By 1922, the party had banned the teaching of sociology in 
universities and closed both the Socio-Bibliological Institute and the Russian 
Sociological Society.  Sociologists such as Pitirim Sorokin (perhaps better 
known as founder of Harvard University’s Sociology Department), whose 
work had become influential under the more intellectually liberal conditions of 
the early Bolshevik regime, were gradually suppressed by the party’s 
increasingly authoritarian control over the academy.  Sorokin left Russia that 
same year to escape the persecution that many of his colleagues had already 
been subjected to (Simirenko 1969a: 12).  While empirical research continued 
on demographics, working conditions, family relations, the effects of 
propaganda and time budgets until the mid-1930s, the authorities’ need to 
minimise exposure of the brutality and shortcomings of Stalinist policies put 
an end even to these narrowly defined studies.  According to Matthews and 
Jones, the need for sociology, as well as its political possibility, came to a 
sudden end in 1936 when Stalin announced that ‘society, having achieved 
“socialism,” now consisted of two friendly and internally homogenous classes 
(the workers and the collectivised peasantry) with a “stratum” or prosloika of 
intelligentsia drawn from both classes but having no contact with the means of 
production itself’ (Matthews and Jones 1978: 4).   
 With the ‘society’ question resolved, there was no longer a need for the 
academic study of society; only for its explanation and illumination through 
the lens of Marxist–Stalinist theory.  Historical materialism became 
synonymous with scientific sociology.  The small corps of sociologists 
practicing in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and other 
republics was liquidated through dismissal, exile or execution by the 1930s 
(Simirenko 1969a: 12).  The conflation of ‘sociology’ with Marxist–Leninist 
theories of society marked the beginning of a long struggle to delineate the 
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boundary between sociology and politics in the Soviet Union.  Marxism–
Leninism’s hegemonic status as the foundation of all scientific knowledge, as 
well as its colonisation of other social sciences, laid the ground for future 
controversies about the definition and role of sociology in the region. 
 
Social science in Soviet Kirgizia, 1917–54 
Until independence in 1991, Kirgizstani social scientists generally adopted a 
Russo-centric narrative of the history of Soviet sociology, positing the ‘Great 
October Socialist Revolution’ as the precondition for their own disciplinary 
history.  Uniquely Russian experiences were universalised into general 
‘Soviet’ ones (Karakeev 1974).  As one Kyrgyz scholar argued in the 1980s, 
the ‘straight scientific and systematic study of Kirgizia began only during 
Soviet rule, when, among other socialist transformations, the culture of 
revolution was realised in the periphery’ (Tabyshaliev 1984: 162).  In fact, 
many Kyrgyzstani sociologists still refer to earlier periods of repression in the 
RSFSR when explaining the underdevelopment of sociology in the 
contemporary Kyrgyz Republic.  Kusein Isaev, a communist–cum–nationalist 
sociologist and the controversial ‘father of Kyrgyz sociology,’ points to this in 
numerous interviews that he has given on the topic:  
Sociology had a difficult fate in the former Soviet Union.  In 
1922 Lenin rose up against this ‘bourgeois’ science. 122 
scholars were banished from the country, sociology was 
accused of being a pseudo-science, and it became simply an 
appendage to Marxist–Leninist philosophy and scientific 
communism. […] Even now, sociology is not fully 
distinguished from philosophy (Baibosunov 1998; see also 
Isaev 1998c; Ryskulov 1998).    
 While this generalised history of Soviet sociology is often taken for 
granted in contemporary academic circles in Kyrgyzstan, it obscures the 
important fact that at this early stage, neither developments nor repressions in 
sociology in the RSFSR had a direct impact on sociology in Kirgizia or any 
other Soviet Central Asian republic.  In fact, neither sociology nor the 
republics as we know them today existed at the time.  In 1924, as the 
discipline of sociology was coming under fire in the RSFSR, the Central Asian 
republics were only just being carved into existence by the Communist Party 
in its razmezhevanie (demarcation) of administrative boundaries for the new 
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Soviet state (Gammer 2000: 128).  What is now recognised as the republic of 
Kyrgyzstan was first established as the Kara-Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast in 
1924, renamed the Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast in 1925, and declared the 
Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936 (Tchoroev 2002: 357).  During the 
1920s and 30s, the intellectual agenda in Central Asia was the development of 
basic literacy, not social science.22  The Kyrgyz language was first inscribed at 
this time and its alphabet was changed twice, from Arabic to Latin in 1924 and 
again from Latin to Cyrillic in 1943 (Isaev 1999a).  Although Soviet 
institutions of higher learning such as universities and filials of the Academy 
of Science began to appear in Kirgizia in the 1930s (Karakeev 1974) following 
the establishment of the Central Asian University in Tashkent in 1920 (Ali 
1964: 91; Simirenko 1969a: 10); these were primarily oriented toward 
providing Soviet political education, not promoting indigenous teaching or 
academic research.   
 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social science in 
Central Asia consisted primarily of Russian-led colonial ‘expeditions’ to the 
‘Muslim near abroad’ or ‘Turkestan,’ as Central Asia was then referred to.  
Research trips were organised to gather information about the languages, 
customs, religious beliefs, productive capacities and political structures of the 
various ethnic groups living in the region, for the purposes of their more 
effective incorporation within the Russian, and later Soviet, empire 
(Tabyshaliev 1984).  The research centres which were set up in the Kirgiz 
Autonomous Oblast in the 1920s, such as the Academic Centre and the 
Scientific Commission for the Oblast Branch of People’s Enlightenment, were 
organised to support Russian-led research within and about the area, 
particularly its natural resource potential (Tabyshaliev 1984).  At the same 
time, the Central Asian Bureau, Central Asian Economic Council and Central 
Asian Territorial Commission (1924) were all ‘under Russian control and were 
directly responsible to the Central Executive Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party’ (Wheeler 1966: 67).  In 1928, Russian ethnographers A. 
Fersman and W. Bartol'd created a ‘five-year plan for the complex study of 
Kirgizia,’ including the coordination of various research groups and institutes 
in the republic for this purpose, in order to understand the territory’s potential 
as a source of natural and labour resources (Karakeev 1974: 17).  One year 
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later, another pair of researchers, F. Fiel'strup and P. Kushner, published an 
ethnographic study entitled Mountainous Kirgizia: a Sociological 
Reconnaissance (Karakeev 1974: 14).   
 The frequency and scale of field expeditions to Kirgizstan and other 
Central Asian regions increased during the 1930s as part of the effort to 
‘construct Soviet culture’ in the area.  In 1935, the USSR Central Scientific 
Commission issued a statement that such work ‘allow[ed] for the significant 
and thorough illumination and clarification of the fundamental problems 
facing the national economy of Kirgizia’ (Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo, 1974: 21).  
Toward the end of this decade, the president of the USSR Academy of Science 
and member of the Committee on Filials and Bases argued that ‘the Kirgiz 
Republic can no longer fulfil premises from the centre of various types of 
expeditions [if the] work is not attached to constantly operational filials of the 
Academy of Science in the regions.’  The Kirgiz filial of the USSR Academy 
of Science was established several years later, in 1943 (Karakeev 1974: 28).  
While this was widely perceived as a major scientific development, it was also 
an immediate consequence of Russia’s increasingly penetrative imperial 
ambitions.   
 The Soviet-led development of scientific research in Kirgizia entailed 
more than mere data-gathering; in fact, it pervaded the very theoretical 
foundations of social science in and about the region.  For example, the debate 
to clarify where Central Asian pastoral-nomadic societies belonged in the 
Marxist five-stage categorisation of social evolution was  
by no means of merely academic significance…its solution 
enables us to sharpen our weapon of a correct Marxist 
understanding…it is relevant to the immediate practice of 
political struggle, the practice of class war both in the Soviet 
East and abroad, in the colonial Orient…the correctness of the 
practical work of the socialist reconstruction of the nomadic 
and semi-nomadic aul [mountain village] of the Soviet East 
depends on the correct theoretical solution of this problem’ 
(quoted in Gellner 1988: 99). 
 The publication of such debates in regional newspapers and journals such 
as Sovietskaia etnografiia (Soviet Ethnography) contributed to the creation of 
a body of knowledge about Central Asian societies within the Russian and 
broader Soviet academic community.  This may be likened to the construction 
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of ‘the Orient’ by British and European scholars in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; the production of a body of knowledge about the 
colonised created by the powerful (Said 1978), even when they attempted to 
study these subjects ‘from the bottom up,’ as did highly respected Russian 
ethnographers such as Bartol'd, Basilov, Snesarev and Abramson (Gellner 
1988: 16).  Tsarist-era research on Central Asian societies which focused on 
Islam and shamanism, traditional family structures, tribal kinship relations, 
patriarchy and indigenous folkways was used to justify the Soviet 
modernisation project in Central Asia.  It was transformed into data which 
informed efforts to integrate the region economically and politically while 
promoting ‘national traditions’ in social and cultural life (Park 1972: 6).  
 The development of Soviet social science about Central Asia, along with 
the establishment of educational and scientific institutions in the region in the 
1930s and 40s, has until very recently been interpreted in Kyrgyzstan as the 
first stage of modernisation and scientific enlightenment, and contrasted 
favourably to the scientific ‘backwardness’ of the Kyrgyz people prior to their 
incorporation into the Soviet empire.  The opening of the Academy of 
Sciences in 1954 was celebrated as an ‘historical event in the life of the 
Kyrgyz people, bearing witness to the growth of its economy, science and 
culture’ (Ob uchrezhdenii 1962).  This ‘elder brother’ narrative was a 
reflection of a more general phenomenon in which, from the 1950s to the 
1980s, ‘the idea that Russian colonialism was more progressive than the 
British and other colonial enterprises finally came to dominate Soviet 
historiography,’ including the history of science and intellectual life (Tchoroev 
2002: 360; see also Ali 1964: 92; Critchlow 1972).   
 Nesvetailov (1995: 66) offers another compelling explanation for this, 
arguing that there was no obvious discrepancy because even in the periphery, 
‘Soviet science perceived itself as being the center’ of world science.  Central 
Asian scholars who identified as members of the Soviet empire and not as part 
of an imperial periphery have therefore long rejected critical appraisals of this 
early period of social science in the region.  They have been particularly 
resistant to its definition as ‘colonial,’ asserting that            
[t]he development of the social sciences in the USSR is a 
single, total process, to which scholars from the Central Asian 
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republics have contributed. […] We do not have ‘central’ and 
‘peripheral’ science, but a single Marxist–Leninist science 
about society (Leninizm i razvitie 1970: 30). 
Such sentiments remained commonplace in sociological texts well into the 
1980s in Kyrgyzstan; here, there was no ‘rebellion in the academy’ against 
Russian domination in sociology as there was in the discipline of history 
during the 1960s and 70s (Allworth 1998: 72). 
 While it is important to acknowledge the significance of this identity for 
many scholars working in remote regions of the empire, it is also important to 
recognise that the history of Soviet social science was neither singular nor 
unproblematically progressive.  The anti-imperialist union of equal nations 
was in reality a colonial empire based on a very strong and deliberately 
maintained differentiation between centre and periphery, in the organisation of 
science as much as in other social institutions.23  While the form and content 
of Soviet-era Kirgiz and Russian sociology were similar, the conditions within 
which sociology emerged in Kirgizia were quite different from those in the 
RSFSR.  Social scientists in Central Asia, for example, had even less 
intellectual freedom and much lower chances for occupational mobility 
(Critchlow 1972: 23) than their counterparts working in the Russian centre.  
This imbalance was not lost on one of the first Kyrgyz sociologists, now a 
professor of anthropology at AUCA, who draws clear distinctions between 
Kyrgyzstani and Russian-led research in Kirgizia prior to the 1960s: 
[T]here had been some investigations organised by Russian 
sociologists and they went to Issyk-Kul Lake [the country’s 
largest alpine lake].  There were ethnographic and sociological 
investigations of, for example, rural life and relations between 
people, family and marriage relations, social relations, 
ethnographic relations of the inhabitants of the villages of 
Chichkhan and Darkhan. […] But these were done by Russian 
sociologists.  And then our Kyrgyz sociologists were also 
involved in such investigations (Asanova 2003).     
The assimilation of the history of social science in Kirgizia into the grand 
narrative of the Soviet ‘civilisation’ of Central Asia, the use of Soviet science 
as a yardstick of social development and national pride in Kyrgyzstan, 
historical amnesia about the repression of alternative historical narratives, and 
post-Soviet counter-reactions to each of these tendencies—all may be seen as 
consequences of the colonial logic of social science in Central Asia.  The 
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history of sociology in Kyrgyzstan must therefore be analysed not in a narrow 
national context, but within the broader framework of the Russian colonisation 
of Central Asia and its continuation in the politics of Sovietisation, not least of 
all because many contemporary problems in the discipline of sociology, both 
intellectual and institutional, have roots in this unequal relationship.   
 
The colonial logic of Soviet social science in Central Asia  
There is no consensus about whether Central Asian societies in general and 
Kyrgyzstan in particular should be classified as ‘colonial’ or ‘postcolonial,’ 
whether the Soviet empire qualified as a colonial power, or whether we can 
draw fruitful comparisons between these and examples of other, more ‘classic’ 
empires such as the British and French (Clem 1992; Fierman 1990; Gammer 
2000; Kandiyoti 2002).  It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully 
explore this complex question.  However, it argues that the organisation and 
culture of Soviet social science may be better understood through the lens of 
postcolonial studies and therefore borrows from this field a number of 
concepts and theoretical perspectives; namely, theories of intellectual 
colonialism, academic dependency, and orientalism/occidentalism.  In the 
following sections, these perspectives will be used to explore the colonial 
logic of social science in Central Asia, particularly as it was practiced at the 
time of sociology’s emergence in Kyrgyzstan during the 1960s and 1970s.   
 
Intellectual colonialism 
According to Alatas (2003: 600), intellectual colonialism is defined as the 
‘cultivation and application of various disciplines such as history, linguistics, 
geography, economics, sociology and anthropology in the colonies’ to bolster 
the ‘control and management of the colonised.’  It is identified by six 
characteristics: exploitation, tutelage, conformity, the secondary role of 
dominated intellectuals and scholars, a rationalisation of the civilising mission, 
and the inferior talent of scholars from the home country specialising in 
studies of the colony (Alatas 2003: 601).  Together, these shape what he calls 
a ‘colonial mode of knowledge production’ in colonised societies, which is 
maintained by direct support or pressure from the colonial power.  As 
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sociology in Kyrgyzstan exhibited each of these characteristics during the 
Soviet period, is best understood through this conceptual lens.    
Science and scientific knowledge occupied a central place in early Soviet 
Central Asian society.  The Soviet authorities were eager to reign in both pan-
Islamism and pan-Turkism in the region because they feared that cross-
republican cultural and religious affinities might result in the emergence of a 
strong and challenging political alliance (Ro’i 1995).  While there were other 
Islamic regions within the Soviet Union (e.g., among the Tatars and 
Azerbaijanis), Central Asia, and to some extent the Caucasus, were of 
particular concern.24   
Because the use of brute force to quell the establishment of such alliances 
had historically met with violent resistance, imperial power was increasingly 
exercised through the control of cultural and intellectual life in Central Asia.25  
Although Soviet science was officially ‘organized in accordance with the 
principles of true democracy and the broad development of creative 
discussion’ (Paskov 1965: 2), it was practically organised to serve the 
economic and ideological needs of an expansive imperial state, and 
intellectually ordered on Marxist–Leninist theories of social planning and 
development.  Its main purpose, as described by one enthusiastic advocate, 
was implicated in its centralised organisation:  
[t]he social sciences occupy an important place and vital role in 
the life of Soviet society.  The whole proceeds along planned 
lines.  The policy of the Communist Party and the socialist state 
is scientifically based; it rests on the objective laws of society 
and it is the primary task of the social sciences to reveal those 
laws and indicate the ways, forms and methods of applying 
them in the interests of the people.  The social sciences help the 
Party and the people to formulate correct criteria for assessing 
the existing situation within and outside the country and to 
determine correctly the prospects for the development of 
society and the direction and methods to be adopted for 
practical human activity (Paskov 1965: 5-6, italics in original). 
In Central Asia, control over intellectual activity was deemed even more 
necessary.  First, it was integrated into a larger campaign to secularise and 
‘modernise’ the once-nomadic tribes (forcibly settled through collectivisation 
during the 1930s); in Alatas’ words, it was a way to ‘rationalise the civilising 
mission.’  Second, development was encouraged in academic disciplines 
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which would enable Central Asian economies to fulfil specialised functions in 
the Soviet system of national production and distribution.  This was not only 
exploitative, but also gave local scholars ‘secondary’ roles in Soviet science, 
orienting their research interests towards the needs of the empire as a whole.  
Finally, Soviet authorities aimed to stifle dissent by bringing indigenous elites 
into the folds of metropolitan power through tutelage and the korenizatsia 
(indigenisation, or assignment of native elites to key posts) of academic and 
scientific life.   
 The institutions in which sociology emerged during the 1960s—the 
university, factory, Academy of Sciences and Communist Party—were 
integral parts of the Soviet state’s politico–industrial–ideological apparatus.  
Knowledge production therefore followed the colonial model, and indigenous, 
self-sustaining scientific institutions did not develop in Soviet Kirgizia.  
Kirgizstani social scientists were directly responsible to Soviet and party 
authorities at the local, republican and all-union levels.  They were dependent, 
both structurally and culturally, on the Russian centres of Moscow, Leningrad 
and Novosibirsk; on republican-level organisations such as the Komsomol, and 
on industrial enterprises for funding, resources and opportunities.   
 The integration of state and science had a decisive impact on how 
sociologists defined their professional role in Soviet society.  According to V. 
Yadov, for example, then head of the sociological laboratory in Leningrad 
State University, ‘the Soviet sociologist bears a special responsibility for his 
conclusions and recommendations.  He is responsible not to a private firm but 
to the people, to the state’ (quoted in Simirenko 1969: 394).  Kirgizstani social 
scientists, however, were doubly subordinate: their deference to the Soviet 
state was compounded by the fact that it was also a colonising power.  
Intellectual and material inequalities were not only embedded in this 
relationship; they defined it. 
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union therefore had profound implications 
for the reorganisation of sociology and re-conceptualisation of its role in post-
Soviet society.  In Kyrgyzstan, this had two main dimensions: the breakdown 
of the centralised relationship between science and the state, and the 
decolonisation of periphery from centre.  The loss of state funding and 
subsidies at a time of increased investment from western development 
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organisations laid the ground for certain features of academic dependency, 
namely, dependence on foreign media of ideas and investment in education, to 
develop (see Alatas 2003).  Decolonisation and de-Marxification, concurrent 
with the influx of new ideas from ‘the west,’ created conditions for new 
intellectual dependencies to emerge.    
 The experiences of early sociologists in Soviet Kirgizia suggest that the 
centralised organisation and vertical control of scientific activity in the Soviet 
Union did not have the totalising effect on knowledge production that it is 
often assumed to have had.  Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate that Kirgizstani 
sociologists interpreted the Soviet science system in various ways; they were 
often aware of its inherent inequalities and struggled to redress them through 
the strategic manipulation of state subsidies and the creative interpretation of 
Soviet ideology.  The chapters also reveal that many academics did not fully 
subscribe to the technocratic model of state science and were pulled between 
loyalty to state and society, on the one hand, and to the quest for scientific 
truth on the other.   
 Nevertheless, the role of intellectual colonisation in the establishment of 
sociology in Kirgizia must not be underestimated.  It shaped the development 
and underdevelopment of sociology in its organisation as a ‘particular kind of 
sociology which is specific to a socialist society, its ideology and its political 
structure’ (Beliaev and Butorin 1982: 419).  This ‘particular type of sociology’ 
was technocratic, heteronomous and established as a colonial mode of 
knowledge production.  Its institutionalisation was thus problematised by two 
phenomena: academic dependency and orientalist and occidentalist attitudes 
towards scientific knowledge.   
  
Academic dependency and underdevelopment 
Academic dependency, the child of intellectual colonisation, can be defined as 
a ‘condition in which the social sciences of certain countries are conditioned 
by the development and growth of the social science of other countries to 
which the former is subjected.’  (In the case of Soviet science, the term 
‘country’ may be replaced with ‘republic.’)  It develops when one social 
science community becomes dependent on ‘the institutions and ideas of 
western social science such that research agendas, the definition of problem 
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areas, methods of research and standards of excellence are determined by or 
borrowed from [another]’ (Alatas 2000: 603).  Alatas (2003) identifies six 
characteristics of academic dependency: dependence on externally produced 
theories and ideas, on the foreign media of ideas (such as books, journals and 
conferences proceedings), on foreign educational technologies, aid for 
research and education, foreign investment in education, and demand for skills 
in the west, or brain drain.  These dependencies often evolve after 
decolonisation, when the colonial mode of knowledge production shifts to a 
post-colonial or neo-colonial model. 
 Relations of dominance and dependence are common where there are 
divisions between centre and periphery.  Contrary to assertions that there was 
neither centre nor periphery in Soviet science, a number of scholars have 
recently argued that the centre–periphery relationship was in fact one of its 
most prominent characteristics (Eisenstadt 1992; Nesvetailov 1995; Schott 
1992).  This is increasingly supported by Kyrgyzstani sociologists themselves.  
Mukanmedi Asanbekov (2003), a candidate of sociology26 and current pro-
rector for science at the Bishkek Humanities University, for example, argues 
that one of the main reasons for the ‘crisis’ in post-independence sociology is 
that   
[s]cience in Kyrgyzstan did not develop independently.  Its 
financial base, structures, themes, theories, etc. were all 
directed from Moscow.  Thus, when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the entire science structure collapsed with it.   
 Identifying the precise relationship between Russian and non-Russian 
republics such as Kirgizia within the Soviet context is no easy task.  Shils’ 
(1988: 251) more sociological definition of centre–periphery relations 
therefore offers a useful way to conceptualise the relationship between 
Kirgizia and Moscow with regard to scientific and intellectual institutions: 
[t]he term ‘center’ refers to a sector of society in which certain 
activities which have special significance or functions are 
relatively more highly concentrated or more intensively 
practiced than they are in other parts of that society and which 
are to a greater extent than are other parts of society the focus 
of attention, preoccupation, obedience, deference or emulation. 
Kirgizstani scholars’ relationship with the Soviet centre was one of academic 
dependence, which manifested itself in both structural and cultural forms.  
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Structural dependence involves material and institutional dependence, while a 
social science community may be considered culturally dependent to the 
extent that ‘definitions of what should be studied and how (theory and 
methods), and criteria of desirable scholarly activity (role models and 
standards of excellence) are those of another national social science 
community where these are not shared by social science communities in 
general’ (Lamy 1976).  Developments in social science in Moscow and 
Leningrad during the 1950s and 1960s affected the way sociology could be 
defined and practiced in the periphery.  Kirgizstani academics looked to 
Moscow to understand how to affiliate themselves with and/or distance 
themselves from other social science disciplines, organise scientific activities, 
and relate to industrial and educational institutions and the broader field of 
political power, as well as to ascertain what constituted legitimate 
‘sociological’ problems to be studied.   
 In some cases, the centre came to Kirgizia in the form of Russian 
academics sent to establish scientific institutions in the republic.  Until the 
1980s, social scientists in Kirgizia emphasised the constructive role of Russian 
assistance in the advancement of indigenous scholarship, claiming that ‘the 
process of the formation and development of the Kirgizstani intelligentsia 
occurred through the brotherly assistance of the Russian people: many 
scholars worked in Kirgizia, helping to establish national cadres’ or ‘thanks to 
the emergency assistance of the Russian people and the Leninist nationality 
policies carried out by the Communist Party of Kirgizia, it became possible for 
scientific workers—social scientists—to grow’ (Alimova 1984: 36-37).  The 
dependence of early Kirgizstani social science on Russian material and 
intellectual support is accurately acknowledged in these narratives.  However, 
until late perestroika there was little critique of the political causes and cultural 
consequences of this dependency.  For example, the ‘national cadres’ or 
indigenous elites produced through these efforts were often Moscow-oriented 
throughout their careers, and in the absence of stable indigenous sociological 
institutions they were dispersed to work as ‘individual enthusiasts’ (Isaev 
1991b), labouring in isolation from one another or in small teams.   
In other cases, Kirgiz social scientists travelled to the centre.  In the 
1980s, for example, the number of candidate and doctoral degrees in the social 
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sciences increased primarily as a result of educational exchanges in which 
Kirgizstani students were educated in Moscow and Leningrad, and Russian 
scholars travelled to Kirgizia for ‘consultations’ (Skripkina 1983: 17).  
However, exchanges between Russian and Kirgizstani social scientists did not 
result in the institutionalisation of a sustainable indigenous sociology 
primarily because they were fundamentally unequal.   
 It is often assumed, particularly within liberal theories of science, that 
state sponsorship for scientific work explains the heteronomous nature of 
Soviet science.  It is important to recognise that financial support does not 
necessarily foster dependence or domination; after all, teaching and research 
must be funded from somewhere.  It is therefore important to move beyond 
identifying the sources of sponsorship and examine its structural and cultural 
forms.   
 Institutionally, social science in Kirgizia developed according to 
definitions of social science that were developed in Moscow.  This is 
illustrated in the history of the Kirgiz Academy of Science from its 
establishment in 1954 to the late socialist period. The creation of institutes of 
Languages and Literature (1928–54), History (1954), Economics (1956), 
Philosophy and Law (1959–64), and Eastern Studies or Vostokovedenie (1963) 
has been interpreted by some historians of science as a ‘natural progression’ of 
Soviet science and an indicator of Kyrgyzstan’s ‘national development.’  
However, it was an historically specific disciplinary ordering, which was tied 
to the political reorganisation of scientific and educational institutions 
throughout the USSR.  By the time the Kirgiz Academy of Science was 
established, the USSR Academy of Science had already been restructured 
twice.  In 1926 it was divided into two sections: mathematics and natural 
sciences on the one hand, and social sciences on the other (sociology being 
housed in the latter).  In 1938 the ‘social science’ division had been 
dismantled and replaced by individual institutes of economy and law, history 
and philosophy, and literature and languages; sociology had been dissolved 
(Kazakevich 1944: 313).   
 The anti-space created for sociology in the mid-twentieth century Soviet 
academy meant different things in centre and periphery.  In the RSFSR, the 
discipline became dispersed rather surreptitiously throughout a wide variety of 
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fields and professions, being ‘merge[d] with history, economics, law, the work 
of the central statistical offices of the government, the trade unions and the 
budget planning authorities’ (Kazakevich 1944: 313).  Kirgizstani social 
scientists and intellectuals, however, inherited an institutional and conceptual 
architecture in which there was simply no space for sociology to emerge.  
Furthermore, they lacked the institutional memory that it had once existed as a 
semi-autonomous, if fledgling, field of knowledge.  In the 1970s, sociological 
research was tucked away in the Institute of Philosophy and Law within the 
Academy of Sciences, along with research in philosophy, linguistics, biology 
and cybernetics, all of which was ‘based on the positions of classical 
Marxism–Leninism on the role of human communication in material and 
spiritual production’ (Karakeev 1974: 164).  Marxist–Leninist theories of 
social structure and process, nationhood and nationality, stability and conflict, 
class, family, religion, and language—not to mention the definition of Central 
Asian peoples as ‘primitive’—had been transformed into doctrines of 
scientific truth by the time the first social scientific institutions were 
established in Kirgizia.  When sociology emerged a decade later within the 
pre-existing fields of historical materialism and scientific communism, it was 
shaped not by a struggle to exist despite them, but rather by the 
epistemological assumptions about science and society which it inherited from 
them.   
 
Orientalism and occidentalism 
This inheritance was legitimised not only by the professional ambitions of 
Kirgizstani sociologists who sought recognition from prestigious academic 
authorities in the Soviet centre, but also by institutionalised attitudes of 
orientalism and occidentalism within the academy.  The sense of inferiority 
vis-à-vis the centre on the part of ‘eastern’ scholars and of superiority in the 
opposite direction had been cultivated through years of Russification in the 
region.   
In his treatise on the hegemonic othering of non-western societies, 
Edward Said defined orientalism as a discourse that is used to construct and 
maintain colonial relationships and politico-cultural divisions between ‘East’ 
and ‘West.’  The ‘essence of Orientalism,’ according to Said, is the 
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‘ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority’ 
(1978: 42).  He argued that scientific knowledge of ‘Eastern’ (i.e., Middle 
Eastern, African and Asian) societies was, until the mid-twentieth century, 
based largely on scholarship produced within the context of the European 
colonial project from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries in the discipline 
of Oriental Studies.  The entire field was organised around the assumption that 
there is a clear distinction between ‘us’ (Europe, the West, familiar) and 
‘them’ (the Orient, strange, exotic); of ‘self’ and ‘other.’  The result was the 
production of a rigidly dichotomous discourse which purported that ‘on the 
one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab–Orientals; the 
former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable 
of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these 
things’ (Said 1978: 49).  This, Said argued, not historical evolution, is how the 
West emerged as ‘civilised,’ righteously dominant and logical, and the 
‘Orient’ was constructed as uncivilised, illogical and in need of colonisation 
(Said 1978: 38, 49).   
Although Said’s theory of orientalism was elaborated on the example of 
the British and, to some extent, Western European academies, it is also an apt 
description of the imagination of Central Asia in much Russian social science 
of the period (Allworth 1975: xxx-xxxi; Borozdin 1929).  Even in Soviet-era 
literature, Central Asians were often represented as Islamic, tribal, nomadic, 
traditional, dirty, ignorant, and backward; a threat to modern culture and 
civilisation, and in need of development and enlightenment.  ‘It was assumed, 
in the mold of classical colonialist tradition, that the peoples of Turkestan, like 
other Orientals, could not represent and rule themselves’ (Panarin 1994: 63).   
Within this intellectual milieu, ethnographic and sociological studies 
about the region were designed to categorise differences between Russian and 
Central Asian cultures and aid in ‘civilising’ the latter through Russification.  
This not only enabled the more effective administration of the Central Asian 
region, but also contributed to the creation of an imperial hierarchy of region, 
ethnicity and language that later became embedded in the Soviet academy.  
Ultimately, the normative and naturalised differentiation between ‘East’ and 
‘West’ led to the institutionalisation of a form of scientific racism which 
extended beyond the boundaries of Russian academic elites into the scientific 
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disciplines and into the collective consciousness of Central Asian social 
scientists themselves (Cavanaugh 2001).  The construction of non-Russian 
ways of knowing as inferior was intertwined with the construction of Marxist–
Leninist science and Soviet rationalism as superior. ‘Orientalisms,’ according 
to Restivo and Loughlin, ‘are created out of a dialectic that also produces 
occidentalisms’ (2000: 139).  Until the 1980s, the Russian academy 
represented the epitome of western science and rationalism throughout the 
Soviet Union.   
Pronouncements of bratstvo and ravenstvo (fraternity and equality) 
notwithstanding, the orientalist and occidentalist foundations of Russian social 
science in Central Asia were not eradicated by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution 
or by the evolution of the Russian empire into the Soviet Union.  In fact, 
conceptions of Central Asia as ‘backwards’ became more hegemonic during 
the Soviet period precisely because they were defined as anti-imperialist, pro-
development and democratic, and promoted images of the ideal (i.e., Russian) 
society as a universalised ‘Soviet’ one.  By the 1930s, Soviet society as a 
whole had become the primary unit of analysis in social science as throughout 
the USSR, and the Kirgiz Republic assumed subordinate status as an 
anthropological site for exploring the local or ‘national’ manifestation of 
general trends in Soviet society.  Central Asians were henceforth incorporated 
into grand narratives of enlightenment, modernisation, progress and 
emancipation as both subjects and agents, despite the fact that their agency 
was highly contingent upon their subordination.   
 Orientalism and occidentalism still remain central dimensions of social 
scientific knowledge about Soviet Central Asia, and because the republican 
academies were so highly dependent on Russian institutions of science and 
education, they also remain rooted in the foundations of Kirgiz social science 
itself.  Russo-centric orientalism became truly hegemonic when it was finally 
declared ‘scientific’ in Marxist–Leninist theories of social evolution—after 
which point social science emerged in Soviet Kirgizia.  Sociology appeared in 
the republic during the 1960s, at the height of the post-Stalinist ‘renaissance’ 
in Soviet sociology.   
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Contextualising the emergence of sociology in Kirgizia 
Soviet histories of Kirgizstani social science assert that ‘the beginning of the 
democratisation of society at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s 
facilitated the ozhivlenie (revitalisation) of the social sciences. […] 
Researchers in the republic began to develop new problems, lay down new 
scientific orientations and strengthen the connection between philosophy and 
practice’ (Kakeev 1990: 38).  However, the rapid growth of sociology 
‘offices’ in academic and industrial institutions throughout the Soviet Union in 
the 1960s was not ‘so much a tribute to the open-mindedness of the regime as 
a reflection of the official desire to make economic and social arrangements 
more efficient’ (Hollander 1978: 375).  The controlled reintroduction of 
sociology was integrated into the movement to de-Stalinise Soviet society and 
give a social and cultural face to economic development and industrialisation.   
 The economic and industrial reforms of this period had ideological as well 
as administrative components, and the ‘new’ sociology was implicated in both.  
Politicians and social scientists alike began to assert that the ‘Marxist science 
of society’ should play a key role in the scientific development of socialist 
society (Simirenko 1969a: 15).  The need to give the Communist Party an 
ideological makeover and create a veneer of communication between 
authorities and the public gave rise to increasing interest in public opinion 
studies.  ‘Connected to information offices in many party committees [were] 
opinion polling services, nearly always using amateur sociologists. […] The 
breakdowns of occupation, age, party status, and such data [were] intended to 
help party speakers tailor their addresses more closely to their audiences’ in 
workshops and factories (Remington 1988: 62).  While the Communist Party 
is infamous for its repression of critical sociology during this period, the 
development of an infrastructure for empirical sociological research was in 
fact a party-driven process which revolved primarily around the need for 
strategic information about public opinion on party activities during a period 
of rapid industrialisation, and for ‘scientific proof’ that its reforms were 
successful (Matthews and Jones 1978; Tabyshaliev 1984; Tabyshalieva 1986).  
Sociology—then defined as empirical research conducted by historians, 
philosophers, economists and psychologists—was redefined as a ‘scientific, 
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objective, comprehensive approach to social problems’ (Simirenko 1969: 
392).   
 In 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party began efforts to 
harness the potential of social science for industrial development, decreeing 
that disciplines such as philosophy (which then included sociology), 
economics, scientific communism, history, law, aesthetics, education and 
psychology should directly contribute to resolving social problems in Soviet 
society and challenging ‘the anti-Soviet great-power ideology of Mao Tse-
tungism’ and American anti-communism (Mandel 1969: 42).  In particular, the 
resolution ‘On the Further Development of the Social Sciences and Increasing 
their Role in Communist Construction’ (Hahn 1977: 36) specified that 
philosophers (and sociologists by implication) should study ‘the relationship 
of objective and subjective factors in the development of society…the laws of 
social consciousness; the theoretical treatment of problems of the individual 
and the group, society and the state, [and] socialist humanism’ (Mandel 1969: 
43).  Sociologists now tend to interpret such statements as historical evidence 
of increased recognition for their professional contributions to the 
improvement of socialist society—which they were, but only insofar as they 
made the party’s power more effective.  It was in the context of this 
technocratic demand for empirical data on the scientific management of 
diverse populations and the ideological need to legitimise increasingly 
invasive forms of social control that Soviet sociology was re-institutionalised 
during the 1960s.   
 The centralised organisation of Soviet science meant that the emergence 
of sociology in Kirgizia was driven by and responded to many of the same 
forces that compelled its re-emergence in the RSFSR: industrialisation, 
rationalisation, secularisation, political and economic administration and 
bureaucratisation, and re-ideologicisation.  In fact, even when political power 
was partially devolved among the union republics during the 1960s, social 
science became more centralised (Bagramov 1987).  As Alexei Tishin (2003), 
a mathematician who trained as a sociologist in Kirgizia’s first sociological 
laboratory in the late 1960s, remembers, 
[a]t the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s there was 
powerful support to develop all spheres of life in Kyrgyzstan.  
 80
 
 
In economics, they built new factories and production plants, 
organisations...and as it was in the economy, so it was in 
culture. […] And thus, it was during this very time, during the 
ascendance of Kyrgyzstan, that sociology came into existence.  
Isaev, too, recalls that ‘this was the time of enthusiasm for sociology: positions 
for “sociologists” or “social psychologists” were introduced in industries, 
organisations, even kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms]’ 
(Isaev 1991a; Tishin 1998).   
 As the demand for information about discrete questions concerning social 
stratification, urbanisation, occupational prestige, and leisure and the family 
became more pronounced, empirical or ‘concrete’ sociology enjoyed a rapid 
revival in the Soviet Union (Lubrano 1977: 38).27  However, it occupied an 
awkward position vis-à-vis ideological orthodoxy, as empirical research had 
long been dismissed as an ‘unscientific,’ ‘bourgeois’ and dangerous practice.  
Early Soviet social science was anti-empirical, and ‘reliance on facts for 
interpretation aroused suspicion’ (Greenfeld 1988: 109).  Within orthodox 
Marxist–Leninist theories of social development, there was no need to analyse 
social facts; social change was lawfully determined by changes in the 
economic mode of production and one needed only to look to the only real 
science of society—Marxism–Leninism—to explain social phenomena.  ‘As 
far as the question of social change was concerned, social behaviour not 
congruent to that expected of the “new Soviet man” was dismissed as the 
“survival of a bourgeois mentality” which would gradually disappear of its 
own accord, under the conditions of full communism. […] Sociology, in the 
Western sense of a science dealing with the study of discrete social behaviours 
and structures, becomes superfluous in such a context, if not faintly heretical’ 
(Lubrano 1977: 37).  During the 1960s and 70s there were therefore ‘some 
major conflicts over the nature of the discipline, or more accurately, over how 
one approaches sociological enquiry in the context of Marxism–Leninism’ 
(Lubrano 1977: 37). 
 Against this background, the practise of empirical research during the 
1960s represented more than a change in party policy toward sociology.  It 
also implied fundamental changes in the interpretation of Marxist–Leninist 
theories of society and their relation to political planning and administration.  
As it became clear that theoretical formulae could not be used to predict 
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economic and political problems or tensions within Soviet society, empirical 
research was re-branded as a ‘science of prognosis’ that could be used to 
‘forecast’ things such as ‘demographic and ethnic processes, urban 
development, the social effects of scientific and technical progress, changes in 
the social pattern of society and developments in public education, health and 
culture (Mandel 1969: 57).  This type of research did not contradict the grand 
theory of Marxist–Leninist philosophy.  Rather, it was seen as a technical 
supplement, useful for solving administrative problems as opposed to 
generating theories of society (Hahn 1977: 38).  Theorising and empirical 
research, while inter-related, were considered autonomous practices that 
informed but did not intervene in one other.   
General sociology [historical materialism] equips concrete 
sociological research with the theory and method of approach 
to study these and other facts and processes.  Concrete 
sociological research provides general theory with new facts 
and processes of social life.  Thus, in order to scientifically 
develop theory, one must have a body of facts; in order to 
obtain a body of facts, one must be guided by scientific theory 
(Ruminatsiev and Osipov 1968).   
The important role of empirical research as a bridge between Marxist–Leninist 
philosophy and Marxist–Leninist sociology is illuminated by Jeffrey Hahn’s 
(1977: 38) definition of concrete sociological research: 
[i]t should probably not be equated with ‘applied’ or with 
‘empiricism’ as used in the Western sense.  Rather, concrete 
research deals with gathering and analyzing empirical data on 
specific social problems.  However, these problems are 
conceptually linked together as the manifestations of social 
change in a given historical period (that is, through the 
conceptual framework of historical materialism).  The 
acceptance of this unity of theory and research becomes an 
essential ideological prerequisite for the Soviet sociologist 
interested in doing empirical research.   
The loosening of restrictions on empirical study led to a boom in academic 
and public interest in sociology during the 1960s.  Ultimately, much of the 
data gathered about Soviet society in this period was deemed threatening to 
Brezhnev’s regime, and sociologists endured a new wave of repression during 
the 1970s (Brym 1990: 207; Weinberg 1992: 2-3).  The 1960s, however, were 
years of growth.  They also marked the beginning of sociology as a field of 
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knowledge and professional practice—if not an academic discipline—in 
Soviet Kirgizia.       
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4 
FIRST-GENERATION SOCIOLOGY IN KIRGIZIA, 1966–73 
 
Founding narratives 
The origins of sociology in Kyrgyzstan—when, where and why the field came 
into being as a field of knowledge, academic discipline and professional 
practice—are a matter of interpretation, the conclusion of which depends very 
much on how sociology itself is defined.  The founding story of Kyrgyzstani 
sociology has become a matter of some contention since the republic’s 
independence, when rival narratives of the discipline’s development emerged 
in the project to construct a new disciplinary history.   
Some academics, predominately those connected with the late Asanbek 
Tabaldiev, claim that his sociological laboratory, established within the 
Department of Philosophy and Historical Materialism at the Kirgiz State 
University in 1966, was the first sociological laboratory in the republic and 
that therefore he should be considered the ‘founding father’ of sociology.  
Those affiliated with Kusein Isaev argue that his laboratory, opened in the 
Department of Scientific Communism at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute in 
1983, was the first and that he therefore deserves the title of ‘father of Kyrgyz 
sociology.’  Other post-Soviet critics of Soviet sociology, including Isaev 
himself and outside observers and younger scholars who are not invested in 
the personal contributions of either of these prominent academics, posit that 
‘for three decades, since the 1960s, sociology in Kyrgyzstan did not make any 
significant steps’ (Blum 1993) and that opportunities for sociology to develop 
as an academic discipline only emerged gradually during perestroika and 
independence (Isaev 1998b; Isaev et al. 1994b).   
 Thus far, there has been no concerted effort among Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists to analyse how these narratives have been constructed, what they 
represent, or what they might reveal about the intellectual and social forces 
shaping the institutionalisation of the discipline; no attempt to place these 
narratives in a broader historical context that would shed light on how the 
epistemological and institutional legacies of Soviet sociology have influenced 
the development of the discipline in the post-independence period.  These 
narratives therefore remain at the level of first-order experience, or what 
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Mannheim (1991: 50) refers to as ‘immanent interpretations.’  In addition, 
theories of scientific development as linear, internally lawful and progressive 
preclude the critical analysis of different narratives, instead interpreting them 
as deviations from a ‘correct’ historical trajectory.  They are thus often 
presented as mutually exclusive and competitive: each is accepted by its 
advocates as an accurate portrayal of historical reality over and against more 
‘ideologically’ or ‘politically’ motivated alternatives.   
 However, each narrative reflects a partial view of a greater historical 
whole.  Discontinuities are also part of this reality and reflect deeper conflicts 
over the definition of sociology and its relationship with other social and 
political institutions.  Conflicts emerge not only in rival narratives of the 
history of sociology in Kyrgyzstan, but also in the tension which arises 
between these narratives and second-order analyses which focus less on 
ascertaining the truth of the ideas or ‘facts’ themselves than they do on 
interpreting the webs of meaning within which they emerged and the political 
processes through which they were construed as significant.  The goal of this 
chapter, as distinct from a disciplinary history, is not to simplify the narrative 
and make it coherent, but to explain why different narratives have emerged in 
the first place (Thompson Klein 1996: 205).   
  To some extent, different interpretations of the origins of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan are spawned by a basic competition for material resources and 
professional prestige.  As pointed out by Nurbek Omuraliev (2003), director of 
the Center for Sociological Research in the National Academy of Science,  
[n]ow there is a competition between the National University 
and Bishkek Humanitarian University regarding the preparation 
of specialists, and each one strives to show that they have had 
the best developments in sociology, that they have the best 
professors.     
Demonstrating an institution’s historical continuity is an effective way of 
establishing authority in a period of institutional crisis.  Competition for 
students became fierce in universities when state policy shifted from socialised 
higher education toward a new ‘market model’ of education.  In the absence of 
any effective standards for higher educational institutions within the republic, 
many Soviet-era lyceums and technical colleges reclassified themselves as 
universities and began recruiting students for new ‘marketable’ programmes 
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such as business economics, marketing and accounting.  In universities 
subordinate to the Ministry of Education, as well as in those answering to 
private boards of trustees, departments of sociology are increasingly forced to 
demonstrate their viability by increasing their student intake.   
In this highly competitive and largely unregulated educational 
environment, the need to establish the authority of sociological knowledge and 
expertise became a central part of projects to institutionalise the discipline and 
secure employment within individual VUZy.  However, because the authority 
of one institution is here often enhanced by the de-legitimisation of another, an 
atmosphere of competition is envelops institutional identity construction.  As 
Bekturganov et al. (1994) remarked in one newspaper article on the 
development of sociology, the hope of the discipline lies in sociologists 
trained ‘at two parallel institutions by only a few scattered professionals’ and 
that ‘this separation…contributes little to the creation and development of 
sociology, and to the preparation of cadres for this prospective branch of 
knowledge.’   
 While conflicts over which institution or group of scholars may be 
considered the ‘original’ source of sociology in the republic are partially 
motivated by material needs and professional interests, however, they are also 
rooted in intellectual disagreements about whether the institutions and 
individuals in question were actually engaged in ‘sociological’ work during 
the Soviet period, whether their theories and methods should be considered 
legitimate contributions to the discipline as it is currently defined, and whether 
their work is relevant to contemporary Kyrgyzstani society.  These debates are 
situated within more general ambivalences about the relationship between 
sociology and power structures in society, and by negotiations over what role 
the discipline is to play in the independent republic.  Here, the word 
‘sociology’ does not necessarily refer to the same set of ideas practices across 
time and space.  Juxtaposing alternative narratives on the origins of sociology 
in Kyrgyzstan illustrates how the meaning of sociology has fluctuated 
throughout the history of the discipline in Kyrgyzstan.   
 This chapter concentrates on the establishment of the first sociological 
laboratory in the Kirgiz Republic.28  It argues that while the work done in this 
laboratory exemplifies the colonial mode of knowledge production in Soviet 
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Kirgizia, the everyday experiences of the sociologists who worked there reveal 
that within this context there were more complicated localised responses to the 
political subordination of social science under the Soviet regime.  Although 
the existence of independent interpretations of Soviet ideology and practice 
are highlighted, however, the chapter ultimately details a history of academic 
dependency and the establishment of political hegemony over social scientific 
knowledge production and practice during this period. 
   
Tabaldiev and the ‘first group of students willing to be sociologists’  
During the 1960s, sociology was viewed as an extra-disciplinary research 
method which could be used to systematically collect information for political 
and administrative organisations; a technical branch of the social sciences.  It 
was neither opposed to nor affiliated with existing academic disciplines, but 
incorporated as an auxiliary subject of interest into the Marxist–Leninist triad 
of social science: political economy, historical materialism and scientific 
communism.  Against this backdrop, in 1966, Asanbek Tabaldiev organised 
what became widely known as the first sociological laboratory in the Kirgiz 
Republic.  It was housed in the Department of Philosophy and Historical 
Materialism at the Kirgiz State University (KSU).   
 Many Soviet-generation academics who now work as sociologists in 
Kyrgyzstan were first trained in this laboratory, including R. Achylova, A. 
Ivakov, A. Tishin (then students or graduate-level researchers) and university 
instructors such as A. Karypkulov, S. Nurova, and K. Artykbaev.  For many, it 
is the earliest institutional point of reference in the history of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan.  Tishin, now chair of sociology at the same university (now the 
Kyrgyz National University, or KNU), claims that the establishment of this 
laboratory marked the beginning of more than thirty years of sociological 
research in Kyrgyzstan (Tishin 1998), and Omuraliev (1997) attributes to 
Tabaldiev the creation of an ‘entire school on the problems of the theory of 
nations and national relations.’  Many of Tabaldiev’s former students thus 
consider him to be the founder of sociology in Kyrgyzstan—a title that has 
become highly contested in debates about whether Soviet Marxist sociology 
should be included in the contemporary history of sociology in Kyrgyzstan 
(Bekturganov 2003).     
 87
 
 
 Tabaldiev wore many hats.  He was a well-respected scholar, former 
village school teacher, head of the Department of Marxist–Leninist Philosophy 
at KSU, and secretary of the university’s Komsomol committee (Smanbaev 
1986).  The laboratory served a variety of educational, ideological, 
professional and vospitatel'nye (training or upbringing) purposes which 
reflected the integration of education, professional training, scientific research 
and industrial production in Soviet society.29  Such laboratories played an 
important role in the development of Soviet sociology during this period as 
they provided spaces for research training that were not otherwise available in 
the official structures of science and education.  Formal teaching of sociology 
was prohibited at this time, and there was widespread concern among 
sociologists throughout the USSR that this relegated the discipline to a 
‘voluntary’ and unprofessional status.  In fact, a series of Soviet Sociological 
Association meetings in 1969 were held under the banner ‘from dilettantism to 
high professionalism’ in order to address this problem (Simirenko 1969: 394).  
The expansion of laboratories such as Tabaldiev’s, which were formed on a 
voluntary basis and required little material commitment from the state, was 
meant to ameliorate the situation.  
 Tabaldiev, a philosopher by education, aimed to elevate the intellectual 
and professional level of social research in the Kirgiz Republic.  He thus 
organised the laboratory to combine training in sociological theory and 
research and set rigorous standards of academic conduct for his associates.  He 
invited students and young teachers to attend a nauchnyi krug (scientific 
discussion group) consisting of bi-weekly meetings in the department, where 
they discussed everything from the classical works of Marxism–Leninism to 
new publications in social philosophy and sociology.  These meetings seem to 
have extended beyond their ideological purpose and provided rare spaces of 
creativity in an otherwise moribund intellectual culture.  Saida Nurova (2000: 
14, 15), one of the first students to attend these meetings and later the first 
woman in Kyrgyzstan to be conferred with a doctoral degree in sociology,30 
says 
you cannot say working under Tabaldiev was easy: he gave 
much time, spirit and thought to his work and demanded the 
same from us. […] The discussions were heated and time flew 
 88
 
 
by unnoticed, as in all this there were elements of play and 
humour. […] The meetings began at 3:00 in the afternoon, after 
the end of lessons, and sometimes lasted until 9:00 or 10:00 at 
night.   
Former members of the laboratory highlight these informal and creative 
aspects of the laboratory. 
 
The extra-disciplinary status of sociological research 
The composition of this study group or ‘club’ as it was sometimes referred to 
(Asanova 2003) reflected the interdisciplinary—or perhaps more precisely 
extra-disciplinary—status of sociology at the time.  The field was diffuse in its 
early years, seen as a specialised field of interest as opposed to an autonomous 
discipline, and defined as a methodological approach to studying the empirical 
details of more substantive questions which were outlined in the officially 
sanctioned Marxist–Leninist disciplines (Simirenko 1969).   
 While some of Tabaldiev’s students considered themselves ‘sociologists’ 
even at this early stage, they hailed from a range of disciplinary fields, 
including philosophy, history, historical materialism, political economy, 
linguistics and mathematics.  Umut Asanova (2003), for example, now a 
professor of anthropology at the American University–Central Asia, was an 
English-language student at the time.  ‘I was very much interested in 
sociological investigations,’ she says, ‘and took part in those which were 
organised by the department…because in Kirgizia there had not been any 
preparation for teachers of philosophy, [and] they were all integrated from 
different specialisations.’   
 Similarly, Nurova wrote a doctoral dissertation on the regularities of the 
development of malykh narodov (minorities) under socialism.  ‘It was in effect 
about ethnosociology,’ she says.  ‘But at that time this type of committee did 
not exist, and I therefore defended it as historical materialism and received a 
degree as a Candidate of Philosophical Science in Social Philosophy.’  She 
asserts, however, that she had always distinguished between sociology and 
social philosophy.  ‘My candidate dissertation was on sociology when 
sociology did not have its own status.  But when it gained its own status, I 
became the first doctor of sociology’ (Nurova 2003).  In other words, 
sociological research was neither allied with nor positioned in antagonism to 
 89
 
 
particular fields of social science during the 1960s and early 1970s.  It was a 
widespread technical practice which had no official disciplinary status.   
 This ‘invisibility’ was reinforced by the association of the term 
‘sociology’ with empirical or ‘concrete’ research.  The operationalisation of 
the practice left little space for those working in sociology to carve out any 
sort of theoretical niche within existing academic disciplines in the Soviet 
academy.  By the time Tabaldiev established his laboratory at KSU, the 
boundaries of sociology had already been determined by political doctrines 
and Marxist–Leninist theories of science and social engineering.  Previously, 
and predominately in the RSFSR, there had been considerable struggles to 
negotiate the boundaries between sociology and politics, ‘Soviet sociology’ 
and ‘bourgeois sociology,’ and empirical sociological research and Marxist–
Leninist theories of society.  Once sharp borders had been drawn along these 
lines, however, subsuming Soviet sociology within political theory and 
practice and separating it entirely from other possible sociological traditions, 
negotiations about the meaning and role of sociology were limited to 
superficial debates about whether empirical research was or was not 
compatible with Marxist philosophy.  As discussed in Chapter 3, sociology 
emerged from these negotiations as a purely empirical method for gathering 
discrete data on questions posed by the Communist Party and analysing them 
within a Marxist–Leninist theoretical framework.  Soviet sociologists, most of 
whom were amateur researchers attracted to sociology from other disciplines, 
by and large attempted to mould sociology into boundaries already set by the 
political and ideological establishment, thereby making room for themselves 
and sociological research within the state and party apparatus.   
 The subordination of sociological research to the ‘substantive’ social 
science disciplines and to party doctrine was reflected in the selection of 
themes for empirical studies organised by the KSU laboratory and the 
organisation of such research.  As part of their professional training, the 
diverse group of ‘the first students willing to be sociologists’ in Kirgizia also 
served as the labour force behind Tabaldiev’s early large-scale field studies on 
ethnicity, family life and industrial management in Kirgizia, most of which 
remain unpublished (Asanova 2003).   
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Studies in industrial sociology 
The emergence of zavodskaia sotsiologiia (factory or industrial sociology) in 
the 1960s and early 1970s provides an excellent example of how sociology 
was embedded within the dominant discourses of science and society in Soviet 
Kirgizia during this period.  Former members of Tabaldiev’s laboratory 
ascribe particular importance to their role in its development.  They not only 
assert that studies of industrial management were sociologically interesting, 
but also that sociological research was vital to the development of industrial 
production during the 1970s.  Tabyshalieva (1986: 329), one of Kyrgyzstan’s 
first industrial sociologists, argued that   
from the middle of the 1960s, the results of social scientific 
research about the formation of agricultural plans were used to 
elaborate scientific bases for the accommodation of productive 
forces in the republic, to help economists help industries with 
production and increasing effectiveness. […] In the 1970s, 
scholars essentially expanded the spectrum of research linked 
to the planning and prognosis of the socio-economic 
development of the republic.  The analysis of regional 
particularities in economic development, revealing backward 
sections and disproportions in social production and the 
preparation of general recommendations from scientific 
research collectives, supported an increase in the level of 
management of the national economy in the Kirgiz SSR. 
 Some of the first major sociological field studies carried out in Kirgizia 
were concerned with issues of industrial sociology.  Asanova, for example, has 
strong recollections of working with other members of the laboratory to 
conduct research among workers at the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Station 
at a time when the industry was expanding rapidly in the republic.31  Her 
reflections reveal the culture of early sociological research, the hierarchical 
organisation of the work, and the interrelationship between political activity, 
industrial development and education and training: 
[w]e went, if you can imagine the car…it was open in the 
back…there were perhaps twenty or thirty of us, students and 
teachers, and it was very cold on the way from Bishkek to Osh 
[the northern capital city and the major southern city]…even in 
summer it was very cold in the heart of the mountains…And 
we investigated the mining plant and the international, 
interethnic relations there, because it was a very great plant, 
and perhaps as many as fifty or eighty nationalities were 
represented at work there….We had questionnaires, of course 
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prepared by the teachers….Me, personally, I enjoyed it 
greatly—to ask, to observe, and to write everything down.  We 
were there for the whole month.  And Asanbek Tabaldievich, 
he himself came and organised some meetings, [saying] please, 
do it this way, interview that way.  And of course we were, how 
should I say it, perhaps not expensive, even cheap working 
power for interviewing, but even so it was some sort of school 
for us, a school of how to behave with people while 
interviewing them (Asanova 2003; see also Tishin 2000).    
 Industrial sociology in Soviet Kirgizia referred specifically to the 
collection and application of social information in the improvement of 
industrial management, production and labour discipline.  Sociological 
researchers (mainly educated workers trained to conduct surveys) worked with 
factory managers, defining this partnership as a mutual responsibility to 
promote ‘cadre development’ and social politics.  Their main role was to 
conduct surveys on worker (dis)satisfaction and recommend ways to improve 
working conditions in order to maintain coherence in the local workforce 
(Tishin 1988).  By canvassing workers about their levels of job satisfaction, 
sociologists served managers, who were in turn expected to ‘correct’ their 
managerial policies in the people’s interest.   
This partnership also included developing strategies that would ensure 
minimal turnover in the labour force (Omuraliev 2003).  As such, sociologists 
also assumed roles as scientific disciplinarians.  Some served on what were 
called ‘social cadres committees’—or, by workers, ‘commissions for 
dismissals’—and were responsible for eliminating conflict within the 
workplace by either dismissing individuals or assigning leaves of absence if 
they were deemed ‘dysfunctional’ for the collective (Sorokina 1989).  In his 
appeals for sociology to be taken seriously by the Communist Party, Tishin 
(1988: 63) issued a caveat, that ‘the methods and results of sociological 
research [in industries] are not a panacea of all administrative “calamities,” but 
merely a means that can be fully effective in the able arms of the 
administration.’  This of course assumed the higher authority of this 
administration; the overall organisation of Soviet society, including 
inequalities in the distribution of industrial production on a national scale and 
the politics of social relations within the workplace, was not considered a valid 
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subject for sociological inquiry.  In fact, as a purely ‘theoretical’ question, it 
was not considered sociological at all. 
  Industrial sociologists also assumed a number of ‘ideological’ duties.  As 
Omuraliev (2003) recalls, ‘even in industrial activity, they paid a lot of 
attention to what we call the sphere of vospitanie, and sociologists at that time 
were ideologically based.’  Propagandising, agitating and political education 
were integral parts of a Soviet sociologist’s professional activities.  Industrial 
sociologists working in the Frunze Agricultural Machinery Construction 
Factory during the 1980s, for example, were primarily responsible for making 
recommendations for ‘social development’ based on centrally issued five-year 
plans and attitudinal surveys among the workers and then presenting the 
results of their surveys to the factory management and internal organisations.  
However, they also worked ‘to influence, through all channels, the formation 
of a healthy moral–psychological climate’ within the workplace and to 
improve communication among labourers.  They targeted managers through 
the installation of a booth labelled ‘Sociology into Production’ located within 
the factory and created programs for the factory radio station and newspaper 
Sel'mashevets (Agricultural Machine Producer).  ‘By these channels,’ argued 
one, ‘we propagandise sociological knowledge and familiarise the collectives 
with the results of studies that have been conducted’ (Vlasova 1989: 42).  
Such activities were justified with the belief that  
[s]ociologists in industry are called on not only to study public 
opinion, but [to] fundamentally form it during the perestroika 
of society.  Factory workers’ participation in sociological 
research brings about the process of democratisation; that is, 
their concrete participation in the administration of labour, 
production, living and the social life of the factory’ (Vlasova 
1989: 43). 
 This was the era of management science and social engineering, when 
Stalin’s expansionist modernisation policies were being replaced with 
programmes for increasing the efficiency and stability of the country’s 
enormous military-socio-industrial complex (Beissinger 1988).  The new 
politico-institutional environment created new opportunities for social 
scientists to earn legitimacy, respect and financial support from the 
Communist Party and Soviet state, which invested considerable resources to 
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channel the administrative powers of scientific research into social planning 
projects.  In Kirgizia, the party established a ‘council for the coordination of 
scientific research’ in 1968, organised a council for the ‘coordination of 
research in the sphere of historical–party sciences’ in order to link historians to 
‘actual problems’ in 1975, issued a decree on ‘increasing the effectiveness of 
scientific research in higher educational institutions’ in 1978, and decided in 
1976 to ‘strengthen mutual ties of social, natural and technical science’ with 
inter-sector, ‘complex’ research (Tabyshalieva 1984).   
 Despite the production of voluminous rhetoric about the need for 
scientific management in industry and the coordinated development of the 
social sciences, however, Kirgizstani sociologists often received little support 
from busy and uninterested factory managers and complained that only 
Communist Party committees assisted them in their work (Vlasova 1989).  
This lack of material or moral support, combined with increasing demands for 
sociologists to conduct research in the service of ‘socialist construction,’ 
created resentment on the part of those advocating the advancement of 
sociology as an academic discipline.  Tishin (1980), for example, argued that 
sociology was stunted not because of anything inherent to the republic, but 
because Kirgizstani students were ‘ten to thirty years behind’ those trained in 
Moscow with regard to the latest technologies in mathematical modelling and 
sampling (then the most popular methods in industrial sociology).  While 
political rhetoric advocating the new role of sociological research was 
effectively transmitted from the Russian centre to the peripheral republics, the 
material bases and intellectual capital for facilitating such a development were 
not.   
 Nevertheless, industrial sociology continued to expand in Kirgizia during 
the 1970s and early 1980s.  By the 1980s, Kirgizstan boasted a number of 
large factories, some employing from 4,000 to 6,000 people (such as the 
industrial union ‘Ala-Too’ and the Lenin factory) and employed an ethnically 
heterogeneous industrial workforce of about 200,000 (Omuraliev 2003).  After 
Tabaldiev was removed from his post at KSU in 1973 (discussed further 
below), Tishin continued the laboratory’s work on labour management and 
lobbied for the further expansion of sociological services throughout national 
industry, arguing that factories were in need of ‘highly qualified and 
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experienced industrial sociologists’ because ‘without them it [was] impossible 
to create or carry out the types of modern plans of social development for 
collectives’ (Tishin 1980).  During perestroika, he continued to assert that 
‘great projects and plans [in Soviet industry] are often not realised or 
experience difficulties, not for technological and economic reasons, but 
because people do not want to work in programmes which do not take their 
interests, demands, social particularities and local traditions into 
consideration’ (Tishin 1988: 63).  Like many sociologists in Kirgizia, he saw 
industrial sociology—and increasingly its methods for surveying the opinions 
of workers—as a logical way of closing gaps between the ideals of centralised 
planning, the constraints of local realities and the subjective experiences of 
Kirgizstani citizens. 
 The degree to which this work was embedded within the logic of power, 
however, is reflected in the conceptualisation of a cooperative project between 
sociologists from KSU and the Naryn Hydroenergy Plant (NGES), lasting 
from 1979 to 1985.  The factory administration initially hired the sociologists 
to explore three questions: first, ‘whether the basic contingent of hydro-
builders would be preserved in the transition after the Toktogul plant was built 
in Kurpaiska;’ second, ‘whether outflow would increase with the opening of 
new industries in other cities;’ and third, ‘how workers and service people felt 
about particular conditions of the building of the hydroelectric plants: 
mountainous factors, distance, long daily commutes, etc.’ (Tishin 1988: 63).  
The sociologists then reinterpreted these practical questions into a project 
entitled ‘Problems of the stabilisation and securing of labour resources in 
constructing the administration of the Naryn Hydroelectric Plant in the 
conditions of the regional expansion of industry and pendulum migration.’   
The title and interpretive framework of this project illustrate how the 
empirical study of social problems within industrial organisations was 
acceptable as long as it was conducted within the framework of Marxist–
Leninist theory about the role, legitimacy and necessity of the institutional 
arrangements themselves.  Discipline, satisfaction and indoctrination were not 
considered social problems sui generis, but rather studied in terms of how 
their ‘incorrect’ development was an obstacle to the realisation of efficient 
administration over production.  The research, in other words, served 
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‘therapeutic’ ends; it was a means to better adjust workers’ behaviour and 
attitudes within the factory setting.  This has been described elsewhere in 
critical theoretical critiques of this type of research, insofar as 
[t]he therapeutic character of the operational concept shows 
forth most clearly where conceptual thought is methodically 
placed into the service of exploring and improving the existing 
social conditions, within the framework of the existing societal 
institutions—in industrial sociology, motivation research, 
marketing and public opinion studies (Marcuse 1964: 107). 
The research, which was ‘based on surveys of more than 2,000 workers, 
observations, interviews, document analysis and the analysis of information 
with mathematical methods and EVM (elektronno-vychislitel'naia mashina),’ 
has been retrospectively portrayed as something which might have made a 
significant contribution to Kyrgyzstan’s successful industrialisation had it 
been taken seriously by the Communist Party and republican authorities 
(Tishin 1988: 63, 1998).  However, the NGES studies did not in fact 
contribute to the institutionalisation or development of industrial sociology in 
Kirgizstan.  Restrictions on the publication of The Builders of the Naryn 
Hydroelectric Plant and poor visibility of sociological research in industrial 
and academic institutions meant that even during the Soviet period such 
studies were likely to be relegated to ‘archives and cabinets’ (Tishin 1988: 
67).   
Nevertheless, technocratic policies of scientific management, particularly 
within industry, shaped the field of sociology for years to come.  In a 1973 
report on a survey of worker satisfaction at eight industrial sites in 
Kyrgyzstan, Aldasheva and Nikolaenko made it clear that ‘the data received 
from this sociological research [was] used to correct and rework existing plans 
for the social development of collectives in industries in Jalal-Abad [a city in 
the south of the republic].’  They did not offer an analysis of worker 
dissatisfaction, but rather described workers’ responses to closed–ended 
questions; in other words, first-order empirical data, translated into operational 
categories.   
 This type of ‘therapeutic’ research was a logical niche for sociologists to 
fill during this period.  Critical approaches to sociological work were 
acceptable and sometimes even demanded within the limited confines of the 
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factory, collective farm and workers’ collective, and its definition as a 
‘scientific’ practice oriented towards technical administration was considered 
consistent with the modernisation of Soviet society.  Empirical research which 
aimed to gather information about time and resource management in factories, 
working conditions and levels of job satisfaction and the effectiveness of 
various ideological campaigns on university students not only posed no threat 
to the party’s hegemony over representation or to its political authority, but on 
the contrary aided its more efficient administration.  By defining themselves as 
both scientific and ideologically committed, Kirgizstani sociologists began to 
stake claims for themselves within this Party-led movement to rationalise 
Soviet industry and its ideological apparatus.  By the early 1980s they had, 
like sociologists elsewhere in the Soviet Union, ‘established an identity as a 
specialist group in a position to legitimately influence social policy’ (Hahn 
1977: 34).   
 This identity, however, was dislocated from the reality in which they 
remained subordinated to political decisions made by Soviet authorities.  
Members of Tabaldiev’s laboratory confronted this particularly during the 
course of their studies of national relations.  
 
Research on national relations in Kirgizia 
In addition to their work on industrial sociology, members of the early KSU 
laboratory also emphasise their highly controversial research on ‘national 
relations’ (read: ethnic relations) within the ethnically heterogeneous 
Kirgizstani population during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Tishin 2000).  
The durability of the official boundaries distinguishing legitimate Marxist–
Leninist sociology from illegitimate bourgeois ‘pseudo-science’ was 
evidenced in the short lifespan of research on national relations carried out by 
Tabaldiev’s students and colleagues.   
Initially, the laboratory did not challenge the logic of the Soviet academy. 
It was subsumed within a department of historical materialism, supervised by 
a respected member of the party intelligentsia, constituted as an extra-
disciplinary space for uniting students and teachers interested in empirical 
research and oriented toward the pragmatic study of problems in ‘communist 
construction’ such as industrial management and inter-ethnic relations.  
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Informal study groups on social theory were organised within the relatively 
flexible purview of Tabaldiev’s own ideological work, which, given his 
political stature, he had some autonomy to oversee.  The Communist Party 
supported the laboratory as long as Tabaldiev and other members did not 
challenge official definitions of sociology or overstep the auxiliary academic 
and political roles they had been assigned.   
 Tabaldiev’s research on inter-ethnic relations in Kirgizia, however, tested 
these parameters.  His long-term interest in the study of ‘the national question’ 
in the Kirgiz Republic was not particularly unusual; discussions of the 
‘nationalities’ or different ethnic groups residing in the Soviet Union, 
processes of ‘internationalisation’ and the creation of a multi-national state 
were widespread in Soviet social science at the time.  While nationalities 
policy had been on the Soviet social scientific agenda since the 1920s, 
Khrushchev’s introduction of the ‘sblizhenie-sliianie [rapprochement-merger] 
theory of Soviet nationalities policy’ in 1961 raised new questions about how 
ethnicity should be dealt with in social science.  In Central Asia, where 
experiences of collective ethnic identity remained intact despite widespread 
Russification, the announcement of a ‘new stage in the development of 
national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer 
together and their complete unity will be achieved’ was met with some 
reservation (Rakowska–Harmstone 1972: 9).  
 As a communist philosopher, Tabaldiev was interested in how research 
into the ‘national question’ might enable researchers to recommend forms of 
conflict prevention in the future, including within Kirgizstan itself (Asanova 
2003).  However, he was critical of the way the issue was approached by the 
Communist Party, namely, as a set of ideological tenets to be confirmed by 
philosophers, historians, economists and scientific communists, as opposed to 
a theme about which critical questions could be raised and empirically 
investigated.  He was resistant to using sociological data to legitimise what he 
considered the anti-intellectual and inflexible elements of Soviet propaganda, 
including the official party narrative of ‘fraternity and equality among 
nations.’   Nurova (2000: 18), for example, recalls that 
[w]hen I began my dissertation with citations from 
Khrushchev, he crossed them out and said that this was the 
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work of party workers who observed subordination, but that for 
aspirants, their scientific integrity is most important. If the 
citation was actually necessary, I could use it, but if it was used 
only to express loyalty, it had to be removed, which he did. 
 Tabaldiev was sceptical of asking ideologically driven questions about 
processes that he doubted were occurring locally in Kirgizia, and more 
interested in how empirical research could be used to investigate the 
complexities of actual social relations.  According to his students, Tabaldiev 
was determined to understand whether ‘there [was] real equality between 
nations, and how this real equality manifested itself in their lives, family life, 
street life, labour life, when they are working, etc.’ so that existing inequalities 
within Soviet society might be redressed (Asanova 2003).   
 Here, first-generation sociologists made a distinction which later became 
blurred when Soviet-era science was denounced whole-cloth as illegitimate 
propaganda.  In their view, Tabaldiev was an effective propagandist and 
agitator, but he was not an ideologue.32  In other words, he engaged in what 
they defined as ‘good’ Soviet science, that which fulfilled the idealistic goals 
of socialist development, as opposed to reproducing the ‘pseudo-science’ of 
party apparatchiks who sacrificed scientific truth to pragmatic political power 
and who used the authority of fabricated scientific truth claims to disguise 
potentially explosive tensions and inequalities.  
  Unlike most social scientific work on ethnic relations in the non-Russian 
republics, Tabaldiev’s research challenged party doctrine and invoked earlier 
Leninist theories about ‘dualistic tendencies’ in the development of nations.  
This theory, which in other contexts was hailed as a contribution to Marxist 
state theory and thus Marxist sociology (Kirgizskaia entsiklopedia 1982: 301), 
asserts that nations (or ‘mature ethnic groups’) of people encounter one in a 
dialectical relationship of assimilation and self-realisation, with the tendency 
to liberate themselves from oppression as well as to submit to the ‘historical 
values of the past ruling systems’ (Rakowska–Harmstone 1972: 8).  While 
Tabaldiev’s interpretation of this theory acknowledged the value of ethnic 
integration so celebrated by Soviet ideology, it also allowed for the possibility 
that separate national or ethnic identities might legitimately emerge.  Thus, 
while there was nothing theoretically original about his application of Leninist 
nationality theory to Kirgiz society, Asanova argues that it was nevertheless 
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politically threatening to authorities who were at the time attempting to 
discourage the rise of nationalist sentiment in the Central Asian republics and 
construct a universalised Soviet society: 
[t]his was his great investigation, seeing two directions of 
international development.  First some integration of relations 
within each other, [and] the second branch is the growing self-
awareness, self-determination.  These were the main ideas, how 
this integration occurs—the combination of inter-
communication, interrelation and integration.  And perhaps 
some kind of assimilation at some times […] assimilation to 
those nations which were more in number and stronger.  Now 
we see there really was a kind of assimilation, because people 
assimilated their language, their style of life, clothes, and their 
behaviour and etc.  This is also a kind of invisible assimilation, 
when Kyrgyz people still began to speak only Russian, and just 
gradually forget their own language.  It is also a process of 
assimilation.  So first of all investigating this branch of 
integration, how it occurred, and the second, growing 
nevertheless—growing, with this parallel direction or tendency, 
the growing of self awareness.  Who am I, what am I?  Am I 
Kyrgyz, or who?  And what am I doing as Kyrgyz? (Asanova 
2003, italics mine)   
Tabaldiev published his doctoral dissertation, Dialectics of two tendencies in 
the development of nations and national relations in Soviet society, in 1971.  
However, Sotsializm i natsii (Socialism and Nations), a large-scale empirical 
study of ethnic relations in Kirgizia carried out and written up collectively 
under the auspices of the laboratory, never saw the light of day.  Its censorship 
revealed the political boundaries of the great renaissance of Soviet sociology 
during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 According to students who participated in this research, had the book 
been published it would have dealt a devastating blow to the official party line 
that there was a peaceful, progressive sblizhenie and sliianie of ethnic groups 
in the Soviet Central Asian republics (Nurova 2001; Tishin 2000).  Instead, it 
revealed and criticised both the strident Russification of the non-Russian 
population in Kirgizstan and exposed vast economic and social inequalities 
between Russian and non-Russian-speaking groups in the republic.  It also 
documented a growing sense of ethnic consciousness among Kyrgyz 
communities, which was spawned not by ‘ethnic narrow-mindedness’ or 
‘chauvinism,’ but by poverty and injustice.   
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 These conclusions, however, were branded as ‘anti-communist 
propaganda.’  Any work which challenged hegemonic claims that ‘the national 
languages [were] progressing rapidly under the conditions of freedom and 
complete equality of nationalities in the USSR’ and that ‘every citizen of the 
USSR is guaranteed complete freedom to speak, educate and teach his 
children in any language whatsoever’ was treated as deviant and seditious 
(Tadevosian 1963: 44).  This was particularly true in the realm of ethnic 
relations, as was later revealed: ‘in practice the sphere of nationality relations 
has been put beyond criticism, treated as a zone of general harmony, while 
anything that doesn’t fit into that harmony is tossed aside, branded as a 
phenomenon of bourgeois nationalism’ (Bagramov 1987: 74; Karklins 1986).   
 Although Tabaldiev reportedly proposed amendments to the republic’s 
nationality and language policies on the basis of this research, the study results 
were first ‘corrected’ by party leaders, then banned from publication, and 
finally, as with subsequent studies of ethnic relations in the republic, they 
disappeared altogether (Elebaeva and Dozhusunova 1991).  Nurova (2000: 
16), who worked on this project as an interviewer in the village of Chychkan 
(now Dzhenish), recalled why she felt the research was important and why she 
was so disappointed when it was censored: 
[a]t the time of the survey I attempted to clarify from one 
young Kyrgyz woman, who did not speak in Russian, why she 
wanted to educate her children in a Russian school.  She 
answered ‘kyrgyzcha on klassty butkondon koro, oruscha uch 
klass oido turbauby’ [he finished tenth grade in Kyrgyz school, 
but it was as if he had finished Russian third grade33] and it 
became clear.  She went to Przheval'sk with her son to visit her 
brother in the oblast hospital.  They were there for half a day, 
but could not find out which section their relative was in.  They 
were beset upon by workers in white coats, most of them 
Russian, who did not know (and who did not want to know) the 
Kyrgyz language. […] And in fact, without knowledge of the 
Russian language at that time, it was difficult to work and 
study, let alone climb the professional ladder, and no one 
demanded knowledge of the other state language…particularly 
from Russians. […] A. Tabaldiev attempted…to change 
national and particularly language policies in Kyrgyzstan at the 
core.  He thought the thesis that Russian had become the 
second mother tongue of the Kyrgyz was untrue and argued 
against it. […] But this point of view did not coincide with the 
officially declared approach, and thus many other problems, 
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including [those in] our book, were crushed.  I always think 
about this with serious pain.  
While Tabaldiev’s interest in both ethnic relations and sociology was typical 
for social scientists of his generation, his combination of the two and desire to 
conduct empirical studies of ethnic difference and inequality in Soviet Central 
Asia were unusual and frowned upon by insecure and authoritarian party 
officials.  His was a ‘path untaken in the republic’ and, eight years after he 
founded his sociological laboratory, Tabaldiev bowed to political pressures to 
abandon it (Tishin 1998: 31).   
 The little institutional security Kirgizstani sociologists enjoyed in the 
confines of the KSU laboratory was revoked when members of the group 
began to associate normative values of patriotic social service and scientific 
objectivity with ‘good’ sociology and corrupt political opportunism and 
manipulation of empirical data with ‘bad.’  By challenging the political truth 
claims of Marxism–Leninism with empirically based sociological ones and 
presenting research results that suggested alternative and even critical answers 
to rhetorical questions posed by the Communist Party about the state of ethnic 
relations in the republic, the laboratory was stripped of its status as a 
legitimate scientific institution.   
 The type of sociology developed here—critical of the status quo but 
deferential in tone, working within the confines of Marxist–Leninist theory 
and loyal to the ideological spirit of the socialist project—was labelled 
‘unscientific’ according to political criteria.  The final authority to judge social 
scientific truth claims was situated not within the field of sociology itself, but 
in the power structures of the Communist Party that it was embedded within.  
Alternative interpretations of social reality based either on social theory or 
empirical research could exist only as long as they were kept private affairs, 
outside the boundaries of official Marxist–Leninist theories of society and 
within the realm of the alter-reality which existed in parallel with Soviet 
officialdom.   
 
The dissolution of the first sociological laboratory 
Some of Tabaldiev’s students argue that such disappointments and frustrations 
contributed to his untimely death at forty in 1975.  Without speculating on this 
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assertion, it is obvious from the historical record and interviews with his 
students that immediately after he defended his doctoral dissertation in 1971, 
the Communist Party began trying to persuade him to abandon the laboratory 
and sociological research.  In 1973, he was finally transferred to the Academy 
of Science, where he became chief editor of the party’s Kirgiz Soviet 
Encyclopaedia (Nurova 2000).  By some accounts, apparently excerpted from 
his personal journal, Tabaldiev was dedicated to this task and worked at it 
diligently until the day he died.  He is purported to have written, ‘who needs a 
person who has done nothing for his own people?  I came to this work out of a 
precious honour and pride in my people, and therefore want to show that the 
Kirgiz are in no way worse than other groups’ (Smanbaev 1986).  While few 
of his former students would argue that the last assertion might be attributed to 
him, some take issue with official reports that his career move into higher 
party service was a personal choice.  Nurova (2000: 18), for example, has 
argued that her ‘teacher was torn away from the school that he had built with 
ten years of his life and, it seems to me, this was the second blow that 
Asanbek-agai [as his students called him] did not survive.’     
 The rise and decline of Kyrgyzstan’s first sociological laboratory is 
portrayed either as a marginal event in Soviet sociology or the formative 
period in the history of Kyrgyzstani sociology.  However, it must also be seen 
within the broader context of power/knowledge in Soviet sociology and 
through the lens of the everyday experiences of sociologists working on the 
Soviet periphery.  The KSU laboratory was established during a boom of 
empirical studies during the 1960s.  While it reproduced a narrow range of 
Marxist–Leninist concepts such as labour, class and cultural reproduction, it 
also produced some controversial evidence that social tensions were brewing 
beneath the society’s ideologically crafted veneer.  In particular, Tabaldiev’s 
research on ethnicity revealed that ‘national relations were not as bezoblachno 
[serene] as the party dictated.’  Kuban Bekturganov, a philosopher who 
worked in Tabaldiev’s laboratory and who is now an instructor of sociology at 
KNU, suggests that the studies simply exposed what was already tacitly 
known: ‘What the party says, that’s how it must be.  But real life is different’ 
(Bekturganov 2003).  The exposure of the discrepancy between political 
ideology and social reality was not unique to Kirgizstan, and this eventually 
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erupted into a general crackdown on empirical research during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, one that ultimately led to bans on sociological education and 
a purge of the leadership of the Soviet Sociological Association in 1972 
(Matthews and Jones 1978).34  In Kirgizia, this tendency manifested itself in 
the ‘reorganisation’ of the republic’s first sociological laboratory.  
 Tabaldiev’s reassignment signalled the end of his sociological career.  
The KSU laboratory survived throughout the 1970s under the leadership of 
Rakhat Achylova, one of Tabaldiev’s students who defended a sociology 
dissertation in Leningrad (Asanova 2003).  Other members of the laboratory, 
led by Tishin, continued their research on industrial sociology.  Even today, 
students of the ‘Tabaldiev School’ remain influenced by his re-interpretation 
of the social scientific terms which were previously used to classify ethnic 
groups in the Soviet Union, such as narodnost' (peoplehood or nationality), 
natsional'noe men'shinstvo (national minority), natsional'naia gruppa 
(national group), and etnicheskaia gruppa (ethnic group)  (Nurova 2001).   
 This theoretical tradition, however, has lost much of its meaning for late 
and post-Soviet generations of sociologists who are deliberately reoriented 
away from Marxist–Leninist theories of ethnicity and toward more ‘western’ 
notions of identity.  In addition, much of the material gathered and produced 
during the laboratory’s eight years of existence was lost in its eventual 
dissolution, its contributions to sociological knowledge in the republic 
relegated primarily to the personal memories and archives of these early 
researchers.  As reflected in Asanova’s (2003) regretful statement: ‘there were 
a lot of…files, all these reports—but I don’t know what happened.  Where are 
the reports, all the reports we were reading. […]  I don’t know where these 
reports are, I don’t know.’  Unfortunately, there is very little publicly 
accessible information about the sociological studies carried out during this 
period.  All that really survives of this early laboratory are the older 
generation’s collective memories of a charismatic scholar whose life and death 
has come to symbolise sociology’s struggle for existence in an authoritarian 
society.   
 At the time of his death, the Kirgizstani academic community 
acknowledged Tabaldiev’s ‘contribution to the history and theory of national 
relations and the training of scientific and teaching cadres,’ the importance of 
 104
 
 
his many publications, his work in propagating ‘political and scientific 
information among the masses’ (Asanbek Tabaldiev 1975) and his status as a 
‘well-known specialist of dialectical and historical materialism’ (Karakeev 
1974: 86).  However, the precise nature of these activities and his status as the 
republic’s first ‘sociologist’ did not emerge until after Kyrgyzstan’s 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.  Since that time, however, the 
history of his sociological laboratory at KSU has been revived and 
reconstructed among Tabaldiev’s former students, most of whom are now 
scattered throughout the republic’s atomised departments, institutes and 
centres of sociology.   
While in operation, Tabaldiev’s laboratory was neither entirely stifled by 
ideological politics nor able to offer a space for truly alternative thinking in 
the social sciences.  However, the attempt to combine empirical research with 
both social theory and social policy made it a site of struggle between the 
authority of social scientific knowledge and that of political power within 
Soviet society.  The early studies which were banned in Kirgizia were not acts 
of ‘resistance’ to the official Soviet ideology, though it is tempting to interpret 
them in this way.  Kirgizstani sociologists were not ‘re-emphasising the 
ancient roots of their communities and their cultural debt to traditional Islamic, 
especially Arabic and Persian influence, while downgrading the Russian 
contribution’ during the 1970s, as were some Soviet historians at the time 
(Critchlow 1972: 21).  In their quest for legitimacy and relevance, sociologists 
conceived of the discipline as a thoroughly modern science.  Their work is an 
excellent example of ‘the paradoxical fact that great numbers of people living 
in socialism genuinely supported its fundamental values and ideas, although 
their everyday practices may appear duplicitous because they indeed routinely 
transgressed many norms and rules represented in that system’s official 
ideology’ (Yurchak 2003: 5).  Early Soviet Kirgizstani sociologists were 
above all frustrated by their inability to be accepted and legitimised by the 
ruling regime.  This is evidenced by the tension they felt between loyalty to 
socialist ideals and frustration at being unable to employ the types of social 
scientific knowledge which they felt could help to advance them.   
Some from this generation are therefore disturbed by the dramatic shift of 
loyalty from ‘communist’ to ‘democratic’ ideas (meaning not democratic ideas 
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per se, but the new anti-Soviet rhetoric of democracy).  Asanova (2003) 
describes this as a ‘great tragedy’ and a betrayal.  ‘How did it happen,’ she 
wonders,  
that we so quickly ‘forgot’ about the decades-long preaching of 
communist ideology that we believed in as the ‘sole truth’ and 
‘sole science’?  Is it proper that, not having clarified these 
painful and core questions for ourselves, we have begun to 
elaborate a ‘new ideology’ as if the former one did not exist, as 
if those people who now so energetically take up the ideology 
of ‘national rebirth’ or, let’s say, the ideology of the ‘all-
consuming market’ did not also militantly struggle for the 
realisation of ‘communist ideas’? (Asanova 1995) 
While she is critical of the repressive elements of Soviet ideology and its 
deleterious effects on human creativity and expression, she also maintains 
respect for the ‘great idea of equality’ which was fostered during the Soviet 
period; for 
a society which is oriented to all social needs and for the whole 
society to be equal, society to be engaged in work, in jobs, no 
unemployment, etc.  People are struggling for their work, for 
their interest, struggling for all these, I don’t know, rights, 
freedom, dignity, etc.  This is socialism.   
She—herself the author of a doctoral dissertation in the sociology of the 
family that was rejected as ‘bourgeois ideology’ in Kirgizia during the 
1970s—is one of the few academics to come forward with a serious critique of 
the lack of critical analysis of this phenomenal change.   
In another example, despite the fact that the Communist Party blocked 
publication of the KSU laboratory’s research on ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan 
and ‘only 1% of all research data was released in publications, papers and 
dissertations,’ Tishin (2003) still holds that Soviet use and funding of 
sociology was superior to that of the current Kyrgyz government and foreign 
organisations which, instead of centralising research resources and investing in 
institution-building, commission individual research projects ‘whenever they 
need something.’  Kuban Bekturganov (2003), a member of Tabaldiev’s 
laboratory and later director of the Communist Party’s Centre for the Study of 
Public Opinion (established in 1983), continued to produce theoretical work 
about the study of public opinion in socialist society well into the early 1990s 
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despite the fact that it was seldom recognised by the political leaders to whom 
it was addressed. 
While these academics challenged the conflation of sociology and 
ideology during the Soviet period, they did so in the spirit of that ideology.  
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, sociology was part of the Communist 
Party’s broader ‘hegemony of representation,’ described by Yurchak (1997) as 
‘a system in which all official institutions, discourses and practices are 
always–already produced and manipulated from the center as one unique 
discourse.’  The experience of early sociologists in Kirgizstan, however, 
reveals that localised interpretations of this discourse varied widely.  While 
academics such as Tabaldiev saw sociological research as a valuable source of 
information about social problems which could be alleviated through more 
‘scientifically based’ or at least empirically informed intervention, Soviet 
political authorities saw it as a potential threat to their fragile authority and to 
the integrity of their ideology.  For Kyrgyzstani sociologists who emphasise 
Tabaldiev’s contribution to the establishment of the discipline in the republic, 
this dissonance determined the fate of the KSU laboratory and the history of 
sociology in the republic.  This particular narrative of the early history of 
sociology has therefore taken on epochal qualities in contemporary histories of 
the discipline, becoming a metaphor for the ongoing struggle of sociologists to 
negotiate the continuing tension between scientific truth and socio-political 
power.  
 107
 
 
5 
THE NEW SOCIOLOGY AND PERESTROIKA  
ON THE SOVIET PERIPHERY, 1983–91 
 
Tabaldiev is not the only charismatic figure in the history of Kirgizstani 
sociology, nor is the story of his laboratory the only founding narrative in the 
discipline today.  In 1983, a second sociological laboratory appeared in the 
Frunze Polytechnic Institute (FPI), after independence renamed the Kyrgyz 
Technical University (KTU).  Members of this laboratory consider its founder, 
Kusein Isaev, the true ‘father of Kyrgyz sociology.’ 
 
Sociology during perestroika and the perestroika of sociology 
By the beginning of the 1980s, Marxist–Leninist sociology had become a 
visible, albeit beleaguered, part of the academic landscape in the Soviet Union.  
Although it was not institutionalised as an academic discipline or 
differentiated from the more ‘theoretical’ subjects of philosophy and scientific 
communism (Zaslavskaia 1989: 111-13), a disciplinary journal 
(Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, or Sociological Research) was founded in 
1974, sociological departments were organised in republican academies of 
science, and centres for empirical sociological research employed several 
thousand people in factories, state and party organisations and schools 
throughout the USSR (Zaslavskaia 1989).  However, increasing intervention 
from the Communist Party—including a politically motivated restructuring of 
the Institute of Concrete Sociological Research in Moscow in 1971 and the 
silencing, censoring and deliberate under-utilisation of empirical sociological 
research—meant that sociologists remained under constant pressure to 
conform to political imperatives while promoting the discipline as 
scientifically legitimate and socially relevant (Brym 1990: 208; Weinberg 
1992: 3).  These new pressures were coupled with widespread decline in 
support for sociological research and the USSR Ministry of Education’s ban 
on sociological education in colleges and universities.  During the 1970s, 
Soviet sociology thus entered into a state of suspended development. 
This began to change during the early 1980s when sociologists who had 
been displaced from their official posts began working as ‘constructive 
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dissidents,’ producing subtle critiques of the state of both Soviet sociology and 
Soviet society (Weinberg 1992: 4).  Even before Gorbachev’s rise to power in 
1985, the reform of Soviet sociology had become intertwined and identified 
with the transformation of Soviet society.  During the early 1980s, there was a 
growing sense of urgency throughout the Soviet Union about the need to 
replace the hierarchical structure of the Communist Party and redress its 
increasing ‘distance from the people,’ which was creating tensions in society.  
This movement was to be pursued through a renewal of the ‘distorted’ aims of 
socialism, achieved by the active application Marxist–Leninist principles to all 
social work and analysis (Bekturganov 1990: 107; Ivanov 1988; Koichuev 
1988: 5; Sherstobitov 1987: 5).  As in other union republics, Kirgizstani social 
scientists, along with party propagandists and agitators, were called upon to 
eschew the dogmatism, redundancy and ‘greyness’ which was said to have 
rendered sociological theory and research impotent in the post-Stalin years, 
and to use their critical faculties to ‘accelerate the socio-economic 
development of [the] country and further elevate the social sciences in Soviet 
Kirgizstan’ (Sherstobitov 1987: 3).   
Gorbachev’s economic and social reforms reinforced this renewal of 
sociological purpose.  Academic and party leaders in Kirgizia invoked 
excerpts from his political speeches in appeals to revive theoretical sociology, 
citing that ‘theory is necessary…not only for perspective of social and 
political orientation [but] literally for every one of our steps forward’ 
(Sherstobitov 1987: 3).  In 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party issued a decree ‘on increasing the role of Marxist–Leninist sociology in 
the resolution of the central problems of Soviet society.’  This decree, 
regarded by many as a catalyst for the development of sociology as an 
academic discipline, called for ‘the necessary strengthening of sociological 
work in branches of the national economy and in industries, increasing the role 
of social development services in the quest for productive labour reserves, the 
decrease of cadre instability, the administration of social processes in workers’ 
collectives, and the planning of their social infrastructures’ (Vlasova 1989: 
41).   
New research themes began to emerge and sociologists supplemented 
conventional studies of political economy and nationality with inquiries into 
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health and social exclusion, new forms of social cooperation, housing and 
health, crime and substance abuse, gender issues, social movements, ideology 
and socialisation, youth and sub-cultures, and postmodernity (Weinberg 1994; 
Eades 1991).  Older conceptions of social structure were gradually challenged, 
as were Marxist–Leninist critiques of ‘bourgeois sociology’ and western 
Marxism (Batygin and Deviatko 1994).  As Gorbachev stated in 1988,  
many of Marx’s and Lenin’s ideas now get a new reading after 
they have been misinterpreted or ignored until recently.  The 
creative power of a scientific and humanistic socialism is being 
restored to life after a successful struggle with dogmatism 
(quoted in Batygin and Deviatko 1994).  
While Kirgizstani sociologists pronounced commitment to the new 
political and economic reforms, they also saw in these reforms the opportunity 
to establish the discipline and practice of sociology, as it had been defined in 
previous decades, in a new and more promising political context.  The calls for 
more effective administration throughout the social system and the unification 
of scientific and technical resources toward this end provided ample 
opportunity for sociologists to present their empirical work as significant and 
valuable for Soviet sociology, while the invitation to criticism made it possible 
for them to re-market their hitherto ‘dangerous’ image as being perfectly 
suited to the new regime of glasnost (openness) in politics and science.  For 
example, Tishin (1988: 62) argued that 
[n]ow sociology, like no other social scientific discipline, can 
effectively and actually realise the positions formulated by M. 
S. Gorbachev at the All-Union meeting of chairs of 
departments of social science: ‘science and theory are 
indispensable where and when the usual skills of action don’t 
work, when past experience and practical native wit no longer 
give the needed advice, when principally new decisions and 
non-standard actions are necessary.’ 
 Perestroika enabled sociologists to lobby for better access to education, 
training and resources in the more highly professionalised centres of sociology 
in Moscow and Leningrad.  By increasing the quality and usefulness of 
sociological research and teaching in Kirgizia, it was argued, the republic 
would hasten its transformation from a peripheral and ‘backward’ republic to a 
modern, autonomous and equal part of the Soviet empire.  This, in turn, would 
subsequently raise the profile of academic sociology as a field of knowledge, 
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academic discipline and professional practice.  The real or imagined 
possibility of a ‘revolutionary renewal of Soviet society on the whole and in 
the union republics in particular’ (Isaev 1991b: 32) raised hopes among Kirgiz 
sociologists that they would finally be able to control the ‘structure, work, 
concepts, and financial organisation’ of their field (Isaev 1991b: 34).  They 
felt this would allow them to be more influential in developing policies which 
were relevant to social realities in Kirgizia and that respected ‘national’ 
traditions and ways of life, while still providing a ‘modern’ scientific 
alternative to ‘traditional’ models of society and social development.   
 In 1989, seemingly unaware of immanent upheavals in the Soviet social 
structure, sociologists in Kirgizia began to organise a Kirgiz Branch of the 
Soviet Sociological Association (Isaev 2000; Isaev and Bekturganov 1990).35  
Within this national framework, they also began planning new, locally based 
initiatives such as the Kyrgyz Union of Sociologists and a republican centre 
for sociological research (Isaev and Bekturganov 1990).  While sociologists 
continued to work in industry throughout the 1980s, they also expanded their 
work in party organisations such as the Komsomol as the ideological offensive 
to promote sociology gained momentum.  In 1983, for example, the 
Communist Party of Kirgizia organised a centre for the study of public 
opinion, which was to gather information about problems within the party and 
relay it to the relevant authorities (Bekturganov 1990: 106).  Several years 
later, sociologists from KSU cooperated with members of the Moscow State 
University’s journalism department and national and republican publishers 
(goskomizdat) to conduct a major study of the regional press (Tishin 1989).  In 
this and the following year, the USSR State Committee on People’s Education 
published a number of decrees granting universities the right to teach 
sociology and train sociologists (Isaev 1991b: 32).   
At this time, the focus of public rhetoric on social science shifted from 
technocratic administration to ‘criticism’ and ‘self-criticism.’36  The social 
sciences were among the first targets of critique.  Sociologists declared 
themselves poorly qualified for the social role they were expected to play in 
the further development of Soviet society, i.e., in facilitating more effective 
and efficient social administration.  However, despite their assertions that 
sociology had assumed a new role for perestroika (Zaslavskaia 1989: 105), 
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neither this role nor the technocratic definition of sociology changed 
substantially during the late socialist period.  The discipline was still dedicated 
to empirical research and associated almost entirely with service to state and 
party, as it had been since its construction as a Marxist science of society 
(Goldfarb 1990: 108).  The waning of repressive policies toward social 
research, the invitation for sociologists to provide administrative bodies with 
‘truthful’ and ‘accurate’ data that would enable them to create better plans, the 
use of sociological categories in social policy, the evaluation of Communist 
Party resolutions from the sociological perspective, and the chance to offer 
‘feedback’ to policy makers did not facilitate the establishment of an 
autonomous academic discipline.  Rather, these were attempts to improve the 
way that social information could be applied to further the interests of the 
power elite.   
However, one crucial change occurred at this time in the relationship 
between sociologists and Communist Party authorities: Kirgizstani 
sociologists began to define themselves as an alternative power base within 
the socialist project.37  Their role in ‘assisting practice’ (Zaslavskaia 1989: 
117) was no longer defined as the mere ‘scientific’ confirmation of state or 
party decisions; serving the state no longer meant being subordinate to it.  
Instead, sociologists began to assert that they must play an active role in 
formulating political, economic and social policies and in analysing and 
criticising those which proved to be ineffective.  Sociology became redefined 
as a guarantor of glasnost and perestroika, an ‘objective,’ ‘scientific,’ and 
thoroughly Marxist antidote to the anti-socialist abuses of power which had 
prevented sociologists from fulfilling their ‘natural’ role in assisting the 
planning, organisation and management of the ideal socialist society.   
In Kirgizia, philosophers and scientific communists who had advocated 
the development of sociology as an autonomous discipline since the early 
1970s made this new position clear in public as well as in the academy.  
Bekturganov (1990: 107), for example, published a number of polemical 
articles on the subject in the popular party monthly Kommunist Kirgizstana.  
In one, he stated that 
[w]e believed that the socialists would succeed in building this 
project, and accepted the technology with the principle that the 
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bureaucratic party apparatus knows better how the system must 
look.  Not surprisingly, with this pragmatic approach and 
dogmatic conclusions, they began to interfere in research in the 
social sciences and the study of public opinion if they did not 
confirm the acceptance of earlier theory.  It was precisely this 
approach that forced social science into scholastic theorising 
and led to a crisis of the theory of scientific socialism. 
Throughout the Soviet Union, academic elites launched a Marxist–
Leninist attack against the Stalinisation and ‘distortion’ of social scientific 
knowledge in previous years, challenging state hegemony by using the 
government’s own rhetoric of free inquiry.  The most prominent of these was 
Russian sociologist Tat’iana Zaslavskaia who, in 1986, addressed the Soviet 
Sociological Association with a scathing speech on ‘the role of sociology in 
addressing the development of Soviet society.’  She accused social scientists 
of ‘bringing up the rear of society’ in their repetitive confirmation of 
Communist Party ideology and support for the status quo, and challenged 
them to initiate rather than follow policy in the new era of economic and 
political restructuring (Zaslavskaia 1989: 105).   
Similar critiques soon appeared in Kirgizia as well (Kakeev 1990; Tishin 
1988).  In 1987, the chief editor of the ‘Social Science’ series of the Kirgiz 
Academy of Science’s academic journal Izvestiia akademii nauk published an 
article on ‘the highest mission of the social sciences’ in connection with 
decisions made by the 27th Party Congress that the social sciences should play 
a greater role in Soviet society, particularly economic development.  He urged 
social scientists to return to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism: the more actively 
Marxist–Leninist theory was applied to practical life, the more successful 
would be the socialist project.  The following year, the vice-president of the 
Academy of Science’s Division of Social Sciences argued that ‘the scientific 
base of perestroika is Marxism–Leninism,’ and that, because ‘perestroika 
demands the creative alternation of the theoretical position of Marxism–
Leninism through an analysis of modern social phenomena and ideological 
and economic decisions,’ the necessity of social science was greater than ever 
(Koichuev 1988: 3).  Promoting the value of scientific truth and struggling 
against its monopolisation rose to the top of the agenda in sociology (Tishin 
1989: 4). 
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The perestroika of sociology in Kirgizia, however, also had more 
localised dimensions, specifically those related to the ‘national question.’  One 
was the emergence of a critical approach to the republic’s relationship with the 
Soviet centre.  Isaev (1998a) recalls that from the very beginning of 
perestroika, he ‘felt…the collapse of the united informational space and 
already established methodological elaborations and literature, and struggled 
not to miss anything’ that he could still obtain from Moscow and Leningrad.  
In addition, while Kirgizstani sociologists reiterated criticisms of the 
historically ‘unscientific’ approach to policy making and governance in the 
Soviet Union and the need for intellectual freedom (Isaev and Bekturganov 
1990), they also began drawing attention to regional differences in Soviet 
society and calling into question fundamental tenets of its organisation (Isaev 
1991b).   
For example, a report on the first conference of sociologists in Kirgizia, 
published in Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia in 1990, stated that 
[o]ne of the reasons administrative measures are not effective is 
the mechanical transferral of measures produced in other 
regions of the country to here.  For example, in central Russia, 
particularly in the regions of Nechernozem'ia, where the rural 
population is aging, the call for young people to remain in their 
villages is fully explicable.  In our republic, on the contrary, 
there is overpopulation and unemployment in the villages, and 
young people have limited possibilities to choose a profession 
or activities.  In such conditions, slogans which were until not 
long ago part of our official ideology—‘All graduates to the 
farm!’ and ‘Let the whole class stay on the kolkhoz!’—were 
deeply mistaken (Isaev and Niyazov 1990). 
Moscow, however, interpreted these nascent differentiations as divisive.  By 
the mid-1980s, party officials in the centre had become concerned that social 
science in the Central Asian republics not only suffered from ‘all-union’ 
afflictions such as the ‘boring and dull repetition of truisms, fear of the new, 
and dogmatism,’ but that it also exhibited specifically ‘national’ problems 
such as ‘a narrow mindedness of problematics, departing from regional and 
all-union significance’ (Sherstobitov 1987: 4).  The privileging of ‘national’ 
analysis over class analysis and the glorification (or sometimes the mere 
mention) of national historical figures were seen as evidence of this tendency. 
In short, it was argued that ‘at times, under the guise of national originality in 
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a number of scientific works, efforts are made to present, in idyllic tones, 
reactionary-nationalistic and religious survivals, in contradiction with our 
ideology, socialist way of life, and scientific worldview’ (Sherstobitov 1987: 
4). 
 Some sociologists in Kirgizia, however, were not convinced that the 
uncritical use of universal Soviet categories was an effective solution to the 
problem of regional underdevelopment in the social sciences.  Isaev, for 
example, began to develop his notion of a ‘national Kyrgyz sociology’ during 
this period, arguing that social science was more politicised in Kirgizia than in 
other parts of the Soviet Union.  ‘This is because,’ he claimed, ‘the distortion 
and deformation of the social–theoretical heritage was more pronounced here 
than in the centre. […] Marxist–Leninist social science, having not arisen on 
Kyrgyz soil, lost its critical edge and revolutionary nature under the strong 
pressure of Stalinist ideology and repression’ (Isaev 1991b: 30).   
 The sense that a ‘one–size–fits–all’ approach to the analysis and 
management of Soviet society had been detrimental to sociological 
understandings of life on the imperial periphery was heightened when, in 
1990, disputes over the redistribution of property and position in the south of 
the country exploded into violent riots between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.  
Sociologists argued that the repression of critical research into ethnic relations 
and the ideological mantra that there were no ethnic tensions in socialist 
society had obscured the analysis, and thus the prevention, of such trends in 
the Kirgiz Republic (Elebaeva and Dozhusunova 1991; Nurova 2001), 
particularly as the party had censored studies which suggested that 
‘relationships between ethnic groups had been worsening for ten years before 
the 1990s’ (Tishin 1998: 34).  As perestroika progressed, the 
underdevelopment of sociology in Kirgizia became increasingly correlated 
with the underdevelopment of Kirgizstani society and the denial of national 
autonomy and identity.    
 
Sociology at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute 
These new intellectual and political orientations emerged first from within a 
new sociological laboratory at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute.  Isaev, a 
prominent communist academic and party member, established the laboratory 
 115
 
 
in the Department of Scientific Communism, which he had founded and 
chaired in 1969 at the behest of Communist Party Secretary Togolokovich 
Murataliev (Abazov 1989; Group of Independent Sociologists 1993; Isaev 
1998).  In 1989, the laboratory was expanded into a Department of Sociology 
and Engineering Psychology in order to replace the Department of Scientific 
Communism, and in 1993 it was transferred to the Bishkek Humanitarian 
University (formerly the Institute of Languages and Humanitarian Sciences) to 
become part of the school’s new Department of Administration and Sociology 
(later the Sociology Department), where it continues to operate (Isaev 1999b: 
7).   
 Unlike Tabaldiev, Isaev is most renowned not as the founder of a 
laboratory, but for his role as an advocate for the institutionalisation of 
sociology in the republic and his efforts to create a national, specifically 
Kyrgyz, sociology.  Like Tabaldiev, Isaev is a charismatic figure.  During the 
Soviet period, he commanded significant authority both among his students 
and (barring a brief fall from grace in the mid-1980s) the Communist Party; he 
has been called ‘one of the greatest scholars’ of his time in the republic 
(Sagynbaeva 2003).  Many of Isaev’s former students credit him with the 
single-handed development of sociology in Kyrgyzstan, particularly noting his 
role in nurturing a group of well-trained ‘cadres’ for whom he organised 
educational opportunities in the best academic centres in the Soviet centre.  He 
is also known as a staunch defender of the discipline in what continued to be a 
hostile political atmosphere.  Ainoura Sagynbaeva (2003), the first chair of 
sociology at the American University–Central Asia and director of SIAR 
Bishkek, a major marketing and social research firm in Bishkek, says,  
I don’t always agree with [Isaev] on a number of 
methodological questions.  But his role in the establishment [of 
sociology] is very important, because of all the candidates of 
science which we have today, 90% are owing to him, during 
the Soviet period when it was only possible thanks to his 
authority.  They were sent from Kirgizstan to study in Moscow, 
Leningrad, and Sverdlovst—to the very best schools of 
sociology.  He did all of this.  He went to the Ministry and 
made demands, I mean he stayed there and spent the night to 
demand.  […] He simply really wanted sociology to exist, so 
that there were specialists and so that these specialists received 
an education in good schools such as Moscow State University 
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[MSU] and the Institute of Sociology within the Russian 
Academy of Science—he sent them there.  All this was his 
personal work.   
Sagynbaeva’s personal experience—a mixture of happenstance, curiosity 
and Isaev’s intervention—was typical for young Kirgizstani sociologists of the 
time.  While studying for an undergraduate philosophy degree in Kiev, she 
was attracted to sociology through short two-semester courses which were 
then just beginning to appear in universities in larger Soviet cities.  She joined 
the FPI department of Scientific Communism upon her return to Kirgizia in 
1986 because ‘that’s where they said there was sociology.’  After working as 
an instructor and in the laboratory for three years, she studied at MSU to 
become one of the first Kirgiz aspirants in sociology.  ‘When I said I wanted 
to go to MSU, [Isaev] got me a place.’  Similarly, Asanbekov (2003) recalls,    
[w]hen I became a sociologist long ago, it was by circumstance.  
After completing higher education where I studied as a 
historian, I could not find a job in my own specialisation.  They 
invited me…to the sociological laboratory at the Frunze 
Polytechnic Institute.  Professor Isaev was the scientific 
director of that laboratory. […] And thus I went to work there; 
there wasn’t anything anywhere else and, little by little, I 
started to learn more about this science.  I worked there three 
years.  I earned my degree and defended my dissertation.  I 
studied as an aspirant in sociology at the Russian Academy of 
Science in Moscow, then at the Academy of Science of the 
USSR, and thus I became a sociologist.     
Isaev, he says, had the greatest influence on him.  ‘He always said, “come on, 
write; do some research, tovarisch…go here, go there; there’s a conference, 
get an invitation to go”’ (Asanbekov 2003). 
 Isaev’s efforts to recruit and train sociologists were relatively successful 
during the late Soviet period not in small part because the discipline had 
gained a degree of legitimacy during perestroika.  By the late 1980s, in fact, 
sociology was relatively well institutionalised in the USSR’s major academic 
centres, and social scientists on the periphery were eager to benefit from and 
contribute to this trend.  Although the FPI laboratory survived into the 1990s, 
however, Isaev’s work contributed more to the popularisation of sociology in 
Kirgizstan than it did to its institutionalisation.  This was due partly to the 
persistence of tensions between political and scientific responsibilities in 
sociological work, and to the continuing reluctance of political and economic 
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elites to loosen their grip on their ideological control of images of Soviet 
society.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Isaev and other sociologists (e.g., 
Bekturganov, Tishin, Achylova and Elebaeva) tried again to reconcile these 
tensions and the spectre of a more critical and analytical sociology appeared 
on the intellectual landscape.  This development, however, remained 
embedded within the culture and structure of state science, and many of the 
early achievements of Isaev and his followers were abruptly nullified with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
 
Disciplining sociology 
One change which occurred during the 1980s and was maintained after 
independence was the redefinition of sociology from an extra-disciplinary 
practice to a semi-autonomous or autonomous academic discipline.  The FPI 
laboratory was initially organised as a research unit within the Department of 
Scientific Communism and defined as an ‘instructional–auxiliary–
sociological–laboratory’ (Sydykova 1998).  As such, it fulfilled a similar 
function to Tabaldiev’s laboratory, namely, the integration of sociology 
education, professional training and political service.  During the 1980s, Isaev 
used this laboratory as a base for training the second generation of Kirgizstani 
sociologists, who, unlike those who joined the KSU laboratory in the late 
1960s and 1970s, entered the field just as it was becoming a field as opposed 
to an extra-disciplinary practice.   
 While the teaching of sociology in VUZy was still discouraged by the 
Communist Party and nonexistent in the Kirgiz Republic, Isaev’s laboratory 
benefited from the nascent movement to develop sociology education in the 
RSFSR.  Frustrated with the republic’s dependence on the centre, Isaev 
supported Soviet policies to increase the production of ‘national cadres’ in the 
Kirgiz academy.  The FPI laboratory provided the first institutional base for 
his long-term project to create a critical mass of professionally trained, self-
reproducing Kirgizstani sociologists who would be equally able to conduct 
empirical research, teach sociology in universities and contribute to the 
discipline’s overall institutionalisation and professionalisation.      
 He also placed new emphasis on distinguishing sociology as an 
independent academic discipline, distinct from but compatible with scientific 
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communism and historical materialism.  According to Sagynbaeva (2003), the 
laboratory’s home within scientific communism was problematic for Isaev as 
he wanted to produce ‘specialists who would actually be pure sociologists.’  
This distinction has led many Kirgizstani sociologists to consider this 
laboratory and not Tabaldiev’s to be the ‘first’ sociological institution in the 
republic (Ibraeva 2003; Osmonalieva 1995).  This is particularly true of 
Isaev’s former students, the first generation of students who could 
systematically defend dissertations in sociology (albeit not in Kirgizstan), 
pursue academic careers as professional sociologists and take advantage of 
resources in newly established departments of sociology in Moscow and 
Leningrad during the second half of the 1980s.  In fact, according to Isaev 
(2000), the institutionalisation of sociology in Kirgizia only ‘beg[an] with the 
preparation of professional specialists in the scientific centres of Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, and other cities in the RSFSR, in which more than fifteen 
candidates of sociological science were trained in the 1980s and 1990s.’   
 The rhetorical redefinition of sociology as an independent field, however, 
did not significantly alter the political and administrative roles which had been 
ascribed to it in preceding decades.  It was still imagined as part of scientific 
communism, in service to the broader political project of reforming and 
improving socialist social planning during perestroika.  The FPI laboratory’s 
organisation, thematic foci and social role remained dictated by economic and 
political forces in Soviet society.   
 Unfortunately, there are very few public records of the early work done in 
this laboratory; as with the KSU laboratory, much of our knowledge of it must 
be gleaned from former members, unpublished papers and dissertations 
(Nurova 2001: 379).  Initially, research teams focused on topics of personal 
and professional interest to Isaev himself, such as the study of village life, 
rural–urban migration and the ‘adaptation of Kirgiz youth to industrial work’ 
in the republic’s urban areas.  He gradually expanded this scope to include 
studies in ‘student life,’ industrial sociology and (during perestroika) local 
elections.  The laboratory also conducted commissioned studies for the 
Communist Party on inter-ethnic relations, party bureaucrats, how political 
leaders should communicate with people of different classes, and the reform of 
non-university based people’s education (Blum 1990).  In 1988, researchers 
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studied industries in the Tokmak and Chuy regions of the republic to ascertain 
whether people felt they were ‘owners’ of their collective property (Isaev and 
Bekturganov 1990).  Such research anticipated the trend toward privatisation, 
which they continued to study until losing funding in 1994 after publishing a 
series of critical articles on the subject (see Chapter 9).     
 According to Isaev (1993a), from the time of its establishment ‘there 
[were] many major changes in the status of this laboratory, the makeup of its 
staff, and also in the character and volume of scientific research.’  These 
changes had less to do with the laboratory’s success or failure as a research 
institution and more to do with the demands and expectations of the Kirgiz 
state, Communist Party and university administration.  In 1988, for example, 
the laboratory was made responsible to the university’s higher-level academic 
bodies such as the rektorat (administrative body of university officials and 
high-ranking academics) and scientific–technical council.  At this time ‘it was 
decided to transform the sociological laboratory into an institute–problem–
scientific-research–sociological–laboratory (or NISL) called ‘Social Problems 
of the Contemporary Scientific–Technical Revolution,’ which was created to 
conduct research on the ‘sociological problems of the preparation of 
engineering cadres and social problems of the scientific–technical revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan’ (Isaev 1993a; Osmonalieva 1995).  This laboratory, 
particularly its relation to both the university and political and economic 
apparatus, served as a model for the integration of sociological research into 
higher education well after independence (Isaev 1993).   
 While Isaev retained decisive control over the laboratory’s organisation 
and activities (Isaev 1993a), his position in the party and belief that sociology 
should support the improvement of socialist planning meant that there was 
little tension between him and the administration over control of the 
laboratory.  His early studies of rural–urban migration and everyday life in 
agricultural and industrial collectives posed no immediate threat to the party’s 
authority.  In fact, his ability to combine new discourses of democratisation 
with official party rhetoric on economic and social development secured the 
laboratory’s survival during the mid-1980s amidst growing fears that the 
discipline harboured ‘subversive’ tendencies. 
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Sociology and social planning 
During this period, Kirgizstani sociologists benefited from Moscow-led 
initiatives which encouraged the use of ‘complex research’ in social planning.  
During perestroika, discourses on socialist development shifted from 
productive economics to a more holistic conception of reform, which defined 
social and economic development as mutually enhancing.  The new theoretical 
focus on the significance of ‘the social’ (ways of life, traditions and 
particularly ‘public opinion’) raised new questions about how it might be 
planned and managed in order to improve levels of economic development in 
the republic.  This created space for sociologists to strengthen their presence in 
industrial institutions as well as to create new roles for themselves beyond 
factory sociology.   
 The proceedings of the 27th session of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party in 1986, as well as Gorbachev’s speeches on the relationship 
between social science, social planning and development, figured heavily in 
shaping the development of policy research during this period (Tishin 1988; 
Tishin et al. 1989; Vlasova 1989).  While the invitation for sociologists to 
participate in policy making was initially greeted with enthusiasm, the 
weakening of party hegemony over the intellectual content of sociological 
research through glasnost gradually enabled sociologists to challenge the 
ideological forms of these policies and advocate an even greater role for 
themselves in defining the meaning of perestroika.   
 Throughout this period, the FPI sociological laboratory remained firmly 
integrated into the administrative apparatus of state and party in Kirgizia, with 
many of its research projects conducted specifically on zakaz (commission) for 
governmental organisations seeking data to inform social planning.  Like the 
KSU sociologists who had previously worked in cooperation with industrial 
managers, members of Isaev’s research team were oriented primarily to 
gathering information obtained through quantitative research and making 
‘scientifically based’ recommendations for administrative changes.  In 1987, 
for example, Isaev led a team of researchers in a study to make 
‘recommendations for the social development plan for the sovkhoz [state farm] 
Stavropol'skii during the 12th Five-Year Plan [1986-90] and in the period to 
the year 2000’ (Dzhangirov et al. 1987).  This project was typical of social 
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research in Kirgizia during the mid-1980s: empiricist, loyal to Marxist–
Leninist conceptual frameworks and oriented toward providing technical 
assistance to improve the effectiveness of the party’s social and economic 
policies.   
 These characteristics were reflected in the project’s research design, 
which was an exercise in gathering information that would allow researchers 
to ‘develop recommendations and create a plan of social development for the 
state farm collective’ (Dzhangirov et al. 1987: 14).  In order to do so, the team 
surveyed 500 workers and pensioners living on the farm, asking them 
questions about their standard of living, working and living conditions, 
education, leisure time and personal activities, political work and general level 
of individual satisfaction.  It then produced descriptions of the responses by 
using electronic statistical data analysis programmes.  The results, which 
exposed poor living conditions and low levels of job satisfaction within the 
community, were then compared to studies of similar sites in the RSFSR, 
Byelorussia and the Baltic republics, and generalised to state farms throughout 
Kirgizstan.   
 The theoretical basis for this data-gathering task was drawn from a 
number of broadly non-theoretical sources, including the classic works of 
Marxism–Leninism, the Communist Party programme, materials from the 27th 
Congress of the Communist Party, the all-union law on state enterprise and 
decrees from the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of 
Ministers regarding ‘the problems of development in the social sphere and the 
realisation of radical economic reforms.’  The social health and stability of 
workers’ collectives were ascribed a central role in this process as they were 
considered key to the viability of the material basis for these reforms 
(Sorokina 1989).  The goal of the research, in other words, was to evaluate the 
extent to which social, material and cultural conditions within collectives were 
conducive to fulfilling the political and economic objectives of the Communist 
Party’s next five-year plan.  Again, it was therapeutic. 
 In many ways, the Stavropol'skii study reflects the continuation of 
sociology’s role as a technical arm of Marxist–Leninist philosophy and party 
ideology in Kirgizia.  While the team used data collection methods similar to 
those used by members of Tabaldiev’s laboratory in their studies of industrial 
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management and national relations during the previous decade (i.e., 
questionnaires and structured interviews), the research itself was actually more 
politically and intellectually conservative in nature, seeking only to inform and 
not influence policy making (as Tabaldiev had intended).   
 However, it also revealed subtle changes in the status of sociological 
research during this period—in particular a thaw, or perhaps convergence, in 
the relationship between sociologists and the republican power elite.  The 
mere fact that sociologists produced and distributed empirical evidence of 
social problems, dissatisfaction among workers, poor living standards on state 
farms, and low levels of education and political engagement (Dzhangirov et al. 
1987: 30, 84) signalled a loosening of political controls on the discussion of 
‘negative’ phenomena and a growing willingness to at least formally consider 
‘public opinion’ and subjective experience as sociological ‘data’ (Dzhangirov 
et al. 1987: 15, 30).  It also anticipated new connections between 
sociological research, public opinion and ideals of democratisation which were 
at the time only beginning to emerge (Abazov 1989; Toktosunova and 
Sukhanova 1990).  As Isaev and Bekturganov (1990: 3) pointed out,  
in the years of repression, the bureaucratic apparatus of 
government laid down its veto on the study of all negative 
social phenomena and processes, the revelation of which could 
expose it in the people’s eyes.  They carefully concealed the 
negative aspects and intentionally circumvented acute problems 
of social policy, international relations, independent religiosity 
and etc., which demanded a principled and critical evaluation. 
It was not until several years later that critiques of this white-washing would 
converge to form new discourses linking sociology with independence, 
democracy and truth-saying, thereby altering (though not fundamentally 
transforming) the definition and role of sociology in Kirgizia. 
 
From the national question to national sociology 
In 1989, the Department of Scientific Communism and NISL at the FPI were 
reconstituted as the Department of Sociology and Engineering Psychology 
(Isaev 1993; Osmonalieva 1995).  This was a significant change in sociology’s 
position within the system of academic disciplines.  Instead of being subsumed 
within scientific communism or historical materialism, sociology was afforded 
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semi-autonomous status in relation to other disciplines such as engineering 
psychology (concerned with the social and psychological aspects of scientific 
management and social planning38) at the FPI or social psychology in a new 
department at the Kirgiz Women’s Pedagogical Institute (Isaev 1993).  The 
FPI laboratory continued to conduct studies on commission for organisations 
such as state farms and the Komsomol, and invested considerable energy 
between 1989–92 to strengthen the relationship between sociology and the 
latter (Sydykova 1998).   
 During this period, members of the laboratory also began carrying out 
non-commissioned studies on social issues related to Communist Party policy 
and perestroika and publishing the results in popular media outlets such as 
Sovietskaia Kirgizia (Soviet Kirgizia) and Komsomolets Kirgizstana 
(Komsomol Member of Kirgizstan).  As perestroika progressed, these studies 
became more nationally oriented in character and increasingly included 
features unseen in previous decades, such as discussions of indigenous social 
problems caused by inequalities in the organisation of Soviet society.   
 As a prominent member of the Communist Party, Isaev remained loyal to 
the goals of rational social planning; however, he also rose to the challenge of 
democratisation and began to question the established relationship between 
sociological research, the Communist Party and political reform within the 
republic.  He invoked the vocabulary of glasnost and perestroika to criticise 
the Russo-centric bias of many social policies applied to Kirgizstani society 
and capitalised on weakening controls over intellectual content to publish 
empirical data about problems in rural communities in Kirgizia.  The FPI 
laboratory was one of the first institutions in the republic to make perestroika 
into an object of analysis and advocate that ‘the necessity of including results 
from sociological research in social administration requires that [we] develop 
the problem of activating the human factor [in order to] realise the principles 
of social justice and the consolidation of socialist ways of life’ (Isaev and 
Bekturganov 1990: 7).  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, members of the 
laboratory began to conduct opinion surveys about various social and political 
issues (e.g., privatisation, local self-governance, Communist Party reforms)  
and developed ‘ratings’ for politicians standing in local and republican 
elections (see Chapter 9).   
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 Other sociologists used this same rhetorical strategy, linking the 
development of sociology directly to political processes of socialist 
democratisation and economic programmes of market liberalisation.  In 1990, 
for example, Bekturganov, then-director of the party’s Centre for the Study of 
Public Opinion, argued that  
due to the disengagement of political power from public 
opinion and real life processes, the break between the political-
economic structure and social expectations has not only not 
decreased, but continues to increase.  We can only find a way if 
we concretely and, at the same time, complexly study and 
analyse the real complex situation by applying Marxist 
methodology.  Only then can we make political and state 
administrative decisions that are oriented toward a democratic 
society, deepen the transformative process in civic and political 
life and realistically measure the forms and methods of 
administration in society. […] Quality and in-depth public 
opinion research would allow a more accurate and clear 
definition of the priorities and ideals of a reformed, human and 
democratic socialism.  (Bekturganov 1990: 107-108) 
Despite these subtle changes in orientation and emphasis, Kirgizstani  
sociologists nevertheless aspired to be more rather than less Soviet during the 
late 1980s.  A survey conducted among those attending the first conference of 
sociologists in 1990, including members of the Academy of Science, Ministry 
of Education and sociologists working in the industrial sector, suggested that 
the majority were most interested in three major sub-fields within sociology: 
the sociology of nations (31%), economic sociology and the sociology of 
labour (26%) and the sociology of youth (20%) (Isaev and Niyazov 1990: 
150).   
 A double-edged criticism of Kirgizstani sociology emerged at this 
conference.  On the one hand, it was not sufficiently national in thematic 
focus; on the other, national traditions and ‘backward thinking’ prevented 
many social scientists from liberating themselves from the habit of 
reproducing dogmatic Marxist–Leninist platitudes.  There was also 
considerable criticism of the ‘rudimentary’ institutional and intellectual state 
of the discipline, which, it was argued, had made little progress since the 
establishment of Tabaldiev’s laboratory in 1966 (Blum 1990; Isaev and 
Niyazov 1990).  Finally, it emerged that Kirgizia was the only republic still 
lacking a national branch of the Soviet Sociological Association.  Isaev’s 
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deliberations to create one began at this conference, and he was elected 
president of the short-lived endeavour.  
 Isaev’s elaboration of a national ‘Kyrgyz’ sociology did not coalesce until 
after independence.  However, the genealogy of his focus on the republic as a 
geopolitical unit of sociological analysis and sphere of political interest is 
evident in many of the publications produced by his laboratory in the years 
immediately preceding independence.  The nation—now meaning the Kirgiz 
Republic and not the USSR—soon became a central feature of his own 
theoretical and empirical work and shaped the direction of research within the 
FPI laboratory.  Additionally, his reputation as a social critic and member of 
the political opposition (the latter a title which he rejects, preferring to call 
himself a ‘patriot–opponent’) can also be traced to this period (Isaev 1998).  In 
1989, for example, he was interviewed by a journalist from Sovietskaia 
Kirgizii regarding his opinions on the ‘national question.’  Even more than 
Tabaldiev, Isaev (1989) has been critical of the unequal relationship between 
the peripheral republics and the Soviet centre and of the ideology of sblizhenie 
(merger), arguing that cultural, specifically educational achievements in the 
republic had been limited specifically because they ‘excluded all concepts of 
national development and national pride.’   
 Instead of blaming this entirely on Russian dominance in the region, 
however, he criticised passivity within Kirgiz culture.  He drew on the work of 
the republic’s most renowned writer and public intellectual, Chingiz Aitmatov, 
comparing Kirgizstani intellectuals to the fictitious mankurts, semi-literate and 
incompetent prisoners of war who became mindless slaves after having their 
heads bound in camel skins (see Aitmatov 1983).  In arguments echoing those 
of Algerian psychiatrist Frantz Fanon (1967), he also claimed that the 
‘national intelligentsia are drawn from the peasantry and quickly move to 
become bureaucrats, directed by the centre…they are good at mimicry and 
have rejected all things national to please the centre’ (Isaev 1989).   
 Sociologists were not exempt from these criticisms (Blum 1991).  Isaev 
advocated the development of national self-consciousness not as a challenge to 
the Soviet state, but rather as a new, non-Stalinist method for equalising 
political relationships within the multi-national Soviet Union.  As he argued in 
an article published just before independence, ‘especially in the Central Asian 
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republics, where economic backwardness combines with cultural 
particularities, bloody conflict has broken out.  And it is here that sociology 
can and must render an invaluable favour, for it can prevent a society from 
possible social tension, give concrete recommendations and determine the path 
of their resolution’ (Isaev 1991b: 27).  In the years following independence, 
Isaev’s insistence on the relevance and necessity of sociology rapidly evolved 
into a new discourse on a specifically national sociology (see Chapter 6).    
 
The challenge to generalised Soviet sociology in Kirgizia  
The ‘bloody conflict’ mentioned above referred to the week-long riot which 
erupted between two different ethnic groups living in the south of the republic, 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, in June 1990.39  It was condemned by Soviet authorities 
as a ‘terrible misfortune’ and the result of young people ‘giving way to their 
emotions and [being] stirred up by the ambitions of extremist-minded 
elements’ (Appeal Central Committee 1990) among a ‘people who, for 
centuries, [had] lived together in peace and harmony’ (Appeal USSR Supreme 
Soviet 1990).  Kirgizstani sociologists, however, interpreted the incident as a 
glaring indictment of structural injustice within the society and a consequence 
of years of denying the existence of ethnic tensions in the republic.  It was also 
interpreted as part of a larger trend of violent demonstrations against political 
repression and economic dissatisfaction throughout the USSR (e.g., in 
Kazakhstan, the Baltics and the Caucasus).  In an article entitled ‘Toward the 
sociological study of the state of the internationalisation of raising young 
people,’ Bekturganov (1991) argued that ‘if ideological work in the sphere of 
national relations goes on without deep scientific analysis of the real situation 
of national processes, without an account of the opinion and mood of the 
representatives of various nationalities and peoples, then it will lead to the 
appearance of national egoism and arrogance, to national isolation and 
particularity [and] to dependent moods and parochialism.’   
 Regardless of how they were represented, the Osh events raised 
awareness that Kirgiz society was harbouring serious and unresolved 
problems, many of which could not be attributed to ‘regularities’ of Marxist–
Leninist development in the all-union context or dealt with within the 
conventional theoretical formulae of Marxist–Leninist sociology.  This was 
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just one of many cracks which had begun to show in Soviet pronouncements 
about the stability and high quality of life on the periphery.  As the pace of 
social change increased at the Soviet centre, Kirgizstani society became less 
stable, with more public discussion of social problems accompanied by greater 
attempts from political leaders to deny them.  Sociologists, particularly Isaev 
and his associates, began calling attention to these issues in the media and 
increasing demands that they be researched empirically. 
 While Kirgizstani sociologists remained heavily dependent on institutions 
in Moscow, Leningrad and other major Soviet cities for training and academic 
resources and continued to work within the Marxist–Leninist frameworks 
which constituted the bulk of their theoretical knowledge, they no longer 
aspired to orient this knowledge outward toward the abstract problems of a 
generalised ‘Soviet’ society.  Being good Soviet scholars no longer meant 
emulating Moscow in every way; indeed, in some cases, it meant precisely the 
opposite.  Isaev in particular turned a critical gaze on Kirgizstani society and, 
as a result, on the colonial-style organisation of Soviet sociology, which he 
argued had long prevented social scientists from genuinely understanding their 
own society.   
 By 1991, Kirgizstani sociologists had redefined their position within the 
Soviet sociological community.  They argued that by attaining relative 
autonomy to engage in research about problems of republican as opposed to 
generalised ‘Soviet’ concerns and phenomena, they would be able to make 
more meaningful contributions to an increasingly pluralistic Soviet sociology 
as a whole.  This new role in turn would allow them to muster greater support 
from the Soviet state and Communist Party, which they argued would 
consequently stimulate the theoretical and methodological development of 
sociology, as well as its professionalisation.  This was justified by arguments 
that the slow pace of social change in Soviet Kirgizia was due to the lack of 
scientifically based revelations of the social levers and 
mechanisms, with the help of which we could involve various 
social groups of the population in perestroika.  But this is 
possible if we give required significance to the development of 
sociology both at the level of each union republic, taking into 
consideration the specific conditions and local particularities, 
and on the scale of the entire country. […] (Isaev and 
Bekturganov 1990: 3) 
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   The waning of generalised Soviet sociology in the Kirgizstan and the 
emergence of a more localised and nationally oriented discipline, however, 
was not initially associated with aspirations to autonomy from political 
institutions or separation from the Russian centre.  Isaev, for example, realised 
that sociology in the republic would suffer from the decentralisation of Soviet 
science.  On the eve of independence in 1991 there were still no fully 
independent sociological institutions in Kirgizia.  Academics remained 
dependent on subsidies from the central government and the inconsistent flow 
of commissions for research from Communist Party organisations and sectors 
of the ‘national economy’ (e.g., factories and state and collective farms).  
While books and pamphlets on Marxist–Leninist philosophy abounded in 
university and public libraries, there was a paucity of literature on sociology, 
and even this was generally obtained by individuals travelling to conferences 
in the RSFSR and other more ‘western’ Soviet republics (or, toward the end of 
perestroika, even abroad).  In addition, even basic information on new 
developments in the discipline was only available in the capital city of Frunze, 
not in rural regions.  The Ministry of Education had stipulated that sociology 
should become a required subject for university students in the early 1990s 
(Isaev 1998b, 1998c), but only a handful of individuals trained in Russia and 
the Ukraine were qualified to teach undergraduate sociology and universities 
were slow to implement courses.  In early 1991, therefore, the recognition and 
support of national sociological communities within the broader framework of 
a reformed Soviet sociology held enormous promise for sociologists in 
Kirgizstan.  The immanent collapse of the Soviet Union, however, did not. 
 
Kirgizstan’s second-generation sociology into independence 
Unlike many institutions, the FPI Department of Sociology and Engineering 
Psychology survived the late Soviet period and independence.  Several years 
later, Isaev was invited to a professorship at the Bishkek Humanitarian 
University and in 1993 the FPI sociological laboratory found a new home in 
the new Department of Administration and Sociology at this university.  The 
department soon became recognised as a base for the professional training of 
sociologists in the republic, with Isaev claiming to have trained fourteen 
candidates by 1995—a claim which was later disputed by sociologists from 
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KNU (Osmonalieva 1994).  Isaev continued to conduct research about 
conventional topics such as the adaptation of rural Kyrgyz youth to urban life 
and increased the frequency of the laboratory’s public opinion studies on 
political issues like privatisation, many of which became more critical as the 
country’s politico-economic situation deteriorated.  He says of this period, 
‘outwardly, all seemed fine—who would have expected that today we [would] 
not have the means to exist?’ (Sydykova 1998)   
 In 1994, the nomenklatura (wealthy private patrons with political status) 
who sponsored the privatisation studies withdrew their funding for political 
reasons, and the laboratory lost the resources to conduct large-scale surveys 
about this and other topical issues.  Since that time, it has made continual 
appeals for support in the media and at academic and development 
conferences (Isaev 1995; Isaev and Ibraeva; Isaev et al. 1996, 1996a, 1997).  
Sociological research at the Bishkek Humanitarian University now depends 
heavily on the procurement of grants and awards by individual faculty 
members or state commissions, private patrons and international organisations.   
 On the one hand, Isaev’s persistent efforts to institutionalise sociology 
throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet periods made him an easy target for 
criticism—particularly from other sociologists formerly associated with 
Tabaldiev’s laboratory at KSU—of opportunism and hypocrisy.  Tishin et al. 
(1998), for example, question the authenticity of his academic qualifications 
by pointing out that that he ‘was head of a department of scientific 
communism for twenty-four years and defended his doctoral dissertation 
[there], and only after the collapse of communism did he become the “father” 
of sociology.’  On the other hand, many sociologists in the republic, 
particularly those associated with the FPI laboratory interpret Isaev’s 
willingness to change his intellectual and political positions as a positive good.  
From this perspective, he is a role model for the development of pluralistic 
approaches to sociological thinking.  ‘Kusein Isaevich really worked on the 
development of sociology in Kyrgyzstan,’ says Nurova (2003).  ‘He studies all 
contemporary concepts and paradigms of sociological theory in France, 
England, Germany, and America.  He thinks that we need to create our own 
sociological theory.’  While few other sociologists actively support his project 
to establish a specifically national sociology (as Gulzat Botoeva [2003] put it, 
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‘maybe a national association or some kind of group of sociologists…but a 
national sociology—I don’t think so’), his decades-long crusade to 
institutionalise the discipline provides them with a point of reference with 
which to understand their own historical identity—an emerging identity which 
was abruptly ruptured in 1991 with the declaration of Kyrgyzstan’s 
independence from the Soviet Union. 
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6 
ONE SOCIOLOGY OR MANY?   
THE LOCALISATION OF SOCIOLOGY IN KYRGYZSTAN 
 
The impact of independence on sociology  
In August 1991, the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic severed its attachment to 
the Soviet Union and officially became the sovereign Republic of Kyrgyzstan.  
Independence was widely unanticipated and largely undesired.  Nevertheless, 
it was publicly celebrated with as much enthusiasm as if it had been won 
through popular struggle.  Two months after Gorbachev was removed from 
power, the new Kyrgyz president Askar Akaev, who had previously been a 
staunch supporter of the Soviet state, gave a speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly, saying, ‘now that the centre has collapsed under the weight 
of the crimes it committed against its own people, there is no holding back the 
will of the republics which have found their freedom in a bid for political and 
economic independence’ (Akaev 1991).  Sociologists clambered onto the 
bandwagon, asserting that ‘in the conditions of an independent Kyrgyzstan, 
[…] the possibility for the gradual development of a national sociology 
appeared’ (Isaev 1998b).        
 Independence did indeed alter the trajectory of the discipline’s 
development, though not necessarily as expected.  The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union transformed the entire intellectual, cultural and political context 
of social science in the communist bloc and required a massive overhaul of the 
structure and organisation of the disciplines in each of the constituent 
republics (Eades 1991; Weinberg 1992, 1994; Batygin and Deviatko 1994; 
Kurti 1996; Skvortsov 1993; Tishkov 1998; Ruble 1993; Zaslavskaia 1989).  
In Kyrgyzstan, it initially created a sense of increased intellectual and 
academic freedom.  Epistemological orthodoxies of scientific communism 
were dismantled as sociologists engaged openly with other schools of thought.  
For example, Isaev (1991) recalled that ‘trips across the border, the study of 
works of foreign authors and of [his] compatriots, and books that were not 
accessible before’ led him ‘to conclude that Marxism is only one branch of 
social thought.  There is a wealth of other views in the world.’  He instructed 
his colleagues: ‘open up for yourself once again Kautskii, Trotsky, Bukharin, 
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Rykor, Chinov, and you will understand how poor and one-sided our own 
vision was. […] Unfortunately, we did not only have a false consciousness, 
but in principle an unscientific one.’  The notion of pluralism in both theory 
and politics was elevated to a new level of virtue (Isaev 1999b: 8, 2000; 
Kydralieva 1998: 171), and sociologists were ostensibly free to develop new 
theories of class, culture, stratification, power and social change in 
Kyrgyzstani society.   
 However, given the long-term hegemony of Marxist–Leninist philosophy 
and the paucity of alternative theoretical frameworks or scholarship in the 
republic, this freedom from intellectual monism did not immediately translate 
into a freedom for something else.  As Isaev (1999f) later pointed out, ‘when 
the Soviet Union collapsed and the sole scientific knowledge of Marxist–
Leninist history made the sociological approach seem useless, the social 
sciences began to suffer from uncertainty.’  The major sociological 
specialisations—the sociology of nations, economic sociology, the sociology 
of labour and the sociology of youth (Isaev and Niyazov 1990: 150)—were 
grounded entirely in Marxist–Leninist theory, and data accumulated in these 
areas were organised in Marxist–Leninist categories of analysis.  This entire 
intellectual architecture was categorically delegitimised through its very 
association with the Soviet past and its incompatibility with emerging 
neoliberal discourses of society and social change.  Kyrgyzstani sociologists 
were thus left with few conceptual resources for teaching or research.  
Bekturganov et al. (1994) argue that ‘Kyrgyz sociology does not yet have its 
own requisite theoretical–methodological equipment that corresponds to local 
conditions’ and that ‘therefore, no one can intelligently explain the processes 
going on in the country.’ 
 With little access to new, non-Marxist Russian resources in sociology, 
many sociologists turned to zapadnaia sotsiologiia (western sociology).  
Independence did not usher in a new era of intellectual confidence in 
Kyrgyzstan, and while the Soviet project was abandoned, many academics 
continue to defer to Russia and, increasingly, ‘the west.’  As Nesvetailov 
(1995: 61) points out, referring again to the centre–periphery organisation of 
Soviet science, ‘the major specific trait of the periphery is its dependence on 
the center.  This position has been retained by the former republics of the 
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USSR.  The only change has been the center’s address: instead of the Soviet 
structures in Moscow, the address has become the world centers of scientific 
activity.’  The orientation to this new centre of ‘world sociology,’ as it is 
called in Kyrgyzstan, has been unquestioningly embraced as the optimal 
model for the development of sociology as an academic discipline 
(Baibosunov 1998; Isaev 1993).   
 Intellectual re-orientation is also visible in the types of theory which have 
replaced Marxism–Leninism and become ascendant since independence, and 
in the desire to ‘internationalise’ indigenous sociology so that it meets ‘world 
standards.’  According to Tishin (1998: 34), ‘the Marxist–Leninist theory of 
nations and national relations was refined with new worldviews by L. 
Gumilev, V. Mezhuev and V. Tishkov.  The ideas of Max Weber, E. Biatra 
and K. Nurbekov received wide circulation. […]  Sociologists in Kyrgyzstan 
paid special attention to the views of English researcher E. Gellner and 
American sociologist S. Huntington.’  Functionalists such as Parsons, Merton 
and Smelser are extremely popular among sociologists (Isaev and Abylgazieva 
1994; Isaev, Akmatova and Shashembieva 1996).  While postmodern and 
post-structuralist traditions are virtually absent on the intellectual landscape, 
Bourdieu, Habermas and Giddens receive increasing attention (Baibosunov 
1998).  Elebaeva and Dozhusunova (1991) have introduced konfliktologiia or 
conflict studies, which integrates American conflict resolution studies with 
Soviet conceptions of ethnic relations and provides a context for studying the 
‘environment and genesis of international contradictions…as well as their 
links with other types of contradictions and the ways and methods of 
eradicating international conflict.’  Theories of the ‘third way’ are combined 
with the more familiar convergence theories of Sorokin, Aron and Bell (Isaev 
1993c); Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of civilisations’ merges with 
Sorokin’s theory of cyclical history (1993c) to develop ‘Eastern’ or ‘Asian’ 
theories of development; and Beck’s ‘risk society’ is used to theorise and 
criticise the social consequences of Soviet environmental policies in 
Kyrgyzstan (Isaev 2000).  Isaev (1997) has also drawn comparisons between 
Popper’s and Gandhi’s theories of the ‘open society,’ challenging the 
predominance of the first ‘western’ theory and recommending more attention 
to the latter ‘eastern’ one.  
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 These externally produced social theories are not adopted undiscerningly, 
and their meaning is often influenced by existing epistemological frameworks.  
For example, structural functionalist theories are often applied to traditionally 
Marxist–Leninist themes such as class relations, marriage and the family, and 
national relations (see also Isaev 2000).  In their discussion of the middle class 
in industrialised capitalist economies, Isaev and Abylgazieva (1994) argue that 
the ‘systematic functioning of all spheres of society depends on three 
ingredients: intellect and specialised knowledge, a material base, and the 
ability to direct personnel and lead people’s activities. […]  In industrialised 
capitalist countries the part of the population that fills this function is the 
middle class, located between the elites and workers (highers and lowers).’   
Similarly, Isaev, Akmatova and Shashembieva (1996) frame their 
analysis of social value in Parsonian terms, defining values as ‘generalised 
goals and means of their achievement, fulfilling the role of fundamental 
norms.  They support the integration of society, help individuals realise their 
socially approved choices of behaviour and life-significant conditions.’  In an 
even more obvious intersection of functionalism and Marxism–Leninism, 
Shaidullaeva’s (1992) candidate dissertation on the ‘structure and function of 
the modern Kyrgyz village family’ aimed to ‘clarify and analyse the particular 
structures and functions of the modern Kyrgyz village family on the basis of 
concrete sociological and statistical data’ while adhering to ‘methodological 
principles’ such as are dialectical principles, connections and developments, 
the historical and logical, the objective and systemic, and the general and 
particular.’  
 The intellectual ‘crisis,’ as this limited theoretical pluralism is often 
referred to in post-independence publications about sociology, has been 
compounded by the disintegration of the Soviet science structure.  According 
to Ibraeva (2003), the Soviet collapse led not only to the disintegration of 
Kyrgyz sociology’s emerging structure and raison d’être, but also to ‘the 
collapse of traditional links with great Russian educational institutions, limited 
access to Russian literature on sociology, the stagnant isolation and decline of 
standards and quality of diplomas for candidate and doctoral degrees that are 
defended either here or in Kazakhstan.’  Sociological research centres in 
schools and factories dissolved, their personnel being scattered throughout the 
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republic.  Many prominent and accomplished ethnic Russian scholars left the 
country; many others left the nearly defunct academy in search of livelihoods 
elsewhere.  For those that remained, opportunities to conduct sociological 
work became increasingly constrained after Soviet subsidies for research and 
education were withdrawn; the Kyrgyz government has given only token 
support for scientific activities since independence (see endnote 2).  The 
virtual cessation of state funding for teaching and research compelled 
Kyrgyzstani sociologists to seek support from other sources, particularly the 
many foreign and international organisations which flooded the country 
immediately after independence.  Sociologists cite lack of support ‘from 
anywhere’ for teaching, research, publication or travel as one of the main 
obstacles to institutionalising the discipline in the post-Soviet period 
(Asanbekov 2003; Blum 1990, 1993; Isaev et al. 1993b), and the 
‘marketisation’ of sociological research is seen as both a blessing (No borders 
1999) and a curse (Baibosunov 1993; Isaev 1996a; Tishin 2003).   
 Although they also struggled to secure funding during the Soviet period 
and could do so only for applied or ‘practical’ research as opposed to 
theoretical studies (Isaev 1991a; Zhivogliadov 1990), many managed to work 
on commission for industrial enterprises, Communist Party organisations and 
groups, and the state administration (Bekturganov 1990: 110).  In 1988, for 
example, the Institutes of Economics and Philosophy and Law under the 
Kirgiz Academy of Science ‘switched to working on goszakazy (state 
commissions) for the government of the republic, on a variety of problems that 
have important national significance,’ including drug addiction and the 
internationalisation of vospitanie.  Similarly, in 1990, plans to create a 
republican centre for sociological research were based on the ‘principle of 
serving the zakazchik-ispolnitel (commissioner–user)’, specifically the state 
and Communist Party (Isaev and Bekturganov 1990: 8).  The then-president of 
the academy asserted that ‘today, for academic science, state commissions are 
the most suitable forms of linking science to production.  Government control 
of the work and confirmation [of its completion] with a special state receipt 
guarantee strong planning discipline’ (Koichuev 1988: 8).   
 There were also criticisms that this method of funding sociological 
research further restricted sociologists’ already limited intellectual and 
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scientific autonomy.  The trend toward goszakazy was also a trend toward 
greater dependence on and alliance with the Soviet state and Communist 
Party.  One journalist argued that ‘[g]iven that there are no [autonomous 
sociological] institutions in the country,’ sociologists had two choices: either 
to offer their services to industry ‘all in the hope for a crust of bread,’ or, ‘for 
those who value independent thought and freedom of scientific enquiry, to set 
up [their] own cooperative and fill orders from industries, organisations and 
institutions on contract’ (Blum 1990). Nevertheless, just prior to 
independence, the goszakaz system was for the most part viewed as a 
progressive development in the institutionalisation of Soviet sociology in 
Kirgizia.    
 The break with these constituencies and the demise of the Communist 
Party as a political and economic force in Kyrgyzstan therefore translated 
directly into the total loss of sociology’s funding and clientele.  This vacuum 
was filled almost immediately by a new, wealthier client base: international 
donor and governmental organisations.  Since the early 1990s, foreign 
governments and international and non-governmental organisations have 
invested ‘many millions of dollars’ in reforming social scientific research in 
the former Soviet republics (Ruble 1999).  The sponsorship of organisations 
such as the Open Society Institute, USAID, The Eurasia Foundation, 
UNESCO, Save the Children, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the MacArthur Foundation, the International Labor Organization and 
others has enabled Kyrgyzstani sociologists to conduct research in otherwise 
impossible conditions (Ablezova 2003; Bitkovskaia 1996; Blum 1993; Ibraeva 
2003; Isaev 1993a; No borders 1999; Osmonalieva 1995; Sagynbaeva 2000).  
These organisations have become, in fact, the primary sources of funding for 
sociological research in Kyrgyzstan today.   
 Dependence on these new clients or zakazchiki, as they are called, has an 
underside as well.  Many of the limitations placed on intellectual autonomy by 
the Soviet state and Communist Party are reproduced by the new clientele.  
While the organisations often promote values of democracy and the ‘open 
society’ (and capitalism by implication),40 their relationship with Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists is often anything but egalitarian.  Not only general topics of 
research, but also specific research questions and research design are often 
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prescribed in advance.  Local sociologists are hired to gather data through 
surveys and interviews which are then analysed and published—often in 
English and in the form of institutional reports as opposed to scholarly 
papers—outside the country (Asanbekov 2003).  Kyrgyzstani sociologists 
generally have no right to use this data for their own research purposes 
(Ablezova 2003; Nurova 2003; Omurkulova 2003).   
   Furthermore, because there is little protection of intellectual property 
rights, there is limited knowledge sharing within the post-Soviet sociological 
community.  While some attribute this to secretive hoarding habits acquired in 
‘Soviet times’ (Ablezova 2003), there is also a more immediate concern that 
competing groups will ‘steal’ questionnaires and research methods and 
thereby gain advantage in securing grants and commissioned research projects 
from international organisations.  For example, when the country director of 
the US International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), attempted in 
2001 to set up a national database for sociological questionnaires, study results 
and data sets, she met with great resistance from sociologists who were ‘very 
territorial about data and only wanted to sell it’ (Omurkulova 2003).  The 
government, for its part, did not want to establish such a database through an 
American organisation.  As a result, post-independence sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan has become highly commercialised and commodified.   
 Some veterans of both the state and market commissioning systems have 
even deeper reservations about the potentially subversive politics of 
institutional affiliations between national sociological research and 
international organisations.  Isaev (1998), for example, thinks that 
[w]e are in a rather interesting situation.  For the past five to six 
years, foreign foundations have been financing many of the 
research projects by our local group of sociologists, aimed at 
gathering data on public opinion.  They never publish their 
research results.  Meanwhile, they have managed to gather 
strategic information, which our government and state 
institutions are unaware of.  This implies that other countries 
have learned about our country’s strengths and weaknesses, our 
market and economic potential, and how we think and what we 
think about.  The ultimate threat, I believe, is in this 
phenomenon (see also Isaev 2003; Sydykova 1998). 
 The marketisation of sociology has affected teaching as well as research 
in the independence period.  Although the formal ban on teaching sociology in 
 138
 
 
Soviet VUZy ended in 1988, the Ministry of Education did little before 1991 
to incorporate sociology into the university curriculum.  After independence, 
numerous departments of sociology sprang up in colleges and universities in 
the republic’s capital.  Some, such as those in the Bishkek Humanitarian 
University and the Kyrgyz National University, are given meagre support by 
the state, while others such as the Sociology Department in the American 
University–Central Asia are funded by foreign governments or private donors.  
For the most part, however, there is low investment in institution building 
projects and many donors prefer to sponsor individual professional ‘training’ 
programmes for sociologists.  This has left many of the republic’s scholars, 
particularly those who do not speak English, without substantial means of 
support for work within universities.  The universities themselves are 
competitive rather than cooperative, each promoting its own model of 
sociological education in an attempt to attract students in the new market–
oriented system.    
 The proliferation of departments, programmes and research centres, 
however, has also led to concerns that poorly qualified instructors are 
producing academically incompetent graduates, who in turn assume positions 
in amateur sociological research companies, compete for valuable contracts 
with international organisations, and deliver misguided information about 
society to the public.  Soviet-era concerns about the detrimental effects of 
‘amateur’ sociology on the discipline’s professional status have been 
exacerbated by the decentralisation of training, standards and resources in the 
independence period, particularly as many sociology courses were still taught 
by philosophers, historians and scientific communists (Isaev 1998c).  To this 
day, despite years of effort, there is still no attestation commission qualified to 
grant doctoral degrees in sociology in Kyrgyzstan, and the few candidates who 
can afford to travel are forced to defend their dissertations in nearby 
Kazakhstan or in Moscow (Baibosunov 1998).  Although many instructors 
have gained further training in sociology through either self-study or grants to 
study abroad, the shortage of professionally qualified sociologists means that 
they are often asked to teach over and above their own abilities (see Chapters 
7 and 8).   
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In short, early enthusiasm about the promises of independence for 
sociology in Kyrgyzstan has been tempered by concern about the deleterious 
consequences of the decentralisation and commercialisation of a discipline 
that had been institutionalised as part of a centralised, socialised empire.  The 
decades-long struggle to institutionalise sociology as a technology of both the 
state and Communist Party, and its rehabilitation during perestroika as a 
discipline dedicated to both scientific truth and political commitment, were 
abruptly severed in 1991.  Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the Soviet Union 
did not automatically translate into independence or autonomy for 
sociologists, but rather into new forms of cultural and structural dependency 
that are being negotiated within an entirely new set of conceptual frameworks 
and institutional arrangements.   
Despite the many challenges facing sociologists in Kyrgyzstan today, 
however, there is an almost unilateral consensus that the discipline can and 
must play an active role in ‘the transition’ of Kyrgyz society from 
‘totalitarianism and communism’ to ‘democracy and capitalism.’  It should, 
according to its advocates, ‘help advance the goals set by the government and 
president for the creation of a free, democratic and civilised society’ (Isaev 
1991a), provide ‘accurate information’ in order to stem the flow of 
destabilising ‘rumours’ in society (Migration 1992), serve as a ‘believable 
source of social information for making decisions or correcting the political 
behaviour of leaders’ (Isaev et al. 1994b), ‘strengthen the scientific basis of 
politics’ (Isaev 1995), ‘facilitate the skilful administration and development of 
society on the whole’ (Isaev 2003) and ‘analyse and differentiate politics 
contemporary to us, not leaving the sphere of the production of political 
products only to individual politicians, and in order to escape from symbolic, 
yea, even the outright manipulation thrust on certain points of view’ (Isaev et 
al. 1997a). 
 Thus, as in the Soviet period, a tension between truth and politics appears 
at the centre of sociologists’ efforts to institutionalise and professionalise 
sociology as a field of knowledge, academic discipline and professional 
practice.  The institutional, intellectual and political legacies of Soviet social 
science have mingled with new, post-Soviet discourses of both sociology and 
the nation to shape the contours of this negotiation.  Factors such as a 
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collective disavowal of sociology’s technocratic and ideological role in Soviet 
society, the contemporary demand for sociology to be ‘practical’ and 
‘relevant,’ scepticism about the effects of illegitimate power on knowledge, 
faith in the possibility and promises of scientific sociology, and professional 
competition for access to the highly competitive and unstable pool of 
resources available for sociological work have intersected to create a new 
context for the production of discourses about the emergence, development 
and future of sociology in Kyrgyzstan.  In this context, the question of whether 
independence demands a new ‘national’ sociology is high on the agenda.41  
 
National sociology in Kyrgyzstan: myth or reality? 
The creation of a national Kyrgyz sociology, or at least a sociology that is 
responsive to the needs of the Kyrgyz people, is portrayed as a uniquely post-
Soviet project.42  However, this obscures the fact that sociology was 
historically a ‘national’ science in the republic.  From the 1960s–80s, 
Kirgizstani sociologists considered themselves members of the larger Soviet 
academic and political community—albeit one unevenly developed in centre 
and periphery—and explained the success or failure of efforts to 
institutionalise sociology in Kirgizia within a broad, inter-republican 
framework (Alimova 1984; Leninizm i razvitie 1970; Skripkina 1983; 
Tabyshaliev 1984).  By and large, until the 1980s they did not interrogate the 
primary unit of analysis—the Soviet Union as a whole—which framed 
sociological work.  In Kirgizia, they thought of themselves as part of a Soviet 
sociological tradition; the concept of otechestvennaia nauka (national or 
patriotic science) communicated both geographical and political meanings of 
Soviet nationhood.  While this may seem incompatible with ethnically based 
post-independence conceptions of ‘national’ identity, it must be understood in 
the historically specific context of sociologists’ earlier conceptions of Soviet 
nationhood.   
By perestroika, however, the validity of Soviet national identity was 
brought into question by social scientists who exposed differences between the 
content and organisation of their work and that of sociological research being 
done in the Russian centre (see, e.g., Isaev 1991b).  Emerging discourses of 
ethno-nationalism within the Soviet Union and critiques of centre–periphery 
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inequalities disrupted the conflation of republican and national identity in 
Soviet sociology.  Whereas Kirgizstani sociologists once criticised themselves 
for being too ‘backward’ to ‘catch up’ with their Russian colleagues, they now 
blamed disciplinary underdevelopment on their institutional and intellectual 
dependence on the Russian centre (see Chapter 5; Isaev and Bekturganov 
1990; Isaev and Niyazov 1990; Vlasova 1989).  They began to ask what 
insights from a specifically ‘Kirgiz sociology’ could contribute to Marxist 
sociology on the whole, and questioned how the development of national 
sociology was inhibited by dependent development and democratic centralism 
within the academy.  At this time, they also began to conduct research on more 
republican-specific issues (e.g., internal migration) as opposed to more general 
pan-Soviet problems.   
After independence, the image of an autonomous Kirgiz Soviet sociology 
which had emerged during perestroika was replaced with that of a new, fully 
independent ‘Kyrgyz’ or ‘national’ sociology.  Since this time, the 
institutionalisation of sociology in Kyrgyzstan has been analysed and 
evaluated almost entirely on the national level (Baibosunov 1998; 
Bekturganov et al. 1994; Ryskulov 1998; Tishin 1998).  ‘Kyrgyzstan,’ it is 
argued, ‘needs real, accurate and timely information’ that only sociology can 
provide (Bakir Uluu 1994), and sociologists are called upon to help national 
power bases such as the president and parliament ‘create a free, democratic 
and civilised society’ (Isaev 1991a), just as they were expected to facilitate 
perestroika and glasnost in previous years (Blum 1990).  The body of 
information published about sociology in Kyrgyzstan since independence (in 
newspaper articles, research reports, theses and dissertations and conference 
proceedings), indeed gives the impression that a national sociology is 
emerging in the republic.  
 However, as illustrated in Part 2, decades of initiatives to coordinate the 
institutionalisation of sociology at the national level have produced few 
tangible or sustainable results.  The KSU laboratory and Tabaldiev’s attempt 
to use it as a base and model for sociological research in Soviet Kirgizia are 
seen as early examples of aborted institutionalisation (Isaev and Bekturganov 
1991; Nurova 2000).  Plans to create an inter-disciplinary Division of Social 
Sciences and Scientific Council on the Problems of International Development 
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and National Relations in the Academy of Science during the 1980s did not, as 
proposed, concretise coordination between social science institutions or 
strengthen empirical research on ‘economic, sociological and legal problems 
that [had] practical national significance’ (Koichuev 1988).  And while state 
commissions were hailed as the financial future of social research during 
perestroika, the withdrawal of state subsidies and revenue after independence 
and the post-Soviet government’s trend towards authoritarian rule quickly 
drew a line under this alternative.   
Just as Isaev and Bekturganov (1990) argued that poor coordination 
between academic social science and technological production led to 
demoralisation among researchers who rarely saw tangible outcomes from 
their work during perestroika, younger sociologists working in the post-Soviet 
period have made similar comments about the absence of institutional 
‘mechanisms’ for implementing sociologically informed policies at the 
national level.  The state, while a source of ideological hope, has been a 
disappointment in reality.  As Ablezova (2003) puts it, non-governmental 
organisations ‘want to change things,’ but ‘the [Kyrgyz] government has more 
power. […] And they’re not ready to get negative results.’  Both before and 
after independence, the state repeatedly rejected proposals to establish a 
centralised republican centre for sociological research (Abdyrashev 1994; 
Bekturganov 1997; Isaev 1993a; Isaev and Bekturganov 1991; Isaev and 
Niyazov 1990), and an attestation committee for the defence of doctoral 
dissertations in sociology (Baibosunov 1998; BHU 1997b; Isaev 1998c; 
Ryskulov 1998; Sydykova 1998).  Isaev’s ongoing attempt to found a national 
union of sociologists, which evolved from his plan to create a Kirgiz branch of 
the Soviet Sociological Association in 1990 (see Sotsiologicheskoe 
obschestvennogo ob'edineniia 1999; Isaev 1991b, 2000), has been beset by 
financial difficulties and internal divisions among scholars themselves 
(Sagynbaeva 2003).  Since 1990, social scientists have continually repeated 
public appeals for improvements in sociology education, increases in state 
funding for sociological research, legal support for social researchers, the 
creation of journals and informational bulletins, and the establishment of 
sociological research centres and a professional association (Blum 1990; 
Bekturganov 1995a; Isaev 1998c; Isaev and Bekturganov 1991). 
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When the rhetoric of ‘national’ or ‘Kyrgyz’ sociology is placed in this 
context, it is revealed as an intellectual, professional and political project 
rather than a description of something that actually exists.  It serves a number 
of important functions, in particular, as an ideological reconstruction of 
sociology and a way of distancing indigenous social scientific knowledge from 
colonial power and politics during a period of intense post-Soviet nation 
building.  However, there are obstacles to the institutionalisation of a national 
sociology in Kyrgyzstan.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the hierarchical 
centralisation of Soviet science encouraged the republic’s dependence on the 
Russian centre and precluded the development of viable indigenous 
institutions.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent nationalisation 
of Russia’s academic institutions left social scientists bereft of what they 
previously considered their own ‘national’ sociology institutions.  Finally, 
while decentralisation made room for intellectual innovation, it also 
engendered professional competition. Without major funding from the state or 
private sector, the establishment of a new national infrastructure for social 
science has been supplanted by the emergence of impoverished, atomised 
institutions which are supported by different, often competing, individuals and 
organisations.  
Sociologists on the ground are aware of these factors and are concerned 
that sociology is being institutionalised unevenly or even fragmenting at the 
national level.  Aldasheva (2003), for example, points out that there is a 
process of institutionalisation occurring in which ‘sociology is developing in 
different directions,’ Omuraliev (2003) notes that different sociological 
institutions within the republic have incommensurable identities and functions, 
and Bekturganov et al. (1994) argue that the ‘separation’ of professional 
sociologists ‘contributes little to the creation and development of sociology.’43  
Even wide-reaching descriptions of trends in ‘Kyrgyz sociology’ obscure the 
fact that they refer only to trends in certain parts of the sociological 
community and exclude others.44    
In addition, there is considerable disagreement over how sociology 
should be defined in the post-Soviet context.  Is it an indigenous form of 
knowledge or a ‘western’ import?  If the former, what are the particular 
concepts and theories which characterise Kyrgyz sociology?  If sociology is an 
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alien discipline, on the other hand, to what extent might it be adapted for use 
in Kyrgyz society (Bekturganov et al. 1994; Isaev, Niyazov et al. 1994b)?  
How can Kyrgyzstani sociologists integrate into the international community 
without losing their particular national or regional identity (Isaev 2000)?  
Given the diversity of sociological theory, what schools of thought and 
methodological approaches may be considered legitimate contributions to the 
field in its new, post-Soviet form (Asanova 1995)?  In the absence of 
authoritative decision-making bodies, who will be able to make these 
decisions?  How will sociologists be trained and employed, and who has the 
power to certify their professional expertise?  If sociology must no longer be 
in service to illegitimate power, what are the proper boundaries between 
sociological work and power bases such as the state, the media and 
international organisations?   
Rather than speaking of a ‘national sociology,’ it is therefore more 
accurate to say that different groups of sociologists are engaged in developing 
different types of sociology in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  These sociologies 
share a number of common features by virtue of their emergence in a shared 
socio-political and economic context.  One can speak of ‘Central Asian 
sociology’ only in the broadest of terms.  After lecturing in both Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, for example, Buckley (1999) noted the rising popularity of 
sociology and the general problems faced by all sociologists in the region.  
However, she also argues that ‘the future for social science appears somewhat 
brighter’ in Kazakhstan, due to the country’s less repressive government and a 
modicum of interest from the national Academy of Science.  Furthermore, 
while sociologists from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan consider themselves part 
of a Central Asian cultural space, many have also asserted the uniqueness of 
their own sociological traditions (Editor 1998; Luk'ianova 1990; Toschenko 
1998).  As will be demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8, even within Kyrgyzstan, 
different university departments conceptualise sociology differently, basing 
their work on different sets of intellectual and professional traditions and 
relying on different institutional alliances within and beyond Kyrgyzstani 
society.   
However, despite criticism that intellectual and institutional 
disorganisation is having a detrimental impact on efforts to establish public 
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legitimacy for the field, there has been no systematic attempt to explain the 
causes or scope of the phenomenon, how differences and similarities between 
conceptions of sociology may be related to social forces and personal choices, 
or why such diversity is seen as anomalous or as an anti-value.  Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists often struggle to explain why, more than a decade after 
independence the field has not been institutionalised in Kyrgyzstan.  As Isaev 
(2000) wrote, 
[t]he establishment of sociology as an independent sphere of 
scientific knowledge, an academic subject and a profession is 
difficult for us.  This is seen in the lack of a special scientific-
sociological knowledge and way of thinking, trained cadres and 
traditions, and the long-term dominance of the ideologicisation 
and politicisation of quasi-social scientists. […] As shown by 
the experience of other countries, the institutionalisation of 
sociological knowledge is dependent upon the appearance of 
specialist professionals, the achievement of a mature scientific 
status, the formation of a particular infrastructure, a calling to 
support the reproduction and translation of knowledge, 
investment in scientific associations and etc.45
Such explanations are grounded in a number of unexamined assumptions: that 
national independence is the logical point of departure for understanding the 
development of sociology in a post-colonial society, that sociology must be 
defined and measured as a discrete discipline and according to a pre-existing 
set of criteria, and that scientific progress is hastened by the institutionalisation 
of knowledge and impeded by the influence of ‘non-scientific’ ways of 
knowing.  As such, they focus on the continued politicisation of sociology and 
the ‘corrupting’ influence of external factors such as financial difficulties, 
political pressure and a general lack of public interest in the field, and on 
answering questions like ‘Who interferes in the development of sociology?’ 
(Isaev 1996b) 
These analyses neglect more theoretical questions about science itself, 
such as whether the social, academic and institutional conditions which make 
possible the emergence of sociology as a sphere of scientific knowledge are 
actually the same as those which make possible its development as an 
academic subject and practical profession.  How is a ‘sociological way of 
thinking’ created, and how and why does it become shared or guarded among 
a broad group of practitioners?  Who or what determines whether a field of 
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knowledge has reached ‘maturity’?  What enables or constrains the 
development of a disciplinary infrastructure, specialist training, and public and 
political legitimacy?   
Only by taking distance from the rhetoric of ‘national sociology’ and 
analysing the local conditions in which sociology is defined and practiced can 
we illuminate the actual processes by which different types of sociology are 
being institutionalised in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  We must understand the 
local intersections of knowledge and power, how sociologists working in 
particular institutional contexts respond to structural opportunities and 
constraints while pursuing professional goals, and how they conduct their 
affairs with different resource-granting constituencies.  Given that the 
intellectual contours of a discipline are often constructed in response to 
changing intellectual environments and the expectations of resource providers, 
this approach can facilitate a sociological explanation of how and why 
sociologists vary in their definition of the nature and role of sociology, why 
the content and organisation of curricula differ, why there are different 
approaches to research, and why the boundaries of the field itself may be 
differently delineated.   
These questions are clarified through an analysis of the boundary–work 
sociologists do within academic departments and in the public sphere.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, disciplinary boundary–work is used to order 
knowledge and professional knowledge production, extend or monopolise 
scientific authority, or defend the autonomy of a particular body of knowledge 
against its colonisation or control by another.  At the institutional level, it may 
serve a number of specific purposes.  It is employed to help sociologists 
establish a unique professional identity, enhance and protect their institutional 
prestige, distinguish themselves from other practitioners and solicit material 
and symbolic resources from external constituencies.  Theoretically, 
boundary–work is understood as a technique of power, which is employed to 
further the establishment of intellectual and professional authority in situations 
where such authority is ambiguous or challenged.  However, practitioners 
working in an emerging discipline may also interpret it more pragmatically as 
a necessary response to practical questions about how to define sociology and 
garner support for their professional livelihood.  Exploring these more emic 
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understandings of boundary–work allows us to better understand how social 
scientific knowledge and power intersect in everyday academic life.   
 
Reintroducing the local: the importance of departmental conditions 
Despite the overwhelming focus on the development of ‘national’ and 
‘international’ sociology in Kyrgyzstan, local institutional context has become 
increasingly important in the post-Soviet period.  Existing work on national or 
indigenous sociology provides excellent insight into the political economy of 
social scientific knowledge in post-colonial societies (Akiwowo 1999; Alatas 
2000a; Bujra 1994; Eisemon 1981; Fahim 1970; Filino 1990; Ganon 1965; 
Hiller 1979; Leoneri 1967).  However, as this work focuses on explicating 
structures of academic dependency and the division of labour within the 
international social scientific community, it tells us little about how local and 
global social forces are experienced, interpreted or negotiated by social 
scientists in individual nation-states.  Too often, explanations of knowledge 
production in newly independent societies are therefore reduced to matters of 
colonial domination, submission and resistance (e.g., Ake 1982; Rahman 
1983).  While it is important to understand how the dynamics of power and 
knowledge work at the level of intellectual geopolitics, it is also vital to 
examine how local power structures and knowledges mediate these forces. 
Recent studies of disciplinary institutionalisation have emphasised the 
importance of local institutional conditions in mediating the construction of 
scientific knowledge within national contexts (Camic 1995; Camic and Xie 
1994; Small 1999).  Small (1999), for example, argues that an emerging field 
of academic knowledge may be differently conceived and institutionalised 
under different socio-institutional circumstances, even within a single national 
context.  Decisions about the scope and content of sociology, its role in 
society, its relationship to other disciplines and practices and the relationship 
between teaching and research are often made within departments that have 
very different philosophies, organisational cultures and resources.  He argues 
that in addition to examining the socio-political sources of such 
differentiation, we must also understand the effects of the narrower academic 
context in which a field emerges and explain how conceptualisations of a field 
are contingent upon immediate departmental conditions.  He argues that  
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[t]he definition and conception of an emerging intellectual 
enterprise in a department will result largely from the efforts of 
its practitioners to secure resources to institutionalize the 
department and legitimize its work; they must obtain these 
resources (which include material capital, political support, and 
academic negotiation) from specific constituencies, which, in 
turn, place expectations about how the new enterprise should be 
defined.  Thus, the relationship is best conceived as an 
interactive process between the practitioners who attempt to 
institutionalize their new enterprise and the constituencies that 
are potentially willing to support it (Small 1999: 661). 
In post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, where educational institutions are isolated from 
one another and from the centre of the scientific world system, the definition 
and establishment of disciplines is particularly conditioned by institutional 
culture. 
A common boundary–work project, such as the creation and 
institutionalisation of a national sociology, can therefore take different forms 
in different institutions.  Bujra (1994), for example, illustrates how differences 
in the ownership and function of social science institutions impacted the local 
development of the field in post-colonial Africa by comparing the historical 
evolution of government led national institutions, inter-governmental 
institutions, social science community led institutions, and donor community 
led institutions.  Similarly, Filino (1990) explores how four different types of 
sociological institutions in Brazil and Argentina—Catholic universities, state 
universities, private teaching centres and independent research centres—were 
affected by the emergence of authoritarian regimes; in general, ‘what sorts of 
sociology find homes in which kind of institutions.’  
Gieryn (1983: 781) reminds us more generally that the demarcation of 
academic disciplines is ‘routinely accomplished in practical, everyday 
settings: education administrators set up curricula that include chemistry but 
exclude alchemy; the National Science Foundation adopts standards to assure 
that some physicists but no psychics get funded; journal editors reject some 
manuscripts as unscientific.’  He goes further to ask, ‘how is the demarcation 
of science accomplished in these practical settings, far removed from the 
apparently futile attempt by scholars to decide what is essential and unique 
about science?’  This question is particularly useful for analysing the 
development of sociology in the highly politicised atmosphere of Kyrgyzstan.  
 149
 
 
Since independence, the local institutional context of sociological work has 
become a key factor in this process as scientific institutions in the republic 
diversify and stratify, and as new departments of sociology begin to emerge. 
 
The institutional factor in Soviet and post-Soviet sociology   
Despite the representation of Soviet sociology as a monolithic enterprise, 
institutions did matter under the Soviet regime.46  However, by the time 
sociology emerged on the academic scene in Kirgizia during the 1960s, the 
production of social scientific knowledge in educational and scientific 
institutions was heavily regulated by the Communist Party and therefore, at 
least formally, relatively homogeneous throughout the country (Lisovskaia 
and Karpov 1999).  Until perestroika, the standardisation of disciplinary 
knowledge was an integral part of both ideological and administrative state 
policy (Bess 2000; Kodin 1996).  This minimised the role that local 
institutions could play in the construction of social scientific knowledge.  
Sociologists working in various sectors of Soviet society shared a common 
intellectual and political culture, spoke one professional language and sought 
support and legitimacy from the same constituencies (i.e., the Communist 
Party and state and local governmental organisations).  While we have seen in 
Chapters 4 and 5 that charismatic individuals were able to assert alternative 
interpretations of dominant themes within Soviet sociology and that individual 
social scientists did not necessarily internalise official definitions of their 
work, the heteronomous position of the field of sociology within the Soviet 
power structure, the hegemonic politico-intellectual culture of the Soviet 
academy and the centralised organisation of education and science prevented 
these variations from becoming sustainable alternatives to official sociology.   
This homogenisation weakened during perestroika as policies of 
decentralisation and democratisation were applied to educational and scientific 
reforms.  Throughout the country, as Dunston (1992: 11) argues, you could no 
longer speak of ‘Soviet education…the concept had become fraught with 
difficulty.  The school system was in some respects beginning to fragment and 
in others to fray at the edges.  The underpinning ideology was no longer 
sacrosanct.’47  At this point, the local context of the production of academic 
sociological knowledge became increasingly more important.  This is 
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particularly evident in the way that certain thematic foci and approaches to 
sociology became associated with different institutions and individuals in the 
Kirgiz Republic: studies on social planning in collectives and factories under 
Isaev at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute, higher education under Tishin at the 
Kirgiz State University, the family and culture under Achylova at the 
Women’s Pedagogical Institute, and national relations under Elebaeva at the 
Academy of Science.  
After independence, Soviet sociology was even more radically 
decentralised and the Communist Party lost its monopoly on defining the field.  
Despite the sense of chaos that this created it was also viewed as an 
opportunity for sociology to recover from the ‘deviation’ of Soviet sociology 
and resume its ‘natural’ course of development as an independent, 
autonomous academic discipline.  Many Kyrgyzstani sociologists believe that 
the emergence of greater intellectual freedom would automatically stimulate 
the institutional development of social science in one particular direction—
that of non-Soviet, ‘world sociology’ (Isaev 1993; Isaev, Niyazov et al. 
1994b).  The adoption of positivist, universalist and modernist theories of 
institutionalisation has made many sociologists sceptical of arguments that this 
process can or should occur in different ways.  Instead, differences of 
approach within sociology that do not fit into the consensus about what 
constitutes the ‘correct’ path of development are often perceived as new forms 
of politicised deviation.48  This has made it difficult for many sociologists to 
come to terms with how and why multiple conceptions of sociology have 
emerged in Kyrgyzstan.   
 
Introduction to the case studies 
Chapters 7 and 8 therefore explore, in comparative perspective, the post-
independence conceptualisation and practice of the field in two academic 
settings: the Sociology Department of the Bishkek Humanitarian University 
(BHU) and the Sociology Department of the American University–Central 
Asia (AUCA).  These cases were selected because while they are situated 
within a common socio-historical context, a different paradigm of sociology 
has emerged in each.  Both are sites of a common project to institutionalise 
sociology as an academic discipline, educational subject and profession in 
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Kyrgyzstan and both consider themselves to be the leading sociology 
department in the republic.49  However, they have different institutional 
legacies, sources of funding and social capital, relationships to state and 
society, and intellectual, political and ideological orientations.  As will be 
illustrated in the case studies, these variables shape how practitioners define 
the content, scope and role of sociology, and on the types of boundary–work 
they engage in to advance the discipline and their own professional interests.  
Before introducing the cases, however, it is important to understand the 
common context in which they are embedded.   
 
Common challenges facing sociology departments in the post-Soviet period 
Kyrgyzstani sociologists working in universities must first of all contend with 
problems affecting education as a whole within the Kyrgyz Republic, 
including poverty, a lack of qualified instructors and teaching materials 
(including paper for publishing books and journals; see Naby 1993), brain 
drain and corruption (Asanbekov 2003; Aldasheva 2003; De Young 2001; 
Isaev 1998c; Karim kuzu 2003; Obychniy prepodavatel' 2000; Osorov 2002; 
Phipps and Wolanin 2001; Reeves 2003; Tishin 1998).  These problems are 
not specific to Kyrgyzstan, but are common to varying degrees throughout the 
former Soviet Central Asian republics and the larger Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  MacWilliams (2001) dubbed the 1990s a ‘decade of 
more freedom and less money’ for Russian universities, while other writers 
have reported an educational crisis in Kazakhstan due to a severe shortage of 
money, teachers and resources (De Young 2001).  In Sabloff’s (1999: xi-xvii) 
study of eight postcommunist universities, she identifies six common trends: 
increased access to education and decreased support for it, widespread 
pressure to ‘westernise’ curricula and teaching methods, the erosion of faculty 
salaries and brain drain, demoralisation and exhaustion among educators, 
changes from specialised to ‘flexible’ curricula and the need to find new, non-
state sources of income such as business, tuition fees and international 
organisations. 
Neither are these problems unique to the post-Soviet period.  In fact, lack 
of financing and the lack of human resources and teaching materials were also 
pressing problems during perestroika (see, e.g., Bekturganov 1990; 
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Bekturganov and Isaev 1991; Blum 1993; Isaev 1991b; Isaev and Niyazov 
1990; Tabyshalieva 1986; Tishin 1981; Vlasova 1989) and, more broadly, 
have routinely plagued social scientists in other newly independent societies 
(Gomez and Sosteric 1999; Rahmad 1983). 
Sociologists also work in a tumultuous environment in which the social 
and political role of higher education is being deliberately, but rather 
inconsistently, transformed.  Both the Kyrgyz government and a variety of 
foreign organisations have put forward successive new plans for educational 
reform.  However, the interpretation of these ideas varies widely across and 
within institutions.  BHU, for example, adheres to a model of ‘specialist 
training’ which draws heavily on Soviet philosophies of higher education in 
which the purpose of higher education was to ‘provide specialists for a new 
socialist society’ (Pennar et al. 1971: 57) and ‘the pursuit of knowledge for its 
own sake or the right of education for individual self-development rather than 
collective purposes [is not]…recognised as a main aim’ (Tomiak 1983: 199).  
(The term ‘socialist society’ has of course now been replaced with ‘market’ or 
‘democratic’ society.)  While this model is commensurate with that of the 
Ministry of Education to which the department is ultimately responsible, the 
financial and social organisation of higher education in Kyrgyzstan has 
become decentralised and subjected to ‘market forces’ to such an extent that 
the state-centred, professional–specialist model of education is no longer 
entirely workable (see, e.g., Isaev 1993).  AUCA, on the other hand, advocates 
a liberal arts model of education which prioritises values of individual 
enlightenment, critical thinking and further education over professional or 
technological training.  While this philosophy resonates with that of the 
university’s foreign sponsors, it is often uncompelling to students seeking 
career training, challenged by national educational elites, and regarded with 
scepticism by the Ministry of Education.  In both cases, the need to reconcile 
ambiguities about the social role of education has had a profound effect on the 
content and organisation of sociology teaching. 
 Beyond the general problems facing higher educational institutions in 
Kyrgyzstan, the BHU and AUCA sociology departments also face challenges 
more specific to post-Soviet social science (Abdyrashev 1994; Ablezova 2003; 
Asanbekov 2003; Asanova 2003; Blum 1991; Botoeva 2003; Fanisov 1990; 
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Isaev 1991b, 1999e; 1998; Nurova 2003; Ruble 1999).  Bronson et al. (1999) 
divide these problems into four categories: structural, intellectual, personal 
and political.50  Structural problems of social science in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) include (1) collapsed infrastructure, including the collapse of 
international ties due to new national borders, (2) degrading salaries, the 
search for non-academic income and subsequent internal and external brain 
drain, (3) erosion of investment in research, deterioration of libraries and 
archives, (4) decreased access to databases and (5) inflexible administrative 
and bureaucratic practices and expectations.  To take a local example, salaries 
at AUCA begin at the equivalent of $80 per month for full-time instructors, 
while centre directors and higher level faculty members such as chairs and co-
chairs may receive up to $250.  Sociologists teaching at BHU were far less 
willing to divulge information about their earnings, and often simply said they 
‘earn very little.’  One full professor, however, reported that her combined 
earnings from teaching at three different universities, including BHU, 
amounted to $150 per month; another said that she earned approximately $26 
per month at BHU.  See also Aslanbekova (2001) and Reeves (2003: 10, 16).  
Reeves (2002b: 26) reports that in 2002, a local newspaper put average the 
salary for a new university teacher in Kyrgyzstan at $14.60 per month. 
The main intellectual problem affecting social sciences in the FSU, 
according to Bronson et al., is the devaluation of academic work, particularly 
in the humanities.  In Kyrgyzstan, Asanbekov (2003) argues that students have 
therefore developed a ‘complex’—‘they either think they can’t work as 
scientists, or they don’t believe it is worth it to try as they see so few results 
from the scientific community now.  Instead, they move into more profitable 
jobs like business.’  He also sees trends towards the feminisation of social 
science, saying that ‘the majority of students and those studying sociology or 
other sciences are women because it is a low-status career that doesn’t pay 
anything and offers no advancement.’51
Personal problems include (1) poverty, (2) loss of status, (3) deterioration 
of collegiality, and (4) isolation.  Those who receive foreign grants are often 
targets of envy at home.  This may also include (5) the collapse of personal 
belief systems, (6) disillusionment, and (7) interruption of career strategies.  
Each of these problems is prevalent in the Kyrgyzstani sociological 
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community; however, career interruptions are experienced differently by 
scholars of different generations.  For some the changes are insurmountable, 
for others negotiable and still others find in them opportunities for building 
new careers (see Chapter 8 and Asanova 2003).  
Finally, political problems include (1) anti-western sentiment, (2) Soviet-
style bureaucracy, (3) repressive regimes, and (4) nationalist tendencies.  
While few Kyrgyzstani sociologists see administrative bureaucracy as an 
impediment to their work, the case studies suggest that this is in fact a major 
problem.  Anti-western tendencies and nationalist sentiment have had little 
effect on sociological work, although stereotypes about both ‘the west’ and 
‘the nation’ certainly have.  Finally, Kyrgyzstani sociologists face intellectual 
interference from both the repressive regime and international development 
agencies. 
Each department also struggles with language barriers which influence 
the types of sociological resources, and thus the range of ideas, available to 
faculty and students.  Sociologists working in BHU, most of whom are 
Kyrgyzstani and speak little English, cite lack of access to English-language 
resources as a major problem (Aldasheva 2003; Asanbekov 2003).  At AUCA, 
where the faculty are required to teach predominantly in English, sociologists 
find it difficult to obtain English-language resources which are suitable for 
their classes.  In addition, the department hires many foreign instructors who 
do not speak Russian and are often unable to suggest supplementary Russian-
language materials to their students.  Many students therefore learn 
sociological vocabulary in English and not Russian, which makes it difficult to 
interact with their Russian-speaking peers at an academic level.    
 Finally, both departments face challenges which are particular to the 
institutionalisation of sociology in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  First, they have 
been expected to create, develop and stabilise academic departments of 
sociology in a very short period of time with extremely limited material and 
symbolic resources (Ablezova 2003; Sagynbaeva 2003).  The demand for 
‘instant institutions’ stems in part from developmentalist discourses of 
institution building, but also from sociologists’ own theories about what 
constitutes a ‘mature’ social science.  After independence, many adopted what 
Rist (1997) refers to as the ‘myth’ of development, which became dominant in 
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Europe during the early twentieth century and which is currently enshrined as 
‘an element in the religion of modernity’ in major development institutions 
such as the United Nations Development Program and World Bank.  This 
philosophy, adopted by  both Comte and Marx, has three premises: one, that 
‘progress has the same substance (or nature) as history;’ two, that ‘all nations 
travel the same road;’ and three, that ‘all do not advance at the same speed as 
Western society, which therefore has an indisputable “lead” because of the 
greater size of its production, the dominant role that reason plays within it, and 
the scale of its scientific and technological discoveries’ (Rist 1999: 40).  It is 
predominant in Kyrgyzstan today; the rejection of Marxism and embracing of 
Comtian-style positivism did not require or provoke a fundamental shift in 
conceptions of human development.  The belief in the importance of creating 
formal institutions not only remained intact, but was reinforced by new 
discourses of institution-building in capitalist models of development.  
Second, the characterisation of sociology as a new or reformed discipline 
in Kyrgyzstan has necessitated the redefinition of the field both generally and 
in the Kyrgyz context (Isaev 1993, 1999b; Isaev, Niyazov et al. 1994b; 
Mendibaev 2003; Nurova 2003).  The combination of the need to design full 
curricula, the ambiguity about what to teach or how to teach it, and the relative 
availability of multiple, often competing, models of disciplinary development 
make the conceptualisation of sociology an urgent and contested problem. 
Finally, sociologists at both BHU and AUCA are forced to resolve many 
socio-economic, institutional and intellectual problems in their everyday 
activities of teaching and research, as well as in more formal exercises to 
institutionalise the discipline.  Their responses, including decisions they make 
about how to define and practice sociology, are shaped partly by the 
opportunities and constraints presented by the structures in which they work 
and partly by the ways in which they interpret these conditions—and the 
possibilities for their own agency—through their own cultural lenses.  Instead 
of seeing culture, economy and institutions as monolithic entities which 
determine the outcome of efforts to institutionalise sociology, we can therefore 
understand culture as a web of localised meanings and practices, both 
historical and contemporary, which mediate the interaction between 
sociologists and larger social structures.   
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Chapters 7 and 8 illustrate how this conjunction of structural forces and 
human agency have influenced the conceptualisation of sociology at the 
institutional level in Kyrgyzstan, specifically in terms of how the discipline is 
defined,  curricula is formulated and research is organised.  Each case is 
divided into two parts: the first providing an overview of the department’s 
history, funding structure and faculty composition, and the second detailing 
the more substantive paradigm of sociology developed at the institution.  They 
also examine the tensions which emerged during this process and illustrate the 
fluid and political nature of the disciplinary boundaries being established.   
To simplify the comparison, the two conceptualisations of sociology are 
displayed schematically in Appendix B. 
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7 
AN APPLIED PROFESSION FOR SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION: 
SOCIOLOGY AT THE BISHKEK HUMANITARIAN UNIVERSITY 
 
Institutional context 
Departmental history and identity 
The BHU Sociology Department, originally called the Department of 
Administration and Sociology, was established in 1993 in what was then 
known as the Institute of Languages and Humanitarian Sciences (ILHS).  
According to Anara Aldasheva, Dean of the Faculty of Socio-Political 
Sciences at the time this research was conducted, 
in 1988 it was decreed that sociology [should] become taught 
as a subject in VUZy.  At this time there were no departments 
of sociology.  And therefore it was decided—I think it was 
decided—to set up a Sociology Department.  I think the 
department was opened in 1993 in order to teach sociology as a 
scientific subject and, gradually, on the basis of this 
department, a sociological laboratory and faculty of sociology 
and etcetera were opened (Aldasheva 2003). 
The establishment of the department, however, was not an isolated event.  
From 1989 to 1993, Isaev and his associates had been engaged in constructing 
a new ‘sociological’ identity for the Department of Sociology and Engineering 
Psychology, which Isaev had established in the Frunze Polytechnic Institute to 
replace the earlier department of Scientific Communism, founded in 1969 (see 
Chapter 5; Ismailova 1995; Osmonalieva 1995; Sydykova 1998).52  The effort 
was rewarded with some public recognition; for example, it was argued that 
the first conference of Kyrgyzstani sociologists in 1990 was rightfully held at 
the polytechnic because it had become the ‘principle sociological institution in 
the republic.’  As one report of the conference, published in the popular paper 
Soviet Kirgizia, asked, 
[w]hy did sociologists of the republic…gather under the roof of 
the Frunze Polytechnic Institute and not in the Academy of 
Science of the Kirgiz SSR or [under the auspices of] the Kirgiz 
state?  The initiative of the polytechnic is no accident.  In 
recent years, it is here that a sociological laboratory actively 
operated.  It studies problems of student life, makes prognoses 
about election results, maintains ties with sociologists in 
industrial enterprises, and develops contacts with well-known 
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sociological institutions throughout the country and in the 
Soviet Sociological Association.  All this allowed the 
laboratory’s scientific advisor, Professor K. Isaev, to make an 
impartial and biting report on the state of work in sociological 
science in the republic (Blum 1990).  
 In 1993, however, Isaev closed this laboratory after the ILHS invited him 
to take up a professorship and chair in the newly created Faculty of Socio-
Political Sciences (Baibosunov 1998; Isaev 1999b; Osmonalieva 1995).53  He 
accepted and, in addition to chairing the faculty, immediately opened up a new 
sociological research laboratory, transferring records, projects and staff from 
the FPI laboratory to a new location at the ILHS.   
The BHU Sociology Department has had two chairs since its 
establishment: Mukanmedi Asanbekov, candidate of sociology and now pro-
rector for science at BHU, from 1994 to 1997 and Topchogul Shaidullaeva, 
formerly an aspirant in the department and candidate of sociology, from 1998 
to 2003.  Despite changes in leadership, it has consistently represented itself as 
a national institution, created by and for the Kyrgyz state and operating as a 
service to the people by training a new cadre of elites and making 
contributions to governmental administration in the form of ‘scientifically 
grounded recommendations’ (BHU 1996).   
This does not imply that individual members of the department subscribe 
privately to its institutional ideology.  Isaev is both a leading member of the 
department and an outspoken critic of the government, a number of instructors 
are self-declared supporters of the political opposition, and scepticism about 
government policy is often expressed in faculty meetings.  While academics’ 
main aim is to train a scientific elite to fulfil administrative functions for the 
Kyrgyz state, they do not consider themselves subordinate to it.  As Aldasheva 
(2003) remarked, ‘the recommendations we work out must be given to the 
state structure and private administrative organs…and it is their right to use 
them or not.’  As with the sociology establishments of perestroika, however, 
the department endeavours to present itself as a relevant and trustworthy ally 
of both state and society which is also intellectually autonomous enough to 
have scientific legitimacy.  The faculty therefore assumes a unified, pro-
government front in all its official activities but formulates criticism of the 
power structure in subtle ways from within.54   
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This image of a coherent, unified professional team has enabled the 
department to attract large cohorts of students since its establishment.  While 
sociology was taught in a number of other higher education institutions in 
Bishkek during the early 1990s (e.g., KNU and the Kyrgyz Agricultural 
Institute), the Department of Administration and Sociology was for several 
years the only department to offer a full undergraduate programme in 
sociology.  By 1995, senior instructor Sagyn Ismailova claimed that 
programmes in sociology, social work, social information and politology had 
already become competitive, with between three and five students applying for 
each available place (Ismailova 1995).  After private institutions such as the 
American University–Central Asia and Turkish–Manas University opened in 
the mid-1990s, however, BHU assumed a more modest reputation as the best 
state university in the republic, and the quality of incoming students became 
increasingly dependent upon their level of educational achievement and ability 
to pay tuition fees.  Because the department lacks the human and material 
resources to compete successfully with private and foreign-led institutions, it 
began to place even greater emphasis on establishing its position as a premium 
state and national institution.   
 
Funding structure 
Sociology at BHU is firmly integrated into the state system of higher 
education.  It is also, however, embedded in a new and competitive 
educational ‘market’ in which state subsidy for higher education has been 
largely replaced by student tuition fees.  As such, it exemplifies the paradox of 
state higher education in the republic.  On one hand, the university is legally 
funded by the Kyrgyz state, supervised by the Ministry of Education and 
politically subordinate to the ruling government.  Even the department’s 
primary research project, ‘Kyrgyzstan on the path to democracy and the 
market,’ is funded by the State Committee for Science and Technology (BHU 
1995).  On the other hand, the decline of state investment in education (see 
endnote 2) has had a deleterious effect on academic programmes in all state 
universities, including the Sociology Department at BHU.   
Salaries for sociologists, for example, plummeted to between $30 and $40 
per month and the department has few resources to purchase books or teaching 
 160
 
 
materials.  Aldasheva (2003) believes that the main problem facing the 
department is the lack of European and American scholarship available in 
Russian translation, while Asanbekov (2003) points to the paucity of print 
publications, poor Internet access and the fact that most faculty cannot afford 
to publish their work in Russian scholarly journals.  While the department has 
formally signed an agreement of cooperation with the Faculty of Sociology at 
MSU, students from Kyrgyzstan lack the resources to take advantage of 
opportunities for exchanges.  As Aldasheva (2003) remarked, 
we are a state university and the source of our income is the 
state.  We also have students who study on both budget [state 
subsidised] and contract [fee paying] bases. […] The 
department is not a priority for anyone.  The money goes to 
wealthy universities.  In general, this department gets nothing.   
Sociologists at BHU are thus severely under-resourced and over the years 
have become increasingly dependent on foreign sources of funding such as the 
Soros and MacArthur Foundations.55  By 1998, in fact, the department 
encouraged its instructors to ‘continue to work to obtain grants for scientific 
research, both for individual scientific research and for projects to support the 
potential of the faculty, department and institutional process.’  Although 
formally reliant on the state, they became increasingly ‘prepared for the 
necessity of doing fundraising for the introduction of new courses and 
improving the material base of the faculty’ (BHU 1998).   
The need to ‘reach out,’ however, creates tensions within the department.  
First, many of the department’s faculty are unable to speak English, which is 
often a requisite for receiving or even learning about foreign grants.  Second, 
such grants offer sociologists little autonomy and are often conditional.  Many 
are in fact commercial contracts commissioning sociologists to gather data for 
foreign clients.  Nurova (2003), for example, says that ‘when a foreign firm 
invites us [to do research], we do not know the results. […] We have the data, 
we interview everyone, but…the firm does the analysis itself.  And we don’t 
even have a publication of this here.’  In a different vein, Isaev has expressed 
concern that accepting such grants may even facilitate foreign intelligence 
gathering (Sydykova 1998), and there are sobering stories of sociologists 
working in other institutions who have had to undertake legal battles to defend 
their rights and reputations against more powerful foreign grant-giving 
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organisations (see, e.g., Sotsiologicheskoe obschestvo Kyrgyzstana [n.d.] and 
Skorodumova 1998).  Finally, competition for foreign grants often pits 
colleagues against one another, encouraging professional power struggles 
rather than cooperation within the department.  
Foreign funding, however, is only one source of extra-governmental 
income for state universities such as BHU.  Bribery has also become endemic 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While it is difficult to obtain reliable 
statistics about how many educators accept or demand payment for admission, 
grades and exams, a number of faculty members from the BHU Sociology 
Department have confirmed that they are expected to give ‘contract’ students 
good marks in return for tuition fees.  The impoverishment of university 
instructors creates fertile ground for this practice;  however, bribery is also 
legitimised by the prevailing sense that educational performance is somehow 
segregated from academic success, and by students’ and faculty’s pragmatic 
understandings of what it means to be part of an educational ‘market.’  Reeves 
explains, for example, that many fee-charging departments in Kyrgyzstan 
define ‘contract’ in a particular way, namely, that ‘one receives a degree in 
return for payment, rather than the fact that one receives an education, which 
may or may not, depending on the student’s abilities and efforts, result in 
successful completion of a degree’ (2003: 21, italics in original).   
Ironically, the prevalence of bribery in state universities in Kyrgyzstan is 
rarely mentioned as a concern in discussions about the improvement of 
educational and professional standards for sociology.  It, like the diversity of 
personal opinions about the department’s relationship to the state and the 
unequal power relations that condition foreign grants, remains part of a 
parallel institutional universe—one of many things unspoken and un-
interrogated, yet very much influential in the development of the field.  These 
factors have an impact that reaches far beyond issues of salaries and budgets.  
As will be seen below, they also influence decisions in curriculum design, 
organised research, and even where to draw the boundaries of the field of 
sociology itself. 
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Faculty relations 
The BHU Sociology Department employs almost exclusively ‘local’ 
Kyrgyzstani instructors who teach primarily in Russian (and occasionally in 
Kyrgyz).  In 1995, the faculty consisted of nine instructors, including one 
doctor of philosophy (Isaev), one candidate of sociology (Asanbekov) and a 
candidate of history (Ismailov).  By 1998,  the number of faculty members had 
increased to ten, including a new doctor of sociology (Nurova) and two new 
candidates of sociology (Shaidullaeva and Ibraeva), as well as several younger 
instructors who had previously been aspirants in the department.  In 2002, the 
department boasted a faculty of thirteen—a core group of senior academics 
(doctors and candidates) who had worked in the department since 1995, and a 
second group of prepodavateli (younger instructors) drawn from the 
department’s pool of aspirants. 
Members of the faculty are expected to contribute to the smooth operation 
of the department as a whole.  A tripartite image of the ‘professional 
sociologist’ as a person possessing disciplinary knowledge, specialised skills 
of sociological research, and patriotism and moral integrity guides all teaching 
and research activities.  The department is thus organised to facilitate training 
in all three areas through instructional work (teaching), scientific-
methodological work (research) and vospitanie (BHU 1997, 2000).56  Each 
task is carried out in a specially designated physical space.  Teaching activities 
are dictated by the approved curriculum and conducted primarily in the 
classroom.  Research is organised at both departmental and individual levels, 
formally located in the sociological laboratory, and disseminated through the 
publication of monographs and articles, most of which are published in 
national newspapers and internally produced sborniki, or essay collections.  
Finally, vospitanie is accomplished through informal avenues such as 
mentoring, student study groups and extra-curricular clubs.  Instructors are 
expected to train students in each sphere so that they will learn the ‘correct 
values’ for professional sociologists who can be trusted to conduct applied 
research for decision making bodies.   
Faculty responsibilities, however, extend far beyond reproducing this 
formal structure.  They include not only doing large amounts of bureaucratic 
recordkeeping and attending departmental meetings and events such as 
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seminars, workshops and student competitions, but also conforming to 
professional norms within the department and fulfilling roles which maintain 
its internal power structure.  At BHU, senior academics (defined as senior in 
terms of chronological age, level of academic degree and length of 
employment at the institution) dominate younger instructors, particularly those 
under the age of thirty-five and who have not yet defended a candidate 
dissertation.  Academic hierarchy is particularly pronounced at BHU, which 
employs a number of instructors who belong to what Ibraeva (2003) calls the 
‘older’ and ‘intermediate’ generations of Soviet-trained sociologists.  These 
categories, she argues, are based not only on age, but also on ‘spirit of 
thinking.’  In her view, the older generation  
[e]njoys traditional values and essentially stands for privilege 
and hierarchy in the professional sphere.  Intrigues are a basic 
way of life.  Today, many of them have experienced the shock 
of being unneeded.  Naturally, this is an old philosophy, above 
all of those who taught scientific communism. It is clear that 
these cadres were not particularly familiar with the sociological 
method of research and today are not in a position to answer the 
demands of the time in the face of growing competition.  These 
people are living through a dramatic situation. 
Despite this rather bleak portrait of Soviet-era sociologists, older faculty 
members working at BHU have taken some proactive measures to adapt to the 
‘new conditions’ of their work, not only by incorporating non-Marxist theories 
and national content into their research and teaching interests, but also by 
attempting to expand their knowledge of research methods and pedagogical 
techniques.  However, because they continue to value hierarchy in academe 
and impose it within the department, the department remains stratified.  In 
turn, younger faculty members by and large tend to reproduce these unequal 
patterns of power and authority in relations with their own students.   
Members of the ‘intermediate’ generation of sociologists who also work 
in the department simultaneously reinforce and challenge this traditional 
hierarchy.  By Ibraeva’s definition, these are middle-aged academics who 
retrained as sociologists after independence and who are more or less able to 
meet contemporary demands, in particular, by conducting ‘western-style’ 
research and adhering to western norms of discourse in international forums.  
This group, however, is also facing a ‘dramatic period, insofar as for many 
 164
 
 
people it is sustained by traditions (reverence for elders, hierarchy in the 
professional sphere, the aim of exploiting young specialists, and etcetera)’ 
(Ibraeva 2003).  Many sociologists of this generation are intellectually 
frustrated, for while they are often inspired by new schools of sociological 
thought and possibilities for further education and training, they generally lack 
the language and computer skills needed to take advantage of foreign-
sponsored opportunities, and are sometimes even excluded by age 
discrimination within foreign programmes.57  Thus, while they may be 
attracted to alternative perspectives and participate in educational initiatives, 
they are constrained by their continuing legitimisation of hierarchical norms 
and superseded by younger academics who have been able to acquire more 
‘marketable’ professional skills. 
The youngest generation of sociologists is the greatest beneficiary of new, 
often foreign-led initiatives to retrain social scientists in the post-Soviet 
period.  However, they are also subjected to exploitation and are often targets 
of professional envy.  One, for example, has been labelled Amerikanka 
(‘American’) by her peers (Omurkulova 2003).  Foreign organisations often 
target younger instructors as ‘mediators’ that can participate in English-
language courses and training programmes and then disseminate new ideas 
within their home institutions; however, those working at BHU receive little 
encouragement or opportunity to do so.  The perpetuation of professional 
hierarchy and the normative expectation of deference to older, often less 
qualified colleagues places severe constraints on younger instructors’ 
academic potential and their ability to initiate intellectual exchange within 
their own departments.  Changes in the definition of sociology, the 
organisation of teaching and research, and professional norms continue to 
originate from above, and those working at lower rank tend to perpetuate this 
hierarchical structure out of fear, apathy or professional ambition.   
 
Conceptualisation of sociology 
The paradigm: sociology as applied profession 
Within this institutional context, sociology has been constructed as an applied 
profession, necessary for helping governmental and non-governmental 
organisations improve practices of socio-political administration within the 
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Kyrgyz Republic.  While faculty members portray the programme as a new 
model of post-Soviet sociology education, it retains many elements of the 
state-oriented, applied–professional model of academic social science which 
dominated the late Soviet period.  Here, older conceptions of Soviet sociology 
have been modified to resonate with new discourses about the nature and 
purpose of social scientific knowledge in the post-Soviet period.  
 The mission of the BHU Sociology Department was unambiguous from 
inception: it was created to ‘prepare a new generation of cadres to administer 
collectives, regions and states’ (BHU 1994).  In other words, it was set up as a 
new space to train cohorts of specialists who were expected to contribute to 
efficient governance by using technical skills to solve practical social 
problems.  As during perestroika, they were expected not only to respond to 
administrative problems presented by members of the establishment, but also 
to identify or ‘diagnose’ social problems through ‘prognosis,’ thereby playing 
an active role in hastening the society’s overall development.  In the 
framework of this general agenda, the department also planned more 
specifically to ‘develop concepts of the place and role of sociology [and] 
politology in the development of the Faculty of Administration and Sociology’ 
(BHU 1994).58   
 Toward this end, the department developed a core of courses, or 
‘disciplines,’ deemed necessary for professional expertise in sociology.59  In 
September 1995, five members of the department (Asanbekov, Ibraeva, Isaev, 
Ismailov and Sharshembieva) were responsible for developing seven 
foundational courses for sociology majors: general sociology, the methods and 
techniques of sociological research, the history of sociology, sociology of 
education, sociology of youth, sociology of deviant behaviour and social 
structures of society (BHU 1995a). The range of courses was expanded in the 
1996–97 academic year to include ‘elective’ options such as the problems of 
the establishment and formation of the elite in the conditions of 
democratisation in the Kyrgyz Republic, the impact of mass media on the 
political culture of the Kyrgyz people, the political thought of the Kyrgyz, the 
sociology of culture, socio-political processes toward the market, ways of life 
and socio-political conflict (BHU 1996), and in 1997–98, the sociology of 
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organisations, sociology of labour, conflictology, modelling and prognosis and 
comparative sociology (BHU 1997a).60   
These courses largely reflect the existing knowledge base of the faculty 
itself.   Asanbekov (2003), for example, who wrote his candidate dissertation 
on the ‘ways of life of the rural population,’ was responsible for developing a 
course on life-ways, and Ibraeva was asked to use her specialisation in media 
studies to develop a course on the mass media in Kyrgyzstan.  Given the 
dearth of qualified sociology instructors in Kyrgyzstan, the department has 
attempted to capitalise on the experience of its existing faculty, even if this 
means incorporating elements of Soviet sociology into post-Soviet courses.  
However, the range of proposed classes also suggests the influence of deeper 
assumptions about the organisation of sociology education itself, namely, that 
gaining broad knowledge of a topical canon and specific understanding of key 
dimensions of social structure and organisation, combined with training in 
research methods, is the best practice for preparing students for professional 
work in sociology.  This philosophy is reinforced at the individual level by 
faculty members’ own beliefs about the role of sociology in society, and at the 
institutional level by the dominance of the applied–professional model of 
sociology education.   
Personality has had a significant impact on institutional development.  
Isaev, for example, advocated improving the professional training of 
sociologists long before assuming the first chair of the faculty in 1993 
(Sydykova 1998), and brought this campaign to the department.  As early as 
1990, he and Bekturganov had criticised the Soviet state for failing to take 
seriously the ‘planned training of professional sociologists,’ and put forward 
the idea of introducing specialised courses in the sociology of industry, work 
and administration as part of the new higher education curriculum for 
perestroika (Isaev and Bekturganov 1990: 6; see also Isaev 1991b).  
Furthermore, when he transferred the sociological laboratory from FPI to 
BHU, he also imported his organisational philosophy: to provide ‘essential 
scientific leadership and conduct research of a fundamental and applied 
character’ and to ‘select, train and raise the qualifications of scientific 
workers’ (Isaev 1993a).    
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His agenda resonates with the intellectual convictions of many other 
faculty members in the department.  Aldasheva (2003), for example, asserts 
that 
[t]he role of sociology is to study social reality.  A sociologist 
must know this reality…must study what is happening in 
society, analyse it, and say what’s wrong with the social 
mechanisms and what can be done to alleviate the problems.  
Further, they must give advice about what needs to be done to 
cure social illnesses or make it so that they do not emerge. […]  
It is asking how many and what, and why and how. 
From this perspective, in order to understand and alter ‘social reality,’ 
sociology students must become familiar with the basic elements of all social 
institutions, relationships and processes, insofar as they are defined by the 
members of the faculty.  Nurova (2003) also prioritises the ‘study of reality,’ 
arguing that sociology has a ‘great role’ to play in helping Kyrgyzstani society 
to recover from its ‘totalitarian past.’  Citing Tishin’s (1998) ‘twelve functions 
of sociology,’ she notes that the study of social reality in all its variety can 
play an ideological as well as a technical role in education by forcing students 
to remove the ‘rose-coloured glasses’ through which they often understand 
society.61  As she argued in an essay on applied research, sociology is 
comprised of three components: general theory, particular theory and applied 
sociology (Nurova and Shaimergenova 2000: 4).   
At BHU, this tripartite structure of the discipline, which had emerged 
during the 1980s (see Kabyscha 1990), is viewed as a linear progression with 
general theory being the base and applied sociology the ultimate responsibility 
of a professional in the field.  The production of ‘trained cadres’ is therefore 
seem as a central part of sociology’s institutionalisation as both a profession 
and an academic science (Isaev 1993, 2000).  This is evidenced by the way in 
which the department sets priorities for its learning outcomes.  By the 
academic year 2003–04, students enrolling in sociology at BHU were 
expected to choose a programme leading to qualification in one of five 
professional specialisations: sociologist–economist, sociologist–marketing 
specialist, sociologist with additional specialisation in computer technology, 
sociologist–legal specialist or sociologist–instructor of social sciences (BHU 
2003).  These specialisations are part of the department’s attempt to 
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compensate for the discipline’s low prestige by extending its authority into 
already existing fields such as economics, marketing, computer technology, 
law and education.  By affiliating sociology with these fields and creating 
‘sociological’ specialisations in each, they can offer students something 
unique within the context of more stable and prestigious disciplines. 
The department’s promotional brochure makes more explicit the 
pragmatic philosophy which underlies the definition of sociology as a set of 
practical professional skills that students can acquire: 
Having received the profession of sociology, our graduates will 
have the opportunity to, at a professional level, conduct 
sociological research and do scientific analyses of social 
phenomena and processes and, on the basis of these, make 
prognoses and recommendations (BHU 2003). 
The conceptualisation of sociology as an applied professional science which 
can be mechanically transmitted in the classroom is further reinforced by the 
Kyrgyz Ministry of Education’s formal definition of the main concepts, 
‘disciplines,’ topics and skills which distinguish the sociology specialisation.62  
In order to understand how the national standards impacted upon the 
conceptualisation of sociology at BHU, we turn now to the area in which they 
have been most influential, the undergraduate curriculum. 
   
G.12(521200) ‘Sociology’: the nationally standardised curriculum 
The design and revision of curricula for undergraduate sociology education are 
shaped in large part by assumptions about what constitutes legitimate 
sociological knowledge and how and why people acquire, produce and 
reproduce it.  The inclusion or exclusion of different content, theories, 
methods and foreign or indigenous materials thus reflects tacit beliefs about 
the nature and role of sociological knowledge and the learning process itself 
(Lisovskaia and Karpov 1999).  This section looks at how faculty members of 
the BHU Sociology Department approach curriculum development and 
explores the underlying structural factors that condition their intellectual 
choices.   
In developing curricula, syllabi and course programmes for sociology 
students, instructors at BHU rely heavily on the State Educational Standard 
for Basic Higher Education in Sociology (Ministry of Education 1994; see 
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Appendix C for summary).  These national standards were elaborated by a 
special disciplinary committee under the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Culture in 1994 and revised ten years later.  The BHU sociology curriculum is 
designed by ‘well-known specialists’ in the department, approved by the 
department’s ‘instructional methods commission,’ and certified by another 
instructional methods committee at the university level (Aldasheva 2003).  Its 
authors draw inspiration mainly from personal experiences in Soviet 
universities, contemporary course programmes from Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, and the national standards for sociology, which are themselves 
based on a Russian model (Aldasheva 2003; Ministry of Education 1994; 
Ryskulueva 2003). 
The standards outline, in considerable detail, an applied–professional 
model of sociology education.  They specify that undergraduate sociology 
education must be 
linked first of all to useful work in organs of administration 
[related to] revealing, posing and seeking resolutions to social 
problems, and the organisation of enlightenment, advertising 
and commercial work.  The goal is to help industries, 
institutions, organisations, commercial structures and legal and 
physical individuals to expose and resolve social problems 
(Ministry of Education 1994). 
Successful sociology graduates from state institutions must be able to make 
recommendations about social reform, assist in administration and predict 
future social trends for the state and services of social protection such as 
health and welfare.  They may also teach in scientific and educational 
institutions, commercial enterprises, sociological centres and centres for the 
study of public opinion (Ministry of Education 1994; see also BHU 1997).   
Until the ‘new generation’ of standards was introduced in 2004, the 
Ministry of Education determined two-thirds of educational requirements in 
academic programmes and allowed individual departments to decide, within 
limited parameters, the other third of their curricula.  While the state 
component was later reduced slightly to 60%, universities remain under 
pressure to conform to a standard canon of disciplinary knowledge.  The main 
function of the standards is in fact to encourage the reproduction of an 
emerging disciplinary canon—not, as is often the case, of hegemonic theorists 
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and schools of thought, but of specialised ‘disciplines’ and skills.  Within this 
broad canon are dozens of sub-canons detailing the specific authors, topics and 
skills that should be taught as part of particular courses (see Appendix C).   
Whereas during the Soviet period standardisation was driven by the 
regime’s need to maintain political control through intellectual hegemony and 
mechanise economic planning, today it is motivated by labour economics and 
the state’s desire to assert control over the content and quality of educational 
process in a highly de-regulated educational arena.  Farida Ryskulueva (2003), 
a senior specialist at the Ministry of Education, offers two explanations for 
why the ministry introduced disciplinary standards instead of continuing the 
older practice of issuing formal uchebnye plany (instructional plans).63  First, 
national standards give students the ‘right of mobility’ in an educational 
system which has become governed by student demand as opposed to state 
planning: 
If we don’t have any standards then [a student] will have 
trouble transferring [between universities].  In one VUZ they 
will teach him according to their own programme, and he will 
have problems in another. […] If you have this kind of 
difference, you can’t continue to educate students because the 
programmes are entirely different.  Therefore, we introduced 
the standards.  Standards give students the possibility to realise 
their right of mobility.  We work out standards that everyone 
must follow in the regions and in Bishkek.  If everyone has 
these requirements, there won’t be any problems.  This is not 
an uchebnyi plan, but a standard.  For this you need standards.   
Because the state no longer has the means or authority to oversee all activities 
within universities, the standards also have more overtly disciplinary 
functions.  They are intended to regulate the gradual introduction of academic 
freedom into higher education (and in effect control its expansion), minimise 
differentiation in the development of new educational philosophies, balance 
equality with excellence, and prevent the disintegration of historical 
relationship between education and labour.  To quote Ryskulueva (2003) 
again,  
[a]cademic freedom is increasing gradually—we cannot just 
give freedom straight away because [instructors] are not yet 
used to it.  We defined the correct contents of the curriculum 
for how many years—one hundred years now, right?  People 
studying in every institution and university knew what, how 
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many and which disciplines they need to study in order to meet 
the requirements.  But in our VUZy we don’t have this yet.  
Our VUZy have absolutely no idea.  First of all, they accept all 
students who come to them but don’t consider whether their 
graduates will be able to get work.  It is important that students 
come and pay money, and that’s it.  They give it and then 
everything falls apart.   
From the ministry’s perspective, the decentralisation of education and the 
breakdown of university job-training programmes are threatening to social and 
economic stability.  Therefore, the main task set before sociologists working 
in state educational institutions after independence was not to develop 
innovative conceptions of curriculum, but to recreate institutional frameworks 
for standardisation to replace those which had either collapsed or been 
abandoned as undesirable.  The impetus for this movement was strengthened 
in 1992 when the Kyrgyz government signed an agreement with other former 
Soviet republics to create a ‘single educational and scientific space in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).’64  Supporters of this initiative 
used it to argue that the development of sociology was being undermined by 
institutional differentiation: 
[t]raining proceeds according to different models of education, 
creating a spirit of competition between universities.  But they 
also have serious problems in standardizing specializations and 
subjects, in raising the quality of preparation for specialists, in 
supporting the process of instruction with educational and 
methodological literature, in conducting scientific research, and 
etc.  The professional and skilful resolution of all these and 
other problems for the most part depends on the effective and 
thorough use of a single educational and scientific space in the 
CIS (Isaev 2000). 
As employees of a state institution who are dependent upon the goodwill 
of the Kyrgyz government for job security, members of the BHU Sociology 
Department elevate compliance with the national standards to a matter of 
departmental and disciplinary identity.  Instructors are required to develop 
their own individualised teaching plans in accordance with the standards and 
must submit them to senior faculty members for approval (BHU 1994).  
Although the standards are technically ‘suggestions’ rather than requirements 
as were Soviet instructional plans, the extent to which a department’s 
curriculum conforms with these goals has a direct influence on whether it is 
 172
 
 
granted attestation from the Ministry of Education (for a summary of the 
attestation procedure, see Appendix D).  The bestowal of legitimate authority 
from the state is significant, particularly as university degrees are conferred by 
the ministry as opposed to individual institutions; students not holding a 
Kyrgyz diploma are seen to have graduated from ‘inferior’ schools and thus 
are at a disadvantage in the national labour market.65  Offering a state-
approved curriculum therefore not only enables the department to assure 
students of their political marketability after graduation, but also bestows upon 
it a type of official legitimacy not afforded to departments in private 
institutions which do not grant state diplomas. 
This legitimacy is based in the perception that the department’s 
curriculum is educationally sound, as it has been certified by national 
‘experts,’ and politically correct, as it has been approved by the Ministry of 
Education.  It is primarily a legitimacy of security; an affirmation that the 
department’s work is permissible and sustainable under conditions of 
economic and political instability.  Because this legitimacy is bestowed from 
without, however, it is tentative and must be vigilantly maintained.  In the 
2004 version of the national standards, for example, the status of sociology 
shifted from a required or ‘foundational’ field to an ‘elective’ subject.66  This 
was interpreted as a disciplinary demotion and obstacle to the 
institutionalisation of a field which, in BHU, draws its authority primarily 
from governmental approval and student demand.   
The BHU faculty therefore use the national standards to develop 
departmental instructional plans which they believe both fulfil state 
requirements and constitute a comprehensive, internationally recognised 
sociology degree.  Toward the first end they emphasis the inclusion of 
canonical themes and the progression of sociology toward ‘world science.’  At 
the same time, however, they seek to enhance their professional and scientific 
prestige with politicians, students and the public by offering a new, socially 
relevant knowledge product.  As a result, the sociology curriculum comprises 
both a stable core of courses in nationally recommended ‘disciplines’ and a 
regular infusion of new, often idiosyncratic courses which address current 
issues in Kyrgyz society and academic discourse.  The bulk of the curriculum 
mirrors the requirements set out in the national standards.  In addition to 
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completing general educational requirements, students must attend a specified 
number of hours in a ‘cycle of general professional disciplines in the subject’ 
(Ministry of Education 1994).  These include the history of sociology, general 
sociology, methods and techniques of sociological research, political 
sociology, demography, social statistics, social anthropology, social 
psychology, social pedagogics, and social modelling and programming.  The 
influence of the standards on the curriculum can be deduced from the heavy 
emphasis placed on developing these particular ‘core’ courses during the first 
years of curriculum development (BHU 1994, 1995a).   
The broad core of survey style courses is supplemented by an annual 
cycle of ‘special’ disciplines, intended to be ‘narrower in relation to the 
subject’ and geared towards professional training (Ministry of Education 
1994: 13).  As Aldasheva (2003) noted, the introduction of new specialised 
subjects is much less systematic than the development of core classes and 
tends to depend on the overall ‘demand for such courses’ in the programme.  
As already mentioned, the possible range of such courses is also determined 
by the supply of qualified or semi-qualified instructors.  The department has 
long offered courses in areas favoured by permanent faculty members, 
including the sociology of youth, comparative sociology, deviant behaviour, 
the sociology of the individual and various courses on Kyrgyz culture.   As 
younger instructors joined the faculty, they began to offer other courses on the 
sociology of mass media, stratification, labour, marriage and the family, 
conflictology and civil society (BHU 1995a, 1996, 1997a).  The department 
has also been developing a new component in gender studies since 2002.   
In addition to these requirements, the national standards stipulate that 
undergraduate students must complete a praktika, or internship.  A practical 
component was introduced into the curriculum in 1995–96 and students have 
since been placed in the department’s sociological laboratory, international 
organisations such as the UNDP, the National Academy of Science, local 
groups such as adoption agencies and women’s shelters, and marketing 
companies such as Tatuu, M–Vektor and SIAR Bishkek.  Finally, students are 
expected to produce a diplomnaia rabota or proekt (senior research paper or 
project) and pass a series of state graduation exams. 
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Curriculum development within the BHU Sociology Department is 
ostensibly a collective process.  Faculty members often debate the merit and 
appropriateness of new textbooks before introducing them into the curriculum 
(see, e.g., BHU 2001, 2002a) and instructors must present their lectures and 
lesson plans for general approval.  The process has a veneer of cooperative 
knowledge production.  In reality, however, the department’s hierarchical 
structure makes curriculum development a power-laden and bureaucratic 
process, dominated by senior members of the department who have 
considerably more decision-making power than their younger colleagues.  
Individual instructors, usually those at the senior level, are responsible for 
developing one or two new courses per year as part of their ‘instructional-
methodological work’ (course development in this case includes writing 
lectures, outlining seminars and elaborating questions for examination).  This 
distribution of labour is intended to broaden the general knowledge base 
within the department.   
However, because such courses are considered avtorskie kursy (authors’ 
courses), faculty members often guard teaching materials such as syllabi and 
lecture notes as private intellectual property or commodities.  These, therefore, 
do not contribute to communal knowledge development within the 
department.  As Nurova (2003) explained, contrary to the Soviet period in 
which she claims they ‘all helped each other,’ academic life has become 
highly competitive, even within departments.  Academics tend to hoard 
knowledge and materials so they can be ‘experts’ in their own field of 
specialisation (not dissimilar to the way in which doctoral students or 
scientific researchers often limit access to original material until it is 
published).  As already discussed, this competitive atmosphere is fostered 
partly by the current individualised grant-giving strategies of international 
organisations, partly by the withdrawal of state funding and subsequent 
financial crisis, and partly because while sociologists now have greater 
opportunity to be more creative, they have less time and fewer resources with 
which to do so, and decreasing confidence in the moral standards of academic 
integrity. 
This has also created other problems in curriculum development, namely, 
lack of intellectual motivation and professional commitment.  Because the 
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sociology curriculum follows the national standards as a matter of principle, 
neither junior nor senior faculty have much say in determining the range of 
courses they are expected to teach.  This lack of autonomy has bred a lack of 
imagination; innovation is theoretically encouraged, but new ideas that are 
marginally unfamiliar are often rejected.  Furthermore, the breadth of the 
curriculum requires each instructor to teach between two and six courses per 
year.67  In 1999, course loads were stretched to the limit by increases in both 
the number of required courses in the curriculum and the number of 
students—in particular, ‘contract’ or fee-paying students—admitted to the 
programme (BHU 2000).  Ibraeva (2003) reflects on how this affected the 
quality of her own teaching at the time:    
Unfortunately, until recently, teaching in the BHU Faculty of 
Sociology…was linked with an incredible teaching load and the 
need to develop the most various courses.  Thus, the courses in 
my pedagogical toolbox were quite diverse: gender sociology, 
sociology of mass media and mass communication, urban 
sociology, political sociology, history of sociology, 
introduction to sociology, sociology of management and 
sociology of conflict.  The practice of ‘plugging up’ gaps in the 
instructional programmes at higher education institutions has 
terrible consequences, [such as] the poor quality of courses, 
particularly in connection with the lack of literature and other 
instructional materials.  I am very glad that this is not a factor at 
AUK. 
The ‘plugging up’ metaphor reflects the current philosophy and practice 
of curriculum development in sociology in Kyrgyzstan—not only in BHU, as 
implied here, but in state and private institutions throughout the entire 
republic.  There are tangible discrepancies between intellectual expectations, 
educational requirements and the human and material resources available to 
fulfil both.  As will be seen in Chapter 8, sociologists working at private 
institutions such as AUCA, which have self-consciously created curricula that 
diverge from both the national standards and traditional models of Russian 
education, also struggle to balance the demand for programmes that will 
satisfy both local and international requirements with the need to promote 
quality teaching and research. 
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Disciplinarity  
‘Disciplinarity,’ or the processes by which knowledge units get constructed, 
altered and deconstructed and the epistemological and social consequences of 
these processes, has been an emerging topic of interest since the 1980s (see 
Messer-Davidow et al. 1996; Good 2000; Lemaine et al. 1976).  The term 
‘discipline’ has dual meaning, referring to both the intellectual boundaries of a 
knowledge unit and to the practices through which these boundaries order or 
‘discipline’ thinking and action in that sphere.  
Each sociology department in Kyrgyzstan has a different notion of its 
own disciplinarity, or relationship to other academic disciplines and social 
practices.  In some cases, as with the AUCA Sociology Department, 
disciplinary boundaries are fluid and contested.  At the BHU Sociology 
Department, however, these boundaries are fixed and largely taken for granted 
as necessary and natural.  This is due partly to the way the discipline has been 
conceptualised, but is also influenced by the department’s affiliation with the 
state and faculty members’ beliefs about the role of sociology in Kyrgyzstani 
society.  Sociology is defined as an empirical object, a naturalised body of 
knowledge possessing a coherent history and stable set of characteristics 
which transcend time and space, and a universal standard against which 
inferior classes of social scientific and lay knowledge can be measured.  Isaev 
(2003), for example, argues that ‘as a science, profession and subject, 
sociology has no less than a two-hundred-year-old tradition of development;’ 
that it is ‘studied in nearly all higher education institutions in the civilised 
countries of the world;’ and that ‘on the eve of the twenty-first century, a 
single world sociological science has been formed and objectively exists.’   
The department is part of the larger Faculty of Socio-Political Science, 
which also houses programmes in social work and politology.  Although the 
department offers introductory sociology courses for students of other 
departments (also called ‘courses for non-sociologists’) and requires that 
sociology and politology students take courses in both subjects, its primary 
agenda is to institutionalise sociology as a discrete discipline, separate from 
politology, social work and other academic disciplines.  Here, sociology is a 
specialised profession, discernable by possession of a specific set of 
‘disciplines,’ information and skills, particularly quantitative methods of 
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survey research.  The BHU Sociology Department has adopted the Kyrgyz 
Ministry of Education’s classification, G.12(521200) ‘Sociology,’ to 
distinguish these sets of knowledge and skills from those allocated to other 
professional specialisations such as politology, social work, psychology and 
pedagogy.  In this framework, sociology addresses only those matters which 
are deemed to belong to the ‘social’ sphere of society: migration, ethnicity, 
gender relations, social change and stability, etc.  These are distinct from 
‘political’ matters, such as government, political parties and elections.  
According to the Ministry of Education, such distinctions not only establish 
neat intellectual boundaries, but also enable potential employers to hire 
specialised graduates for positions requiring particular professional skills.  
This is perceived as the main ‘selling point’ of sociology for students, 
instructors and potential employers.   
While the department promotes itself as a purveyor of ‘professional 
qualifications,’ the effort to discipline sociology by erecting unambiguous 
boundaries between it and other disciplines is also motivated by a desire to 
promote sociology as a unique way of knowing about society in order to 
expand sociologists’ authority and right to resources.  Therefore, in addition to 
demarcating knowledge/skill boundaries between professional specialisations 
such as sociology and social work, sociologists at BHU are also sensitive 
about distinctions between social science, politics and lay knowledge.  The 
well-educated professional sociologist must be qualitatively different both 
from politicians, who are believed to distort social reality intentionally, and 
from members of the general public, who are seen as lacking the necessary 
information and skills to apprehend social reality accurately.  Professional 
sociologists are portrayed as the scientific guardians of social consciousness, 
whose authority draws on possession of specialised disciplinary knowledge 
and the ability to conduct scientific studies which produce objective 
representations of social reality. 
 
Centralised, policy-oriented research 
The quest for objective truth about society is therefore adopted as the primary 
discourse surrounding sociological research at BHU.  The creation of a 
sociological laboratory (or rather, the relocation of the earlier FPI laboratory) 
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in 1993 was hailed as a major step forward in the advancement of the 
discipline, and the laboratory has since become a prominent sociological 
institution within the republic.  It is defined by its members as a progressive 
example of how to reorganise sociology in the post-independence period 
(Isaev 1993).  However, it has also received negative publicity after its 
members became embroiled in public debates about the politicisation of 
sociology (Isaev 1993a; see Chapter 9).     
The relationship between teaching and research in the department is 
similar to a model previously advocated by Isaev and others during 
perestroika.  It asserts that all departments of sociology should be affiliated 
with a nauchnaia–issledovatel'naia–sotsiologicheskaia–laboratoriia 
(scientific–research–sociological–laboratory, or NISL).  The Marxist–Leninist 
theoretical basis for this model was that  
[t]he teaching of sociology must maintain a dialectical 
interconnection with two types of scientific knowledge 
[material and spiritual (thought, values and imagination)].  In 
consequence, a sociologist–instructor must be above all a 
highly qualified specialist and combine a high theoretical level 
of sociological knowledge with the talents and skills of 
conducting concrete empirical research (Isaev 1993). 
During the late 1980s, combining teaching and research in Soviet universities 
was a radical rethinking of the relationship between education and science, 
which hitherto had been regarded as fundamentally different social 
institutions.  Social scientific research was conducted primarily for the Soviet 
politico–industrial–military complex and produced in ‘scientific’ institutions 
such as the Academy of Science and on-site research centres.  Social science 
education, on the other hand, was carried out to provide scientific institutions 
with a skilled labour force, and was situated in specialised secondary and 
higher education institutions such as universities and technical institutes.  
While this rendering of the relationship between teaching and research may 
have been called ‘dialectical,’ the emphasis is on research and an academic’s 
ability to train students to be well-rounded professional researchers.  For 
example, a recently published sociology textbook criticised teaching materials 
in the field because their authors ‘do not do concrete sociological research’ 
 179
 
 
and therefore produce books which are, on the whole, merely traditional or 
classical ‘compilations of sociological views’ (Tishin 1998: 3).68   
Within the BHU Sociology Department, there have been a number of 
initiatives to include students in research work.  Some instructors supervise 
small groups of students as part of their nauchno–issledovatel'skaia rabota so 
studentami (scientific–research work with students).  In 1996–97, Ibraeva 
mentored a group on ‘the role of mass media information in the reformation of 
society’ and Asanbekov supervised one which dealt with the ‘problems of 
establishing new social commonalities’ (BHU 1997).  In 1999, Shaidullaeva 
organised a student club called ‘Datkaiym’ in order to hold discussions on 
contemporary social problems, particularly regarding female elites (BHU 
2000).   
Despite such initiatives, the creation of a dialectical relationship between 
teaching and research remains a formal rather than substantive project.  While 
students are required to assist with projects carried out by members of the 
sociological laboratory and conduct individual research projects, 
apprenticeships are often formulaic and not systematically integrated into 
students’ learning experiences.  Instead of being dialectically related, it is 
perhaps more accurate to say that sociological teaching and research co-exist 
as related but discrete activities.   
As with the curriculum, sociological research at BHU is highly 
structured, centrally organised and dominated by a small number of senior 
academics.  It is defined as a departmental, not individual, activity.  Instructors 
and students must design projects which conform and contribute to the 
department’s ‘general scientific theme.’  In the 1999–2000 Annual Report, for 
example, it was specified that ‘members of the department continued to work 
actively on their scientific themes, defined in the framework of the 
departmental themes’ (BHU 2000).  From 1994 to 2000, the ‘all-faculty 
scientific problem,’ funded by the State Committee for Science and 
Technology of the Kyrgyz Republic, was ‘Kyrgyzstan on the road to 
democracy and the market.’ By 1995, the Sociology Department had 
developed its own ‘all-department theme’ within this broad framework, called 
‘Social changes in the conditions of a transitional society’ (BHU 1995, 1998, 
2002).   
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Every year, this broad programme is divided into a number of narrower 
themes, each one investigated by a designated group of instructors and 
supervised by a senior faculty member.  Such research teams are more 
commonly referred to as ‘sociological groups’ and may be constituted and 
reconstituted depending upon the nature of the research (Nurova 2003).  In 
1994 and 1995, teams conducted research on the establishment and 
development of new social groups in the process of transition to market 
relations, the particularities of the creation of new political, military and 
economic elites in the conditions of democracy, and changes in the process of 
transformation (BHU 1994, 1995).69   
Under the first theme, supervised by Isaev, staff conducted empirical 
research on topics such as the development of a national working class, 
entrepreneurs and farmers, the social problems of women, and the 
participation of young people in privatisation, ultimately publishing twenty-
one articles on the results of this research in national newspapers and several 
locally produced sborniki (BHU 1995).  The following year, the team 
developed a programme on ‘monitoring public opinion,’ upon which basis 
they made recommendations to the governmental groups in charge of 
designing privatisation policies and produced a four-part publication, The 
Kyrgyz Republic: Changes in the Process of Social Transformation, which 
focused on outlining the effects of political and economic reform on everyday 
life in Kyrgyzstan (BHU 1995).  The aim of this research was overwhelmingly 
to ascertain and expose the ‘objective social reality’ about the reforms, which, 
it was argued, was obscured by both popular misinterpretation and political 
propaganda, particularly on the part of the government.     
The second theme, also supervised by Isaev, explored the ‘formation of 
the political elite as it is directly linked with fundamental changes in the life of 
the new Kyrgyz state.’  The process, it was asserted, could only occur in a 
democracy ‘defined by political freedom and political pluralism.’  Research on 
the topic, which was dominated by Isaev’s controversial studies on political 
ratings conducted from 1991–97 (see Chapter 9), therefore focused on 
drawing correlations between elite power and levels of political freedom in the 
republic (BHU 1995).  In post-independence Kyrgyzstan, political ratings 
studies are defined as ‘an important element of democracy in all civilised 
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states;’ it is argued that they ‘serve as a believable source of social information 
for making decisions or correcting the political behaviour of leaders’ (Isaev et 
al. 1994b).  They are also symbolic of a shift from traditional politics to 
rational political organisation insofar as they ‘[evaluate] the head of state not 
according to his position in the hierarchy, but according to his concrete deeds, 
and the effectiveness of the work he undertook to do’ (Isaev et al. 1994).    
During this period, departmental reports claim that little research was 
conducted on the third all-departmental theme, the ‘social-spiritual face of the 
people of Kyrgyzstan,’ owing to a lack of funds for empirical sociological 
research (BHU 1995).  However, some faculty members pursued this theme in 
more individualised ways, despite severe financial and professional 
constraints.  Asanbekov, for example, has developed a project on national 
culture, filling notebooks with commentary on theories of social change and 
globalisation.  However, he feels disabled by lack of resources and support, 
and his personal research has not been included in the department’s overall 
research programme.  Claiming that his primary role as university pro-rector 
takes up 80% of his time, he says, ‘very little time, practically none, is left for 
working on any sort of scientific problem.’  While he can work in a group 
within the Sociology Department, he would prefer to pursue his personal 
research interests.  ‘In general,’ he remarks,  
I am a better scientist than administrator. […]  It makes me 
happier to do unofficial scientific research.  If they give me 
money to publish three articles, it would be a great achievement 
for me.  Not only because I would work on something to 
completion, [but also because] these articles contain my own 
opinion, my own analysis of these problems. […]  If I could be 
sure that I would receive a salary for scientific research and 
knew I could support my family on it, of course, I would 
absolutely leave [the administration] for science (Asanbekov 
2003).    
 From 1996 to 2000, the department’s research programme was expanded 
to include other themes, which were pursued to varying degrees from year to 
year: socio-cultural processes (e.g., globalisation, migration, mass media and 
ideology), labour and distributive relations (e.g., unemployment, internal 
migration, poverty), the establishment of new social groups (mainly 
entrepreneurs and various professional strata), changes in the social types of 
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individuals (including migrants and women), deviant behaviour and inter-
ethnic relations (BHU 1997).  The results of empirical studies (primarily 
questionnaire research and expert surveys) conducted on these themes were 
again used to ‘make recommendations for organs of social administration in 
[the] republic’ and published in internally produced sborniki and national 
newspapers.  Several faculty members also completed individual projects 
within this framework: Ibraeva, for example, published a book on media in 
Kyrgyzstan, and Alamanova produced a translated summary of a German 
textbook on the sociology of labour and professions (BHU 1997). 
 The research conducted by the programme’s aspirants reflects the 
department’s insistence on professional hierarchy as well as intellectual 
homogeneity.  During 1994 and 1995, seven were writing dissertations on the 
development of social groups, two on problems of the political elite and two 
on more general topics of social development in Kyrgyzstan.70   All but two 
were supervised by Isaev and all took Kyrgyzstan as their unit of analysis or 
‘example.’  From 1996 to 2000, after the department’s research programme 
had been broadened to include other themes, these students were joined by 
new aspirants who focused on emerging themes of democratisation, 
stratification, values and religion;71 Satkynaliev worked together with Isaev to 
comprise the department’s new ‘team’ on deviant behaviour.72  By 1998 and 
1999, the department’s aspirants, most of whom were supervised by Isaev, had 
also begun to concentrate on the study of ‘civil society,’73 and by 2001 were 
working within the new thematic component on the ‘problems of gender 
relations in Kyrgyzstan,’ led by Shaidullaeva (BHU 2002). 
 Graduate students at BHU rarely have the opportunity to choose their 
own topics of research, and many are assigned studies which correspond to the 
work of a senior academic and the department’s ‘general scientific theme.’  
Botoeva (2003), for example, met with considerable resistance when she 
proposed to write a masters thesis on narcotics, a subject which she became 
interested in while on an educational exchange to Indiana University: 
I wanted to write my dissertation on narcotics, but they didn’t 
let me.  They said, ‘oh you’re such a girl, you still don’t have 
enough information, it’s an overly dangerous theme.’ And thus, 
though I wanted to do research about drugs, I don’t know why, 
I couldn’t. […] I went seven times in order to get away from 
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the theme [and my supervisor]. I wanted to work with [another 
supervisor], but he didn’t want to give me to anyone because he 
knew I would do all right.  I went to him seven times and told 
him I didn’t want to do this theme.  It was a horrible theme: 
‘Open society: problems and perspectives of its establishment 
in Kyrgyzstan.’ I wanted to write about narcotics.  And then 
[the person who I wanted to supervise me] said, ‘you’re small, 
you’re weak,’ as if there were no problems with narcotics that 
would support interviews or something.74   
The control over and homogenisation of research interests, however, 
reflects more than an affinity to intellectual centralisation.  While monism is 
encouraged for the sake of solidarity and control, it is exacerbated and at times 
almost necessitated by the severe shortage of scholarly materials in other 
areas.  According to the department’s annual report for 1995, research 
conducted by members of the department on the topics above ‘form[ed] the 
foundation of the information base of research programmes for graduate 
dissertation themes in sociology and politology’ (BHU 1995).  The university 
library stocks only a few books on sociology and selected volumes of 
Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, and the smaller library maintained by the 
Faculty of Socio–Political Sciences contains mainly theoretical and 
introductory textbooks.  Likewise, there are few academic resources on 
contemporary sociology housed in the national library (e.g., Isaev 2003a; 
Osmonov 2001).  
 In addition to working within the department’s structured research 
programme, faculty members and graduate students therefore also seek 
funding from foreign grants or research commissioned by the government or 
international organisations such as UNESCO, TACIS, Gallup and the IMF.  
Despite his criticism of the colonialist nature of such relationships, Isaev 
(1993) has even suggested that under such circumstances sociological 
laboratories should be used for ‘fulfilling zakazy from the state, private or 
other types of organisations and enterprises on a khozgovorniy level [i.e., 
financial contracts], which is an important source of additional salary for 
teachers, co-workers and students.’  Such research generally addresses topics 
of interest to these agencies, such as migration, business, unemployment and 
reproductive health.  However, because it frequently takes the form of 
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empirical data gathering for use in specific policy reports, it has little impact 
on the department’s research programme as a whole.   
 
Boundary–work and contingency in sociology at BHU 
 
Outwardly, the BHU Sociology Department presents a clear, unambiguous 
image of sociology as an academic discipline, educational subject and 
profession.  However, a more careful analysis of how this reified image has 
been constructed and maintained reveals that it emerged at the convergence of 
a number of non-scientific factors, including the opportunities and constraints 
provided by the state educational system and the institutional organisation of 
the university, the norms which govern how sociologists acquiesce to or 
challenge these structural conditions, the background assumptions and 
intellectual architecture of individual actors, historical legacies of financial 
and academic dependency, and the ascendance of new discourses on both 
social science and society. 
 The need for disciplinary boundary–work which aims to extend the 
authority of sociology into already existing fields is minimised in the 
department, primarily because decisions about how to distinguish between 
sociology and other academic disciplines and social practices are generally 
made outside the department itself.  The state, particularly the Ministry of 
Education and its affiliated advisors, is recognised as the legitimate authority 
in categorising bodies of knowledge, particularly insofar as these are linked to 
sectors of society which fall under the purview of the state.  Similarly, there is 
little controversy over what content (concepts, topics and skills) may be 
legitimately included in or excluded from the discipline.  This is because 
sociologists at BHU also recognise more abstract authorities of canonical 
knowledge and disciplinary tradition in both Soviet and western sociologies.  
Many faculty members are unfamiliar with the concept of ‘the canon’ and, 
assuming a positivist theory of knowledge production, do not question the 
disciplinary standards that are perceived to have been established as 
hegemonic.75  The reproduction of hegemonic canons which are defined as 
standards of excellence in mature science is therefore interpreted as the ideal 
method for disciplinary development.  The legitimacy of new truth claims in 
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sociology is measured against their correspondence to other truth claims 
issued by external authoritative institutions, namely, the state and dominant 
western sociological institutions.   
 The latter phenomenon has material as well as intellectual foundations.  
Sociologists at BHU have limited access to sociological work, both historical 
and contemporary.  Soviet resources, which are in any case now often 
neglected, present two dominant paradigms of sociology: Marxist–Leninist 
sociology and zapadnaia sotsiologiia.  Older, Soviet-generation sociologists 
continue to be influenced by both, although it is currently a professional taboo 
to publicly condone elements of the first.  Younger, post-Soviet-generation 
sociologists, however, rely heavily on Russian textbooks of zapadnaia 
sotsiologiia, most of which were first published in the 1980s and reproduce 
the traditional classical sociological canon (Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Mead, 
Parsons etc.), sometimes including and other times excluding Marx.  Due to 
the lack of resources to purchase new materials, poor Internet access and the 
breakdown of communication between Kyrgyzstani sociologists with 
colleagues from more resource-rich former Soviet republics (e.g., Russia and 
the Baltic countries), those working at BHU have little opportunity to learn 
about post-Soviet developments in sociology, including work which 
challenges the hegemony of traditional canons and that introduces new 
concepts and themes into sociological discourse.     
 In addition, the hierarchical professional culture within the department 
reinforces the tendency toward authoritative knowledge reproduction rather 
than creative knowledge production.  The authority of the state is exercised at 
the department level by academic administrators who assume responsibility 
for outlining and monitoring compliance with a specific set of disciplinary 
standards.  Senior sociologists at BHU do not have to struggle to establish or 
maintain their authority within the department, as older Soviet norms of social 
and academic hierarchy are observed (if not legitimised) by all faculty 
members.  Furthermore, while the rigid hierarchisation of professional 
position largely eliminates ambiguities about who has authority within the 
department, it does not prevent competition for status among faculty members.  
All are equalised on the wider ‘market’ for research contracts and foreign 
grants; in fact, younger faculty are often at an advantage due to their higher 
 186
 
 
levels of social capital (e.g., better computer and in some cases language 
skills) as well as by ageism in grant-giving agencies.  This engenders 
competitive rather than cooperative relations among sociologists within the 
department, many of whom respond by hoarding knowledge and information 
in order to protect their job, niche of expertise and edge in extra-departmental 
opportunities.  In other words, while the department outwardly advocates its 
commitment to the advancement of social scientific knowledge, the internal 
organisation and culture instead create conditions for its static reproduction.   
 The reproduction of social scientific knowledge, however, is also part of 
the department’s project to establish scientific legitimacy vis-à-vis its declared 
role as producer of the state and nation’s new professional and administrative 
elite.  Sociology, defined as an applied profession, is purposefully constructed 
as a standardised complex of bodies of knowledge and skills which can be 
transmitted from one generation to the next, ‘received’ by students, and 
applied to a range of social problems.  The emphasis on technical skill is in 
turn used to legitimise the discipline’s social relevance, which is an important 
factor in maintaining political and public support for the department and for 
attracting new students to the programme.   
However, there are tensions between the quest for scientific legitimacy 
and that for social relevance in sociology.  The department has not, for 
example, resolved the discrepancy between its overtly political relationship to 
the state and its insistence that the sociological knowledge and practice which 
it purveys are essentially apolitical.  Boundary–work has been used to 
distinguish the nature of sociological knowledge (i.e., ‘scientific’) from its 
social role (i.e., political and applied); however, the distinction also blurs the 
actually existing intersection of the scientific and the political.   
In addition, members of the department conduct additional boundary–
work to justify their commitment to these two competing goals.  On the one 
hand, faculty members are responsible for maintaining the order of the status 
quo; overt challenges to the ruling regime made at the department level, for 
example, would result in reprisals from the university’s primary benefactor, 
the state.  The department’s teaching and research activities therefore reinforce 
the notion that the role of sociology is to aid in the more effective 
administration of state and society; if it is to encourage social change, this 
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must be effected within the context of advising political and managerial 
authorities who can then more ‘scientifically’ design and implement social 
reforms from the top down.   
On the other hand, however, sociologists within the department maintain 
that one of the discipline’s main functions is to ‘expose’ social reality and 
unpleasant facts about social life in Kyrgyzstan.  As such, the sociology which 
is taught in the classroom often has a more critical edge.  Students may be 
encouraged to think critically about issues such as the legality of elections, 
political participation or the meaning of national culture; however, the work 
they produce for examinations fits comfortably within the bounds of the 
standards for professional knowledge outlined by the Ministry of Education.   
In order to balance these competing roles, the department emphasises an 
ideal of scientific politics and asserts that a truly ‘scientific sociology,’ 
precisely because it is apolitical, can contribute to state-sanctioned social 
reform through both scientific skills and social criticism.  By claiming to offer 
a window onto social reality through providing students and the public with 
social scientific information, sociologists can also claim to be promoting the 
restoration of social stability in a society that is widely regarded as chaotic and 
trapped within an informational vacuum. 
Nevertheless, within BHU the theoretical and conceptual content of 
sociology are not generative sources of questions about this or any other 
society.  Instead, sociological knowledge is perceived as a resource for 
answering questions which are raised in other non-intellectual contexts, often 
about practical problems faced by political groups and organisations, the 
media and commercial and industrial institutions, or indeed, perceptions of 
public opinion.  Theorising, in other words, is largely absent from the 
definition of sociological work in BHU. 
The BHU Sociology Department is an excellent example of the discipline 
in transition—not from communism to democracy or socialism to capitalism 
as is often argued, but rather from Soviet state sociology to national sociology 
in a post-colonial state.  It also reveals how sociologists have interpreted and 
negotiated the ambiguous relationship between sociology and politics, or truth 
and power, in this context.  Chapter 7 moves away from this example to 
explore how many of the same structural contingencies coalesced with 
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different human and cultural factors to cultivate the emergence of a very 
different conceptualisation of sociology at the American University–Central 
Asia.    
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8 
BETWEEN SCHOLARSHIP AND SERVICE: 
SOCIOLOGY AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY–CENTRAL ASIA 
 
Institutional context 
History and departmental identity 
The Sociology Department at the American University–Central Asia was 
founded in 1998, five years after the BHU department was established.  At the 
time, the university (then known as the American University in Kyrgyzstan) 
was five years old.  It began in 1993 as the Kyrgyz–American Faculty, a small 
department housed in the English-language faculty of KNU.  Its founder, a 
charismatic instructor of English named Kamila Sharshekeeva, aimed to train 
students in English and introduce them to a variety of newly emerging 
‘market-oriented’ fields such as business administration, law and economics.  
In 1997, the school separated from the National University, strengthened its 
formal ties with the US government, changed its name to the American 
University in Kyrgyzstan (AUK), moved into a separate building in the city 
centre (the former headquarters of the Kirgiz Republic’s Communist Party 
Supreme Soviet) and was conferred independent status by presidential decree 
(AUK 2002; Ministry of Education 2000).76  By 1997, the institution began a 
rapid transition from a small, professionally oriented Soviet faculty to an 
American liberal-arts-style private college.  The shift included a reorganisation 
of the disciplines, in particular, a new focus on the establishment of social 
science departments (Reeves 2003).77  
This coincided with an initiative to establish a ‘new kind’ of sociology 
department in Kyrgyzstan, one which would incorporate best practices from 
both Soviet and American models of sociological education.  It was led by 
Ainoura Sagynbaeva, a Moscow-educated candidate of sociology who was at 
the time teaching short courses in sociology in one of the university’s two 
departments.78  Sociology was not introduced to AUCA as an independent 
discipline, but rather as an elective course.  Sagynbaeva, however, was 
inspired to expand the university’s offerings in sociology while on an 
academic exchange to Washington DC in 1997.  There, she encountered a 
wide variety of sociological perspectives that were absent in Kyrgyzstan, a 
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strong scholarly community and specialised degrees in which students made 
choices about how to design their own educational programmes.  She returned 
to Bishkek to discuss the idea with her students at AUK, aided by the daughter 
of another Kyrgyzstani sociologist who wanted to study sociology.  Other 
interested students followed her example. ‘To be honest,’ says Sagynbaeva, 
‘when I told the girls that I dreamt of a school, I didn’t mean to have a 
department.  I simply meant colleagues who would understand me, who would 
love sociology’ (Sagynbaeva 2003).  She thought that AUK was the most 
suitable site for her project because it was ‘experimental’ and less ‘Soviet’ 
than either BHU or KNU.  She imagined the department from the ground up 
as an intellectual and academic enterprise, without substantial consideration 
for the administrative needs of the state.   
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore the ideological and 
institutional particularities of AUCA; this has been done already (Reeves 
2003; Sharshkeeva 2001).  However, it is important to understand why the 
university established a reputation as the republic’s most ‘independent’ and 
post- or anti-Soviet institution.  First, the university acquired symbolic 
political prestige as a ‘bridge’ between Kyrgyzstan and the United States when 
US First Lady Hilary Clinton attended its opening ceremonies in 1997.  It soon 
after became endowed with almost missionary status as the standard bearer of 
‘modern’ educational reform and the republic’s controversial transition to 
American-style practices in higher education.  Second, owing to the 
university’s heavy emphasis on English-language learning, it began to attract a 
large number of high performing and wealthy students who were also 
recipients of foreign grants, many of whom spent time in the US on 
educational exchange programmes sponsored by organisations such as Soros 
and ACCELS.79  In other words, both the administration and student body 
played a role in encouraging the westernisation, specifically the 
Americanisation, of higher education at AUK.  Third, as Reeves (2003: 28) 
points out, the school had no Soviet identity to ‘shake off.’  The novelty factor 
means that institutions such as AUK, ‘whilst facing considerable difficulties of 
their own (notably, establishing themselves as “reputable” in the eyes of 
longer-established institutions)…have far greater leeway to introduce reforms 
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without this being seen as revolutionary (and therefore at risk of encountering 
reactionary coups).’   
However, its self-declared autonomy did not save the university from 
criticism and hostility.  Some of resistance originated from within the faculty, 
particularly from instructors who wanted to maintain a more specialised and 
didactic approach to education.  There has also been some resistance to 
‘internationalising’ education in a country that is self-consciously constructing 
a ‘national’ identity (Reeves 2002b).  Finally, many of the university’s large-
scale administrative initiatives—merit-based admission and scholarships, 
charging high tuition fees, discouraging bribery and corruption, focusing on 
cross-curricular critical thinking and switching from a ‘points’ to a ‘credit-
hour’ system—have met with enormous resistance from other members of the 
educational community in Kyrgyzstan, many of whom feel threatened by these 
changes.  For some, Reeves argues, AUK is a  
reminder of the glaring inequalities that have polarized 
Kyrgyzstani society for the last ten years and the unfettered 
penetration of the market into areas of social life, education 
among them, that were previously free of such logics.  As such, 
it is often seen as representing a set of values and an 
educational philosophy rooted in liberal individualism that is 
alien to, and inappropriate to meet the needs  of, contemporary 
Kyrgyzstan’ (2002b: 22).   
While there has been no  successful ‘reactionary coup’ against AUCA, there 
have nevertheless been a number of attempts to close the university, curtail its 
experimental activities, and force the administration to conform to more 
traditional types of educational management.   
Emerging against this political and cultural backdrop, the Sociology 
Department also identified itself as an ‘experimental’ programme.  However, 
Sagynbaeva’s initial vision of a hybrid Soviet–American school of sociology 
was gradually superseded by new plans to institutionalise a thoroughly 
‘western’ Sociology Department, which were put forward by foreign 
academics recruited by foreign organisations, mainly the Open Society 
Institute and Indiana University, specifically to ‘reform’ and ‘aid’ the 
department.  Although their approaches to the experiment differed, all aimed 
to bypass the Soviet experience entirely and find ways to adapt disciplinary 
knowledge from western sociological theory and method to the local context 
 192
 
 
of Kyrgyzstani society.  The programme curriculum was revised twice in five 
years.  The shift from Soviet–American sociology to an Anglo–American–
Kyrgyz sociology did not affect the department’s identity as an experimental 
programme; however, it resulted in the department’s segregation from other 
national sociology institutions, its distance from the state, and its strong 
symbolic and material affiliations with American culture, politics and 
education.   
 
Funding structure 
Like the Sociology Department at BHU, the AUCA Sociology Department has 
never been a priority for funding or support.  AUCA is a private university 
which represents itself as a model for non-state higher education in the 
republic.  Its main sources of funding are tuition fees, the Open Society 
Institute and the US State Department.  (While the Kyrgyz government signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the last two, its unspoken responsibility 
is to offer the university political support in the form of non-interference.)  
The department enjoys no direct benefit from student fees, although its 
existence is contingent upon its ability to enrol well educated, fee-paying 
students.80  However, it receives technical support (visiting scholars, student 
exchanges, computer software, teaching materials, etc.) from fixed-term grants 
such as those initiated by the University of Nebraska, Indiana University, 
IREX, Fulbright and the Eurasia Foundation (AUK 2002).  
AUCA enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy from the Kyrgyz 
Ministry of Education; however, this was granted in large part as a favour to 
the school’s founders, who had maintained their Soviet-era connections with 
other members of the new political elite.  This autonomy has been maintained 
by a series of formal and informal negotiations; it is also conditional on donor 
philanthropy and the stability of political relations between the university and 
the Kyrgyz and American governments.  The fragility of this position was 
exposed in 2003, when a major internal crisis erupted, pitting different 
factions of the university leadership and faculty against one another.  A 
symbolic struggle between two philosophies of educational management—
bureaucratic and democratic or personalised and authoritarian—became 
manifested in a professional battle between the university’s American 
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president, David Huwiler, and its former Kyrgyz provost, Sharshekeeva.  The 
Soros Foundation, US government and Kyrgyz state all threatened to 
withdraw their support for the university if the issue was not resolved to their 
satisfaction (see Abdrakhmanova 2003).   
Such conflicts necessarily affect the Sociology Department; for example, 
Sanghera (2003) recalls how the rift occupied the full intellectual attention of 
faculty members, leaving little room for discussing other issues.  However, the 
department is more immediately dependent upon the good will of powerful 
individuals who are responsible for allocating budgetary funds—the president, 
vice-president, provost, vice-provost and various financial and pedagogical 
committees.  The need to persuade influential persons within the university 
administration of the value and merit of sociology education has at times 
compounded the problem of how to cater to both the Kyrgyz Ministry of 
Education, which confers legal status on the department, and western 
sponsors, which confer on it symbolic intellectual legitimacy. 
Just as sociologists working at BHU are pulled between loyalty to the 
state and the need to solicit supplemental funding from non-state 
organisations, those working at AUCA are torn between their ideological 
commitments to ‘civil society’ organisations and American higher educational 
institutions, and the need to receive approval from the Kyrgyz government and 
society.  Almost since its inception, therefore, the department has fought two 
battles on four fronts.  Faculty members need to distance themselves from the 
Kyrgyz state and national education system while nevertheless attempting to 
gain legitimacy within both, and to align themselves with and obtain 
accreditation from US educational authorities while distinguishing themselves 
from American sociologists as members of a uniquely ‘Kyrgyz’ institution. 
 These tasks have been made particularly challenging by the perpetuation 
of severe financial hardship.  As with the BHU department, formal 
sponsorship agreements have not translated into sustainable material 
maintenance for the AUCA Sociology Department.  A year after it was 
established, the then-chair (Sagynbaeva) and co-chair (myself) submitted a 
budget to the university administration, requesting money to purchase 
computers, a printer, copy machine, tape recorder and video camera for 
research purposes (AUK 1999b).  In 2001, the department still lacked these 
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basic items, as well as money to hire new instructors, purchase books and 
computer programmes for teaching (e.g., SPSS), subscribe to academic 
journals, join scholarly associations such as the International Sociological 
Association or fund student research and extra-curricular activities (AUK 
2001).81  While the university eventually allocated a room for the department 
to set up an applied research centre in 2002, Ablezova (2003) remembers that 
‘it was very hard to get these tables and shelves…and the computers were not 
here.  They didn’t provide us with a lot.’   
One of the department’s most acute financial problems is the lack of 
funding to hire qualified faculty to teach required and elective courses.  Even 
the relatively high salaries offered at AUCA are an insufficient incentive for 
highly qualified instructors to stay on.  Ibraeva (2003), for example, claims 
that she earned more money working on contract for organisations such as the 
United Nations and OSCE than she did teaching at AUCA.  Although she 
earned $250 a month as an instructor, these ‘earnings as a sociologist in 
universities were never the main source of income.’  However, the 
administration does not provide the department with the resources or authority 
to hire new instructors, despite the fact that faculty members have argued that 
this would enhance the university’s own objectives to improve scholarship and 
raise its profile within the international academic community.  In 2001, the 
department’s two co-chairs (Botoeva and Reeves) requested $2,650 to hire 
two full-time faculty members who would have ‘a commitment to teaching’ 
and support the department’s transition from a Soviet-style ‘point’ system to 
an American-style ‘credit-hours’ system (AUK 2001).  Although this request 
was denied, the department was nevertheless expected to alter its curriculum 
to conform to the university’s new credit-hour system.   
 After five years of failed appeals for financial and professional support 
from the university, faculty began to seek alternative solutions to their 
perpetual financial crisis.  Since its establishment in 2002, the Applied 
Research Center has worked to broaden its support base with the foreign 
organisations for which it conducts research.  In this way, faculty managed to 
secure basic research equipment such as a laptop, camera, dictaphone and 
video camera from Save the Children UK as part of their contract to conduct a 
study on child poverty in Kyrgyzstan.  While according to the contract these 
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should all be returned, the staff have been promised that they will be able to 
keep them (Ablezova 2003).   
Like sociologists working at BHU, however, sociologists at AUCA often 
feel disempowered by unequal relationships with foreign clients.  
CIMERA kind of published [our research], and we are going to 
publish something for Children and Poverty—a book or some 
kind of bulletin.  As for the HIV project, they promised us that 
they would publish it as well.  But we do not have any kind of 
rights…I mean we don’t have money for it.  That’s why we 
don’t ask them.  For sure, we will have some credits for 
publishing.  There should be an inscription that it was 
conducted by the Applied Research Center, and [have] our 
names there. […] The basic problem in our centre is the 
financial part.  We don’t know how to negotiate these things.  
[There are] little things we just don’t know.  [Things we can’t 
do.]  Because the data is not our property; it’s the property of 
the clients (Ablezova 2003). 
Without adequate funding from either the state or university, however, the 
department is forced to earn revenue through commercial research. 
In addition, sociology instructors have increasingly turned toward visiting 
faculty, particularly from the department’s partner school, Indiana University, 
for training and collaboration in areas such as curriculum development, 
departmental administration, sociological theory and methods of social 
research.  Unlike the BHU Sociology Department, which is not defined as a 
progressive ‘target institution’ by western universities or aid organisations, the 
AUCA department receives between one and three visiting faculty—often 
American and British—from overseas universities per year.  The following 
section describes more closely the role that these foreign instructors play in the 
life of the department and in the conceptualisation of sociology itself. 
 
Faculty relations 
The AUCA Sociology Department comprises a mixture of permanent Russian-
speaking local faculty, most of whom receive average salaries of $80 to $150 
per month, and revolving English-speaking foreign faculty, who are generally 
paid ‘foreigners’ wages’ of $200 per month or more.  From 1998–99, there 
were six instructors on the department roster—one candidate of sociology 
(Sagynbaeva) and a doctor of philosophy (Isaev, who was also teaching at 
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BHU), one masters of sociology (myself), and three instructors with lower 
degrees.  However, four of the six taught only one general education or 
elective course each; Sagynbaeva and I taught the remaining nine required and 
three elective classes.  In 1999, when we assumed responsibility for teaching 
the required sociology sections of the undergraduate curriculum, instructors 
from other universities and research centres such as Nurova and Elebaeva 
joined the department temporarily to offer elective courses in the sociology of 
management and ethnology.  By 2000, the faculty consisted of eight 
instructors: four shtatnye, or ‘on the staff,’ and four sovmestiteli, or instructors 
from other institutions hired on a contract basis to teach semester-length 
elective courses (AUK 2000, 2000a).  All instructors are expected to teach at 
least one course per semester; however, their professional responsibilities do 
not include individual or collective research.  Although there have been 
initiatives to integrate teaching and research within the department, at the time 
of this study these were still treated as separate activities, the Applied 
Research Center being affiliated with the department but operating 
independently from it. 
The Sociology Department is a young department.  While it employed a 
number of older-generation instructors to teach elective courses from 1998–
2001, many have since left AUCA and been replaced by younger American-
educated instructors (e.g., Mehrigiul Ablezova, Gulzat Botoeva and Medina 
Aitieva).  Because the department does not offer graduate training and lacks 
the resources to recruit senior instructors, its main recruitment policy involves 
sending promising graduates abroad to pursue further education or masters 
degrees at Indiana University, with the understanding that they will return to 
teach.  There are concerns, however, that this ‘train-to-return’ model of faculty 
recruitment may in the long run contribute to brain drain rather than 
sustainable development.  While aspirants graduating from BHU have fairly 
limited opportunities for employment within and beyond the republic, those 
completing English-language degrees from western universities often face 
difficult choices about whether to remain in western academia or return to 
Kyrgyzstan.  John Newman, who worked as a visiting professor in the 
department during the spring of 2003, says,  
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it seems to me that a place like AUCA is targeting the best and 
the brightest to give them a ticket out.  […] I know you can’t 
stop people from doing this…I fully have sympathy with the 
hierarchy of needs; that if you are hungry you can’t think about 
the great philosophical issues of the universe. […] I don’t know 
if what I hear is just some sort of general academic grousing 
that you hear all academics doing about how tough life is in the 
academic world, but for them it is hard.   
Another strategy for increasing the number of qualified instructors on the 
faculty is to recruit from abroad; to ‘import expertise.’  Although one 
departmental document (AUK 1999c) claims that the department intended to 
‘recruit well-known specialists from [the Kyrgyz Republic], the US and other 
western countries,’ new recruits have been drawn primarily from the US.  
Since the department’s establishment, at least one full-time, junior-level 
American or British instructor has been appointed by a foreign organisation, 
primarily the Soros-sponsored Civic Education Project (CEP), though also 
Fulbright and Indiana University.82  Although two such instructors (Balihar 
Sanghera and Russell Kleinbach) hold PhDs in sociology, others such as 
myself (co-chair from 1998–2000) and Madeleine Reeves (co-chair from 
2000–02) were hired immediately after completing masters degrees in the 
field.  Regardless of degree level and their temporary contract status, however, 
foreign instructors are often offered either an administrative position within 
the department (i.e., chair or co-chair) or receive privileged status as 
‘consultants’ or advisors.   
As at BHU, faculty relations in the department are hierarchical.  
Formally, the department is organised around principles of democratic 
governance, mutual cooperation and academic freedom.  Many of its members 
in fact distinguish themselves from instructors in state universities by their 
deliberate refusal to institutionalise hierarchies of age, status and degree.  
Indeed, faculty meetings within the department are more than formal 
exercises.  While frequently poorly attended, such meetings often involve 
serious debates about the programme—which courses should be required and 
elective, how to assess students for admission and graduation, how to organise 
internships, etc.  Younger instructors also enjoy more dynamic and equitable 
relations with their older colleagues, most of whom fall into Ibraeva’s 
‘intermediate’ category of middle-aged sociologists, and most of whom have 
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received some degree of sociology education in American universities.  Team 
teaching is encouraged, and instructors are often invited (or, in times when 
teaching staff is particularly stretched, required) to design innovative courses 
which are added to the curriculum without necessarily receiving formal 
approval from senior faculty.  Many of the department’s achievements, 
including the establishment of the Applied Research Center, have been 
initiated and/or accomplished by junior instructors. 
Despite the more open atmosphere and egalitarian relations, however, 
professional power is nevertheless stratified in the department.  Power and 
prestige are distributed not according to age and academic degree as in BHU, 
but are rather based on an individual’s occupational status and ethnicity or 
citizenship.  Full-time foreign members of the faculty command considerable 
prestige, owing to their ideological affiliation with ‘the west,’ but exercise 
limited professional power as they are often poorly integrated into the 
university’s formal and informal power structures.  Their high level of job 
security and exclusion from indigenous power structures such as the clan, 
however, make them well placed to lobby the university administration on 
sensitive issues where their Kyrgyzstani colleagues often fear to tread.  Full-
time Kyrgyzstani instructors occupy a more ambiguous position.  While they 
are afforded greater professional power in terms of administrative decision 
making at the university level, they tend to have less intellectual and academic 
prestige than their foreign colleagues.  They also have less job security, which 
often makes them reluctant to enter into debates with the administration.  Part-
time local instructors, particularly those who do not speak English and spend 
little time in the department, have the lowest power and prestige, and part-
time, temporary foreign instructors often play very little role in the department 
at all.     
These inequalities are reinforced by the administration’s privileged 
treatment of foreign faculty, relatively low salaries, and the absence of 
incentive or pressure (as in BHU) to contribute to conform to a departmental 
identity.  Newman (2003), in fact, remarked that  
the most interesting thing is that I see faculty kind of trying to 
act like faculty, but—it strikes me for a variety of reasons—not 
being able to do it.  And I think that, especially with the young 
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faculty, there’s no senior local faculty to act as mentors that 
didn’t live under a very autocratic system.  I think [there is a] 
sense of faculty governance, faculty responsibility, faculty 
taking charge of the academic mission of the university—and at 
once you see that happening, but at the same time you don’t.  I 
don’t see it enough and I don’t see it sustained as much as I’d 
like to see it, where people, where their single-minded devotion 
is to making this work, and to work becomes my responsibility 
shared with my colleagues, a sort of collegial intensity that I 
think is going to be required here (Newman 2003).   
Divisions are also exacerbated by the department’s two-way language barrier: 
most foreign faculty speak little or no Russian and many of the local 
instructors do not speak English.  The latter problem has improved in recent 
years, however, as local faculty members have taken it upon themselves to 
learn English and foreign faculty take an interest in Russian.  Internal groups 
within the department, however, continue to be organised around language, 
with English-speaking local and foreign faculty forming an influential core.   
As a result of these subtle hierarchies, an intellectual–technical division 
of labour has emerged within the department.  For a number of years, the 
intellectual content of the sociology programme was organised and maintained 
by full-time faculty members, mainly the chair and co-chair, who made key 
decisions about curriculum design, course offerings and programme policy 
before presenting them to the rest of the faculty for discussion and 
amendment.  While curriculum design is formally a team effort, foreign 
academics have historically dominated decisions about the type of content to 
include and exclude from the curriculum.  This trend has begun to change in 
recent years, however, as visiting faculty have begun to value perspectives 
from local faculty and as local instructors have demanded to be more involved 
in the educational process.  Changes to the curriculum in 2003, for example, 
were negotiated among a core group of local and foreign English-speaking 
faculty (e.g., Ablezova, Botoeva, Sanghera and Tanya Yarkokva). Although 
Sanghera, the sole foreign faculty member in the group, initially brought the 
notion of reform to the table, it was an issue that had been of concern to the 
others, and he points out that he would have desisted had the others not been 
interested in participating (Sanghera 2003).  Despite this greater degree of 
collaboration, however, professional authority remains determined by degrees 
of ‘western-ness;’ Sanghera was routinely asked by his peers to draft ideas and 
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reports that could be put to discussion among the group, and took a leading 
role in lobbying for the changes with the university administration.     
While part-time, local and younger instructors are not systematically 
exploited at AUCA, they are nevertheless responsible for the vast majority of 
administrative and technical work within the Sociology Department.  This 
includes writing reports for the university administration, marketing for 
student recruitment and liaising with other departments, as well as organising 
events and translating for foreign instructors working in the department.  As 
will be seen below, the foreign–local hierarchy also reveals itself in more 
intellectual forms, in particular, the definition of sociology itself.   
 
Conceptualisation of sociology 
The paradigm: sociology between scholarship and profession 
While sociologists at BHU aim to create and strengthen institutional ties 
between sociology and the apparatus of the nation-state by defining sociology 
as an applied profession, at AUCA the discipline has been defined in 
deliberate opposition to existing conceptions of the relationship between social 
science and society in Kyrgyzstan.  Its faculty have consciously striven to 
sever associations with what are often referred to as ‘Soviet’ conceptions of 
social science, including its affiliation with the state, and to foster new 
affinities with the international (i.e., Anglo-American) academic community.   
Sociology was first defined at AUCA as a liberal art, oriented toward 
explaining and understanding society (as opposed to ‘fixing’ it), and as a 
discipline which would enable students to become independent and ‘critical’ 
thinkers.  In 1999, Sagynbaeva outlined three priorities for departmental 
development: the expansion of elective courses and student choice in 
sociology, the encouragement of independent research on the part of both 
students and faculty, and the development of critical thinking skills, leadership 
qualities and creative talents (AUK 1999a).  While she herself is an applied 
researcher, she rejected the applied–professional model of the field in her early 
visions for the department.  Likewise, when Ibraeva took over as chair in 
2002, she came, at least formally, with a liberal intellectual agenda.  She 
aspired not only to ‘give a definite sum of sociological knowledge, but to 
teach students to think critically, using established technologies of analysis’ in 
 201
 
 
order to help them ‘find their niche in sociology and be independent 
individuals’ and to contribute to the development of the social science 
community in Kyrgyzstan (Ibraeva 2003).    
The orientation toward liberal–critical scholarship has been consistent, 
one might say even dominant, within the department.  However, unlike at 
BHU, the philosophy and practice of sociology are considerably contested 
here.  Neither institutional legacies nor governmental authority have played a 
decisive role in the construction of departmental or disciplinary identity, and 
the more nationally diverse faculty has struggled to strike a balance which 
meets the expectations of both ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ constituencies.  The 
project of defining sociology in the post-Soviet period is complicated at 
AUCA by the underlying tension between ‘internationalising’ and 
‘nationalising’ forces, manifested in the desire to create a western-style 
sociology that will nevertheless be recognised as a legitimate specialisation in 
Kyrgyzstan.  While the overarching identity as a private, alternative, post-
Soviet department provided space for the development of a liberal, non-Soviet 
conceptualisation of sociology, the concurrent need to integrate the discipline 
into new national frameworks demanded increasing attention to the applied–
professional model.   
The conceptualisation of sociology as liberal–critical scholarship is not 
only incompatible with the intellectual orientations of some Kyrgyzstani 
faculty, but also with many of the material realities of higher education in the 
republic.  The dominant conception of sociology therefore co-exists with an 
alternative conception of the discipline as an applied profession.  While the 
department may be characterised primarily as a science of society oriented 
toward interpretation and social criticism, it has become increasingly 
characterised as applied science in the service of ‘civil society.’  While the 
rhetoric of American social service is used to describe the department’s public 
orientation, ‘service’ is still defined in practice as the provision of 
information-gathering services for potential clients.  In addition, while the 
department views itself as a training ground for a new national elite, the 
meaning of this differs dramatically from the state-centric ‘cadre politics’ 
which shape conceptions of professional sociology at BHU.  At AUCA, 
sociology students are expected to make contributions to national and 
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international development not necessarily by applying technical skills to 
practical problems, but through producing critical research and social 
criticism; they are encouraged to identify not with the government, but with its 
international opposition.  This conceptualisation, as will be seen below, has 
impacted both the curriculum and the department’s research activities.   
 The early mission of the department was fluid and nebulous.  Unlike at 
BHU, where the department reproduced many familiar Soviet practices and 
was subject to strict governmental control, according to Sagynbaeva (2003) 
‘there was absolutely no foundation for creating programmes at AUK.’   
You went [to the administration] and they said, ‘fine, in 
September there will be a new programme.’  I had to…create 
an uchebnyaia programma and find instructors to teach the 
courses.  My situation was extremely complicated in 
comparison with other department heads, because they had the 
first course [of students] coming.  That’s OK; there are a 
number of general subjects.  But I had the problem of finding 
teachers for [second-year students]; I had to write a programme 
for the second course.  And of course this was difficult because 
there was still no programme for the first course.  There still 
were no goals or concepts, in general, of what [or] who we 
would graduate.  There was absolutely nothing.   
The freedom to design new parameters for sociology education and to 
reject the state standards allowed for a certain amount of innovation in the 
conceptualisation of the discipline.  However, in conjunction with a shortage 
of books, journals and contact with other sociologists, it also created 
something of an intellectual vacuum.  Sagynbaeva was in a less than ideal 
position to take advantage of this potentially liberating ambiguity.  She had 
limited access to alternative models of sociology education and few colleagues 
with whom she felt she could discuss the issue in any depth.  Furthermore, 
after granting her permission to establish a sociology department, the 
university administration expected her to produce and implement a full 
curriculum for first and second-year students.  Ironically, in an institution 
which purported to value critical thinking and intellectual experimentation 
above all else, Sagynbaeva did not have the luxury of creative contemplation.  
Her initial plans to develop sociology as a locally relevant intellectual 
vocation were soon overshadowed by the pragmatic demands of 
institutionalising it as a general, standardised academic discipline. 
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This more technocratic approach to departmental development resulted 
not in the articulation of Sagynbaeva’s ‘new Soviet–American sociology,’ but 
rather in the urgent importation of foreign, mainly American and British, 
models of sociology education.  In contrast to the state-centred and top-down 
development of the BHU Sociology Department, sociology at AUCA evolved 
under the influence of hegemonic definitions of sociology imported from 
abroad.  The practice of adopting foreign models of sociology education 
became institutionalised as the university began to hire foreign sociologists to 
help establish the department and reform the social sciences.  In the autumn of 
1998, for example, I joined CEP and was assigned to serve as Sagynbaeva’s 
co-chair in the new department.  However pleased she was to have help, she 
had not invited this particular type of intervention.  ‘To be honest,’ she 
remembers,    
when we were told that an American woman was coming to 
help me and to teach, I was a little worried because it was so 
hard for me.  Everything was new, and I was all by myself.  
And then to take on some American woman—I thought, what a 
surprise!  What will I do?  How will I do it?  We don’t have a 
common language.  I was really worried (Sagynbaeva 2003).   
These feelings changed over time as we developed a working relationship and 
she ‘understood that we could work together’ (Sagynbaeva 2003).  However, 
she also feels that while the department is ‘alive,’ it is not entirely what she 
initially imagined it would be.  
This is evident in a comparison of promotional brochures published by 
the department in 1999 and 2003.  At the time, the university’s high tuition 
fees, distance from traditional educational institutions, lack of state attestation, 
emphasis on English-language instruction and liberal education, and affiliation 
with the Soros Foundation and US government made it difficult to attract 
Kyrgyzstani students seeking ‘marketable’ professional degrees.  Furthermore, 
few people in the republic had heard of sociology—or at least the types of 
sociology advanced by the department.  For example, in a faculty–student 
meeting to ‘explore sociology,’ one student admitted that she thought a 
sotsiolog was someone who gathered statistics for the government, while 
another suggested that we change the name of the discipline altogether to 
clarify its meaning and dissociate it from Soviet sociology.  Because the 
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department’s survival depended on student intake, one of its first tasks was 
therefore to construct a departmental and disciplinary identity which would 
attract students to the programme.   
The definition of sociology in the first brochure was a generic one that 
had been adapted from a selection of US websites: 
Sociology is the systematic study and inquiry of human social 
life.  It provides a solid basis for understanding modern and 
historical social issues, including individual and group 
relationships, crime and poverty, human rights, racism, sexism, 
politics, economics and social stability and processes of change 
(AUK 1999).        
The programme’s main selling point at this time was a quote from Peter 
Berger’s Invitation to Sociology, which promised students that they would be 
able to ‘look behind the scenes’ to find out what was ‘really going on’ in the 
social world.  The ‘social world’ in this case was in fact an image of society 
constructed by mainstream American sociologists; ‘social issues’ were framed 
in unfamiliar lexicon such as ‘individual and group relationships, crime and 
poverty, human rights, racism, sexism, politics, economics and social stability 
and processes of social change’ (AUK 1999).  The programme’s learning 
outcomes as defined in this brochure reflect the early dominance of the 
liberal–critical conceptualisation and the heavy influence of American 
sociology.  It was designed to ‘offer students critical sociological perspectives 
and concepts for understanding the complexities of modern social life and 
problems, train students in the principles and methods of qualitative and 
quantitative social research, introduce students to classical and contemporary 
social theories and research concerns, familiarize students with fundamental 
issues of sociological study, encourage students to develop individual research 
interests, and prepare students for a variety of professional work and/or 
graduate training in sociology’ (AUK 1999).   
Sagynbaeva did not include either her intention to build on Soviet 
sociological experience or an introduction to ‘social problems’ as defined by 
Kyrgyzstani sociologists in this initial conceptualisation of the discipline.  
However, she insisted on including a section on ‘careers in sociology,’ or a list 
of areas in which sociologists might find gainful employment in ‘developing 
effective solutions for complex social problems,’ such as businesses, non-
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profit and government organisations, journalism and museums.  As there was 
no precedent of employment for sociologists in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, this 
list was modified from the website of the American Sociological Association.  
The department’s nationally based division of labour, discussed above, is also 
reflected in this document: the American author outlined the intellectual 
substance and social benefits of the discipline, while the Kyrgyz author 
emphasised its applied and professional dimensions.  Despite Sagynbaeva’s 
orientation toward sociology as an intellectual vocation, her fuller immersion 
into Kyrgyzstani society and concern about the competitive market for 
students compelled her to take a more pragmatic approach to defining the 
discipline.  
The next promotional brochure, which was published by the same faculty 
members in 2000, built on the image of sociology as marketable liberal–
critical scholarship, but added to this a new symbolic dimension: identification 
with ‘the west.’  By this time, although many government officials and 
educators within the republic remained highly critical of AUK’s pro-American 
orientation, the school had gained a reputation as a prestigious, elite and 
internationally recognised university.  Intellectual geopolitics became an even 
more important factor in the struggle to attract students, and therefore exerted 
even greater influence on departmental and disciplinary identity.  In an attempt 
to distance themselves even further from the Kyrgyz state and traditional 
forms of Soviet education, the department emphasised its intellectual and 
institutional affiliations with the US and Western Europe, as well as with 
capitalist values more generally.  The brochure asserted that sociology was 
recognised and practiced ‘in all developed countries of the world community,’ 
and that a sociology education would enable students to become highly 
educated, mobile, independent, oriented to the modern world and valued in 
national and international labour markets.   
By 2002, the department had expanded.  Students had successfully 
graduated from the department and gone on to work and study both in the 
region and abroad (AUK 2001).  This expansion also fostered diversification.  
Faculty members began to rethink the definition of the discipline.  Foreign 
sociologists continued to promote the liberal–critical scholarship model of the 
discipline, but also began to question the uncritical adoption of this model for 
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sociology in Kyrgyzstan and to develop new courses which addressed more 
‘national’ issues or that included localised content.  Many Kyrgyzstani faculty, 
on the other hand, grew frustrated with the department’s slow development 
and continuing financial difficulties and began to seek other models of 
disciplinary development.  As they had by this time assumed primary 
responsibility for marketing the department, two drafts of a new promotional 
brochure, published in 2003 in both Russian and English, placed less emphasis 
on promoting sociology’s academic virtues and more on selling its practical 
usefulness as a tool for personal advancement in what the authors defined as 
an increasingly competitive, outward-looking society.  The first draft, for 
example, stated that 
[i]n Kyrgyzstan…there are great opportunities to receive a 
degree in Western universities, especially the Central European 
University in Budapest, Oxford and many in Germany and the 
US. […] Receiving a PhD or Masters from a Western 
university opens many doors, in particular, the possibility to 
teach in national and foreign institutions and find interesting 
work in state and international research organisations (AUK 
2003c). 
While this statement did not appear on the final version, the new 
emphasis on applied, western-oriented sociology remained.  The department 
still defined sociology as a way for students to ‘understand society,’ but 
clarified that theoretical and critical insight into issues such as poverty, crime 
and corruption was also important for ‘resolving these sorts of problems, 
creating theories which explain the laws of the social world, serving leaders to 
act and even helping to predict the future’ (AUK 2003d).  The Americo-
centric list of professions available to sociologists outlined in the 1999 
brochure had been concretised thematically and rhetorically to better reflect 
the range of options potentially available to students in Kyrgyzstan: working 
with non-governmental, commercial and international organisations; teaching 
in universities and schools; conducting analytical work in state organs of 
administration such as the ministries of labour, culture, education, migration, 
and state services on migration; and acting as personnel directors in industrial 
firms, marketing and advertising.  The continuing commitment to teaching 
sociological theory was linked to a new focus on applied research with the 
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assertion that ‘humanity knows a wealth of examples when theories changed 
the course of history.’  Finally, prospective students were assured that  
the faculty consists of Western sociologists and many local 
sociologists [who] have received a Western education.  
Students of our university have large chance to receive 
financial support both from foreign sponsors and the university. 
[…] The uchebnyi plan has received favourable expert 
evaluations from both American and European specialists and 
meets the requirements for an international degree, and the 
diploma will be valid in both Kyrgyzstan and abroad (AUK 
2003d). 
The inclusion of social problems such as corruption, the use of concepts like 
‘social law’ and prediction, and the new emphasis on sociological professions 
in government, commerce and industry reflects a subtle indigenisation of the 
content and context of sociology at AUCA.  Ironically, however, 
indigenisation was also marked by an increase in the level of deference toward 
American, British and European sociological communities.   
By 2003, sociology was defined as a scholarly, practical and marketable 
discipline which was oriented toward public service at both national and 
international levels.  It was legitimised not only by its grounding in the liberal, 
non-Soviet tradition of ‘critical thinking,’ but also by its technical practicality, 
national relevance and recognition from Western ‘experts.’  While it was 
initially conceptualised as an intellectual experiment within and for a 
transitional post-Soviet society, cultural and material factors intersected to 
reorient the project in two ways: first, towards American models of sociology 
as an academic discipline, and second, towards Kyrgyzstani models of 
sociology as an applied profession.  The trajectory of this process can be seen 
not only in the department’s marketing materials, but also in the successive 
revisions of its undergraduate curriculum.     
 
The internationally-oriented curriculum  
In contrast to sociology at BHU, the AUCA sociology curriculum was 
originally designed with little regard for the national standards.  Although the 
standards had been in place for four years when the department was founded 
in 1998, sociologists were encouraged to experiment with ‘new’ models of 
curriculum development—particularly those imported or adapted from the 
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US—and to refrain from conforming to the Ministry of Education’s 
expectations.  In fact, despite the university’s ‘commitment to democratic 
values, to freedom of expression and inquiry, and to academic integrity and 
honesty’ (AUK 2002), many academics who attempted to promote the 
potential value of more ‘traditional’ approaches were often ostracised or 
reprimanded for their ‘conservatism.’   
A policy of innovation was therefore pursued unreservedly in the 
Sociology Department during 1998 and 1999, before the faculty and university 
administration became concerned about obtaining attestation from the 
Ministry of Education.  While the curriculum still diverged from the form and 
content of the national standards adhered to so stringently by BHU, in 2000 
the AUCA department succeeded in obtaining a state license to teach its 
version of sociology until 2005, at which point the attestation will be reviewed 
(Ministry of Education 2000, 2001). 
As mentioned above, the undergraduate curriculum was born of two 
separate agendas.  The first was Sagynbaeva’s desire to design a new type of 
programme to produce students educated in sufficient depth (as opposed to the 
wide breadth of the Soviet system), but who were not as narrowly specialised 
as she believed many American students are.  In addition, she wanted to 
facilitate the development of a new hybrid school of indigenous sociological 
thought and offer a programme that incorporated student choice as an 
alternative to the more conventional lock-step implementation of uchebnye 
plany.  The second agenda was the university’s desire to expand its course 
offers and establish fully operational, American-style social science 
departments.  While Sagynbaeva’s project required considerable space, time 
and flexibility, the university’s mission demanded rapid decision making and 
procedural institutionalisation. 
Without precedent or guiding principles for such a programme and with 
few sociologists available to staff the faculty of a new department, developing 
a full, experimental curriculum for sociology presented a considerable 
challenge.  In the first few months of the department’s existence, Sagynbaeva 
drew on her personal experiences as a student and lecturer in Russia, the 
Ukraine and the US and adapted curricula from American and Russian 
universities.  She also used older models of Soviet sociological education and 
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consulted with senior sociologists such as Isaev in order to compile a course 
programme.  Despite the difficulties, she also considered this a time of 
exciting creativity: ‘it was a very interesting period of my life,’ she recalls 
(Sagynbaeva 2003).   
 The first draft of the curriculum (AUK 1998) was not the hybrid Soviet–
American degree that Sagynbaeva had initially envisioned.  It was learning-
centred as opposed to professional training-focused and had been compiled 
from sample curricula borrowed from American and European sociology 
departments.  It was closely fashioned after the curriculum developed by the 
university’s International Relations Department (now the Department of 
International and Comparative Politics).  The IR programme, written by 
British and American social scientists working at the university, was based on 
the philosophy that social science education in Kyrgyzstan should ‘move away 
from the old-style curriculum where all students in a major are required to take 
the same programme’ and to change ‘to an American-style curriculum, where 
students are required to take a number of “core” courses…but otherwise are 
free to choose among a variety of courses to complete their undergraduate 
degrees’ (AUK 1997).  The main agenda of curriculum development in both 
the IR and Sociology departments at this time was to challenge Soviet 
philosophies of education and replace them with American ones.  The foreign 
faculty dominating this early phase of curriculum development therefore had 
little interest in implementing or adapting the national standards for sociology.  
Furthermore, as many did not speak Russian and had little or no contact with 
officials from the Ministry of Education or other educational administrators, 
they failed to realise that this decision was often interpreted locally as radical 
or even heretical. 
 The first version of the sociology curriculum ambitiously aimed to ‘meet 
both international standards of sociological training and the particular needs 
and interests of university students in Kyrgyzstan,’ in other words, to combine 
the local and the global (AUK 1998a).  Students were expected to complete a 
certain number of subject hours of instruction as in BHU.  However, the hours 
corresponded not to ‘contact hours’ in the classroom, but rather to ‘points,’ 
which were in turn correlated to ‘credits’ in the American higher education 
tradition.  Disciplinary courses constituted approximately one-third of the first 
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curriculum: a year-long introduction to sociology and a shorter introduction to 
research methods, two semester-long theory courses, a course in social 
anthropology, one semester-long course each in qualitative and quantitative 
(statistical) methods, a course in the sociology of stratification and inequality, 
and two short courses in academic writing (AUK 1998).   
Beyond these requirements, students were expected to choose, with the 
help of a personal faculty advisor, seven of the following elective courses 
during the duration of their studies: comparative and historical sociology, 
sociology of culture, sociology of sex and gender, political sociology, 
sociological perspectives of mass media, racial and ethnic relations, 
environmental sociology and human ecology, social demography, principles 
and methods of computerised statistics, and collective behaviour and social 
movements.  Draft documents from this period also list other potential course 
offerings such as comparative Marxism, criminology, conflict resolution, 
medical sociology, democracy and institutions, deviance and social control, 
sociology of education, social history, and urban sociology.  At the time of its 
implementation, however, the department had instructors to teach only three of 
the nineteen proposed electives.   
 In 1999, the department introduced a praktika, or internship, into the 
curriculum.  In contrast to the placement-oriented guiding principles of 
professional training internships at BHU, practical experience at AUK was 
justified on four grounds: promoting the combination of theory and practice, 
encouragement of independent research, provision of professional experience, 
and facilitation of community service.  At a more theoretical level, it was 
based on the belief that ‘in sociology there is no prescription for how to 
connect social theory to social and political practice’ (AUK 1999d).  A draft 
plan of the internship project continued that  
[p]raxis is a craft that can only be improved with having to 
make difficult intellectual, scientific, and moral decisions in 
real-life situations.  Because training in sociology does not 
provide students with a definitive set of skills or formulas for 
how to use their theoretical and methodological knowledge in 
everyday life, it is important to provide them with opportunities 
to use their sociological classroom training in practical 
situations.  The internship positions…are designed to facilitate 
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and necessitate connections between students’ academic work 
and practical, professional, and social problems.   
This philosophy, however, translated poorly into practice.  Organisations 
which agreed to sponsor student interns (e.g., UNDP Gender in Development, 
Counterpart Consortium, SIAR Bishkek, the International Organisation of 
Migration, the National Statistics Committee and the UNHCR) had little 
experience in coordinating practical learning experiences and often lacked the 
time and resources to give students adequate attention.  Furthermore, many 
Kyrgyzstani organisations continue to use interns as temporary employees and 
often assign them menial tasks such as filing or data entry.83  While later 
proposals for instituting a ‘service learning’ component into the curriculum 
were met with enthusiasm by the departmental faculty (Newman 2003a), 
many agreed that the lack of time for planning, culturally specific conceptions 
(e.g., the idea of the university as a ‘community resource’ and students as 
competent resource people) and dearth of qualified instructors or host 
organisations led them to decide that it was impracticable in Kyrgyzstan. 
The AUCA sociology curriculum was not initially organised into minors, 
specialisations or tracks.  Following the American tradition, courses were 
classified as theory, method or specialised topics. Sagynbaeva, however, 
divided the curriculum into four main ‘disciplines’ in documents that she 
prepared especially for the Ministry of Education: social institutions, social 
structures and processes, the history of sociology, and methods.  Despite the 
department’s unique ideological and geopolitical orientation and its status as 
part of a private university, it still needed to obtain a license from the Ministry 
of Education before it would be legally permitted to confer sociology degrees 
on students.  Sagynbaeva’s more thematic or ‘disciplinary’ classification 
system played an important role in convincing evaluators from the ministry 
that while the department diverged from traditional models of higher 
education and the national standards, it was still integrated into Kyrgyzstani 
academic traditions and should therefore be considered a legitimate part of the 
national educational system.   
At the same time, the department sought accreditation from the US so that 
its degrees would be recognised by the international academic community and 
accepted by universities abroad.  One of the main differences between AUCA 
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and state universities in Kyrgyzstan is that the former grants both American 
and Kyrgyz degrees.  Students therefore graduate from the university with an 
AUCA Bachelor of Arts and a Kyrgyz diploma (AUK 2002).  Thus, 
curriculum designers face the difficult task of simultaneously fulfilling two 
very different sets of academic requirements and developing a programme that 
is compatible with different systems of education.  They must demonstrate to 
the Ministry of Education, on the one hand, that students undertake study in a 
wide range of ‘disciplines’ that will prepare them for ‘theoretical, applied and 
pedagogical work in social science institutions, industrial enterprises, 
organisations and commercial–entrepreneurial structures,’ as well as in centres 
of public opinion, mass media; branches of governmental social security such 
as health, labour, legal support and moral welfare; state administration and 
social organisations, consultancy, or further education in a masters programme 
in sociology (Ministry of Education 1999).   
On the other hand, American reviewers have been more concerned with 
issues such as eliminating excessive course requirements, striking a proper 
balance between theory, method and substantive course content, identifying 
what constitutes ‘core’ knowledge in sociology, discerning what types of 
sociology are most necessary in Kyrgyzstan, and questioning whether students 
can engage in ‘service learning’ rather than the more traditional uchebnaia 
(instructional) and proizvodstvennaia (practical) internships.  While the 
university administration increasingly encourages the introduction of elective 
courses, the Ministry of Education considers electives useful only for 
‘enhancing professional quality’ (Ministry of Education 1999).  Government 
evaluators have also been concerned that the department’s ‘new approach’ to 
instruction, a ‘synthesis of pedagogical principles generally taken from 
Kyrgyzstan and the US’ (Ministry of Education 1999) contained only a  
limited quantity of courses on social problems in Kyrgyzstan, 
which is not unimportant at this stage of the development of 
our state.  Also, the programme does not support a material–
technical base for conducting sociological research.  The 
material–technical outfitting of programmes allows for the 
improvement of the practical significance of sociology 
programmes in Kyrgyzstan (Ministry of Education, Attestation 
Commission 2002). 
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Thus, the department must also balance the treatment of locality and 
globality in the curriculum.  The deliberate adoption of an ‘American’ model 
of sociology education co-exists with the desire to educate students who will 
be able to function as sociologists in and for their own society.  Both western 
faculty and officials from the Ministry of Education have consistently 
expressed concern about the programme’s general knowledge approach and 
relative lack of attention to the sociology of Kyrgyzstani society.  Various 
efforts have been made to correct for this bias.  In 1999, for example, 
Sagynbaeva and I offered a research course on the history of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan, and others have since taught classes on post-communist social 
change, nationhood and ethnicity in Central Asia, and the politics of post-
Soviet transition.  However, the international orientation of the faculty and 
institution has overshadowed efforts to indigenise programme content.  
Sagynbaeva (2003), who no longer works at the university, remains frustrated 
with both the absence of localised understandings of sociology and the 
existence of obstacles to producing it: 
I understand that all this knowledge is, you could say, western.  
In the Soviet system there was little knowledge, and as yet in 
Kyrgyzstan there is none at all.  It is all western.  I would like 
to do it so that in the courses we look at both western theories 
and some sort of purely Kyrgyz life. […] Of course, this won’t 
be anything grand.  It won’t be scientific.  But they have to try. 
The first version of the curriculum looked usable on paper.  However, its 
creators had concerns about its practical viability as early as October 1998:   
[We] cannot offer a complete sociology major without having 
the faculty to teach the required courses and those courses that 
students would take in their specialised areas.  Those students 
entering a Bachelors programme in sociology need guarantees 
that they will be able to complete the requirements for that 
degree.  We can offer a variety of sociology courses or even a 
sociology minor, but do we have the human resources to 
announce a sociology degree programme? 
In other words, the problem of ‘plugging up’ gaps in the curriculum also 
affected this private university.  Handwritten notes on the first draft of the 
curriculum (AUK 1998) reveal that the faculty had devised a number of tactics 
to fill holes which were left gaping by the lack of instructors: ‘Soros 
exchanges, Fulbright, IREX,’ it reads; ‘send one to States for MA;’ ‘ask 
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Ibraeva, Isaev, Aldasheva to teach…’  This sort of ‘plugging up’ in fact 
became a central tactic in the department’s ‘short-term curriculum 
development plan, designed to meet the immediate needs of sociology 
students and faculty at AUK.’  While sociologists from other universities were 
hired to teach elective courses from 1999 to 2002, the department’s chronic 
inability to ‘begin a process of faculty recruitment and contact…to hire 
qualified instructors,’ precluded a transition to its medium and long-term goals 
for curriculum development. 
 In 2002, while the department was still pursuing this short-term tactical 
approach to faculty recruitment, the curriculum was revised again.  Balihar 
Sanghera, a British sociologist assigned to the department by CEP, initiated 
discussions about curricular reform among his English-speaking colleagues 
shortly after his arrival to AUCA.  In comparison with his previous CEP 
appointment in Novosibirsk, which he felt has a dynamic sociology 
curriculum, the AUCA programme was organised ‘bizarrely,’ ‘chaotically,’ 
with no apparent logic to the inclusion or exclusion of courses.  There was ‘no 
structure…to how students would progress in the lifetime of their course.’  For 
example, in one semester students were offered a course on ‘social change,’ 
one on ‘institutional change,’ and one on ‘transformations in post-communist 
countries.’  Similarly, the department offered a course on fashion and another 
on consumption.  ‘Did we really need two courses on the sociology of 
consumption?’ asked Sanghera (2003).    
Although his colleagues had not previously raised the issue amongst 
themselves, ‘there was a degree of consensus that there was something not 
quite right.’  According to Sanghera (2003), ‘that’s not to say that all of it was 
wrong…in effect, we didn’t really change all that much, I think we changed 
the structure, but I don’t think we changed a lot of the content.’  Despite the 
widespread agreement that the curriculum needed to be revised, there was 
considerable disagreement about ‘what next to do, what kind of courses to 
offer’ (Sanghera 2003).  Sanghera wanted to design a curriculum, based on 
‘best practices’ from Lancaster University (UK) and the Central European 
University (Hungary) that would give students a ‘broad understanding of what 
sociology entails;’ specifically, components on economy, culture and politics.  
Others, however, wanted to include more ‘marketable’ courses in areas such 
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as quantitative research methods, and were afraid that theoretical courses 
‘would not allow students to be employed by what [they] thought to be the 
main employers, market research companies’ (Sanghera 2003).   
The curriculum was revised seven times before it was finally accepted by 
the department and sent on to the university’s Curriculum Committee for 
approval.  It was the outcome of a long negotiating process, not only between 
individuals within the department, but also between competing philosophies of 
education and conceptions of the nature and social role of sociology.  While 
many of the Kyrgyzstani faculty were engaged in a campaign to make 
sociology more useful and marketable for both the state and non-governmental 
organisations, Sanghera advocated a more liberal–critical approach.  In his 
opinion, 
our job as a university is not—not necessarily—to turn out 
employable people for market research companies.  We’re not 
paid [by them] to skill their future employees.  I think our job 
as a university is to broaden the horizon of undergraduates in 
areas that we think are useful.  And we may agree or disagree 
about what are the canons in sociology, but I think we would 
recognise what would be a good set of courses.  And that is our 
job.  In terms of what happens afterwards, in terms of what 
happens with employment, I just don’t think as lecturers we 
should be worrying about that. 
Ibraeva (2003), however, wanted to  
disseminate this particular world view throughout [her] society.  
[She] believes in the potential of this science to resolve applied 
administrative problems [and] hopes that this potential can be 
realised by [them] in the country.  
In the end, the new curriculum was designed to introduce new courses, 
give students more ‘structured choice’ in designing their degree, and enable 
the department to offer a ‘broad spectrum of courses that explore in depth the 
abstract and concrete complexities and contradictions of society’ through the 
lens of what Sanghera identified as the two main ‘camps’ in contemporary 
sociology: political economy and cultural studies.  It also included a range of 
methodological and special-topic courses.  While this version of the 
curriculum retained the first curriculum’s set of required courses for the first 
two years of study, third-year students were tracked into specialisations of 
‘Economy, Polity and Society’ or ‘Culture and Society,’ with the opportunity 
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to take courses from the alternate track in their final year (AUK 2002).  
Students are now required to complete 12 courses in social theory and research 
methods (including structured internships in the second and third years of 
study), 5 courses in their area of specialisation, 22 elective courses and 14 
courses from the general educational requirements.   
In addition to its pedagogical goals, the new curriculum also had a more 
pragmatic agenda: to make the sociology programme more attractive to 
students, thereby increasing student intake into the department.  This entailed 
integrating sociological content into more dominant discourses of the 
‘transition,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘the market.’ According to Sanghera, 
[t]he courses in the curriculum are a mixture of existing and 
new courses, as well as re-naming previous courses to attract 
students from other disciplines.  For instance, ‘Political 
Sociology’ has been re-named as ‘State and Society,’ 
‘Economic Society’ as ‘Market Society,’ and ‘Methods of 
Measurement’ as ‘Quantitative Research Methods’ (AUK 
2002, 2003a). 
As with previous versions of the curriculum, however, the success of the 
new programme depended on the department’s ability to recruit qualified 
lecturers able to teach new courses such as ‘Identity and Difference,’ ‘Political 
Economy’ and ‘Advanced Social Theory.’  As Sanghera noted, ‘of course, the 
new courses require particular lecturers to adopt them, and prepare readily for 
their implementation.  Assistance will be offered in terms of visiting guest 
lecturers, curriculum development programmes abroad, and mentoring from 
recognised authorities’ (AUK 2002).  However, as in previous years, the 
department had little power to select its own visiting faculty and has been 
unable to attract permanent, full-time instructors willing and able to take on 
the new courses.  As with the 1999 curriculum, half the programme’s courses 
could not be taught at the time of its implementation (Sanghera 2003). 
Sanghera, however, chose not to adopt the ‘plugging up’ approach to this 
problem which had led to curricular disorder in the first place.  He was faced 
with a choice: to either develop ideas about what constitutes a good 
curriculum and then figure out how to implement it, or identify current 
strengths within the department and build upon them.  ‘I thought that going 
with our current strengths now,’ he says, 
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would have led to a rather mediocre curriculum because not 
many of the lecturers are sociologists. […] I felt that was not 
the way to go.  Given that this was a long-term process, a long-
term development, nothing that could be fixed right away, I 
thought that we could come up with some ideas about what are 
good courses, who could be in the ideal position of teaching 
them, and then ensure that these people will be in a position to 
teach them in three years. 
Through the revision process, Sanghera (2003) learned that one of the 
main obstacles to curriculum design was that the contents of the curriculum 
were almost entirely determined by an economic as opposed to pedagogical 
logic.  ‘Academic good practices,’ he argues, are intertwined with—even 
determined by—the ‘whole business of economic survival.’  Because 
instructors are not salaried and under constant threat of having their courses 
cancelled due to low student enrolment, many choose to offer only popular 
courses, without regard for how these fit into a broader pedagogical 
framework, or offer the same courses every term in order to reduce workload.  
To overcome this and encourage instructors to be more creative, he lobbied 
the administration to make their courses compulsory (required courses are held 
regardless of student numbers).84    
Striking a balance of theoretical and practical, national and indigenous 
subject matter and perspectives is an enduring problem for sociologists at 
AUCA.  It has affected not only curriculum development and teaching, but 
also conceptions of disciplinarity and the nature and organisation of 
sociological research within the department. 
 
Disciplinarity 
In contrast to BHU where the boundaries of sociology are clearly demarcated 
from other disciplines, the academic parameters of sociology are more fluid 
and contested at AUCA.  While the department has striven to establish 
sociology as an independent academic discipline since its inception, it has also 
embraced, rather unsuccessfully, elements of inter-disciplinarity.  This is due 
partly to the dominance of Anglo-American models of sociology education 
and partly to influential faculty members’ preference for cross-disciplinary 
knowledge.  However, it has also been influenced by more material concerns, 
in particular, the need to consolidate resources and attract students to the 
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programme.  For example, according to Sanghera (2003), by 2002–03 there 
‘was a risk that the Sociology Department would be taken over by another 
department if it didn’t get more students.’  At the time, it was recruiting only 
six new students per year.  Thus, decisions about the structure of disciplines—
their contours, overlapping elements, differences, inter-disciplinary 
relationships, and connections—have often been made on extra-intellectual 
grounds, disciplinary or departmental prestige being the most prominent, with 
‘usefulness’ or relevance running closely behind.  The tension between 
erecting and crossing disciplinary boundaries, often interpreted as a matter of 
personal and cultural politics, has been best revealed in debates about whether 
to ‘merge’ the Sociology Department with other social science departments in 
the university, including Psychology, Anthropology and International and 
Comparative Politics (ICP). 
At the time of this research, the AUCA Sociology Department had 
become an autonomous division within the university.  When it was first 
established in 1998, it shared a small office with the departments of 
Psychology and Economics.  The three programmes shared space, a budget, 
equipment and faculty; however, they maintained sharp intellectual boundaries 
as different disciplines.  Psychology, which aimed to provide education in 
‘political and business life, personal problem solving, group behavior 
management, personal and professional growth, personnel development 
management, image making, advertising and public relations,’ and economics, 
which focused on ‘offering students an understanding of market-oriented 
economics,’ were not considered legitimate elements of sociology, or the 
‘systematic study of society’ (AUK 2002).  
The sheer need for physical space encouraged further disciplinary 
differentiation.  While the Economics Department moved to a new office in 
1999, sociology and psychology were still forced to share.  In 2001, co-chairs 
Reeves and Botoeva asserted that  
the departmental space currently available is simply insufficient 
to accommodate the increased volume of students.  There is, at 
present, often little room to move in the department, and the 
noise levels from the volume of students and faculty it 
accommodates limit the amount of productive work that can be 
achieved (AUK 2001).   
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That year, both programmes were allocated new, larger offices and in 2002 the 
Sociology Department acquired an adjoining room to set up its applied 
research centre.  It is clearly distinguished from other departments not only by 
its physical independence, but also by its identity as discrete, self-contained 
academic subject.  Although sociology students are encouraged to take courses 
from other departments—many have now become ‘cross-listed’ for this very 
purpose—formal interdisciplinary degrees have not been introduced. 
  The new spatial autonomy, however, did not resolve more intellectual 
concerns about the disciplinary status of sociology within the university.  In 
fact, increasing stratification between ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ departments and 
disciplines has inflamed controversy about whether sociology can and should 
be considered an independent discipline, and whether the department 
commands enough prestige and legitimacy to survive on its own.  For 
example, ICP—by far, the university’s most lucrative and successful 
department—suggested in 2002 that the two departments develop a plan for 
joint intake of students, where second-year students would be required to 
major in either sociology or political science.  From the perspective of the ICP 
department, affiliation with a more popular discipline would help sociology 
attract more high-quality students and ultimately help raise its prestige.   
Faculty members of the Sociology Department, however, expressed 
concerns that if students were allowed to enrol in a general programme, they 
would ultimately choose not to major in the less prestigious field of sociology 
and that, as a result, its reputation would be tarnished.  ‘From our side,’ recalls 
Sanghera (2003), ‘no one was interested, so it got scuttled there.’  Their goal 
remained to reinforce the disciplinary boundaries of sociology, emphasising its 
unique contribution to social scientific knowledge and asserting its practical 
usefulness for society.  Instructors from the more resource-rich ICP 
department, in response, accused the sociologists of being narrow-minded and 
overly conscious of disciplinary status, as well as over-protective of their 
student intake.   
A similar debate emerged in 2003 when another foreign faculty member 
from the Anthropology Department (then called Kyrgyz Ethnology) 
recommended a merger of the two departments.  Initially, Sanghera was 
interested.  ‘From where I was standing,’ he says, ‘the    
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the anthropology department is a weak department.  Half the 
courses don’t really make that much sense.  And the sort of 
courses which I think would have been useful for us to offer to 
them and vice versa to us.  For example, economic 
anthropology.  They don’t offer this course.  Again, maybe this 
is my bias…how come they don’t offer a course on economic 
anthropology?  They offer courses on Kyrgyz music, which is 
great, but you don’t need three courses on that….It was Farida 
who came up with the idea that we should perhaps merge the 
departments. […] I thought it was a good idea.  You would 
have one department, Anthropology and Sociology.  This 
would also improve our number intake.  No longer would it be 
6, because anthropology was also having low numbers, like 5 
or 6, so now we would have 12!’   
However, this number play would have other consequences.  Merging the 
departments would mean that there ‘had to be some rationalisation and job 
losses and the lecturers in anthropology weren’t willing… [but] you couldn’t 
have a department of 12 [students] per year with almost 12 [instructors] full-
time; it just wouldn’t be viable’ (Sanghera 2003).  In addition, both 
departmental chairs realised that one would have to stand down. 
The proposal was finally overruled by Ibraeva, chair of Sociology, who 
was at the time on an exchange programme in Indiana.  However, the rank and 
file faculty members of both departments had been critical of the plan all 
along.  Many ‘felt that anthropology and sociology were sufficiently different 
from one another to merit having different departments’ (Sanghera 2003).  As 
one argued, neither discipline was established or well understood.  Combining 
the programmes would therefore only lead to more confusion, the eradication 
of both, and kasha (a mixed mess) (Bakchiev 2003; also Sanghera 2003).  In 
his mind, it was imperative to delineate and institutionalise anthropology and 
sociology as discrete scientific disciplines, each with their own specialised 
body of knowledge, skills and applications.   
Finally, the question of disciplinarity arose again with regard to the 
boundary between sociology and mathematics, and during debates over who 
has the authority to teach courses in social science.  In 2003, members of the 
Sociology Department began to re-examine the rationale for the mathematics 
component in its entrance exam and curricular requirements.  While maths 
was required by the Ministry of Education, it was largely irrelevant to 
students’ performance in the programme, which was evaluated on more 
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qualitative criteria and their ability to perform statistical analysis for social 
research.  However, when a recommendation was made to replace 
mathematics requirements with open-ended essay or analytical problem-
solving questions, there was great concern that faculty from the mathematics 
programme would be resistant and even view the move as an attack on their 
occupational status.   
A similar controversy had erupted earlier in the year when the Sociology 
Department wanted to replace mathematical statistics courses with ‘social 
statistics,’ to be taught by sociologists; they were accused of ‘stealing’ classes 
(and therefore students and salaries) from the mathematics programme.  A 
similar accusation was also levied against the department when influential 
foreign faculty challenged the authority of the American Studies Department, 
which had begun to offer a ‘track’ in sociology and teach sociology courses 
that were not affiliated or cross-listed with the Sociology Department.  As 
Newman (2003) put it, ‘American Studies has a de facto sociology program, 
[but] they don’t have a single person qualified to teach sociology teaching in a 
sociology curriculum.’  While these criticisms were issued in order to make 
distinctions about professional qualification and to preserve the authority of 
instructors in the sociology department, they were often interpreted as 
occupational posturing and disciplinary narrow-mindedness.   
These examples illustrate that the tendency to promote disciplinarity over 
inter-disciplinarity in sociology at AUCA is a deliberate choice, influenced by 
material as well as intellectual considerations.  Here, boundary–work is a 
matter of both professional survival and intellectual clarification.  The 
conjunction of structural conditions and ideas has also affected the nature and 
organisation of sociological research conducted within the department, as 
illustrated in the following section. 
 
Individualised, market-driven sociological research 
While the AUCA department has historically focused on teaching sociology, 
the inclusion of a research component was a priority since its establishment 
and faculty are formally encouraged to conduct academic research as part of 
their professional responsibilities (AUK 1999a).  However, the department did 
not establish a research centre until 2002 (AUK 2003b).  Several factors 
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contributed to this, including AUCA’s liberal arts agenda, the intellectually 
oriented visions of the department’s founders and the sheer lack of physical 
space and human resources, which made a distribution of labour between 
teaching and research difficult, if not impossible.   
The Applied Research Center defines itself as a ‘non-commercial 
research organization…which undertakes research on issues of social 
significance’ (AUK 2003).  Initially, plans to create a laboratory were based 
on the assumption, derived from Soviet principles of dialectical education and 
practice, that members of a sociology department should conduct research and 
that this required space beyond the small office that sociologists shared with 
members of the Psychology Department (AUK 2001).  The need for 
designated research space became pressing as the curriculum was expanded to 
include student internships and practical research experience.  As phrased in a 
2001 budget request,  
The students in [sociology and psychology] have repeatedly 
requested a room where they can conduct empirical research 
(interviews, focus groups, experiments etc.), and which would 
be equipped appropriately for that purpose.  AUK currently 
lacks such a space. (AUK 2001) 
Sociology instructors also appealed to the university administration’s own 
pedagogical philosophy in their requests for funding: 
The move to a credit-hours system will place greater emphasis 
on the need for a space where faculty can conduct 
tutorials/consultations/office hours with students in relative 
quiet.  At present, individual consultations with students have 
to take place in the cafeteria or other public places, which is 
both pedagogically unsound and discourages faculty from 
holding regular office hours. […] The educational benefit of a 
quiet space for preparation cannot be underestimated.  At 
present, it is simply impossible for teachers to prepare lectures 
or mark written work in the departmental office because of the 
volume of traffic it receives.  This in turn means that teachers 
(including programme heads) are physically present on campus 
less than they might optimally be, which cannot be good for 
departmental-administration contact (AUK 2001). 
 In January 2002, the university finally allocated the department a small 
second office.  Mehrigiul Ablezova, a sociology MA who had worked as an 
interviewer for Sagynbaeva’s company SIAR Bishkek, was appointed head of 
research soon after.  ‘When I came here,’ she recalls, ‘they just decided to 
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offer me a position as the head of the sociological laboratory.  And I became 
one.  The first thing I did was rename it the Applied Research Center’ 
(Ablezova 2003).  Renaming the laboratory was a meaningful symbolic 
gesture for Ablezova, who, as a member of sociology’s younger generation, is 
thoroughly oriented away from Soviet and Kyrgyz academic traditions and 
towards the concepts, practices and language of American sociology.  
Whereas the term ‘sociological laboratory’ conjures images of experimental 
research and hard science, the notion of an applied research centre suggests 
space for the study of social problems and their alleviation. 
Ablezova was faced with the formidable task of creating a respectable 
centre for research in an empty room without financial resources, academic 
materials, equipment or staff; indeed, there were no established research 
interests, and no obvious constituencies.85  She and other faculty members 
who worked in the centre therefore sought additional sources of support 
beyond both the university and the state, namely, international organisations.  
Unlike the BHU laboratory, which receives a meagre donation for its research 
projects from the Kyrgyz government, the Applied Research Center receives 
no state funding.  Instead, it attracts money for research by commissioning 
studies from international organisations and has worked deliberately to 
establish a reputation for producing quality work in this field.   
Its first contract was a two-year study on child poverty in Kyrgyzstan, 
conducted for Save the Children UK.  The study, a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative research, ‘examines child poverty in Kyrgyzstan, with a 
particular emphasis on chronic poverty and inter-generation poverty 
reproduction.’  It attempts to explain why and how poverty is reproduced and 
‘provide an empirically sound account of what the extent of such poverty is, 
which groups are particularly vulnerable, and why’ (AUK 2003).  The project 
was a team effort: Reeves, a British sociology MA assigned to the department 
by CEP, wrote the proposal for this project and worked on it together with 
Tatiana Yarkova (also of CEP), Ablezova, Botoeva and Ibraeva.  The 
department’s high staff turnover made the team unstable, however, and 
according to Ablezova (2003) detracted from the quality of the research itself:  
different people worked on different stages…the thing is, we 
started working on the questionnaire when the literature review 
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was not finished.  And actually, if you do it classically, you 
should construct the questionnaire on the basis of the literature 
review.  But we did it, I guess, non-scientifically, non-
professional. […] I don’t call it ‘non-professional’ because the 
majority of research is conducted that way.  We do the topics 
we can do right now. 
As this statement implies, child poverty did not become a lasting research 
theme within the department.  In addition to the need to move on to new 
contracts, few of the team were interested in the topic in the first place.  
‘Frankly speaking,’ says Ablezova (2003), ‘I gave myself my word that I 
would never deal with poverty.  It’s too complex; too difficult a subject and I 
don’t want to deal with all this mess. […] And now I’m working on poverty, 
and it’s children’s poverty, so it’s even…harder for me.  But now we have 
another proposal [about HIV], we got it from UNICEF.  So we’re working on 
this.’  
The centre’s next contracted project, a study of HIV in Kyrgyzstan, grew 
out of the study on child poverty when a woman who was asked to comment 
on the first questionnaire asked the group to conduct a study for her 
organisation (Ablezova 2003).  ‘[S]he knew about us already and she wanted 
us to conduct it,’ said Ablezova (2003).  ‘Actually, she didn’t reach for 
anybody else.’  This is precisely the sort of reputation of reliability that the 
staff of the AUCA research centre have striven to establish.  It in turn led to 
two more commissioned studies: one on the ‘influence of internal migration 
on family structures,’ sponsored by the Indiana University Consortium, and 
another on ‘mass media and languages,’ sponsored by the Swiss media NGO, 
CIMERA.  The former is a purely qualitative investigation of migration 
conducted through focus groups and semi-structured and in-depth interviews, 
while the latter employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
to ‘examine the consciousness of journalists and explore the social and lingual 
aspects of mass media in Kyrgyzstan’ (AUK 2003).  While the research 
questions were designed by the client organisations, the research team had 
considerable autonomy in developing the research instruments and in the 
initial stages of data analysis.  However, this did not increase their right to 
retain or use the data for other purposes. 
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 Officially, the Applied Research Center’s mission is fourfold: to support 
academic research, to ‘gather and systematize data from the surveys conducted 
on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic and throughout the world that will be 
open and serve as educational and methodological material for various 
courses,’ to carry out research on ‘social, economic, political, demographic 
and social-environmental problems facing the country,’ and to provide a space 
for students to gain research experience through internships and assistantships 
(AUK 2003).  The prioritisation of these goals has been particularly important 
in continuing efforts to secure institutional support from the university 
administration, which is primarily interested in the laboratory’s contribution to 
its own development.  A 2003 departmental needs assessment, for example, 
therefore emphasised the importance of creating a database of information for 
student use.  ‘Since all students cannot develop their own research,’ it argued, 
‘they need statistical data for analysis in some of their student papers.’  Such a 
database was also deemed important for the statistical training of sociology 
students who suffered because the ‘department still has a lack of statistical 
data on regional and country conditions’ (AUK 2003b).   
In addition to promoting its usefulness as an internal information source, 
the centre was presented as an important site for the development of hands-on 
research experience and, more broadly, the ‘integration of theoretical learning 
and practical skills.’  The university administration became increasingly 
concerned about linking teaching and research in 2002.  Members of the 
centre capitalised on this new agenda and argued that it could become a ‘base 
for much social science research [done] by sociology instructors, which will 
have an impact on explaining current societies in Central Asia’ in the 
classroom, but only if it received ‘proper technical and financial support.’ 
Finally, it was argued that the centre could contribute to the development of 
the university by conducting internal research which would ‘assist in making 
the work of all university structures more effective along with better human 
relations among students and instructors.’ 
 In addition to these institutionally focused goals, staff also argued that, 
given adequate support, they could ‘support the development of democracy in 
the country and region’ by having an ‘effective impact on the development of 
civil society’ and ‘providing for the monitoring of political, economic and 
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cultural changes in the republic’ (AUK 2003).  This objective is central to the 
project to create a distinctive identity for the centre as a source of reliable 
empirical sociological research in the service of development.  Its members 
are self-consciously oriented away from state-centred concepts of 
development and toward international agencies, which they see as dominant in 
the research process but less likely to manipulate research results for political 
purposes (Ablezova 2003).  In addition, Ablezova argues that international 
organisations offer the centre more ‘moral’ support because, unlike the state, 
they conduct training sessions, share information, and encourage the staff to 
‘make a difference’ with their research.   
While this outward orientation towards foreign clients shapes the 
activities of the centre and thus the nature of the discipline’s 
institutionalisation at AUCA, it is not based on theoretical understandings of 
the institutional relationship between sociological research and development 
aid, or between sociology and the state.  Rather, it stems from two things: a 
history of disappointment with governmental cooperation, and a general lack 
of trust in the state.  Ablezova (2003), who points out that she has never 
worked for the government, commented that  
Mr. Newman…says that we can write prescriptions to [heal] 
some illnesses of society, and I totally agree with him.  But the 
thing is, in the end it never happens.  For example, I conducted 
so many—I was involved in, not conducted—some studies.  I 
mean, the research [was kind of conducted in vain]; it was a 
waste of time, a waste of money, and a waste of talent, because 
it—I didn’t see any kind of results from these projects.  
Nothing happened, nothing changed after that.  I think that 
sociologists should work more actively with the government so 
that they can change something.  For example, if we’re 
studying poverty, we should work with, I don’t know, the 
Ministry of Education [or] the Ministry of Social Protection in 
order to have some kind of power to change these things.  
Because sometimes, my fear is that when we conduct these 
surveys like Children in Poverty, after that, nothing happens.   
Nevertheless, she says that she is ‘more into working with non-governmental 
organisations.  They try to do something to change things. […] So I’m more 
interested in working with NGOs rather than government.  But government is 
more powerful.’  Such statements reflect Ablezova’s frustration at the 
discrepancy between what she thinks her role should be (to write prescriptions 
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for healing social problems) and what it actually is (in her mind, to conduct 
research that has no practical effect because the researchers do not work in 
cooperation with policy makers).  Botoeva (2003) is also disappointed in the 
lack of state support for sociological research: 
The state invests very little in research.  Very little. […] And 
thus on the whole a lot of research is done by international 
organisations, they order it.  Even the research on children in 
poverty is a commission from Save the Children UK.  Child 
poverty in Kyrgyzstan, right, and who commissions it?  
Foreigners.  And many other projects, too.  And then [the 
organisations] have the right over everything in this project: 
over all the data—we don’t have the rights to one bit of 
information.  And so it turns out that there are several research 
projects on a single theme, because even if they publish it, they 
do it in the west and nothing stays in Kyrgyzstan—no 
publications, no nothing.  It’s very bad.   
In contrast to BHU, sociological research at AUCA is highly 
decentralised, even atomised.  The department does not dictate or monitor 
individual research projects or prescribe the forums in which research may be 
published; departmental reports contain no mention of conferences attended, 
manuscripts prepared or articles published in newspapers and other media.  
Individual research projects are not generally discussed at faculty meetings, 
and the practice is so personalised that academics working together within the 
department are often unaware of what their colleagues are doing.  As Botoeva 
(2003) put it, ‘someone does something but no one knows that someone is 
doing something or what anyone is doing.’   
However, while there is no formal ‘scientific theme’ in sociological 
research at AUCA, members of the department have developed specialisations 
in particular areas.  The most established is Ablezova and Botoeva’s work on 
developing methodologies for large-scale empirical studies of social problems 
which are of interest to international aid agencies.  Their research, however, 
bears little relation to teaching activities in the main department, though it has 
substantiated their courses on research methods.  While Sagynbaeva’s early 
work on qualitative methodology, particularly the use of focus groups for 
marketing studies, was discontinued after she left the department in 2002, 
undergraduate students now have the opportunity to gain practical experience 
with interviewing, focus groups and questionnaire construction through the 
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Applied Research Center.  However, although researchers have developed 
areas of methodological expertise, the thematic content of research is still 
determined almost entirely by external demand.  Newman (2003) interprets 
this in a negative light, remarking that 
we’ve got some projects that they really did a nice job in 
gathering data [for] and then the data just sit.  They fulfil the 
grant obligations and then they move onto the next thing. […] 
[With] the migration study, they did some descriptive work on 
migration and what it does to families and then—they didn’t 
abandon it, but they set it off to the side and moved to the 
poverty study.  And then they gathered the data on the poverty 
study, and then they gathered the data on the professional 
orientation study.  And what they’ll do is report out what the 
funding agencies want.  They’ll make their annual reports and 
this sort of thing, and then move onto the next project.  I’d like 
to see them get some national and international exposure for the 
research.   
Many Kyrgyzstani faculty members, however, feel that what this arrangement 
lacks in autonomy it makes up for by offering them the opportunity to explore 
different questions and themes.  Botoeva, for example, explains why she likes 
being a sociologist, even though she had originally wanted to become a lawyer 
or judge: 
Why do I like it?  Well, I like it because…it’s always new, 
sociology—you can develop as much as you want, it’s not 
something singular.  I don’t know.  Maybe other disciplines are 
also interesting, there are many that I haven’t encountered!  But 
with sociology everything is new, everything is always 
interesting; you can open up everything, right? […] I really like 
sociology; that you can resolve various sorts of problems, 
maybe help.   
Similarly, Ablezova (2003) says the most appealing thing about her choice of 
career is that 
you never work on the same topic.  For example, now we are 
working on poverty and I found…I studied, I read some articles 
on poverty, other work on poverty.  Before, I was interested in 
environmental attitudes, so I started to read all the articles and 
research done on environmental attitudes.  And you know, you 
always discover something, you are so flexible, you know, 
within sociology. It can be very practical.  I’m a positivist and 
I’m good at numbers, crunching numbers, and I love doing 
these numbers.  So I just kind of found myself there, and… I 
don’t think I regret that. 
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Sociologists at AUCA have the political freedom, both internally and 
externally, to determine the direction of their own sociological research.  
However, this does not necessarily translate into greater opportunity to 
conduct independent research, particularly when heavy teaching loads and low 
wages reduce the amount of time and energy instructors can spend on personal 
intellectual work, and when lack of institutional sponsorship breeds 
dependence on commissions from external clients.  Ibraeva (2003), for 
example, remarks that ‘to do research through the support of one’s institution,’ 
she says, ‘is a luxury we still do not have. […] Unfortunately, the financial 
question sometimes compels one to work on other things to the detriment of 
professional work.’  These ‘other things,’ in fact, tend to be commercial 
projects that fail to develop beyond the early stages of literature reviews and 
data collection, and that lack theoretical substance.  Thus, while the AUCA 
Applied Research Center has managed to sustain itself by conducting 
empirical research for client organisations, it has nevertheless been unable to 
institutionalise a culture of academic research at the university. 
 
Boundary–work and contingency in sociology at AUCA 
 
While sociologists working at BHU find defining sociology unproblematic, 
perhaps in the extreme, the definition and characterisation of the discipline has 
more conspicuously occupied sociologists at AUCA since the department’s 
establishment.  Here, too, the boundaries of the discipline are contingent on a 
variety of factors: culturally specific ideologies about social science and its 
role in the wider society, the emergence of and affiliation with a new western 
scientific ‘centre,’ the diverse background assumptions of faculty members, 
and material factors such as dependence on external funding and poor access 
to physical space within the university.  The main difference between the post-
Soviet construction of sociology at BHU and AUCA is that these 
contingencies have led to more visible controversies about the nature and role 
of sociology at the latter.   
The creative potential of this fluidity, however, has been inhibited by 
institutional imperatives to institutionalise the discipline in a formal way 
which meets the demands of both Kyrgyz and American constituencies.  In 
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addition, professional and ideological propensities to rapid academic reform—
particularly among foreign faculty members—often pre-empt careful 
consideration of how the discipline is actually being institutionalised at the 
university.  It might be said that the definition and boundaries of sociology at 
AUCA exist in a state of perpetual revolution.  This has two main 
consequences.  On one hand, it encourages theoretical innovation in the 
conceptualisation of sociology.  On the other hand, however, it also 
encourages the devaluation of accumulated knowledge and experience and 
precludes awareness of institutional history.   
 The history of the AUCA department is a localised window onto the 
enduring influence of institutionalised power relationships among academics 
at the global level.  In many instances, faculty members recognise that 
decisions about how to define and practice sociology are constructions; the 
existence of uneven power relations and the technological–intellectual division 
of labour between local and foreign instructors are no secret within the 
department.  Deliberate efforts to democratise faculty relations and redistribute 
authority more equally have failed to deconstruct these hierarchies entirely. 
However, shared ideals about the importance of reducing the effects of power 
relations in the academic sphere have created space for sociologists from 
diverse backgrounds to take different positions within the department, thus 
enabling the emergence and development of two alternative visions of the 
discipline: sociology as liberal–critical scholarship and sociology as applied 
service profession.  While these remain mutually independent to a large 
extent, recent movements to rethink the relationship between teaching and 
research, as well as the increasing participation of Kyrgyzstani faculty 
members in making intellectual decisions within the department, suggest that 
the two approaches may converge in the future.   
 Whether one type of sociology becomes ascendant over the other, 
however, will depend on a variety of factors.  The relative dominance of the 
liberal–critical scholarship model of sociology has been maintained by a 
number of things: the stability of the university’s general identification with 
American liberal arts education and its rejection of Soviet models of 
technocratic education, the continuing supply of liberal sociologists from 
western institutions, the routine training of younger faculty members in 
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American universities, the predominance of liberal and critical scholarly 
materials in the departmental library, and external moral support for 
developing new definitions of social relevance.  Changes in these structural 
conditions would present sociologists with a new set of problems and choices 
in constructing the field. 
 Unlike at BHU, here the quest to establish scientific legitimacy for 
sociology is relatively unproblematic; it is asserted on the basis of the 
department’s affiliation with western sociological traditions and institutions 
which are assumed to be universally authoritative.  The more pressing problem 
is communicating the discipline’s social relevance, not only to prospective 
students, but also to the Kyrgyz state, to which the department must appear 
experimental but not threatening, and to American educational authorities, to 
whom the department must exhibit both its international and national 
qualifications and its commitment to post-Soviet reform.  In other words, 
sociology at AUCA must be at once a discipline dedicated to preserving and 
revolutionising the social order, and sociologists must strike a balance 
between different expectations of what constitutes legitimate social scientific 
knowledge in each context.   
 The need to appeal simultaneously to these different constituencies has 
forced faculty members to modify descriptions of their teaching activities in 
different circumstances and to reconcile minimum compliance with the state 
standards for sociology with maximum compliance to the professional and 
intellectual norms of Anglo-American sociology.  Instead of advocating the 
potential for sociology in improving scientific politics as in BHU, the AUCA 
department has absorbed some of this tension by creating a division of labour 
between teaching and research, with curriculum design oriented outward, 
toward ‘the west,’ and research oriented inward, toward the study of social 
problems in Kyrgyzstan. 
 This more nationally orientated research, though, receives little 
professional recognition from other sociologists in the republic because it is 
maintained predominantly through commissions for foreign clients, many of 
which advocate non-state or ‘civil society’ solutions to national social 
problems.  Thus, while the AUCA Sociology Department would like to be 
seen as a non-political educational establishment, its self-imposed distance 
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from the state and state-run sociology institutions gives it a highly politically, 
even oppositional profile.  Instead of countering this, the department 
capitalises on it by emphasising its unique offering to the liberal functions of 
sociology education, including personal development, professional growth, 
individualised critical thinking and social enlightenment.  The nature and role 
of sociology in this context is constructed in direct relation to the department’s 
reformist vision of social change.      
 In the instructional sphere, sociology at AUCA is both generative and 
applied; problems for discussion and debate within the classroom emerge from 
sociological theory as often as they are resolved by it.  Themes for 
sociological research, however, are still determined by commercial demands 
from foreign zakazchiki.  Financial dependence on contract research, 
combined with heavy teaching loads, low salaries, poor scholarly community 
and a lack of space and resources make it difficult for sociologists to pursue 
individual research interests within the department, despite the formal 
encouragement of such scholarship.  As a result, the department has 
established a reputation as a reliable centre for American-style sociological 
education and survey research, but has not cultivated the development of any 
sustainable areas of specialisation or expertise. 
 Sociology at AUCA has never been ‘in transition’ as this phrase is often 
interpreted in former Soviet institutions.  It was imagined and introduced as a 
novelty in Kyrgyzstan; a department whose philosophy and geopolitical 
affiliations enabled it to reject the old and embrace the new.  From its 
inception, it self-consciously represented an ideal rather than a change.  
However, historically familiar patterns of academic dependency have emerged 
within the department, which suggest that neither the type of sociology being 
institutionalised here nor the structural and cultural contingencies of the 
process are entirely new.  Sociology at AUCA is in a different type of 
transition as faculty members struggle to negotiate an ambiguous balance 
between east and west, national and international, theoretical and applied 
sociology, and intellectual and financial autonomy and dependence.  As such, 
it embodies the problems faced by those attempting to institutionalise a 
liberal–critical scholarship model of sociology in a technocratic and aid-
dependent post-colonial state.   
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9 
PRIVATISATION, POLITICAL RATINGS AND PUBLIC SCIENCE:  
SOCIOLOGICAL BOUNDARY–WORK IN THE MASS MEDIA 
 
 
The case studies presented in Chapters 7 and 8 illustrate how different 
conceptions of academic sociology have emerged from different departmental 
contexts in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  They also demonstrate that ‘Kyrgyzstani 
sociology,’ far from being a monolithic enterprise, is in fact a concept which 
encompasses a variety of different conceptualisations and practices.  However, 
in Kyrgyzstan, the field of sociology extends beyond academic institutions 
into the public sphere, particularly, commerce, development organisations and 
the media.  This chapter will explore, through a set of smaller case studies, 
how and why the discipline’s definition, content and role have been negotiated 
in the most public of all sectors, the national print media.  Because public 
social science is conducted predominately by Kyrgyzstani and not by foreign 
sociologists within the republic, this chapter also provides a more in-depth 
examination of the epistemological issues that have emerged within the 
applied–professional model of sociology since independence. 
 
Sociology in the national press 
The overt linking of sociology with other, non-academic sectors of society is 
in part a continuation of the Soviet-era relationship between science and 
society.  However, the emergence of a deliberately public sociology which 
serves as a platform for academic politics and aims to build bridges between 
social scientists and the lay reading public is a relatively new phenomenon.  It 
has emerged from the conjunction of a number of factors: the expansion of 
independent media outlets and reduction of scholarly forums such as journals 
and bulletins, an increased public concern about knowing the ‘truth’ about 
social reality, the reorganisation of science and higher education, the 
association of sociology with modernity and development, competition 
between different sociological groups and institutions, and perhaps most 
significantly, sociologists’ need to establish legitimacy for sociology and 
attract financial and political support from new types of constituencies, 
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namely, the state, international organisations, private business and even public 
citizens.  
 In this context, the division between academic and public sociology has 
become particularly fluid in the post-independence period.  Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists have ambivalent feelings about using newspapers as a medium for 
publication, and despite the practical obstacles to publishing scholarly work, 
many do differentiate between ‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ forms of 
presentation.  On one hand, many see publications in newspapers and popular 
magazines as inferior to those published in academic journals or even non-
peer reviewed, institutionally-produced conference proceedings.  On the other 
hand, the absence of peer-reviewed journals and the lack of resources for 
publishing in general have created a situation in which newspaper publications 
are often classified as ‘scientific publications’ (the Sociology Department at 
BHU, for example, includes them in its annual research reports).  The fact that 
such publications are not acceptable contributions toward the fulfilment of a 
candidate or doctoral degree, however, suggests that there is still considerable 
stigma attached to media publication.   
 Articles about sociology began to appear on the pages of national 
newspapers such as Slovo Kyrgyzstana (a pro-government publication), 
ResPublica (an opposition paper) and Svobodnye gory (the newspaper of the 
Jogorku Kenesh, or parliament) shortly before independence.86  This marked a 
shift to ‘public science.’  The term ‘public sociology,’ particularly in 
American lexicon, refers to an engagement between academic sociology and 
public, often social or political, commitment; it can also refer to efforts to 
bridge the gap between academic scholarship and public consciousness and 
action.  However, it can also refer more analytically to ‘rhetoric, argument and 
polemic [designed] to persuade the public or influential sectors thereof that 
science…is worthy of receiving public attention, encouragement and finances’ 
(Turner 1980 quoted in Gieryn et al. 1985: 392).  In contemporary 
Kyrgyzstan, it means both.  Kyrgyzstani sociologists have used the media to 
‘construct ideologies [of social science] with style and content well suited to 
the advancement or protection of their professional authority’ (Gieryn 1983: 
783) while simultaneously attempting to educate the public about sociology 
and make political statements about current events.87   
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 While most of the articles on sociology published in popular media 
during this decade can be considered part of the larger phenomenon of public 
science, two debates in particular stand out as significant.  The first, a series of 
articles about public opinion on privatisation in Kyrgyzstan published in 1994, 
demonstrates how the historical conflict between scientific objectivity and 
political interest in social scientific work was reconstrued in the post-Soviet 
period.  This debate revolved around sociologists’ authority (or lack thereof) 
to define, evaluate and criticise controversial government policies, and 
illustrates how representations of the relationship between sociology and the 
state were realigned as the latter became more authoritarian.  It also reveals 
how and why two separate kinds of boundary–work—that done to expand 
professional and scientific authority and that to protect the autonomy of 
scientific knowledge from the political field—were seen as vital by 
sociologists attempting to establish legitimacy for their work during this 
period.   
 The second major debate, which became known as the ‘ratings scandal’ 
in 1994, consists of articles about ‘political ratings’ published by Isaev and 
members of his research group at BHU published from 1993 to 1997, as well 
as critiques of these studies written by sociologists from other institutions in 
the republic.  This debate encompasses a range of topics related to the problem 
of scientific credibility as it is manifested both among sociologists and 
between sociologists, the broader public and the power elite.  It reinforces that 
the boundary between science and politics is often renegotiable in the face of 
increasing political pressures on sociologists, but also reveals how central 
sociological concepts such as ‘objectivity’ may be defined strategically in 
relation to the professional goals of sociologists.   
 Ultimately, the public debates about research on both privatisation and 
political ratings are manifestations of a deep-seated controversy about the 
professional ethos of Kyrgyzstani sociology, including the role of the 
discipline, its relationship to power structures in society, and the emerging 
norms of legitimate, post-Soviet sociological method.  Because both debates 
centre on studies which take the methodological form of public opinion 
research, before turning to them it is important to understand how the study of 
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public opinion has been defined and practiced in Kyrgyzstan and what 
relationship it bears to sociology more generally.         
 
Public opinion: the ‘democratic’ face of Kyrgyzstani sociology 
 
The above themes emerged from a dense volume of public opinion studies 
which were conducted by sociologists (or individuals defining themselves as 
sociologists) and published in the Kyrgyzstani press after independence.  They 
are situated within a larger body of ‘sociological’ articles published on a wide 
variety of other issues during this period, including public perceptions of 
Islam, the declining standard of living in the republic, poverty, changes in the 
professions, educational reforms, migration, national development, crime, 
referendums and elections, and the role of the mass media in society.   
In fact, the bulk of sociological research conducted during the 1990s 
consisted of survey research in one form or another.  As Vladimir Chernyshev, 
then-director of the Tashkent (Uzbekistan) Office of Public Opinion under the 
Soviet Sociological Association, argued, the proliferation of survey research in 
the region during perestroika raised as many questions as it answered: 
In recent years, newspapers and magazines have begun to 
publish the results of surveys conducted by sociologists.  This 
material demands great interest, insofar as it reflects the 
relation of the population to the state of things in various 
spheres of life in our society.  It also raises a number of big 
questions: what is this science, the sociology of public opinion?  
How do sociologists get to and analyse the data?  What does 
the use of results and their analysis give to practice? 
(Luk'ianova 1990: 55) 
These pointed questions about the definition of legitimate knowledge and the 
authority of legitimate knowers had become highly contentious in Kyrgyzstan 
by the mid-1990s.  Despite such fundamental uncertainties, however, public 
opinion research came to occupy a central position in Kyrgyzstani sociology, 
and empirical surveys, along with structured interviews and marketing-style 
focus groups, are the dominant and preferred methods of sociological research 
today.   
While both public opinion and marketing research generally exist on the 
margins of sociology as an academic discipline and have been criticised as 
being conservative therapeutic tools for ‘exploring and improving the existing 
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social conditions, within the framework of the existing social institutions’ 
(Marcuse 1964:107), they have become the most prominent forms of ‘applied 
sociology’ in Kyrgyzstan.  In fact, the term ‘public opinion research’ is used to 
refer to a variety of practices, including polls, rating and ranking surveys, 
structured interviews and focus groups, the common denominator being that 
the purpose of each of these methods is to ascertain ‘public opinion.’  The 
concept assumed privileged status as an analytical category in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstani sociology with the conjunction of four factors: the continuation of 
Soviet-era philosophies of social science as a technocratic tool for scientific 
management, the belief that empirical data provide a scientific antidote to the 
political manipulation of social reality, methodological individualism, and the 
conviction that public opinion research is a symbol and dimension of modern, 
democratic civil societies.  
 
Public opinion research in the Soviet Union 
The concept of public opinion, however, is not new.  It has been an integral 
part of Kyrgyzstani sociology since the late socialist period.  Owing to its 
focus on the subjective individual, it has often been considered the 
‘democratic’—and therefore most historically repressed—face of Soviet 
sociology.  The study of public opinion in Kyrgyzstan has its origins in an 
earlier Communist Party practice of conducting surveys to provide party 
leaders with ‘feedback’ about how Soviet citizens understood top-down 
political and economic decisions and to ascertain whether they were ‘ready’ 
for certain types of social reforms.   
 The most famous of these were public surveys about a wide variety of 
social issues, conducted by the newspaper Komsomol'skaia Pravda in the 
1960s and 1960s, in which readers could voluntarily clip out, complete and 
return short questionnaires to the newspaper editors (Buckley 1998: 224).  
Data from such non-representative surveys were used to both ascertain and 
influence the ‘mood of the masses,’ as collective social consciousness was 
called, and to more effectively persuade the general public to legitimise the 
will of the regime.  This helped sustain the asymmetrical ‘two-way’ 
relationship between Communist Party leadership and society at large, in 
which ‘the masses would learn the truth about society from the party through 
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its propaganda, and the party would learn where and when people would be 
prepared for social change, as well as new techniques and strategies for 
“revolutionary” struggle’ (Inkeles 1958: 18).   
 Insofar as empirical research on ‘sensitive’ issues was discouraged during 
the post-Stalinist period, early studies of public opinion in Soviet Kirgizia 
were neither systematic nor statistical, and they lacked methodological rigour 
(Buckley 1998).  ‘In past years,’ said one Kyrgyzstani practitioner, ‘we had 
the view that public opinion meant letters and announcements directed by 
citizens to party and Soviet organs.  Many letters—that was good.  It meant 
that we studied and knew public opinion’ (Luk'ianova 1990: 55).  At the time, 
‘knowing’ public opinion did not imply understanding or interpreting the 
particular views or experiences of individuals or social groups.  Instead, it was 
a matter of studying reactions ‘primarily to determine the pace and speed of 
[one’s] own actions.  The goal [was] not to cater to public opinion, but to 
move it along with you as rapidly as possible without undermining your 
popular support’ (Inkeles 1958: 24).  A similar instrumental rationality can 
also be seen in many studies of industrial sociology during this period, 
particularly insofar as industrial sociologists made heavy use of individualised 
survey research for much the same purpose (see Chapter 4). 
 During perestroika in Kirgizia, public opinion research was reconceived 
as a populist counterweight to ruling power control in the political arena and 
offered up as a solution to the perceived need for people (both within the party 
and external to it) to empower themselves with information and disempower 
government authorities who continued to monopolise images of truth about 
social and political reality.  Public opinion was redefined as ‘a science about 
what society thinks and how it is related to various phenomena and facts of the 
surrounding activity.  The differing part of this science is that the source of 
information is concrete people’ (Luk'ianova 1990).   
 However, ‘public opinion,’ defined as the sum of individual opinions of 
private citizens (Isaev et al. 1997) and the conversion of these into a collective 
consciousness (Isaev 1995) also came to be perceived as a legitimate political 
force sui generis as well as a reflection of social experience.  It was viewed as 
a political institution (Lokteva 1991; see also Bekturganov 1994: 15) and a 
‘mirror in which most people’s relation to power…is reflected’ (Sydykova 
 239
 
 
1998; see also Isaev et al. 1996b).  It was further argued that the democratic 
potential of public opinion had been wilfully distorted and suppressed during 
the Stalinist era by authoritarian institutions which prevented people from 
expressing individual opinions and sociologists from exposing them.   
 This new, more critical function of public opinion research first emerged 
during the 1980s when it was officially employed to help democratise the 
imbalanced, didactic relationship between the Communist Party leadership 
and its rank–and–file members.  Leninist theories about the importance of 
information in democratic centralism and the power of mass political 
participation were revived, and the public were reminded that ‘it is well 
known that V. I. Lenin more than once said that leadership bodies of the party 
must have before them a full picture of the work of local organisations, as 
without information it is impossible to centralise party leadership’ 
(Bekturganov 1990: 107).  If party authorities did not consider the ideas of 
subordinates within the organisation, it was asked, how did they intend to 
democratise their relationship with society at large?  The revitalisation of 
public opinion research during perestroika thus began as part of a movement 
to democratise the party itself.   
 This narrow application, however, was soon broadened to incorporate 
other social institutions, and public opinion became a prominent concept in 
discourses about the democratisation of socialist society more generally.  Its 
reformed role was ambitious: to ‘play a positive role in the further unfolding 
of transformational processes, in the expansion of glasnost and criticism and 
self-criticism, and in raising the political activity of the masses’ (Bekturganov 
1990: 107).  In fact, it was argued that ‘the political significance of research in 
public opinion is linked above all to the necessity of democratising and 
humanising socialist society’ (Bekturganov 1990: 107), and that the failures of 
perestroika could be attributed in large part to a lack of knowledge about 
everyday life (Isaev and Bekturganov 1990: 3).   
Because political power has been alienated from public opinion 
and from the people and real life processes, the break between 
public expectations and the authoritarian-bureaucratic structure 
has not only not decreased, but may even assume enormous 
proportions.  The way out of this situation is in the concrete 
and, at the same time, systematic study and analysis of the real 
 240
 
 
complexities of the situation, and in appealing to public 
opinion.  This can help to make scientifically developed 
political and state administrative decisions which are oriented 
toward the democratisation of society, the deepening of social 
transformations, the inclusion of various strata of the 
population and individual citizens in social and political life, 
and the actual implementation of democratic forms and 
methods of administration (Bekturganov 1994). 
 
The institutionalisation of public opinion research during perestroika 
If public opinion was seen as a new scientific and political force in late 
socialist Kirgizstani society, then professionalising, institutionalising and 
publicising public opinion research was the new mission of sociologists.  
Members of the sociological community, including prominent academics such 
as Isaev and Bekturganov (director of the Centre for the Study of Public 
Opinion under the Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1985–87) 
advocated a more active role for public opinion research, and consequently for 
themselves, in social and political life.  Instead of being mere surveyors of 
general attitudes, it was argued that ‘sociological groups and bureaus 
established within the Councils of Peoples' Deputies, party committees and 
social organisations should become integral parts of the effective activities of 
these same organisations’ (Bekturganov 1990: 110).  In addition to its 
traditional role as a source of information about the ‘social mood,’ public 
opinion research was portrayed as necessary for the revitalisation of 
democratic scientific politics, which, while administered by decree from the 
top down, should originate from information gathered from the bottom up.  
Once sociologists understood public opinion, it was argued, they could advise 
authorities how to change it.   
 During perestroika, public opinion surveys served, if only symbolically, 
to redirect the weight of authority away from the Communist Party and back 
toward ‘the people.’  In order to legitimise this within the socialist context, 
sociologists invoked Marxist–Leninist theories which asserted that objective 
social forces are reflected in mass psychology and can be created or reformed 
by enlightened intervention.  Kirgizstani sociologists continually advocated 
the creation of new alliances between state and party organisations and 
sociological researchers; teams that could cooperatively develop ‘technical 
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assignments’ for political purposes (Bekturganov 1990: 110).  Such projects 
were to be housed in a ‘range of organisational offices for the study of public 
opinion in the regions, connected with state, party and social organisations’ 
and staffed by a new aktiv (group of party activists) of anketery (surveyors) 
who would be selected by the party and trained by the republic’s few 
professional sociologists.  While several efforts were made to institutionalise 
this movement and a number of centres for the study of public opinion were 
established in Kirgizia (including one established and directed by Bekturganov 
in 1983 under the Central Committee of the Communist Party), as with 
industrial sociology (see Chapter 4), the study of public opinion was never 
institutionalised as a sustainable practice in Kirgizia.  In 1990, the most 
prominent practitioner of public opinion studies made devastating criticisms of 
the state of the field: 
It should be noted that not all the research on public opinion, 
either in the country [USSR] or in our republic, was conducted 
at the necessary scientific-theoretical level.  It makes mistakes 
in methodical samples and the analysis of sociological 
information.  This happens because we lack an established 
system of the study and formation of public opinion’ 
(Bekturganov 1990: 106). 
 
Public opinion studies in independent Kyrgyzstan 
Despite these unresolved weaknesses in the field, independence heralded a 
dramatic increase in the number of public opinion surveys being conducted in 
the republic by amateur researchers and sociologists alike, many of whom 
were based in new ‘sociological research centres’ which had begun to 
proliferate during the late 1980s (Toktosunova and Sukhanova 1990; see 
Buckley 1998 for similar trends in the RSFSR).  After independence, rhetoric 
about the social relevance of public opinion studies was reinforced by the 
powerful symbolic association of public opinion research with democratic and 
‘civilised’—and by implication anti-Soviet—politics.  It was asserted, for 
example, that ‘in truly democratic countries, politicians pay attention to the 
results of public opinion so they are prompted to action in deciding internal 
and external politics of the state’ (Isaev et al. 1996b) and that ‘in civilised 
countries, public opinion is a political institution that is a recognised and 
 242
 
 
legalised mechanisms at all levels of the decision making process’ (Lokteva 
1991).  While such proclamations are rarely supported with references to 
empirical evidence, they are also rarely if ever questioned by either 
sociologists or the general public.  For many, the emergence of public opinion 
research is a clear indication of modernisation and development.  
 While it is difficult to obtain reliable statistical data on the expansion of 
publications on public opinion research during the early independence 
period,88 many sociologists in Kyrgyzstan are critical of the phenomenon.  
Isaev, for example, pointed to a discrepancy between the proliferation of 
public opinion surveys and the general confusion about what they are for, 
linking this with the underdevelopment of sociology more generally, saying 
that  
[w]hile sociological surveys of public opinion have become a 
standard attribute of processes of democratisation in society in 
recent years, we lack a good understanding of their role and 
place in society.  This is connected above all with the fact that, 
due to the relative newness of this problem in our republic, 
fundamental sociological research and even sociology as a 
science itself does not receive enough attention (Isaev, 
Akhmatova and Dosalieva 1996). 
In a critique of Isaev’s research on political ratings, Bekturganov (1994a) 
waged a more serious criticism of post-independence public opinion studies.  
While he supported the popularisation of public opinion research, he also 
asserted that methodological weaknesses, along with the conflation of 
sociological research and political interest, were ‘distorting the principles of 
correctness of the selection of experts, methods, techniques and procedures 
defining political ratings.’   
Veteran sociologists such as Bekturganov and Tishin have also been 
critical of the ascendance of what they call ‘dilettantism’ and its deleterious 
effects on the status and legitimacy of academic sociology in the republic.  On 
the one hand, they argue that the expansion of sociological discourse in the 
national media was a direct result of democratisation, and that as such it 
allowed for the ‘disclosure of sides of our life that are not accessible to other 
sciences and…[had] a direct impact on the formation of public opinion about 
events and people’s actual behaviour.’  In this sense, they acknowledge that 
the long struggle to remove censorship on sociology and social criticism had 
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to some extent come to fruition, if only by default after the collapse of Soviet 
communism.  On the other hand, however, they express concern that ‘the 
rising wave of sociological surveys conducted today does not reflect all the 
deep life processes [and] many social problems are still analysed by 
publicists,’ which they deem inadequate for the ‘scientific analysis of life 
phenomena’ (Bekturganov et al. 1994).  As Tishin (1998: 32) remarked, 
[s]ociological dilettantism emerged on the wave of high-quality 
sociological research and exists to this day, discrediting 
sociology.  In Kyrgyzstan right up to the 1990s researchers 
faced the problem, difficult to eradicate, of sociological 
publications and the promulgation of [research] results.  
Sociological material in the republic was held back by 
ignorance and was very rarely printed. […] In 1993–94, the 
other extreme developed.  Monthly sociological pages and 
weekly sociological reviews with puzzling rubrics appeared in 
the periodical press.  The philistine style of the materials, their 
lack of content and advertising-like presentation have created 
the impression of political prostitution on the part of individual 
sociological researchers; for example, on the problems of 
privatization, the definition of politicians’ ratings, and etc.  
However, not all sociologists have fallen into this trap.  At the 
same time, the National Academy of Science conducted 
fundamental sociological research about the development of 
international relations, and the problems of national conflict 
and tension. 
Here, Tishin clearly distinguishes between legitimate social science done 
within the Academy of Science and ‘amateur’ or ‘pseudo’ sociology done by 
groups or individuals lacking academic training or institutional affiliation.   
 The distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ analysis, and more 
narrowly between legitimate and pseudo-sociology, became particularly 
important as a disparate variety of intellectual and political actors, many of 
whom were competing for similar positions of social power, claimed to be 
validated by the authority of science.  According to Bekturganov and Tishin, 
the lack of a creative indigenous sociological theory, the paucity of social 
scientific language to describe social phenomena, the lack of trained 
specialists in sociology, personal power-seeking and ambition, and the 
dominance of ‘percent–o–mania’ and ‘anket–o–mania’ at the expense of more 
‘serious’ mathematical and statistical forms of data analysis have led to 
sociological ‘illiteracy’ within the community and to ‘subjective,’ and 
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therefore invalid, research on public opinion.  In turn, this state of affairs has 
negative consequences not only for the discipline’s public image, but also for 
the possibility that sociologists will be recruited as consultants in social and 
political decision making (Bekturganov et al. 1994).   
There is also a generalised, almost conspiratorial fear that the results of 
public opinion research might ‘fall into the trap of those who crave political 
power,’ both domestic and foreign, thus enabling them to engage in the 
psychological manipulation of society at large (Isaev 1998; Sydykova 1998).  
This fear, and its underlying assumptions that there is such an entity as ‘public 
opinion’ and that it actually constitutes an objective and potentially powerful 
political force, have exacerbated concerns about professionalism in sociology 
and the need to distinguish between ‘real sociology’ and pseudo-science in the 
republic (Bakir Uluu 1997; Bekturganov 1994a; Isaev et al. 1994b, 1997a).  
The failure of efforts to professionalise the discipline during the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s was compounded after independence by the deregulation of 
academic activity and by the ascendance of a populist conception of sociology 
which equates sociological research with the distribution and evaluation of 
questionnaires.  Ablezova (2003), who worked for several years as a 
marketing researcher in SIAR Bishkek before joining the AUCA faculty, 
describes her own understanding of this phenomenon:   
now…many people who have nothing to do with marketing 
sociology conduct surveys, conduct research, without even 
knowing how to do sampling or design a questionnaire, and 
what’s the rule in the field, how they should conduct 
interviews, how they should analyse data. […] And I think that 
it also has a negative influence on sociology.   
 The importance of this issue is revealed most explicitly in Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists’ efforts to separate legitimate sociology from pseudo-science and 
distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sociological practice through the use of 
boundary–work in the mass media.  Debates over the proper boundaries of an 
academic discipline or professional practice are practical as well as 
philosophical questions (Gieryn 1983).  The immediate socio-political 
contexts of boundary–work in sociology were the post-Soviet privatisation of 
land and other state property, and the formal (albeit far from substantive) 
transformation of centralised, authoritarian politics into a democratic political 
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system in which power is distributed equally between citizens and elites.  The 
practice of defining, popularising and defending sociology in the media must 
therefore be understood in terms of how discourses on sociological method 
and ethos, as well as the more general relationship between science and 
politics, were constructed within these broader contexts.  
 
From privatisation to prikhvatizatsiia: sociology confronts the state89
As illustrated in Part 2, the definitions of sociological method and practice in 
Kyrgyzstan have been historically contingent and often pragmatically defined.  
This case study, based on a series of seven newspaper articles about 
sociological research on post-Soviet privatisation, explores how Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists have constructed the boundary between social science and politics 
in order to enhance the discipline’s legitimacy within shifting political 
conditions which created different obstacles to this goal.90  Unlike cases in 
which scientists engage in rhetorical debates with other groups of scientists 
and non-scientists to gain control over social and material resources, the 
boundary–work exhibited in these articles was targeted at counteracting 
political ideologies and the spectre of authoritarianism, as well as 
disentangling sociology from both.  The challenge to sociologists’ authority in 
this case comes not from other academic disciplines or social practices, but 
from the possibility of a return to a heteronomous relationship between 
sociology and the republic’s political and economic elite.     
 There is very little sociological research on post-Soviet privatisation in 
Kyrgyzstan.  While economists and legal scholars have expressed some 
interest in the topic (e.g., Dabrowski et al. 1995; Nicholas 1997), primarily in 
terms of evaluating the effectiveness of economic liberalisation programmes, 
sociologists and anthropologists have generally neglected it.  Much of the 
research which has been done reproduces widely a hegemonic consensus that 
Kyrgyzstan’s relative ‘success’ in privatising state-owned property, along with 
its ‘pro-Western’ and ‘democratising’ government, have made the republic an 
‘oasis of democracy and social peace in a region wrecked by powerful ethnic 
and religious conflicts’ (Dabrowski et al. 1995: 269).  The process of 
privatisation in Kyrgyzstan is therefore often defined by its formal 
components and analysed according to fiscal outcomes.  It is divided into two 
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phases, the first from 1992–94 being extremely unsuccessful and the second, 
beginning in 1994, only relatively less so (Dabrowski et al. 1995; Nicholas 
1997).  While the Kyrgyz State Property Fund criticised the early reforms for 
being unprofitable (Nichols 1997: 323) and it is widely acknowledged that 
‘large segments of non-employee citizens have been left out of the 
privatisation process’ (Dabrowski et al. 1995: 288), the overall logic of the 
initiative has gone largely unchallenged by social scientists.  The failure of 
early ‘voucher’ forms of privatisation (VPP),91 for example, is attributed to 
straightforward administrative incompetence (Nicholas 1997), and the effect 
of privatisation programmes on the everyday lives of ordinary people is often 
overlooked.  
   
Indigenous survey research on privatisation 
These effects, however, were not lost on Kyrgyzstani sociologists, some of 
whom began to study the social face of privatisation.  In the early 1990s, 
members of Isaev’s sociological laboratory at KTU and later BHU, who had 
by this time begun to call themselves the ‘Independent Group of Sociologists’ 
(Isaev 1994), conducted a series of nation-wide surveys of public opinion 
about privatisation.92  The studies were based on an ‘all-Kyrgyz representative 
sample’ that, according to the researchers, covered ‘all regions and cities in the 
republic.’  Each was based on a sample of 2000 respondents, which the team 
claimed reflected the ‘demographic, national [ethnic], and socio-professional 
structures of the population of the republic as a whole and of each oblast in 
particular.’  They also claimed it was ‘the first time such work ha[d] been 
conducted’ (Isaev 1994).  The surveys, which were purely empirical, were 
intended to ‘gather a wealth of material for rethinking, administration, and 
decision-making’ (Isaev 1994).  In some cases, the results were published in 
newspapers as isolated tables or descriptions of statistical averages (e.g., the 
percentage of respondents who felt privatisation was beneficial or detrimental, 
classified according to ethnic group, class, age).  In other cases, however, the 
statistics served as points of departure for political, often polemical statements 
about more general issues in question surrounding the specific research being 
presented, such as inequalities in the privatisation process, corruption and 
social misinformation.   
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For example, the introduction to the first article in the series, entitled 
‘Privatisation for what and for whom?’ was a political treatise on the social 
relevance of sociological research as much as it was a description of the 
research itself.  After arguing that successful privatisation depended on 
widespread public participation, Isaev criticised authorities for failing to take 
this into account and asserted that sociological research was the best—indeed 
the only—way to obtain information about how privatisation was actually 
progressing (Isaev 1994).  In a certain sense, this was a new twist on the 
theory of ‘two-way communication’ which had motivated Soviet-era public 
opinion surveys.  Instead of providing ‘feedback’ for the Communist Party, 
sociologists reconceptualised their work to suit the new political economy of 
post-independence Kyrgyzstan: economic policies must accommodate public 
demand and, if they did not, policy makers must find ways to educate the 
public about the importance of their political projects and garner social 
support for party legislation.  The success of economic policy, in other words, 
was still seen as being heavily dependent on the construction of ideological 
consensus, and the possibility of creating the latter depended on obtaining data 
from effective surveys of public opinion.  On this basis, it was argued that 
applied sociology could be 
called on to help in the study of concrete reality, conditions and 
the opinion of the population about the process of privatisation.  
It is precisely applied sociology, if its results are used 
intelligently, that can become an accurate barometer, accurately 
indicating the ways and means of constructing market relations 
(Isaev 1994). 
These claims were reinforced by the public presentation of data in a highly 
‘scientific’ style, namely, descriptive statistics displayed in table form.  The 
tables included information on the percentage of respondents who reportedly 
supported and opposed moves toward privatisation as well as those who had 
no opinion.  They were organised by region, educational level, class (or ‘social 
category of worker’), socio-demographic group (age) and national (ethnic) 
identity.  Table 1, translated from the Russian version (Figure1), is typical of 
the display format used to present studies of privatisation in Kyrgyzstan to a 
broad reading audience.   
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Figure 1: Opinions on privatisation organised by ‘national group’ 
Results of a 1994 public opinion survey on privatisation (Isaev 1994) 
  
 
 
Table 1: Opinions on privatisation organised by ‘national group’ 
Results of a 1994 public opinion survey on privatisation (Isaev 1994)  
(Translation of Figure 1) 
 
NATIONAL GROUPS 
in % of the entire number of respondents in each group 
 
Variants of answers Total Kyrgyz Russian Uzbek Kazakh German Other 
Number of respondents 2000 1136 421 263 45 28 107 
What does privatisation mean to you? 
Don’t know, don’t 
understand 
 
46.3 
 
47.7 
 
38.4 
 
51.5 
 
33.3 
 
24.1 
 
47.7 
Transition of property 
from state use to 
personal, private… 
 
 
27.1 
 
 
22.1 
 
 
37.5 
 
 
29.3 
 
 
37.8 
 
 
31.0 
 
 
22.5 
Gives the right to be an 
owner (property) 
 
6.9 
 
6.2 
 
8.0 
 
4.2 
 
11.1 
 
3.5 
 
13.1 
It is a path to the 
recovery of the 
economy 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
1.5 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
4.4 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
2.8 
Gives freedom of 
action 
 
0.7 
 
0.4 
 
1.0 
 
1.5 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
It is a great increase of 
wealth for the rich, 
established to seize 
social power 
(prikhvatizatsiia)  
 
 
 
 
2.7 
 
 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
 
 
3.7 
Great significance 7.1 10.4 1.0 4.2 2.2 3.5 2.8 
Other answers 6.4 8.3 9.0 4.7 9.0 30.9 7.4 
    
Some articles also included lists of the questions asked of respondents.  
Appendix F, for example, is a list of questions published from an early survey 
on privatisation.   
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These early studies on privatisation were originally funded by sponsors 
identified only as nomenklatura (wealthy patrons, typically who also have 
political power) (Isaev 1998) and, in one case, ‘an American agency’ (1996a).  
Isaev (1998) later remarked that  
we used to have different sources of financial support in the 
earlier days.  During that period we published a book on 
privatisation in three volumes, as well as numerous articles.  
However, when they realised that public opinion was shifting 
from privatisation to prikhvatizatsiia, the nomenklatura 
eventually withdrew [funding]. 
It was the critical slant of the articles which eventually led to a struggle 
between sociologists and politicians for control over how the motivations for 
and consequences of privatisation were defined.  One of the reported 
responses in Table 1, for example, stated that privatisation ‘is a great increase 
of wealth for the rich, established to seize social power (prikhvatizatsiia).’  
Although it was attributed to under 4% of respondents in all ethnic groups, the 
very fact that sociologists included it at all posed a threat to the government’s 
position (also included as a response) that privatisation is a ‘path to economic 
recovery.’  This implicit criticism, presented as one of several objective and 
‘scientific’ responses, was compounded by the claim in the text that nearly 
half the population either did not know about or understand privatisation. 
As surveys on privatisation continued, sociologists became more critical 
of both the process and those implementing the changes.  Articles published in 
1994 focused on the ineffectiveness of the Kyrgyz government’s ‘propaganda 
campaign’ to popularise VPP (Isaev 1994a), the class dynamics of public 
opinion about privatisation (Isaev and Abylgazieva 1994) and the 
‘complexities and contradictions’ that seemed inherent in the privatisation 
process (Isaev, Akbagynova, and Abylagazieva 1994).  Articles also began to 
include percentages of people purportedly living below the poverty line (90% 
according to one estimate from the Kyrgyz professional union, see Isaev 
1994b) and were highly critical of the overall outcomes of privatisation 
initiatives. 
By February 1994, the researchers reported that 66% of those surveyed 
considered privatisation practices unfair and argued that there were substantial 
discrepancies between people’s expectations of progressive change and the 
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actual results of the policies (Isaev 1994b).  They began to emphasise ethnic 
and ‘national’ differences in this experience, which complicated the state’s 
generalised programme, and began offering theories not of what people 
thought about privatisation, but why they were so passive in the movement.  
Several articles pointed out that ‘the majority of people care about basic living 
problems and not privatisation,’ an obvious reference to extreme levels of 
poverty in the republic (Isaev and Abylgazaieva 1994; Isaev, Akbagynova and 
Abylgazaieva 1994).  In one article, Isaev and Asanbekov (1994) argued that 
ethnically Kyrgyz respondents were least informed about privatisation not 
only because they had access to fewer media sources in the rural regions of the 
republic, but also because they maintained a more ‘traditional’ way of life in 
which information is communicated through informal relationships as opposed 
to official networks such as the media.  They also suggested, as is commonly 
argued in Kyrgyz ethnology, that the ‘nomadic past’ of the Kyrgyz people 
dominated their collective economic psychology (or ‘mentality’ in local terms) 
to such an extent that it prevented them from being independently minded, and 
that they thus would fare better under programmes for more ‘collective’ forms 
of privatisation.   
While many theoretical questions can obviously be raised about these 
arguments, their role here was more political than academic: they are implicit 
critiques of ‘imported’ policies.  By the sixth article, it was blatantly asserted 
that 
[i]n this type of situation, propaganda and agitation won’t work 
on social consciousness.  It is thought that the main reason for 
people’s passivity in privatisation is serious opposition to the 
socio-economic mechanisms of the transition to a market 
economy (Osmonalieva 1994). 
By summer 1994, sociologists working in the BHU laboratory had published 
seven progressively critical articles about privatisation in the republic.  While 
the articles had ‘scientific’ status because they were written by academic 
sociologists, they were also deliberately political documents, formulated in an 
emotive rhetoric which combined academic jargon and concepts with political 
platforms and analysis.  Despite the relative freedom enjoyed by sociologists 
in the early years of independence, social research was still entirely dependent 
on funding from political patrons and produced in a semi-authoritarian 
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environment.  Ultimately, the articles were deemed politically threatening and 
sponsorship for large-scale public opinion research studies at BHU was 
withdrawn in the second half of the year (Sydykova 1998).  While not 
specifically intended to contribute to the redefinition of sociology in post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the boundary–work conducted through this experience was 
nevertheless influential in this process. 
 
Boundary–work in studies of privatisation    
In the early years following national independence, it was assumed that 
freedom from Soviet control would facilitate the expansion of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan and for its recognition as a legitimate and relevant way of 
knowing.  It seemed logical that the discipline would be embraced as a path to 
enlightenment about a long-obscured social reality and as a way to resolve 
social problems ‘scientifically.’  The legitimation, institutionalisation and 
professionalisation of sociology were regarded as inalienable components of 
transition to a ‘civil,’ ‘democratic’ and capitalist society; in fact, the success of 
the latter was not infrequently attributed to the development of the former 
(Isaev 1993, Isaev et al. 1994b; Ismailova 1995).   
By the time BHU researchers began their studies on privatisation, 
however, this expectation had become more of a mirage.  Sociologists 
continued the campaign to portray the discipline as legitimate and relevant, but 
found themselves doing so in a state which, while no longer Soviet, still 
remained hostile to ideological challenges from the social sciences, and in an 
economy in which material resources for research and teaching were scarce 
and in high demand.  They did this largely by portraying sociology as 
objective, scientific, politically potent and methodologically anti-political, 
erecting unambiguous boundaries between sociology and the illegitimately 
political, and asserting their relevance for the creation of a new type of 
scientific politics. 
For example, while Isaev paid lip service to ideals of democratisation, by 
1994 he was fully aware that Kyrgyzstan was not a democratising society.  
However, as he still sought funding for social research, he and his team of 
researchers adopted the formal rhetoric of democratisation to wage subtle 
critiques of the government’s trends toward authoritarianism, in particular its 
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deleterious effect on sociology, while nevertheless maintaining that sociology 
could contribute to alleviating abuses of power by being closely allied with the 
state.  The characterisation of sociological research outlined in the articles on 
privatisation—large-scale, empirical, methodologically rigorous, longitudinal 
and by implication expensive—was also linked to sociologists’ renewed 
demands for the creation of academic institutions in which such research could 
be conducted, and for the establishment of ‘democratic’ social, political and 
economic institutions which could become consumers for its products (Isaev 
1994).   
 In this socio-political milieu, sociologists engaged in two types of 
boundary–work simultaneously.  On one hand, the privatisation articles 
promoted images of sociology which aimed to extend or expand the influence 
of sociology into two arenas dominated by the state: economic policy making 
and ‘reality management.’  This was reflected, for example, in statements that 
data were intended both to inform public opinion about privatisation and to 
provide decision makers with information about public perceptions of the 
policies.  In this instance, researchers clearly identified themselves with the 
administrative apparatus of the Kyrgyz state.  ‘The results,’ they claimed, ‘will 
offer scientific–informative help to power structures of the Kyrgyz state in 
elaborating policies for social transformation, corresponding with the socio-
cultural characteristics of our republic and the particularities of the mass 
consciousness of its citizens’ (Isaev 1994).  This assertion implies a continuing 
acceptance of the technocratic role of sociology in the republic, as well as a 
pragmatic approach to lobbying for funding resources.  Here, the relationship 
between sociology and power is carefully constructed so that ‘scientific’ 
knowledge can be legitimised as long as it contributes to the establishment and 
maintenance of ‘just authority,’ or legitimate political power in the form of 
democratic governance and publicly-sanctioned social planning.  As 
sociologists such as Isaev continued to seek patronage from the state, they 
sought to build a favourable relation with it by adopting the government’s 
official ideology about democratisation and liberalisation and framing 
criticisms of state policy within this sanctioned rhetorical framework.      
On the other hand, however, the researchers also aimed to distinguish 
sociology from politics and political activities, attempting to establish the 
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autonomy of sociological knowledge from ‘non-scientific’ forms of 
information and argumentation.  Sociological knowledge (in this case about 
public opinion concerning privatisation) was carefully characterised as 
meeting four major criteria of ‘democratic’ knowledge: (1) ‘complete, 
systematic and complex,’ (2) ‘authentic, scientific and methodologically 
grounded,’ (3) ‘efficient and regularly replenished,’ and (4) ‘able to apply 
different approaches to studying different regions of the republic’ (Isaev 
1994).  Appeals to the logic of scientific objectivity and neutrality became part 
of attempts not only to differentiate social research about political issues from 
political activity, but also to carve out spaces for social critique in a period 
when public criticism was being increasingly suppressed.  While there is 
nothing inherently ‘scientific’ about many of the arguments made on the basis 
of public opinion surveys on privatisation, connecting these claims to 
legitimate scientific research (and by symbolic implication democracy, 
‘civilisation’ and truth) enabled sociologists to claim a degree of intellectual 
authority and political immunity.   
In the case of the privatisation surveys, however, these rhetorical 
strategies had little practical impact on the personal, political and material 
interests of the organisations funding the research.  This exercise in public 
science and boundary–work neither effected changes in the actual relationship 
between sociologists and the power elite nor prevented powerful sponsors 
from withdrawing their patronage when the results and interpretations of the 
research ceased to validate their own agenda. 
 
Political ratings in Kyrgyzstan: real sociology and ‘pseudo-sociology’ 
Another series of articles about the ‘sociology of the elite,’ based on public 
opinion surveys conducted to calculate the ratings of politicians and political 
parties, became the site for a different kind of struggle over scientific authority 
and legitimacy within the social science community itself.93  This case 
provides another illustration of how the nature and role of sociology is 
constructed differently according to shifts in social demand, and how the 
definition of theoretical and normative concepts such as ‘objectivity,’ ‘value–
neutrality’ and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sociology are fluid and emerging.  Gieryn et 
al.’s (1995) ‘market model of professionalisation’ offers some insight into the 
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economic forces shaping this process, and boundary–work to establish 
legitimacy for certain ‘scientific’ practices and exclude those deemed ‘pseudo-
scientific’ is clearly visible.  
 The study of political ratings became popular in Kyrgyzstan during 
perestroika as power was devolved from central to locally elected authorities 
(Isaev 1991b) and local elections raised concerns about predicting and 
monitoring political behaviour.  Ratings of political leaders in Kyrgyzstan, 
which are most often created by ranking individuals on a five-point scale, 
were published regularly from the early 1990s to 1997 and continue in 
modified form to the present day.94  While members of the BHU sociological 
laboratory (specifically, teams of researchers associated with Isaev) published 
more than twenty articles in a four-year period, researchers in other 
institutions such as Osh State University, the Sociological Laboratory at the 
Osh Higher Technical College and KNU were also actively engaged in 
debates over the purpose, methodology and interpretation of surveys 
conducted to establish political ratings. 
 
Social relevance 
Isaev and others devote considerable attention in their articles to promoting 
the social relevance of sociology in general and studies of political ratings in 
particular.  The latter are justified symbolically, often with reference to their 
usage in the west.  Sociologists argue, for example, that this type of research 
constitutes an integral part of modern democratic and ‘civilised’ states in 
which political life ‘is strongly influenced by the personal quality of its 
leaders’ (Group 1993) and where ‘research results serve as a believable source 
of social information for making decisions or correcting the political 
behaviour of leaders’ (Isaev et al. 1994b).  Similarly, ‘take Boris Yeltsin who, 
together with every other kind of authority, is always evaluated.  And in the 
US, France, Germany, and other such countries, top officials and elite people 
are evaluated.  We follow this path in order to become a democratic country’ 
(Isaev 1999d).   
Such research is also associated with the rationalisation of the political 
process, as ratings surveys require that political prestige and legitimacy be 
measured ‘not according to…position in the hierarchy, but according 
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to…concrete deeds and the effectiveness of work’ undertaken (Isaev et al. 
1994).  As Kyrgyzstan is defined as a society in ‘crisis’ or ‘transition’—or in 
one case, described as a Hobbsean ‘war of all against all’ (Isaev et al. 
1994b)—the demand for ‘real, accurate and timely information’ (Bakir Uluu 
1994) about those in power has increased.  It is believed that empirically 
derived information is not only a corrective for poorly conceived policies that 
fail to address actual social problems (Isaev et al. 1994b), but also a way to 
provide the public with vital political information ‘when the parties don’t and 
leaders won’t’ (Isaev et al. 1994e).   
As with the studies on privatisation, the realisation that Akaev’s 
administration was becoming more rather than less authoritarian influenced 
the rhetoric that sociologists used to represent their work in the media.  
Justifications for the social relevance of sociology shifted in mid-1994 from 
emphasising the therapeutic and policy oriented role of sociology in modern 
democratic societies to focusing on its more critical functions in authoritarian 
states.  Sociologists began to argue, for example, that their work was 
necessary because ‘the new “democratic” leaders are still not accustomed to 
the fact that they are studied from the point of view of sociology and do not 
want to be placed on a level with those they consider “subordinate”’ (Isaev et 
al. 1994b).  Another article employed statistical data from the surveys to argue 
that the society was entering a period in which the president’s authoritarianism 
would be ‘victorious’ and institutionalised (Isaev et al. 1994f).   
While the researchers maintained that the association between sociology, 
modernity, democratic politics and ‘civilisation’ was an ideal to aspire to, they 
also began to argue that in times of political crisis, and particularly under the 
threat of non-democratic abuses of power, sociological research may challenge 
the hegemonic ideologies of those in power.  In a ‘non-objective’ (i.e., 
politicised) world, sociologists became responsible for ‘analysing and 
commenting on facts, not reconstructing reality, and not refuelling elements of 
“lies” of political consciousness, not creating illusions tied to politics’ (Isaev, 
Ibraeva and Madalieva 1995).  By 1997, notions that sociology should 
contribute to the efficiency of state power had been replaced by the assertion 
that sociological research was ‘necessary in order to analyse and differentiate 
contemporary politics, not leaving the sphere of the production of political 
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products only to individual politicians, and in order to escape from systematic, 
even outright manipulation thrust on certain points of view’ (Isaev et al. 
1997a).   
As with the privatisation studies, sociologists used their articles on 
political ratings to reconstruct their relationship to the state during this period.  
Sociological research was even ascribed national missionary status, thus 
crystallising sociologists’ new role as an alternative power base in Kyrgyzstani 
society: 
The results of our research may not ‘suit’ someone and might 
be ‘uncomfortable,’ but without servility or care for authority, 
without consideration of the preferred market, we absolutely 
inform them about the wide community.  We see this as our 
mission—you know we answer to national socio-political 
science.  This is the civic and scientific position we intend to 
stand by, regardless of opponents and individuals of all shades 
(Isaev, Ibraeva and Madalieva 1995). 
In taking responsibility for this task, sociologists also assumed identities as 
national heroes who struggled to honour the scientific pursuit of truth in an 
atmosphere of political power-seeking and ideological manipulation: 
From the time we began empirical sociological ratings of 
political workers (since 1991), various toadies, people wanting 
to please, advisors, intriguers and envious people of all shades 
have tried to ruin the beginnings of this research.  But we 
continue with our sociological scientific studies.  They are 
widely known in the community of the republic through 
newspaper publications.  Our scientific results are objective, 
impartial and reflect reality. […] In a situation where the 
systemic crisis of society is deepening, the social status of the 
population is worsening, and faith in the power structures is 
decreasing, the task of defining the ratings of political workers 
demands courage from researchers (Isaev et al. 1997a). 
While studies of political popularity were justified within the BHU Sociology 
Department as part of its larger research project oriented towards advising the 
nation’s power elite (see Chapter 7), they were publicly justified as a 
challenge to the power of this very group. 
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Underlying epistemologies  
Arguments asserting the social relevance of sociology, and in this case the 
value of specific studies of political ratings, were based on a number of 
epistemological assumptions about the nature of scientific knowledge, the 
connection between social science and modernisation, and the proper 
relationship between social science and society.  First, social science is 
portrayed both as a symbolic indicator and as a practical method for the 
modernisation of political life, particularly the rationalisation of political 
behaviour and the transition from personality based politics to rational-action 
or deeds-based politics.  Second, the practice of constructing social scientific 
knowledge (e.g., about the legitimacy of political figures or platforms) is 
defined as objective and, if conducted effectively, not socially or politically 
contingent.  Sociological research is seen to transcend political and intellectual 
crises within the society and to act as a guarantor of truths about social reality, 
which are exploited by political actors that value truth for its use value and not 
as an end in itself.  Third, this transcendental epistemology requires that 
sociologists speak truth to power.  In a democratic society which respects the 
value of truth and its role in effective social policy, they should be immune to 
political retribution.  Finally, the production of sociological knowledge is not 
tied to any particular political or social system.  While it is described as an 
integral part of democratic societies which ostensibly base political decisions 
on scientific research, it is also seen as a necessary presence in non-democratic 
societies as an alternative to the ideological hegemony of undemocratic 
regimes. 
The very fact that sociologists put so much energy into establishing the 
social relevance for sociology and appealing to both political leaders and the 
public for support reveals that the struggle for scientific authority in 
Kyrgyzstani sociology is intricately intertwined with the social and political 
role of the discipline, as well as with the demand for material resources.  
However, the conceptual framework of positivist, objective, empirical and 
apolitical science prevents Kyrgyzstani sociologists from engaging with this 
problematic in a theoretically grounded manner, or from considering that  
different representations of science correspond to different 
positions in the scientific field, and that these representations 
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are ideological strategies and epistemological conditions 
whereby agents occupying a particular position in the field aim 
to justify their own position and the strategies they use to 
maintain or improve it, while at the same time discrediting the 
holders of the opposing position and their strategies (Bourdieu 
1975: 40, italics in original).      
That there are tensions underlying the dominant doxa of sociology becomes 
clearly visible in public contests for scientific legitimacy in sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan.  By defining sociology as a necessary, important and privileged 
way of knowing, sociologists raise the stakes of its status as an academic 
discipline.  By using scientific rhetoric to claim political immunity, they open 
spaces for disagreement about the proper relationship between politics, 
knowledge and power.  The struggle to establish scientific authority therefore 
becomes a central feature of public sociology.  In articles on political ratings, 
this struggle is manifested in three separate debates about the methodology of 
sociological research, the relationship between science and politics, and the 
definition and practice of professional ethos.   
 
Monitoring methodology: the boundaries of acceptable sociological practice 
Debates over social research methods, including approaches to sampling, 
questionnaire construction, the interpretation of raw statistical data, the use of 
‘expert’ or ‘mass’ surveys and the actual procedures by which research is 
conducted assume a particularly prominent place in Kyrgyzstani sociology.  
This is because they are associated not only with questions of scientific 
reliability and validity, but also with issues of intellectual integrity, conformity 
to ambiguously defined professional norms, and concerns about the 
politicisation of sociological knowledge and practice.  While boundary–work 
is an important way of creating new standards for sociological research in 
post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, it has also contributed to the creation, maintenance 
and destruction of professional norms among sociologists and to the 
establishment of relationships of trust and scepticism between sociologists and 
the public. 
 From the outset, Isaev’s publications on political ratings included lengthy, 
albeit selective, explanations of the methodology that his teams used to obtain 
the results they presented.  This is partly a continuation of Soviet ‘political 
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education,’ in which media such as newspapers, radio and television 
programmes were employed in agitation campaigns.  Communist agitators, 
including sociologists, were concerned primarily with explaining party 
decisions to the public and mobilising them to participate in party-led 
initiatives and social events.95  The practice of using the media as a tool for 
educating and persuading the public about the value of a particular policy—in 
this case, the production and application of survey research on political 
ratings—still bears some resemblance to this older practice.  This is also 
suggested by the authors’ language in claims that ‘our research and 
publications fulfil enlightening, socialisation and mobilising functions.  They, 
as benevolent bearers of social scientific information, do significantly more in 
explaining the essence of reforms being carried out in the state, compared to 
the acts of informers, time-servers or cowards’ (Isaev et al. 1997a).  Similarly, 
they claim to have chosen to use the ‘simplest, single-measure tables’ for data 
display ‘in order not to confuse our readers’ (1993a).  Because Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists consider themselves public figures, they take seriously the 
responsibility to educate the public about their work, albeit at an acceptable 
distance and in the role of ‘experts.’ 
 There are, however, more immediate factors motivating the publication of 
long explanations of sociological methods.  Chief among them is the bitter 
competition for professional authority which has emerged within the small, 
mainly indigenous, community of sociologists in the republic, particularly 
between groups of sociologists at BHU and KNU vying for prestige, 
recognition and commissions.  In October 1994, for example, Isaev’s group 
published a meta-explanation of why they were explaining their methodology:  
We especially paused in detail on the selection [of respondents] 
because recently in the mass media there have been a variety of 
studies of public opinion, the quality of which has been called 
into question. […] We will not analyse these now, as in our 
view this problem merits a separate professional discussion. 
Despite the call for sociologists to discuss these problems in a more exclusive 
and professional space, the debate was nevertheless conducted in the public 
sphere.  From 1993–97, Isaev and his group published newspaper articles 
criticising the research of Osh-based academic Tursunbai Bakir Uluu, 
branding it ‘ignorant’ and ‘sociologically illiterate’ (Isaev et al. 1993b).  Bakir 
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Uluu (1994, 1997) responded with articles attacking Isaev’s work, labelling it 
‘unscientific,’ ‘narcissistic’ and ‘ideological.’  He was joined by KNU 
sociologists Tishin and Bekturganov, who suggested that work done at BHU 
was part of a ‘political game’ and that unqualified research in general was a 
threat to the status of the discipline in the republic (Bekturganov 1994a). 
 Interestingly, each antagonist made similar accusations of the others, 
particularly with regard to methodology.  This reveals that while there was a 
broad consensus about certain methodological norms—in particular, that 
sociological research should be objective, politically detached, representative, 
valid and reliable—there was considerable disagreement about what each of 
these terms meant and where to draw the boundaries of ‘correct’ intellectual 
interpretation and professional practice.  The intensity with which these issues 
were debated also indicates that method, or the processes by which knowledge 
is constructed, played an important role in the determination of legitimate 
knowledge and the collective identification of authoritative knowers. 
 Because the representativeness of sampling techniques in social research 
is linked to ideals of both scientific truth and the democratisation of 
knowledge (Blum 1991), the design of survey samples used in studies of 
political ratings has been particularly contentious.  In the contemporary 
political context, incorrect sampling frames are tantamount to scientific 
incompetence and wilful politicisation, both of which are deemed detrimental 
to the institutionalisation of the discipline in the post-Soviet period 
(Bekturganov 1994a).  As one author argued, ‘the most democratic of all these 
approaches [of selection], created by equal opportunity for all, must be an 
instrument of sociology as the production of choices, to avoid biases in this or 
that group of investigators’ (Baibosunov 1993).  Bekturganov (1994a), for 
example, attempted to discredit Isaev’s methodology by implying that he was 
either unfamiliar with or unwilling to use different approaches:  
The main condition for maintaining the quality of sociological 
research is representativeness, that is, representation of the 
surveyed field.  Here, subjects of opinion define not only the 
goal of the research, but also the use of [different] types of 
selection and methods for selecting the primary information. 
[…] But in the research done by the group of independent 
sociologists, they use the same type and scale of selection every 
time.   
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This passage referred specifically to Isaev’s consistent use of the five-point 
scale to survey public and ‘expert’ attitudes toward politicians—in the words 
of the independent group of sociologists (1993), chosen because it was ‘the 
simplest and easiest to understand’ of all the methods available in applied 
sociology.  This choice of method, however, was defined as populist and 
therefore ‘unscientific’ by others in the field, who argued that such simplistic 
methods marginalised other, more ‘scientific’ approaches such as 
mathematical modelling and complex statistical analysis (Bekturganov et al. 
1994).  The necessity of making sociological research accessible to the public 
was for them secondary to making it scientific.   
 There were also debates about the types of surveys used to ascertain 
opinions about leading politicians.  Kyrgyzstani sociologists make clear 
distinctions between ‘expert’ and ‘mass’ surveys.  While the latter are 
considered more accurate (Isaev and Ibraeva 1995), the former have become 
popular in recent years, primarily because researchers lack the financial and 
human resources to conduct large-scale representative surveys of the general 
population.  ‘Mass’ surveys are defined as questionnaires distributed to 
‘simple respondents,’ who ‘can be anyone living in the republic, chosen by 
special a method depending on their sex, age, nationality [ethnicity], 
education, region of residence, and other indicators.’  An ‘expert survey,’ on 
the other hand, is a set of questions asked of carefully selected ‘experts,’ or 
people who ‘work professionally in an area of real activity of interest to 
sociologists’ (Isaev et al. 1993).  Over the years, the definition of ‘expert’ has 
been modified to mean, among other things, ‘people who are completely 
knowledgeable about politics and professionally familiar with the politicians 
of the republic’ (Isaev, Ibraeva and Madaliev 1995), people ‘chosen based on 
their professional background for scientific purposes’ (Isaev 1998) and 
‘unbiased, neutral opponents who are equidistant from the powers–that–be and 
the opposition, who are professionals in their work, scholars who always 
distinguish between critical relations to power and opposition, and who have 
their own independent and objective opinion about the processes of social life’ 
(Isaev 1999c). 
This qualitative differentiation between expert and lay knowers has been 
used to deflect criticism that certain sampling frames are insufficiently 
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representative and that research data are insignificant or inconsistent 
(Abdyrashev 1994; Bakir Uluu 1997; Bekturganov 1994a).  Boundary–work is 
particularly evident here.  In some cases, differences between ‘experts’ and 
‘simple respondents’ are de-emphasised so that generalisations about public 
opinion can be induced from responses given by a small number (e.g., 50) of 
selected interviewees.  For example, Isaev and Ibraeva (1995) argued that an 
expert survey can be a ‘sounding out’ of the public mood, and that while it 
‘does not fully or adequately reflect the state of mass consciousness, it allows 
[them] to speak about tendencies in social public opinion and the mood of the 
masses.’  In another article published several days later, Isaev, Ibraeva and 
Madaliev (1995) argue that while ‘experts' evaluations are subjective, in our 
view they are complete enough on they whole to reflect the public mood and 
public opinion, which is so changing and transient.’  Later still, Isaev, 
Shaidullaeva and Madaliev (1998) asserted that 
when experts realistically approach the problem of socio-
political changes in the republic, then you can claim their 
opinion expresses the opinion of the masses.  At the same time, 
as the results of the research show, the mosaic-like, multi-
coloured and contradictory nature of experts' answers to the 
same question suggests that their opinion reflects the diversity 
of opinions. 
In each case, the difference between ‘experts’ and ‘simple respondents’ is 
reduced to a quantitative question of whether generalisations about larger 
populations can be drawn from the responses of a smaller and more 
purposefully chosen segment—a choice made, it is argued, for financial 
reasons, but which is nevertheless acceptable within the bounds of acceptable 
sociological methods.  The legitimacy of ‘expert surveys’ and of the political 
interpretations which are made on the basis of them is therefore justified by a 
theory of relative representativeness.   
In other cases, however, ontological differences between the knowledge 
of ‘experts’ and ‘simple respondents’ are instead emphasised to explain why 
different surveys about similar questions produced different results (Isaev et 
al. 1993, 1994a; Isaev, Shaidullieva and Madaliev 1998).  In these cases, 
sociologists argue that experts and non-experts are two fundamentally 
different types of knowers.  Thus, because their responses cannot be expected 
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to be similar, inconsistencies in the results of studies conducted among 
‘experts’ and ‘the masses’ did not challenge the validity or reliability of the 
studies themselves.  This was explained at length in an article published on 
political ratings in April 1994 (Isaev et al. 1994a), worth quoting in full here 
because it offers a clear explanation of the logic behind these epistemological 
distinctions.  It also illustrates the ‘educative’ role that Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists sometimes assume when presenting their work in the public 
sphere. 
A survey of respondents and a survey of experts are two 
different methods of applied sociology.  (There are also a range 
of other methods, but that is a theme for a separate discussion.)  
All residents of Kyrgyzstan who are included in a selected total 
may be respondents, depending on their sex, age, region and 
place of residence, nationality, social means and other 
indicators, depending on the goals of the study.  The whole 
problem here is that the basic parameters of our artificially 
created model (or sample) correspond to the socio-demographic 
structure of the entire population living in Kyrgyzstan.  In this 
case, by correctly creating the sample, we can guarantee that 
the opinion of our respondents generally reflects the opinion of 
the whole population.  [While it may be a few points off], we 
can always calculate this by using a special mathematical 
formula.  When we conduct a survey of experts, however, then 
this is already not asking simple residents of the republic, but 
specialists and professionals who study an area of social life 
that we are interested in.  In this research, political scientists, 
sociologists, psychologists, journalists and activists of political 
parties are all experts.  For objectivity, we select expert 
personalities who do not work for power structures.  For 
example, in the President’s Apparatus, the Jogorku Kenesh, the 
government, and oblast akimiats [councils] there are plenty of 
professionals who have candidate and doctoral degrees, but for 
fully understandable reasons we do not invite them to be 
experts in our studies.  As far as an expert survey is a survey of 
professionals, its results have a greater degree of prognosis, 
because professionals, in contrast to simple respondents, are 
obliged to have a broader perspective.  Therefore, we think the 
results published today and the results of the expert survey we 
published earlier do not contradict one another. 
There are several interesting themes in this passage, such as the overt concern 
about the politicisation of knowledge and its effect on sociological method and 
the distinction made between the legitimate professionalism of ‘activists of 
political parties’ and the illegitimate work of ‘personalities who…work for 
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power structures,’ including academics holding positions in offices of state 
and regional administration.   
 The most interesting, however, is the boundary–work done to elaborate 
two different but equally valid types of ‘objectivity’ in sociological research—
one for studies that subjectify the ‘masses,’ and one for those which subjectify 
the ‘elites.’  Each draws its legitimacy from a different source.  The validity of 
mass surveys is contingent on statistical probability and representativeness, 
while the validity of an expert survey is determined not by the number of 
respondents, but by their ‘individual character, intellectual and professional 
level, and propriety and honesty’ (Isaev et al. 1997, 1997b) and the belief that 
professionals, ‘in contrast to simple respondents, are obliged to have a broader 
perspective’ on social and political affairs (Isaev et al. 1994a; see also Isaev et 
al. 1996a).  It is also significant that expert surveys are more frequently 
associated with good sociological practice in foreign (i.e., western) countries 
(Isaev, Shaidullieva and Madalieva 1998). 
 This distinction is not grounded in theories of objectivity (e.g., 
representation versus interpretation), but based on hierarchies of knowledge 
and ontological assumptions about different types of knowers.  As a result, 
different definitions of objectivity may be ascribed to different survey 
methods, which are then interpreted strategically in boundary–work.  There is 
little discussion of how the problem of representativeness may be addressed or 
challenged through the use of expert surveys, how political affiliation or 
qualities of ‘propriety and honesty’ may affect the answers of ‘simple 
respondents,’ or how researcher bias may also influence the definition and 
identification of ‘objective’ and ‘honest’ experts in the first place.  These 
debates are excellent examples of how the ‘selection of one or another 
description depends on which characteristics best achieve the demarcation [of 
sociology] in a way that justifies scientists’ claims to authority or resources,’ 
and good illustrations of the argument that science ‘is no single thing: its 
boundaries are drawn and redrawn in flexible, historically changing and 
sometimes ambiguous ways’ (Gieryn 1983: 781). 
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Mapping the fields: shifting boundaries between science and politics 
In addition to concerns about representativeness and validity, the BHU 
research group was heavily criticised for the way it constructed lists of 
political leaders.  Bakir Uluu (1994), for example, accused the group of 
substantial, even intentional researcher bias because it listed the left-leaning 
Republican Party first in its list of parties.  ‘People who are weakly political,’ 
he argued, ‘which is a special problem of southerners—[owing to] a famine of 
information and a difficult relationship with the rest of the republic—
automatically choose the first party on the list.’  Bakir Uluu also argued that 
good sociological practice privileged open-ended questions which enabled 
researchers to elicit spontaneous responses as opposed to providing 
respondents with closed-ended choices from pre-constructed lists, which, it 
was argued, inevitably bear the marks of their makers.   
 The debate over questionnaire design reached its apex when in 1994 the 
BHU group removed Akaev’s name from the list of politicians being rated 
(Bakir Uluu 1997; Bekturganov 1994a).  Though Isaev was accused of 
‘shuffling the data,’ he claimed it was an attempt to diffuse political debates 
which had emerged after previous ratings surveys suggested that the 
president’s popularity had declined (1996a).  More specifically, he argued it 
was a way to ‘consolidate society, avoid conflict with individuals and develop 
sociology in [the] republic as a science, academic subject and profession’ 
(Isaev et al. 1994b).  Pro-government critics, however, interpreted the decision 
as a politically motivated attempt to symbolically exclude Akaev from the 
political landscape (Bakir Uluu 1997) and criticised it for being a ‘distortion of 
the principles of correctness for the selection of experts, methods, techniques 
and procedures defining political ratings’ (Bekturganov 1994a).  Bakir Uluu’s 
(1994, 1997) accusations of researcher bias were rooted in deeper concerns 
about the effects of political, and in this case specifically party, bias.  They 
were a response to Isaev’s (1993b) claims that Bakir Uluu himself had 
conflated social scientific criticism with ‘party work.’  Both men are 
prominent academics who also hold positions of responsibility in political 
(opposition) parties in Kyrgyzstan; both, therefore, are forced to justify dual 
affiliations to science and politics.   
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 The integration of sociology and the Communist Party during the Soviet 
period has made the sociology–political party relationship particularly 
contentious in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  During perestroika, sociologists began 
to promote the need for scientific autonomy, albeit still within a context of 
political commitment and often from within the party (Adamalieva and Tuzov 
1991; Blum 1990; Isaev 1991a, 1993a).  They welcomed  and in fact often 
expected material and political support from the party, but also demanded the 
right to serve it as they saw fit, which was not necessarily by towing the party 
line.  In the post-independence period, however, the mere association of 
sociology with any particular political party has become one of the main 
criteria for labelling it illegitimate, politicised, unscientific and immoral.  
Bakir Uluu (1994) erected a clear boundary between scientific and political 
activity when he published an open letter to Isaev, saying,            
I did not write this article as a member of ERK, but as a social 
scientist.  For that reason I signed only my last name.  If I 
published something different, I would sign it ‘head 
representative of the ERK party political council.’  Obviously, 
when you conduct sociological research, you don’t write 
‘Kusein Isaev, member of the high council of the DDK party.’  
Therefore, let’s be ethical about this question: both you and I, 
aside from our party work, work in institutions of higher 
education.  We cannot separate one from the other.  It is a 
different matter if you…want to reintroduce principles of the 
party into science.96
Isaev, however, challenged this construction of the boundary between science 
and politics in a later article in which he drew a sharp line between political 
activities and sociological work while not denying his commitment to either.  
When confronted with questions from sceptical journalists about the possible 
conflation of truth and power as a result of his dual affiliation, he replied, 
[e]veryone has a right to their own opinion. […] I never use the 
word egemen [independence], but rather azattyk [freedom or 
liberty].  The ultimate treasure for an academic person, a 
scholar like me, is the independence and freedom of his country 
where scientific justice is upheld as a priority.  There are few 
who value this treasure.  Opposition and opponent are not to be 
confused, for they carry absolutely different meanings.  I 
consider myself a patriot–opponent (Isaev 1998). 
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Here, he justifies both sociological legitimacy and social relevance by 
distinguishing between his academic and political work while defining the 
former as a moral imperative of the latter. 
 In such debates over the science–politics boundary, there is little concern 
that social science will have an adverse effect on political work; in fact, quite 
the opposite, as it is believed to increase the transparency, effectiveness and 
justice of political action.  However, there is also no consideration that 
political affiliations, beliefs or practices can have any positive effect on 
sociological work.  Sociologists recognise two legitimate relationships 
between sociology and politics: either a complete separation of the two, or a 
unidirectional relationship in which sociology informs political action but 
political action has no effect on sociological work.  This is commensurate with 
two assumptions: first, that sociology can and should contribute to the 
development of scientific politics, and second, that one can maintain clear 
boundaries between ‘science’ and scientific knowledge and ‘politics’ and 
political knowledge in the process. 
 The location of the boundary between these two fields is, in other words, 
drawn along a normative axis of intent.  ‘Good’ sociological research may 
have political implications and still remain legitimate as long as it objectively 
reveals ‘the status quo’ of ‘social reality.’  However, ‘when the research 
programme itself serves to corroborate a priori ideals born of someone’s 
political ambitions,’ it crosses over into the realm of illegitimate knowledge 
(Blum 1991).  Phrased metaphorically, 
[r]esearch undertaken with the goal to show that a sick person 
does not have syphilis, but a common cold, is not only 
destructive for the patient, but dangerous for the environment 
as well (Blum 1991). 
The distinction between good and bad sociological research is also grounded 
in positivist theories of knowledge which ascribe a negative role to 
subjectivity in social science, and correspondence theories of truth that 
eliminate the agency of the subjective knower from the production of 
statements about social reality.  However, despite the fear of the effects of 
subjectivity (in this case interpreted as effects of power) on the validity of 
scientific truth and the belief that truly objective research is possible, some 
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sociologists allow that ‘any concrete sociological study, whether it is objective 
or not, has a certain level of subjectivism’ (Isaev et al. 1994a).  The legitimacy 
of sociological knowledge, therefore, depends on the extent to which the 
causes of this subjectivism can be eliminated in processes of research and 
interpretation.   
Two of the most common strategies for achieving this among 
Kyrgyzstani sociologists working in the post-independence period are the 
establishment of scientific and intellectual autonomy within the political field 
and the use of positivist, empiricist methods in sociological research.  In both 
cases, practices which aim to guarantee neutrality and objectivity are opposed 
to those which are founded on politicisation and intent.  This is illustrated in a 
sample of text written by Isaev et al. (1994a), which appears in many of their 
subsequent articles on political ratings (Isaev and Ibraeva 1996; Isaev, Ibraeva 
and Madaliev 1995; Isaev et al 1994b): 
Precisely for this reason we strive to conduct our research 
independently from the power structure and various political 
forces in the country.  For members of our independent 
sociological group, objectivity, scientific conscientiousness and 
the quest for truth, as well as the observation of widely 
accepted methods of conducting applied research, are 
obligatory concepts. 
However, as mentioned above, the definition of objectivity is still very 
context-dependent and shifts according to sociologists’ practical needs.  Since 
independence, the sociological community has become fragmented.  There is 
no central group or institution that represents a legitimate consensus on these 
issues; no agreed upon set of disciplinary guidelines.  This leads not only to 
contests for this dominant position, but also to a blurring of the boundaries 
between insider and outsider, and to confusion about what distinguishes 
professional sociology from ‘non-scientific’ or amateur knowledge 
production.  As Isaev asked in a 1993 article which refuted claims that his 
group had ‘politicised sociology,’ ‘falsified results,’ and ‘filled someone else’s 
orders,’  
[w]ho will judge?  The ethico-moral aspects of this drama, as 
well as the problem of professionalism in sociology, deserve a 
separate discussion.  We are ready for it.  Are our opponents 
who call themselves professional sociologists ready for it?  
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Here’s a question: to what extent can you consider yourself a 
professional person if you don’t have a basic education and if 
you only work on applied research from time to time? (Isaev et 
al. 1994b) 
These questions are fertile ground not only for boundary–work about 
methodology and the relationship between science and politics, but also for 
negotiations about the professional ethos of sociology in Kyrgyzstan.   
 
‘Clean hands and clean minds’: the professional ethos of sociology97
Because concerns about scientific autonomy and reliable method are tied to 
normative criteria of subjective intent, they are often recruited in efforts to 
define the professional ethos of sociology in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, or what 
distinguishes the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sociological practice.  
Subjective notions of honesty, integrity and professional and political morality 
therefore play a central role in the definition of objective practices in 
sociological work in Kyrgyzstan.   
This is not unusual in the sociology of science; methodological rules are 
moral as well as technical imperatives of scientific practice.  According to 
Merton (1996: 267), the ethos of science is ‘that affectively toned complex of 
values and norms which is held to be binding on the man [sic] of science.’  
These norms not only shape the definition of science within different cultural 
contexts, but also influence the ‘scientific conscience’ of practitioners.  As 
such, ‘the mores of science possess a methodological rationale but they are 
also binding, not only because they are procedurally efficient, but because 
they are believed right and good’ (Merton 1996: 268).   
The establishment of a professional ethos for sociologists in Kyrgyzstan 
has been a highly contentious process as different groups of practitioners 
struggle to institutionalise different definitions of ‘good’ sociological practice, 
and as new alliances between sociology, the state and international and 
commercial organisations come into conflict with existing norms regulating 
the relationship between academic and political work.  For example, new 
ethico-moral values such as disinterestedness and non-commerciality which 
have been embraced in theory are difficult to sustain practically in conditions 
where the discipline is judged on its level of political relevance and almost 
entirely dependent on external sources of funding.   
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As illustrated in Part 2, while Soviet sociologists adhered to or were 
bound by Marxist–Leninist norms of professional practice, strains between 
their scholarly responsibility to scientific truth and their voluntary or requisite 
subordination to the Communist Party created ambiguities in the professional 
ethos of sociology.  By the 1990s, two dominant definitions of ‘good’ Soviet 
sociological practice had emerged, both of which were distinguished from 
mainstream western ideologies of ‘modern science,’ particularly in their 
rejection of disinterested objectivity and their encouragement of political 
commitment in scientific work (see Merton [1996: 274-76] on 
‘disinterestedness’ in modern science and Inkeles [1958: 138] on Marxist–
Leninist criticisms of ‘objectivity’ in intellectual activity).   
The first, established by academics who supported the party’s hegemony 
in the social sciences, emphasised the political use value of sociological work.  
Officially, good sociology in Soviet Kirgizia was that which contributed to 
extending the power of the party within society and eliminating divisive 
criticism; it met the administrative and ideological needs of the ruling regime.  
The second definition of ‘good’ sociology, elaborated less systematically and 
more discretely by both party and non-party academics who were critical of 
the party’s ideological control over intellectual activity, was also based on the 
political use value of sociological work in that ‘good’ social research was that 
which could be employed in the pursuit of socialist social reform.  The 
difference was that the latter definition privileged scientific truth claims over 
political truth claims.  In this version of the professional ethos, ‘good’ 
sociology should form the basis for political decision making and not vice 
versa; ‘good’ political power was that which was subordinated to scientific 
authority.   
These two definitions of ‘good’ sociology continue to inform the 
emerging professional ethos of Kyrgyzstani sociologists in the post-Soviet 
period.  This ethos, elaborated in media texts, can be deconstructed into five 
elements.  Each of these appears throughout the articles on political ratings, 
and each reveals how the professional ethos of sociology is being negotiated in 
response to changes in the epistemological foundations and cultural 
organisation of sociology, from Marxist–Leninist theories of science and 
society to non-Marxist, positivist conceptions.   
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First, legitimate sociological work must be motivated by purely 
‘scientific’ intentions which are not ‘corrupted’ in any way by personal or 
political aspirations to power.  This norm is expressed, for example, in Bakir 
Uluu’s (1994, see also 1997) arguments that his research is more legitimate 
than Isaev’s because his goal was ‘the search for truth and not power’—a 
claim imbued with normative force by the symbolic association of his research 
with the ‘European school of education’ and Isaev’s with Kyrgyz patriarchal 
traditions.  This marks a clear departure from the Soviet conception of 
politically committed research in the form of partinnost' [party-ness] and a 
shift toward the notion of ‘disinterestedness’ which grounds positivist 
ideologies of modern science in the west.98   
This is connected to the second element of the emerging ethos, which is 
that sociological work should be non-commercial and not–for–profit, but 
rather produced to assist decision makers, inform the public and advance 
knowledge in general.  Both Bakir Uluu and Isaev invoke this norm to 
challenge the authority of each other’s research.  While Isaev protested against 
the employment of sociological research as ‘political prostitution’ (Isaev et al. 
1997a), Bakir Uluu accused him of taking the 
unfaithful path of the ‘marketisation’ of science.  In 
sociological science we have accepted the following laws: a 
sociologist carrying out a survey does not have the right to 
divulge the collected information or give out completed 
questionnaires to individuals who are not connected with the 
research [but] who would pay for it (Bakir Uluu 1994). 
Again, this reflects a move away from the Marxist–Leninist conception of 
applied social science as a technical service to the power elite, and toward 
ideals of autonomy and informational ‘communism’ which characterise 
ideologies of science in capitalist societies (for more on communism in 
science see Merton 1996: 271-74).   
Third, sociological work must be conducted in the most ‘objective’ way 
possible, with every possible influence of subjective interpretation being 
accounted for at every stage of research.  This runs contrary to previous 
norms, which held that objectivity was a ‘bourgeois’ tactic that prevented the 
identification and exposure of social inequalities.  Fourth, sociologists must 
adhere to scientific laws and obey the scientific method; the superiority of 
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these approaches to ‘speculative philosophy’ is believed to have been 
demonstrated by advances in western social science.   
Finally, sociologists must occupy a moral high ground by being 
personally and publicly honest about the limitations of their knowledge and 
motivations for their research, and by not allowing themselves to be 
influenced by extra-scientific forces.  Engaging in political debate, even about 
sociology itself, is frowned upon and portrayed as ‘uncharacteristic’ of social 
scientists; however, it is justified if such debates are deemed necessary for 
defending the moral superiority of social scientific work over political truth 
claims (Isaev et al. 1994b).  Sociologists who do engage in debates with one 
another over the legitimacy of particular studies, methods or practices 
therefore often preface their political arguments by reaffirming their 
commitment to the principles of intellectual autonomy and professional 
morality.  
This nascent ethos has assumed particular significance in the context of 
the project to institutionalise the discipline within the republic during the post-
Soviet period.  As Isaev et al. argued in one response to Bakir Uluu, ‘it is 
doubly important if we consider that sociology in our republic is going 
through a growing phase.  For members of our sociological 
group…researching socio-political and other processes in Kyrgyzstan, honesty 
and objectivity, as well as scientific laws, are sacred values’ (1993b; see also 
Isaev et al. 1994a for similar oaths of loyalty to values of ‘objectivity, 
scientific conscientiousness, and the quest for truth, as well as the observation 
of widely accepted methods of applied research’).   
Personal integrity is also highly valued in this environment, where 
absolute objectivity has become a primary criterion of scientific legitimacy 
despite acknowledgements that it may not actually be a practical possibility 
(Isaev, Ibraeva and Madaliev 1995).  This is reflected in attempts to use 
subjective personal characteristics and individual morality as a means to 
reconcile intellectual and methodological tensions or biases in studies of 
political ratings: 
We are far from asserting the possibility of an absolutely 
objective, sterile, de-ideologicised consciousness of the 
sociological interpreter.  But it is also true that the principles of 
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our work are honesty, independence and scientific, objective 
strictness in work with facts.  The Independent Group of 
Sociologists does not gravitate towards either a single political 
party or movement or towards a single leader, and does not 
have biases in relation to who would or would not be [in 
power] (Isaev, Ibraeva and Madalieva 1995). 
The development of a professional ethos for the discipline is not only 
important for locating and patrolling the boundaries of acceptable sociological 
practice among sociologists, but also plays a major role in establishing 
scientific authority within the public sphere.  Notions of honesty, integrity, 
morality and rational action are familiar, as they are also prevalent in more 
general discussions about post-Soviet social ethics in Kyrgyzstan.  They 
resonate with a public that feels it lives in a ‘period of global transformation of 
consciousness and a deep break of norms and behavioural stereotypes’ 
(Bekturganov 1995) and sociologists find it natural as they encounter a 
‘normal process of depoliticisation and de-ideologicisation of the population 
who are awaiting intelligent decisions from politicians’ (Isaev and Ibraeva 
1995).  Sociologists who do not conform to these norms or who are judged by 
others to be in violation of them are often labelled ‘pseudo-sociologists’ or 
‘dilettantes’ (Baibosunov 1993) by their peers and excluded from the 
academic community (Isaev et al. 1993b, 1997a).  However, the inherent 
ambiguity of the broadly agreed upon terms of reference means that such 
labels may be assigned arbitrarily and, in many cases, for deeply political 
reasons.   
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the ideal professional ethos of 
disinterestedness (or purity of intent), non-profitability (or communism in 
science), objectivity, scientificity and moral integrity, which is elaborated in 
the articles on political ratings is often subverted by the existential realities of 
academic life in Kyrgyzstan and by the hierarchical, competitive organisation 
of sociology in the republic.  It is also complicated by the dual-pronged project 
to establish scientific legitimacy and social relevance.  Appeals for 
methodological and moral disinterestedness in the pursuit of sociological truth 
exist in tension with demands for sociologists to produce politically relevant 
research.  The commercialisation of sociological research has made 
researchers vulnerable to both intellectual and moral criticism, as they are 
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almost entirely dependent on contract work and commissions.  In the absence 
of centralised academic standards and in an atmosphere where corruption is 
rampant even in the highest echelons of the academy, sociologists are forced 
to regulate the boundaries of the profession independently.  Fierce competition 
between them, however, often makes the maintenance of professional norms a 
personal and political struggle.  The ideal of free flowing information within 
the scientific community is unattainable within this competitive environment 
in which knowledge and expertise have become commodities and potential 
sources of social capital and professional power.  While adherence to the 
procedures of scientific method is marginally easier to evaluate, disagreements 
about what constitutes an ‘acceptable approach’ make this a contentious area 
as well.   
In other words, although Kyrgyzstani sociologists are constructing a 
professional ethos of science which ostensibly transcends structural constraints 
and mediates contradictions in their relationships with one another and with 
other social institutions, it has not yet become institutionalised as a 
professional code of practice.  Instead, it remains most effective as a rhetorical 
device with which the definitions of professional norms can be further 
elaborated, debated and contested.  The tensions in the ethos of Kyrgyzstani 
sociology are central to understanding why, nearly five decades after its initial 
emergence in the republic, sociology in any form has not been institutionalised 
as an academic discipline or professional practice.  Many setbacks—the 
censorship and reorganisation of the KSU laboratory, the repression of 
research on ethnic relations, the lack of support for sociological work, the 
inability to establish indigenous sociological institutions, the lack of material 
and symbolic resources, and the breakdown of productive relationships within 
the academic community—are undeniably results of structural constraints such 
as authoritarian government, centre–periphery inequalities, intellectual and 
financial poverty, and academic dependency.  Theories about the state of the 
discipline which focus on these factors, such as those introduced in Chapter 1, 
are therefore not misguided.  However, they are incomplete.  These and other 
problems are also created by non-material factors, particularly the ways in 
which the nature and role of sociology, as well as the meaning of its reform or 
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‘transition,’ have been conceptualised and articulated by Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists themselves.   
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10 
CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The project to transform sociology from a discipline that compromises ‘truth 
in strength’ to one that can assume ‘strength in truth’ epitomises the zeitgeist 
in late socialist and post-Soviet sociology on the Central Asian periphery.  The 
many different projects to reform and institutionalise the discipline from the 
mid-1980s to the present day (as discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8) have in 
common an underlying desire to divorce the production of truth about social 
life from the exercise of political power; to wrest the power of truth from the 
hands of those perceived to employ it to maintain illegitimate types of power.  
As stated in the beginning of this dissertation, Kyrgyzstani sociologists have 
therefore tried to reform sociology from a heteronomous field of knowledge 
and practice into an autonomous one.  Those exercising power by betraying 
the public through manipulated truths are accused of betraying both the people 
and truth itself; neither justice nor truth can exist under such circumstances.    
 The proposed solution to this problem has been the creation of conditions 
in which people—political leaders, citizens and social scientists—can seek 
social truths outside the logic of power.  Acquiring ‘strength in truth’ can only 
be achieved, it is argued, as long as the quest for social reality is pursued in 
isolation from personal and political interests, particularly through empirical 
studies conducted according to the scientific method.  Truth claims 
constructed in this way are believed to be objective, politically neutral and 
value-free, and therefore useable guides for social and political action.  They 
are believed, in other words, to form the foundation for a rational scientific 
politics which can stem domination by illegitimate power by asserting the 
strength of legitimate truth.  The autonomisation of sociology and its 
transformation from a Marxist–Leninist technology into a positivist and 
empiricist science is therefore presented as the only way for rescuing truth 
from the abuses of power; for making the transition from a society that finds 
‘strength in truth’ rather than being subjected to politically motivated and 
ideologically managed images of reality.   
 This entire movement can be interpreted, and often has been interpreted, 
in two different ways.  The first, which takes into account both Soviet and 
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post-Soviet sociology and which is most prevalent among Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists themselves, is as a movement towards democracy and ‘civilised’ 
or ‘world’ science.  In this explanation, the development and 
institutionalisation of a scientific type of sociology that functions to preserve 
truth and justice in the face of an illegitimate power that corrupts both is 
squarely in line with what was once the dominant history of sociology 
internationally.  It is reinforced not only by the hegemony of post and anti-
Soviet rhetoric, but also by the particularly limited narrative of the history of 
sociology which is available in the republic, i.e., the ‘Whig history’ of 
sociology reproduced in many Russian-language texts on zapadnaia 
sotsiologiia and in outdated English-language textbooks donated by foreign 
academics and organisations.   
 The second interpretation, which refers only to post-Soviet sociology and 
is dominant among many foreign sociologists and observers, is that the 
attempt to institutionalise scientific sociology in Kyrgyzstan represents a new 
type of naïve positivism, brought about by years of intellectual repression 
under Soviet rule and cultural tendencies towards reductionism and 
authoritarianism.  Ironically, this interpretation is also supported by a narrow 
and ethnocentric understanding of the history of sociology, as well as by 
assumptions of the superiority of ‘western’ knowledge and knowers and a 
general lack of information about Kyrgyzstani sociology. 
 Both of these interpretations, however, are riddled with essentialisms of 
scientific knowledge (particularly its synonymisation with truth) and 
Kyrgyzstani society, particularly academe.  They are also bolstered by tacit 
and often essentialist assumptions about the complex relationship between 
social science and society.  By revealing that definitions of sociology are 
contingent and that ‘belief in the value of scientific truth is not derived from 
nature but is a product of definite cultures’ (Weber quoted in Merton 1996 
[1938]), this dissertation has challenged these assumptions.  It demonstrates 
that the development of different conceptualisations of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan—specifically, the positivist, applied–professional model and the 
post-positivist liberal–critical model—was neither a natural nor inevitable 
consequence of the Soviet collapse.  It was instead a conscious decision made 
by sociologists, albeit one made by within particular intellectual and structural 
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constraints and through the lens of particularly partial bodies of theoretical and 
historical knowledge.  In particular, the ascendance of positivist and empiricist 
sociology in the post-Soviet period may be understood as a deliberate, if 
extremely uncritical, attempt to reorganise the relationship between power and 
knowledge in Kyrgyzstani society and indeed to democratise the latter. 
 This project to establish scientific legitimacy for the discipline and to 
resuscitate faith in the value of scientific knowledge, however, has been 
complicated by its intersection with another project: the establishment of its 
social relevance.  In post-Soviet Central Asia, Marxist–Leninist philosophies 
of science have converged with both critical and neo-liberal philosophies of 
science which assert that social science must be useful and socially ‘relevant.’  
While the demonstration of relevance has historically been central in attempts 
to institutionalise the discipline, the definition of relevance has rarely been 
questioned; Kyrgyzstani sociologists do not ask, relevance for whom and for 
what?   Instead, they have formulated arguments about the social relevance of 
sociology by reproducing broader hegemonic beliefs about what constitutes 
the ‘good society’ and the role of social order and change in creating it.   
 In the 1970s and 1980s, good sociological practice was Marxist; linked to 
the more effective realisation of Soviet socialist ideals of justice and equality, 
as well as to modernisation and industrialisation as articulated in Communist 
Party ideology.  During perestroika, Marxist sociology continued to serve 
these general goals but was reconstructed as a critical counterweight to the 
Communist Party ideology which sociologists argued had ‘distorted’ the 
original socialist agenda.  It also gained a new role as part of efforts to 
increase the autonomy of peripheral republics within the Soviet empire, thus 
becoming integrated into the movement to develop a non-Russian national 
identity.   
 After independence, both the nature and the role of sociological 
knowledge were drastically revised.  Adherence to Marxist–Leninist theories 
and principles no longer constituted good sociological practice; in fact, it 
became the criterion for what became classified as ‘pseudo-sociology.’  
Embracing what Marxism–Leninism had rejected—positivism, empiricism, 
faith in scientific objectivity—became central in the project construct a new 
post-Soviet sociology.  Its institutionalisation became a symbolic measure of 
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the rationalisation of political power.  The development of an alternative 
liberal–critical model of sociology which rejects both the Marxist and 
positivist legacies is also part of this project; however, it links the new 
sociology to the radicalisation, not rationalisation, of power.   
 In other words, after separating the production of sociological knowledge 
from the logic of political power in order to establish scientific legitimacy, 
sociologists have needed to associate its application with the logic of power to 
promote the discipline’s social relevance.  Kyrgyzstani sociologists have 
devised a number of strategies to reconcile these two divergent projects, in 
particular, by using boundary–work in both academic and public settings.  
They have reconstructed sociology in the post-Soviet period through three 
main types of boundary–work: the erection of rigid borders between social 
scientific knowledge and power at the level of knowledge production, the 
blurring or crossing of boundaries between scientific knowledge and power at 
the level of knowledge application, and the articulation of ideals of either 
scientific politics (in the professional–applied model) or critical sociology (in 
the liberal–critical model) which naturalise the combination of logics in the 
two activities.  Figure 2 displays this in schematic form. 
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 However, the two-pronged nature of the project—to affiliate power with 
knowledge (in the construction of communist society during the Soviet regime 
and in the realisation of democratic reforms after independence) and to 
separate social scientific knowledge from illegitimate power—has made it 
difficult to untangle the mutually constitutive relations between sociology and 
power at all stages of the discipline’s historical development.  These 
naturalised categories and relationships, which have been created by 
sociologists through deliberate boundary–work for the purposes of ordering, 
institutionalising and promoting the discipline, have been largely taken for 
granted by sociologists themselves.  They have become integrated into the 
sociological imagination; they are now background assumptions, part of the 
prevailing intellectual doxa.  Sociologists, prevented from considering the 
effects of power in their own knowledge production by their maintenance of 
the boundary between science and politics, have therefore been unable to 
interrogate the co-constitutive relationship between power and sociological 
knowledge.   
 And yet, while the discourse of knowledge production is anti-political, 
the practice of knowledge production is highly politicised.  On a macro scale, 
we can see that the very subject of sociology—the concepts, topics and skills 
that are included as part of the discipline—have emerged, and continue to 
emerge, almost entirely within the logic of power.  The research problems that 
dominate Kyrgyzstani sociology today are no less over-determined by forces 
external to the discipline than those which prevailed during the Soviet period.  
They are formulated in response to public opinion about social problems, 
dictated by the administrative and ideological needs of the state, and 
purchased and consumed by foreign zakazchiki.  There is, furthermore, little if 
any theorising about these research problems which are operationalised as 
empirical questions; they are framed in non-sociological and often anti-
theoretical terms.  While the drive for autonomisation appears to be thriving in 
the scientisation of sociological method, a study of the intellectual content of 
the discipline reveals that the field remains almost entirely heteronomous. 
 This heteronomy is rooted in the conjunction of the quest for relevance, 
the legacies of intellectual colonialism and the current realities of academic 
dependence.  Sociology emerged in Soviet Kirgizia on the coat-tails of an 
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imperialist agenda.  Its content, method and raison d’être developed, albeit in 
various ways, in accordance with the needs of the state and Communist Party.  
This integration of the sociological and the political was institutionalised not 
only by consent and coercion, but also through Soviet practices of intellectual 
colonialism in Central Asia, particularly tutelage, conformity, and the 
rationalisation of the civilising mission.  Perestroika presented the most 
promising opportunity for challenging the centralised organisation of Soviet 
social science and breaking the chains of intellectual colonialism in Kirgizia.  
This is reflected in the emergence of critical and creative approaches to 
Marxist sociology, as well as in the more independent formulation of problems 
for sociological research.   
 Independence, however, imposed a new type of dependence on 
Kyrgyzstani sociologists, effectively cutting short this period of creative 
intellectual development.  Without indigenous sociological institutions, 
funding for sociological teaching and research, theoretical alternatives to 
Marxism–Leninism, or an established sociological community, sociologists 
turned toward the new scientific centre, ‘the west.’  While the nature and role 
of social science is no longer controlled by an imperial state, it has become 
heavily determined by foreign governments and aid agencies.  The abrupt end 
of intellectual colonialism—including its financial subsidies—engendered a 
new type of academic dependency, characterised by sociologists’ dependence 
on foreign ideas, media, educational technology, financial aid for teaching and 
research, investment in education, and brain drain (the last feature including 
the outflow of sociologists from universities to foreign agencies and clients 
within Kyrgyzstan).  While the scientisation of sociological method and the 
erection of boundaries between science and politics may superficially create 
the illusion of an autonomous discipline, the inherently political nature of 
intellectual content in the discipline and the refusal to seriously interrogate it 
ensures that sociological knowledge remains dominated by political logic.    
 The effects of power in the production of sociological knowledge are also 
evident at a micro level.  The way in which localised departmental conditions 
shape the construction of different paradigms of sociology as a scientific 
discipline, academic subject and profession reveal that far from being 
‘scientific,’ decisions about what may be classified as legitimately sociological 
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are often made on non-scientific grounds, such as political position taking, 
professional posturing, and the need to attract material and symbolic resources 
for teaching and research.  Within departments, social and political hierarchies 
of age, gender, ethnicity and nationality promote intellectual and professional 
competition, contradicting claims made by these very departments that 
sociological knowledge can only be developed in an atmosphere of free 
exchange and collaboration.  Finally, as in all social science, sociological 
knowledge in Kyrgyzstan is produced by actors who bring to it, at every stage, 
their own world views, background assumptions, biases and agendas. 
 This dissertation therefore argues that there is an inherent contradiction 
between new discourses of sociology as science and new practices of 
knowledge production which are currently being institutionalised in 
Kyrgyzstan.  The most pressing problem is not, as Kyrgyzstani sociologists 
define it, the deliberate repoliticisation of sociology as during the Soviet 
period, nor is it, as in the views of foreign observers, the resurgence of 
positivist social science.  The main problematic in the institutionalisation of 
sociology in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, at the level of knowledge production, is 
that the goal of creating an autonomous academic discipline which may 
develop in greater freedom from the dictates and logic of political power is 
defeated by the predominance of epistemological assumptions and 
methodological practices which are themselves politicised and which prevent 
the analysis of the actual relationship between sociology and politics, or 
knowledge and power. 
 The goal of institutionalising a type of sociology that is socially and 
politically relevant is, on the surface, more attainable, particularly if 
sociologists continue to develop it as a source of either policy research or 
social criticism.  However, this goal is also thwarted by self-defeating 
assumptions and practices, in particular, the belief in a unidirectional 
relationship between sociology and politics.  A politically engaged sociology 
that refuses to theorise and articulate its own political position or that does not 
take as one of its primary problematics the nature of political power itself runs 
the constant risk of being assimilated into the logic of the political field.  
Empiricism and the scientific method are not only not remedies for this 
dilemma; in many cases, they may actually exacerbate it.  As C. Wright Mills 
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notes, ‘it is possible for social research to be of administrative use without 
being concerned with the problems of social science’ (1959: 53).   Kyrgyzstani 
sociologists have, in other words, attempted to pursue through scientific 
rationalisation a grand vision that can only be realised through the application 
of critical reason. 
 Both types of boundary–work in Kyrgyzstani sociology—that done to 
autonomise sociological knowledge from the heteronomy of political power 
and that done to make sociology a socially and politically relevant 
discipline—have a potentially critical edge.  In the right combination, they 
open possibilities for sociology to become a truly radical intellectual 
endeavour and practical profession in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  However, this 
can only be achieved if sociologists critically consider the philosophies of 
scientific knowledge upon which they are based, and if inequalities in the 
structural conditions and organisation of sociology in the republic are 
redressed.  It is on these two projects that the future of sociology in 
Kyrgyzstan depends.    
 
Sociology, knowledge and power: beyond the Kyrgyz case 
The story told in this dissertation—one of the quest for truth about social 
reality in authoritarian regimes, transitional societies and newly independent 
nations in the midst of social revolution and fragmentation—is unique to 
Kyrgyzstan only in ethnographic detail.  The theoretical and human themes 
that emerge from it speak to broader questions about the nature, role and fate 
of social science in these types of societies, as well as to the political economy 
of truth in ‘western’ sociology.  In particular, it forces us to reflect again upon 
the ways in which our own hegemonic conceptions of truth and ‘good’ social 
research have been formulated, negotiated and contested; what social 
conditions have been necessary for these formulations to emerge, and under 
what conditions we too might seek out other alternatives.  It returns us, in 
other words, to the issue of power/knowledge in sociology itself.  
 Reductionist interpretations of recent developments in post-Soviet social 
science seem to suggest that many sociologists have forgotten the lessons of 
the sociology of knowledge, particularly the work of Foucault, that urge us to 
explore the social context of knowledge production before evaluating it 
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through a normative lens, or even interpreting it from our own taken–for–
granted epistemological perspective.  Instead of asking what the rise of 
positivist and empiricist sociology says about the state of the Kyrgyzstani 
academy, we may also productively ask what the act of problematising this 
intellectual project says about our own understanding of the relationship 
between positivism, empirical research, truth and power.  Is the quest for 
autonomous truth about society still a valid goal for social scientists to pursue?  
Can it be achieved without disregarding recent contributions of critical 
sociology regarding the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and 
objectivity in social scientific research, and the all-pervasive reach of power in 
society?  Can theoretical insights about the politics of knowledge from 
Mannheim, Foucault and Bourdieu be introduced into positivist 
epistemological frameworks to stimulate the development of a politically 
engaged, scientifically autonomous discipline?  In doing so, could sociological 
practice in societies such as Kyrgyzstan disrupt the prevailing 
power/knowledge doxa that often divides positivist and critical sociologists?  
Given the widespread acceptance of Foucault’s thesis (1967, 1973, 1978, 
1989, 2001) that social scientific truth is in fact an effect of power—a thesis 
which has, of course, been employed in this work—is there still place in 
sociology for strength in truth?  
 The point of raising such questions is not to promote positivism, but to 
draw attention to three ways in which this dissertation speaks to broader 
themes at the intersection of power, knowledge and sociology.  First, the 
critical study of social science in colonial and postcolonial societies must not, 
as is sometimes argued, be superseded by the study of a postmodern ‘global’ 
or international sociology.  While categories of centre and periphery, 
intellectual colonisation, academic dependency and boundary–work are 
obviously not the only ones that may be used to analyse Soviet and post-
Soviet social science, they are nevertheless productive in the effort to 
understand the relationship between certain types of socio-political order and 
the construction of social scientific knowledge.  This dissertation suggests that 
further research in this direction will be fruitful and enlightening. 
 The second point is that focused, ethnographic case studies in the 
sociology of knowledge on the periphery of empire, and on the edge of the 
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scientific world system, are important for our understanding of the politics of 
social scientific knowledge in a wider cross-national context.  In order to 
reduce inequalities within the scientific world system, or to eradicate the 
unequal system itself, we need what Smart calls an ‘interpretive’ rather than a 
‘legislative’ international sociology, ‘one which attempts to offer a translation 
service between different cultures and communities’ (1994: 158).  In-depth 
case studies of the development of non-western sociology such as this, as well 
as comparative studies that may follow from it are one way of advancing this 
project.     
 Finally, this dissertation illustrates how the foundational questions of 
sociology, particularly its political and scientific status and the effect of these 
on its legitimacy and relevance, are still crucially important in the formation of 
discipline in the field; they remain questions and potentialities, and yet lie at 
the heart of truth claims throughout social science.  Reflexively, it suggests 
that our own negotiations of the boundary between science and politics, truth 
and power in sociological work at any particular moment should be seen as 
just that.  The exploration of boundary–work and contingency in this process 
in Kyrgyzstani sociology offers a theoretical model for interrogating the 
political economy of truth not only in post-Soviet society, but in other socio-
historical contexts, including our own.     
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APPENDIX A 
THE SOCIOLOGISTS 
 
Ablezova, Mehrigiul  
Ablezova holds an undergraduate degree in Business Administration from 
AUCA and a master’s degree in sociology from Indiana University.  Her first 
encounter with sociology was in 2001, when Sagynbaeva (see below), director 
of the SIAR Bishkek social marketing research company, hired her as an 
interviewer.  She joined the AUCA Sociology Department in 2002 and, in 
addition to her teaching responsibilities, has since been appointed director of 
the department’s Center for Applied Social Research.  Her team has conducted 
commissioned studies on child poverty (Children in Poverty), HIV in 
Kyrgyzstan (UNICEF), media and language (Cimera).  Her intellectual 
interests currently centre on a range of issues, including environmental 
attitudes and methods of quantitative research. 
 
Achylova, Rakhat 
Between earning a candidate of philosophy degree from Leningrad State 
University in 1966 and a doctorate in philosophy in 1988, Achylova was a 
member of the sociological laboratory at the Kirgiz State University.  She 
assumed directorship of this centre after Tabaldiev’s death in 1975 (see 
below).  In the 1990s, she organised a team of researchers to conduct a variety 
of studies about marriage and family life in Kyrgyzstan.  She served as rector 
of the Kyrgyz Women’s Pedagogical Institute. 
 
Aldasheva, Anara 
Aldasheva earned a candidate of sociology degree from BHU currently serves 
as Dean of the Faculty of Socio-Political Sciences.  She has published fifteen 
papers on sociological themes.   
 
Asanbekov, Mukanmedi  
Asanbekov, currently the pro-rector for science at the Bishkek Humanitarian 
University, earned his Bachelors degree in history.  Soon after he completed 
his undergraduate studies, he was invited to join the team of researchers at the 
 287
 
 
sociological laboratory within the Department of Scientific Communism in the 
Frunze Polytechnic Institute, led by Isaev (see below).  He trained in sociology 
during his three-year tenure here, eventually enrolling as an aspirant at the 
USSR Academy of Science (now the Russian Academy of Science) in 
Moscow, where he wrote a candidate dissertation on the life-ways of the rural 
population of Kyrgyzstan.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, his research 
interests shifted toward the theoretical and empirical study of social change, a 
topic about which he currently writes in his spare time. 
 
Asanova, Umut  
Asanova originally studied English language at the Kirgiz State University and 
taught English at the INFAK, or Foreign Language Faculty.  Later, from 
1974–78, she was an active member of the sociological laboratory within the 
Department of Historical Materialism under Tabaldiev (see below).  She 
participated in some of the first large-scale social research projects in 
Kyrgyzstan, including studies of industrial management in the hydroelectric 
sector (see Chapter 4).  In 1981 she completed a candidate dissertation on the 
sociology of mixed-race marriages, which included the translation of a number 
of key English-language texts on the subject.  While it was accepted in 
Moscow, she was forbidden to publish it in Kirgizia on the count that it was 
‘bourgeois sociology’ and subsequently did not receive her candidate degree 
until 1984, when she was permitted to defend it in Kazakhstan.  She is 
currently employed as a professor in the Anthropology (formerly Ethnology) 
Department at AUCA. 
 
Bekturganov, Kuban  
Bekturganov was one of the original members of the first sociological 
laboratory at KSU and from 1985–87 served as director of the Centre for the 
Study of Public Opinion under the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party, the laboratory of which was housed in the Institute of Philosophy and 
Law at the Kirgiz Academy of Science.  Later, he became the first person in 
Kyrgyzstan to defend a candidate dissertation in applied sociology.  He 
currently works as an instructor in the Sociology Department at the Kyrgyz 
National University in Bishkek.   
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Botoeva, Gulzat  
Botoeva, who originally intended to study law, enrolled in what was then the 
only sociology programme in the republic, at the Bishkek Humanitarian 
University, in 1993, where she later earned a Masters degree in sociology.  
She was educated in sociology at the graduate level for six months at Indiana 
University and is currently an instructor of sociology at AUCA.  While her 
graduate dissertation concerned issues of migration in Kyrgyzstan, her 
intellectual interest lies primarily in the study of deviant behaviour and in 
conflict theory.  She is a prominent member of the research team at the 
university’s Centre for Applied Social Research and is actively involved in 
continuing studies on child poverty in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Elebaeva, Ainoura  
In 1988, Elebaeva was appointed head of the Division of National Relations in 
the Institute of Philosophy and Law in the Kirgiz Academy of Science (later 
named the Centre for Sociological Research and directed by Omuraliev, see 
below).  From 1991–93 she carried out a number of studies for local and 
national government bodies on interethnic relations in the republic, and is 
recognised as one of the foremost experts in the field.  She currently organises 
a group of social researchers who study ethnic conflict and tension in the 
independence period.  With Omuraliev, she co-authored a major study on the 
Osh conflict (Elebaeva et al. 1991) and has published a number of other 
articles on ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan (Elebaeva and Omuraliev 1993, 
1995). 
 
Ibraeva, Gulnara  
Ibraeva, who was appointed Chair of Sociology at AUCA in 2002, holds an 
undergraduate degree in journalism and a candidate degree in sociology.  She 
began her teaching career at BHU as an instructor of media studies in 1994.  
Her intellectual interests include media, gender, and social theory.  In addition 
to publishing three books on the sociology of media (Ibraeva 1997, 2000, 
2003), she has co-published another on gender (Ibraeva et al. 1999) eight 
articles and at least ten conference papers on sociology.     
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Isaev, Kusein  
Isaev is referred to by some as the ‘father of Kyrgyz sociology,’ which refers 
to his prominent role in popularising the field during perestroika and after 
independence.  He earned a candidate degree in philosophy from the USSR 
Academy of Science in 1967 and later a doctorate from the Department of 
Scientific Communism at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute for his work on 
social development in rural villages during the 1960s.  He taught political 
economy in the Kirgiz State University and, at the behest of the Communist 
Party, established a Department of Scientific Communism in the Frunze 
Polytechnic Institute in 1969.  In 1983, he organised and assumed directorship 
of a laboratory for sociological research within this department, in which he 
trained a number of the sociologists referenced in this dissertation.  The 
laboratory was transferred to BHU in 1993 when Isaev was asked to take up a 
professorship there.  Since this time, he has written prolifically on sociology, 
publishing two textbooks (1993b, 2003a) and dozens of articles in the 
republican newspapers (see bibliography).  He continues to teach at BHU and 
has also lectured in sociology at AUCA and the Turkish–Manas University. 
 
Mendibaev, Nuratbek 
Mendibaev was originally educated as an historian in Frunze (now Bishkek) in 
the 1960s.  He became attracted to sociology after attending a Soros-sponsored 
conference on sociology in 1995, at which Isaev (see above).  After this time 
he began educating himself about new developments in sociology and 
publishing a variety of articles related to sociology and sociological research 
in the local press in the southern city of Osh, where he presently resides.  He is 
currently employed as a professor in the Department of Philosophy and 
Sociology at the Osh Technical University. 
 
Nurova, Saida  
Nurova, the first woman in Kyrgyzstan to be awarded a doctoral degree in 
sociology, was first educated as a school teacher.  In 1966, after completing a 
Masters degree in philosophy (which she defines as sociological) in 1965, she 
joined the newly established sociological laboratory at the Kirgiz State 
University.  For several years she organised research on ‘ethno-sociology,’ 
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related to the laboratory’s broader focus on interethnic relations in Kirgizia 
and in connection with her own graduate research.  As degrees in sociology 
were not conferred at the time, she defended a candidate dissertation in 
historical materialism.  Before pursuing her doctoral degree she taught in 
universities in Osh and Karakol and in the 1980s began attending courses in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan to retrain in sociological research.  After several more 
years of teaching in Karakol, she joined the Faculty of Socio-Political 
Sciences at BHU in 1998.  Her main research interests are the sociology of 
culture, sociology of administration, political sociology and social theory. 
 
Omuraliev, Nurbek  
Omuraliev holds a first degree in philosophy (1983) and received a candidate 
of philosophical sciences degree from the Kazakh State University in 1991.  In 
1994, he was appointed director of the Centre for Social Research under the 
National Academy of Science of the Kyrgyz Republic, where he is still 
employed.  This centre, the successor to the former Division of National 
Relations (see Elebaeva, above) conducts research for both public and private 
organisations, including the president’s administration.  He is also senior 
lecturer in the Sociology Department at KNU and serves on the administrative 
board which oversees doctoral and candidate degrees in philosophy, sociology 
and political science.  His research interests include interethnic relations and 
social research, and he has conducted studies in a variety of other areas 
including poverty, political culture, public health (including AIDS) and the 
environment.  He has published more than forty papers and participated in a 
number of local, regional and international conferences.  
 
Sagynbaeva, Ainoura  
Sagynbaeva, founder of the AUCA Sociology Department, received her 
candidate degree in philosophy from Kiev University in 1985.  She became 
interested in sociology during her second year as an undergraduate and took a 
number of short courses in the field.  She returned to Bishkek in 1986 and 
joined the Department of Scientific Communism at the Humanitarian 
University in order to participate in the teaching and research activities in the 
sociological laboratory there, which had been established three years earlier.  
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In 1989, as soon as Moscow State University opened a degree programme in 
sociology, she enrolled there and completed a candidate degree.  She also 
worked as a researcher in the USSR Academy of Science’s Institute of 
Sociology.  After returning to Bishkek from Moscow she taught short courses 
in sociology at the Academy of Management before winning a grant from 
USID to study in Washington, DC.  Inspired by this trip to combine the best of 
both Soviet and American sociology education, she introduced sociology 
courses to AUK (now AUCA) in 1996 and in 1998 opened a Sociology 
Department at the institution.  She simultaneously founded SIAR Bishkek, one 
of the republic’s most prominent companies for social and marketing research.  
She left AUCA in 2002 to pursue a full-time career in commercial research. 
 
Tabaldiev, Asanbek  
Tabaldiev is considered by many to be the first sociologist in Kirgizia.  
Trained as a school teacher, he worked in his home town of Dzheral-Tal 
before pursuing a candidate degree in Marxist philosophy at KSU.  An active 
member of the Communist Party, he served as chair of the Department of 
Philosophy and Historical Materialism at the institution and in 1966 
established the first laboratory of sociological research in the republic.  In 
1973 the Communist Party of Kirgizia requested that he take up another 
position as editor of the Kirgiz Soviet Encyclopaedia, which he remained 
responsible for until his death in 1975.   
 
Tishin, Alexei  
Tishin’s entry into sociology was through mathematics, in which he earned his 
undergraduate degree.  After completing his degree he was directed to the 
sociological laboratory at KSU, which was at the time working on developing 
the use of mathematical modelling in sociological research.  After Tabaldiev’s 
death in 1975 (see above), Tishin continued to work in the laboratory, leading 
a number of large-scale studies on industrial sociology.  In 1989 he directed a 
joint research project with the Faculty of Journalism from Moscow State 
University to study the effectiveness of the regional press in Kirgizia.  He is 
currently chair of the Sociology Department at KNU. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
COMPARATIVE CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY: 
BISHKEK HUMANITARIAN UNIVERSITY AND  
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY–CENTRAL ASIA 
 
 Sociology Department
Established 1993 
Bishkek Humanitarian 
University 
Sociology Department 
Established 1998 
American University–
Central Asia 
Institutional history 
and identity 
Successor to Soviet-era 
Sociology Department 
and Engineering 
Psychology  
Identifies with Kyrgyz 
state and people 
Established to combine 
Soviet and American 
models of sociology 
education 
Identifies with universalist 
principles and American 
sociology 
Institutional funding 
structure 
State-funded 
Increasingly reliant on 
other sources of funds 
(tuition fees, bribes) 
‘Private’ university funded 
by foreign governments 
and international 
organisations 
Increasingly reliant on 
other sources of income 
(tuition fees) 
Disciplinarity Boundaries between 
sociology and other 
disciplines clear and 
uncontested 
Boundaries between 
sociology, psychology, 
anthropology and political 
science ambiguous and 
contested 
Faculty composition 
and departmental 
structure 
Tripartite division of 
labour—teaching, 
research, upbringing; 
local faculty 
Dual division of labour—
teaching and research; 
combination of local and 
foreign faculty 
Definition and role of 
sociology 
Applied profession; 
establishment of scientific 
politics 
Liberal–critical 
scholarship/applied 
service; understanding and 
explanation of social 
phenomena 
Sociology curriculum Nationally oriented, 
Russian-inspired, 
professional training 
model 
Internationally oriented, 
Euro-American inspiration, 
liberal education model 
Sociological research Centralised and policy-
centred 
Individualised and market-
driven 
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APPENDIX C 
 
STATE EDUCATIONAL STANDARD  
FOR BASIC EDUCATION IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
Summarised from the Ministry of Education’s Gosudarstvennyi 
obrazovatel’nyi standard bazovogo obrazovaniia po napravleniiu G.12 
(521200) ‘Sotsiologiia’ (1994) 
 
Section 1. Legal status of the state educational standard for basic 
education in Sociology 
 
1.1 The state standard for basic education in Sociology establishes the 
requirements for the content and level of preparation of individuals 
receiving a bachelor’s degree in sociological science. 
1.2 This standard is part of the state educational standard for general 
requirements in higher education, GOS-VO-94, and works in 
connection with it.  The standard was accepted by colleagues of the 
Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic on 2 
December 1994 and will be in operation from 1994 to 2000. 
1.3 The state standard for basic education in Sociology is the foundation 
for the creation of curricula (uchebnye plany) and programmes for 
preparing bachelors of sociological science, diploma specialists 
specialising as sociologists, and social anthropology. 
1.4 Attestation and the licensing of subdivisions within higher educational 
institutions, the practice of preparing bachelors of sociological science, 
and the state certification of graduates are carried out on the basis of 
this standard. 
1.5 The requirements of this standard are obligatory for the fulfilment of 
all higher educational institutions in the Kyrgyz Republic (independent 
of their administrative supervision or form of maintenance), which are 
carrying out educational–professional programmes of basic and further 
[graduate] higher education.  Note: Higher educational institutions 
have the right to choose the form and method of organising their 
instructional process, allowing it fulfils the requirements set forward in 
this standard. 
 
Section 2. General character of the subject 
 
2.1 The subject G.12 (521200) ‘Sotsiologiia’ was certified by order no. 
10/1 of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic 
on 2 December 1993. 
2.2 Educational–professional programmes in Sociology are four-year 
programmes. 
2.3 Professional work for a graduate of Sociology is oriented toward the 
deep study of social conditions of life, the character and content of 
social transformations and changes in the state, society and collective.  
A specialist in this sphere must be able to give an argumentative 
answer to the question of what is necessary for realising substantial 
social reforms in life and innovations in social administration, and 
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which social and other changes are promising.  A bachelor must be 
prepared to do professional work in organs of state administration, 
social organisations, committees and services of social welfare, and 
various branches of the social sphere. 
2.4 Individuals successfully mastering educational–professional 
programmes in accordance with the requirements of the present 
standard will be conferred with the qualification of an academic degree 
of ‘Bachelor of Science’ in Sociology.  A bachelor of Sociology, 
successfully completing a programme of basic higher education and 
receiving a recommendation of the state attestation commission for 
continuing their education in further higher education may study for a 
master’s degree in Sociology.  A bachelor of Sociological Science may 
continue instruction in a programme to prepare specialists in further 
higher education in the specialisations of G.12.303(5212.303) 
Sociology, G.12.319(5212.319) Social Anthropology, as well as in 
related specialisations: G.11.321(5211.321) Social Work, 
G.11.320(5211.320) Links with the Social, and G.11.331(5211.311) 
Socio-cultural Work. 
 
Section 3. General requirements for enrolling in study in programmes 
that prepare [students] to become bachelors of Sociological Science 
 
3.1 Those entering the first step of instruction with evidence of 
uncompleted higher education must have knowledge in a group of 
middle school programmes in history, language and literature, 
mathematics, and information and computer technology.  Higher 
educational institutions have the right to define the form of entrance 
exams.  
3.2 Transferring to a programme of Sociology in the same institution is 
done on the recommendation of the state attestation commission and 
the successful completion of the state exams.  Entrance into the same 
programme in a different institution is done through [providing] 
additional evidence of uncompleted higher education and the 
recommendation of the state attestation commission… 
3.3 Individuals having evidence of uncompleted higher education in socio-
political and humanitarian subjects are admitted to enrol in a 
programme preparing bachelors, on a competitive basis of vacant 
places under the condition of passing entrance exams in various 
academic disciplines defined by the state standard for corresponding 
subjects.  The form of entrance exams is determined by the higher 
educational institutions. 
 
Section 4. Maximum amount of instructional loads for educational–
professional programmes preparing bachelors of Sociological Science 
 
4.1 The maximum working calendar consists of 140 weeks of theoretical 
instruction, 25 weeks of examination sessions, 9 weeks of practical 
experience, 4 weeks of state attestation, 25 weeks of vacation, 
including monthly breaks for studying; in all, 203 weeks. 
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4.2 The maximum instructional load for students consists of 7624 hours in 
56 academic weeks.  Within this, student work with instructors in the 
form of required classroom lessons accounts for no more than 60% of 
the instructional weeks in the average period of instruction.  The rest of 
the time belongs to students for their independent work, faculty 
courses, lessons in physical culture and other individual consultations 
with instructors. 
4.3 The instructional–productive practicum begins from the third year of 
instruction and includes 2 weeks of instructional practicum and 7 
weeks of productive practicum, which is conducted after completing 
the theoretical instruction in related sociological disciplines in order to 
receive practical skills to conduct sociological research. 
4.4 The amount of required classroom lessons for a student must not 
exceed 32 hours in the period of theoretical instruction.  Required 
lessons in physical culture and lessons in faculty disciplines are not 
included in this. 
 
Section 5. Content requirements for the preparation of bachelors of 
Sociological Science 
 
5.1 Requirements for humanitarian and fundamental natural–scientific 
training for preparing bachelors of Sociological Science.  […]  
[Includes math, information and computer technology, training in 
theories of validity, statistics, mathematical logic and modelling and 
demography.] 
5.2 Requirements for the general professional preparation of bachelors of 
Sociological Science.  In the framework of a general sociological 
training a bachelor in Sociology must (1) know the basic levels of 
sociological knowledge and general sociological theory, the history of 
sociology, and the methodological and methodical foundations of 
sociological research; (2) distinguish the basic constitutional 
organisation and geographic, economic, social and psychological 
particularities of the Kyrgyz Republic and its regions; (3) know the 
specialised sociological disciplines, the content of scientific 
knowledge, the relevant nomenclature for specialised sociological 
science: theory, methodology and the history of sociology, methods of 
sociological research, sociology of labour and the market, theory of 
social structures and social stratification, social institutions and ways 
of life, socio-political processes, organisation and administration; the 
sociology of culture, education and science; and public opinion; (4) be 
able to make correct explanatory scientific conclusions about research 
in relation to the theory and method of sociological science; and (5) be 
able to independently conduct sociological research of an applied 
character on the level of small groups, enterprises and organisations, 
and territorial communities at various levels, and use the necessary 
instrumentation of modern sociological science. 
5.3 Requirements for the special (disciplines of specialisation) preparation 
of bachelors of sociological science.  A bachelor must master general 
theoretical knowledge, scientific methods of sociological research and 
skills of practical work in concrete spheres of social life.  The cycle of 
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specialised disciplines must prepare a bachelor with a deep mastery of 
the subjects of sociology and must hold special seminars, which are 
necessary for narrow specialisation to a lesser degree in one subject, 
and also disciplines of mixed specialisations by the student’s choice.  
The concrete requirements for the special preparation of a bachelor and 
the content of the cycle of specialised disciplines are established by 
higher educational institutions (faculties).  The obligatory minimum 
contents for educational–professional programmes of basic education 
in G.12.303(5212.303) Sociology [are as follows]: 
 
Index Title of disciplines and their basic didactic 
units99     
Hours of 
instruction 
G00.00 Cycle of required disciplines supporting the 
humanitarian and socio-economic preparation 
of bachelors 
1770 
EN.00 Cycle of general mathematical and natural 
science disciplines 
1040 
EN.01 Mathematics and informatics 410 
EN.02 Concepts of contemporary natural knowledge 102 
EN.03 Basic ecology 102 
EN.04 Disciplines and courses by student choice, set 
up by the higher educational institutions 
(faculties) 
426 
DN.00 Cycle of general professional disciplines in 
the subject 
2262 
DN.01 History of sociology 270 
DN.02 General sociology 360 
DN.03 Methodics and techniques of sociological 
research 
280 
DN.04 Political sociology 180 
DN.05 Demography 200 
DN.06 Social statistics 150 
DN.07 Social anthropology 200 
DN.08 Social psychology 200 
DN.09 Social pedagogics  100 
DN.10 Social modelling and programming 180 
DN.11 Disciplines and courses by student choice, set 
up by the higher educational institutions 
(faculties) 
120 
DS.00 Cycle of special disciplines, set up by the 
higher educational institutions (faculties) 
1800 
P.00 Practicum 9 weeks 
IA.99 Summary state attestation 4 weeks 
 
Notes [Section 5]: 
 
1. A higher educational institution (faculty) has the right to: 
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1.1 Change the number of hours allotted to the basic instructional material 
for a cycle of disciplines by 5%, for disciplines included in the cycle 
by 10% without exceeding the maximum amount of the weekly load 
for students under the condition that it preserves the minimal content 
of the discipline. 
1.2 Fix the required depth of mastery of individual sections of a discipline 
included in the cycle of humanitarian and socio-economic disciplines, 
general mathematics and natural–scientific disciplines, depending on 
the profile of that subject. 
1.3 In addition to the required disciplines, each student must study 
disciplines at his or her discretion and follow the forms of attestation 
established by the higher educational institution (faculty).  The general 
amount of these disciplines corresponds to the number of hours by 
student choice. 
1.4 Faculty disciplines are stipulated by the curriculum (uchebnyi plan) of 
the higher educational institution, but are not required for student 
instruction. 
1.5 Course work (projects)—on the second course in methods and 
techniques of sociological research and the third course in special 
sociological theory—is considered a type of instructional work in the 
discipline and fulfilment of hours allotted to its instruction. 
1.6 The cycle of special disciplines is considered professional training, 
narrower in comparison with the subject.  The higher educational 
institution (faculty) may recommend different variants of this cycle, 
from which students have the right to choose one.  Each of these 
variants, in line with the required discipline cycle, must include 
courses by student choice. 
1.7 ]The higher educational institution has the right to] use, by its 
discretion, the time allotted for military training if no military 
department has been opened in the institution by government decree. 
 
Section 6. Assignment, sphere and conditions for using a bachelor’s 
degree in Sociological Science 
 
6.1 A bachelor in Sociology is prepared for theoretical and applied 
pedagogical work in scientific institutions having a social scientific 
profile, in businesses, organisations, institutions, commercial–
entrepreneurial structures, organs of mass media, sociological centres, 
offices for the study of public opinion, committees and branches of 
social welfare and social support, and in organs working with 
employment, law enforcement, health care and upbringing work, and 
others.  They are prepared to work in organs of state administration 
and social organisations, in commercial and economic structures in the 
capacity of consultants on sociological questions dealing with 
sociological research and various spheres of social life. 
6.2 The professional work of a bachelor-level Sociologist is linked first of 
all to  practical work in organs of administration and the discovery, 
staging and search for resolutions to social problems; with the 
informational support of institutes of society and the state; and with the 
organisation of educational, advertising and commercial work.  The 
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goal of this work is to help businesses, institutions, organisations, 
commercial structures, legal and physical individuals in discovering 
and resolving social problems.  The concrete areas of work, in the 
interest of which bachelors in Sociology are trained, is defined by 
specialised training, the contents of which are set out by the higher 
educational institution in the framework of this subject.  A bachelor in 
Sociology may work in higher educational institutions as an instructor, 
senior instructor or teacher under the condition [that s/he had] the 
relevant training (1 year), in agreement with the requirements for the 
state standard for these specialisations and having received the relevant 
certificate. 
 
Section 7. Attestation of graduates for the right to confer the qualification 
of the academic degree of the bachelor of Sociology 
 
7.1 The final state qualifying attestation is done in accordance with the 
requirements of the state educational standard ‘Higher education—
general requirements.’  The forms and content of the final state 
qualifying attestation for bachelors must fulfil the requirements for the 
content and level of the preparation of individuals completing 
instruction.  
7.2 The system for marking knowledge and abilities of a student in the 
instructional process, including the final examination in disciplines in 
this subject, is considered to be a complex state exam in general 
humanitarian cycles task after the first two years of instruction and an 
exam by choice in sociology, social work or social anthropology after 
the fourth year of study, as well as the defence of diploma work [final 
undergraduate paper].   
 
This standard was established on the basis of the state educational 
standard for higher education of the Russian Federation in G.12/521/200 
‘Sociology.’ 
 
The standard project was reviewed at a meeting of the Ministry of 
Education and recommended for certification. 
 
Executors 
 
Candidate of Philosophical Science, Docent,                             K. Bekturganov 
Chair of Philosophy at the Kyrgyz State  
National University 
 
Director of the Ministry of Education for      S. Toktomyshev 
Humanitarian Education, Rector of the  
Kyrgyz State National University, Professor 
 
Deputy Director of the Ministry of Education,           M. Omorov 
Docent in the History Faculty of the Kyrgyz  
State National University 
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First Deputy of the Ministry of Education                                     [no signature] 
and Science                                                                         
 
Chief of the Administration of Higher Education        Sh. Dzhusenbaev 
 
Head Specialist of the Ministry of Education                                T. Chubukova 
and Science                   
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APPENDIX D 
 
ATTESTATION SCHEME FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Translated from the Ministry of Education’s  
Programma gosudarstvennoi attestatsii vyshego uchebnogo zavedeniia  
(ca. 1999) 
 
1. Self-attestation 
2. Application to the Ministry of Education 
with all documentation 
3. Preliminary expert evaluation of 
documents
4. Official announcement about attestation 
and creation of the attestation commission
5. Payment for attestation 
6. Expert evaluation of curricula and 
educational programmes for each subject
7. Expert evaluation of instructional-
material base 
8. Expert evaluation of status of technical 
equipment for instructional process
9. Expert evaluation of informational 
support for instructional process 
10. Expert evaluation of cadres 
11. Expert evaluation of institutional means 
13. Expert evaluation of possibilities for 
further education 
14. Expert evaluation of scientific research 
15. Expert evaluation of scientific-
methodological work 
16. Expert evaluation of pre-university 
preparation 
17. Expert evaluation of requirements for 
graduates 
18. Presentation of tests for marking the 
quality of knowledge of graduates 
19. Expert analysis of tests in each subject 
20. Tests are checked 
21. Analysis of testing results 
22. Attestation commission writes final 
report 
23. Members of the Ministry of Education 
accept the decision on attestation 
12. Expert evaluation of fulfilment of 
licensing requirements 
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APPENDIX E 
 
NEWSPAPERS/JOURNALS IN WHICH  
SOCIOLOGICAL ARTICLES APPEAR 
 
Newspapers 
 
Asaba 
Ata Zhurt 
Betme-bet 
Bizinesmen Kyrgyzstana 
Vestnik vremeni 
Vechernii Bishkek 
Delo No. 
Zaman 
Zhurnalist 
Kommunist Kirgizstana 
Komsomolets Kirgizii 
Kut bilim 
Kyrgyz rukhu 
Leninskii put' (Osh) 
Liberal'naia gazeta 
Liudi i svet 
Molodezhnaia gazeta 
Moskovskom Komsomol'tse 
Mugalimder gazetasyb 
Nasha gazeta 
Nauka i tekhnika 
Osh zhanyryty 
Pamir 
Panerama 
Politika i obschestvo 
Pravda 
Propagandist i agitator Kirgizstan 
Piatnitsa 
ResPublica  
Reforma 
Rynok kapitalov 
 
 
 
Svobodnye gory/Erkin too 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
Sovetskaia Kirgiziia 
Stolitsa 
Trudy Kirgizii 
Utro Bishkeka 
Uchitel' Kirgizstana 
Iuzhnyi kur’er 
Ekho Osha 
 
Journals 
 
Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR 
Vestnik—Kirgizskii    
   Gosudarstvennyi Natsional'nyi   
   Universitet 
Vestnik Statistiki  
Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Kazakh  
   SSR—Obschestvennye Nauki  
Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Kirgiz  
   SSR—Obschestvennye Nauki 
Izvestiia Akademii Nauk  
   Respublikoi Kirgizstana 
Mektep-shkola 
Politsfera 
Sbornik nauchnykh trudov— 
   Kirgizskoi Gosudarsvennyi  
   Universitet, Frunze 
Sotsial'nye i gumanitarnye nauki  
Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 
Ekonomika i zhizn'  
Ekonomicheskie nauki 
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APPENDIX F 
 
QUESTIONS FROM A 1994 SURVEY ON PRIVATISATION 
(Isaev 1994) 
 
1. What does privatisation mean to you? 
2. Do you support privatisation? 
3. Is privatisation necessary for the economic recovery of Kyrgyzstan? 
4. What influence will privatisation have on economics in the present time? 
5. Do you believe that privatisation will be able to facilitate economic 
recovery? 
6. Do you believe that privatisation alone will lead to an increase in the 
prices of goods in Kyrgyzstan? 
7. Do you believe that privatisation can support the continual delivery of 
widely demanded goods in our stores? 
8. Do you think that privatisation alone can facilitate the rise of inflation in 
Kyrgyzstan? 
9. Do you think that privatisation will increase unemployment? 
10. If privatisation really leads to the increase of unemployment, then in your 
opinion do we really need to do it? 
11. Do you believe that privatisation can create new possibilities for us to 
receive economic profit? 
12. Do you believe that privatisation can help you (a) increase your income, 
(b) become an investor, (c) receive dividends from your investments, (d) 
become an owner, (e) obtain a more interesting and rewarding job, (f) raise 
your qualifications or make a career? 
13. How soon do you expect to receive benefits from privatisation? 
14. How can we compare privatised stories, businesses, restaurants with those 
of the state from the point of view of support for quality goods and 
services under competitive prices?   
15. Is the competitive market (to which, as we say, we are moving toward) 
better than the planned economy according to which we have lived since 
1920? 
16. Do you believe that privatisation can create a competitive market? 
17. Which of the following economic sectors would you give priority to under 
privatisation (housing, land, social welfare services, agriculture, industrial 
production, construction, transport, trade, social support)? 
18. Is privatisation moving too fast or too slow in each of the following sectors 
(housing, land, social welfare services, agriculture, industrial production, 
construction, transport, trade, social support)? 
19. What are special paid means (spetsial'nye platezhnye stredstva)? 
20. Have you requested your special paid means? 
21. If no, why? 
22. If you have used your special paid means, then how did you use them (I 
gave them to my boss at work, I gave them to my representative of a 
workers’ collective, I bought shares in an enterprise where I work, I 
bought shares in an investment fund, I used them to buy an apartment)? 
23. If you haven’t used your special paid means, why did you not use them? 
24. If you bought some sort of shares in some sort of enterprise, did you 
receive any dividends? 
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25. If you have not received dividends from the purchased shares, then how 
soon do you expect to receive them? 
26. If you work to privatise your workers’ collective, does it release its shares? 
(a) if yes, then on what basis do they release shares? (b) are you satisfied 
with this approach? (c) if you are not satisfied, why? 
27. In your opinion, which method is fairest, most open to social discussion, 
and fastest (making enterprises into joint-stock companies, selling to 
collective property, selling to private individual property, transfer to lease, 
open auctions, sale on competitive basis)? 
28. In your opinion, how is the process of privatisation going today? 
29. Which state organisation does the most for privatisation today? 
30. Which state organisation stubbornly puts obstacles to privatisation? 
31. Could property owned by the akimiat be privatised? 
32. From which of the following sources have you received information about 
privatisation (mass media, akimiat, friends, family, managers at work, the 
State Fund for Communal Property, regional funds for property, other)? 
33. Does the government do a good job of informing the population about 
privatisation? (a) if yes, then in what way? (b) if no, then clarify why. 
34. If you were given the chance to ask a question to the chair of the Fund for 
State Property, what question would you ask? 
35. In general, how did you live two years ago? 
36. In general, how do you live today? 
37. If your life is worse than it was two years ago, what is the reason? 
38. In general, what quality of life do you expect to have in the next two 
years? 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
Introduction 
 
1 The Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence from the Soviet Union on 31 
August 1991.  In this dissertation, ‘Kirgizia’ refers to the Kirgiz SSR, while ‘Kyrgyzstan’ or 
the ‘Kyrgyz Republic’ refers to the independent post-Soviet state.     
 
2 ‘Heteronomy’ broadly means something ‘subject to a law or standard external to itself;’ Kant 
used it to mean ‘laws which are imposed on us from without.’  Here, it is used in a specifically 
Bourdieusian sense to refer to a position of economic or political dominance within an 
intellectual field.  It is distinguished from ‘autonomy,’ which refers to a position maintained 
by operating within the non-economic logic of the intellectual field itself. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
3 State investment in education declined dramatically after Kyrgyzstan declared independence.  
Egorov (2002: 61) reported that government spending for research and development declined 
from 0.73% of the GDP in 1990 to 0.14% in 1999; Glenady (1995) supports this with her 
figure of 0.18% in 1994.  According to the Kyrgyz National Statistics Committee, in 2000 the 
state allocated 3.1% of its annual GDP to education—less than half the amount it allocated in 
1995 (Reeves 2003: 9).  At the 2001 general meeting of the Kyrgyzstan Academy of Science, 
president Janybek Jeenbaev claimed that the 17 million soms ($345,000) allocated to the 
Academy by the government was ‘not enough to achieve good scientific results’ (Radio Free 
Europe, 2001).  In 2002, a local newspaper reported that state universities received only 10–
15% of their expenses from the state budget (Osorov 2002).  See also Sydykov (1995) on the 
need to establish a union of scientists to protect the interests of scholars. 
 
4 Akaev was overthrown by a popular movement on March 24, 2005. For more on 
authoritarian trends in Akaev’s leadership strategies, see Spector (2004).
 
5 This statement was made in an interview conducted by the author in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 
the summer of 2003.  The source remains anonymous as criticism of high-ranking political 
figures can be professionally and personally dangerous for interviewees in the contemporary 
political climate. 
 
6 The issue, however, has been addressed by a number of foreign scholars working in the 
region.  See, for example, Reeves (2002, 2002a). 
 
Chapter 2 
 
7 This includes the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of science and technology in advanced 
industrial societies and Habermas’ (1987) critique of positivism; social constructivists such as 
Peter Berger (1967) who popularised the theory of the social construction of reality and C. 
Wright Mills (1963) who did the same for our understanding of the cultural apparatus; 
feminist theorists such as Dorothy Smith (1988) who theorised the gendering of scientific 
knowledge; Marxist and radical historians such as Howard Zinn (1980) who exposed the 
ideological and political foundations of contemporary historiography; and sociologists of 
science and scientific knowledge such as Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (1983) who 
investigated the nature of science as a social institution and revealed how scientific knowledge 
is constructed in everyday practice.    
 
8 For a critical counter-response to the post-positivist approach and an argument for reforming 
positivism in social science, see Alexander and Colomy (1992). 
 
9 While Marx used ‘ideology’ to mean false consciousness, an ‘erroneous perception of the 
world,’ the Soviets used it to mean ‘the overall conception of the world deriving from what 
are believed to be the interests of a social class’ (Mandel 1969: 24).  After independence, 
however, the definition has been reclaimed to describe something distorted and untrue. 
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10 In an attempt to identify the centre or ‘core’ of international sociology, Alatas (2003: 602) 
defines ‘the west’ as ‘the contemporary social science powers, which are the United States, 
Great Britain and France.’  The definition in Kyrgyzstani sociology, however, is more fluid.  
Kyrgyzstani sociologists make many references to ‘western’ sociology without specifying 
precisely what they mean; it is a concept rather than an identification (Blum 1993; Fanisov 
1990).  In most of these cases ‘the west’ includes Western Europe (particularly Germany) 
and/or the United States, and may even refer to Russia (Isaev 1998b; Isaev et al. 1997a); 
Ismailova 1995).  However, the terms ‘east’ and ‘west’ are also employed symbolically rather 
than being used to signify geographic locations.  There are two main symbolic uses of ‘the 
west’: the west representing civilisation, rational progress, modernisation and order (e.g., 
Isaev 2000), and the west that represents moral anarchy, pornography, consumerism and 
excessive individualism (e.g., Isaev, Akmatova and Dosalieva 1996a).  Likewise, there are 
two main meanings of ‘the east’: one representing personalised power, tribalism, patriarchy, 
and  backwardness, and one symbolising national purity, pre-colonial identity, indigenous 
knowledge and collective humanism.  (For a discussion of the difference between ‘eastern’ 
and ‘western’ conceptions of ‘open society’ based on Gandhi and Popper respectively, see 
[Isaev 1998e).   
 
11 Space does not allow for an exhaustive overview of the extensive body of literature in the 
sociology of science and scientific knowledge, including well-known works by Bloor (1976), 
Ben-David (1971), Bruno (1987, 1999), Knorr-Cetina, (1981), Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 
(1983), Latour (1987), Latour and Woolgar (1979) and others.  This section focuses instead on 
those studies which have contributed directly to my understanding of the sociology of social 
scientific knowledge and, more specifically, sociology.   
 
12 Lemaine et al. (1976: 13) also use these categories to refer to factors which influence the 
development of science, but divide ‘external–social’ into immediate institutional context, 
specific economic and political factors, and diffuse social influences.  See also Ben-David’s 
grouping of the ‘interactional’ and ‘institutional’ approaches to the sociology of science, cited 
in Blume (1974: 12). 
 
13 This included (1) the expansion of roles for sociologists in society (as distinguished from 
social reformers, philanthropists, and government statisticians), (2) the institutional 
recognition of sociology within universities, (3) new ‘intellectual structures’ that supported the 
main trends of British sociological thinking, (4) financial support for research (in the form of 
individual philanthropy), (5) a general concern for social problems, (6) a faith in the 
ameliorative/corrective power of sociology, (6) group consensus about what sociology 
actually is, and (7) the demonstration of sociology’s usefulness and effectiveness as a tool for 
social change. 
 
14 Other sociologists of science place Bourdieu in the ‘internalist’ category, insofar as his work 
deals wit h the ‘forces internal to scientific fields.’  See Steinmetz and Chae (2002: 115). 
 
15 These goals can alternatively be described as the ‘acquisition of intellectual authority and 
career opportunities; denial of these resources from “pseudo-scientists”; and protection of the 
autonomy of scientific research from political interference’ (Gieryn 1983: 781).  
 
16 While scientists in the Scopes trial defined religion and science as separate but compatible 
ways of knowing (thus promoting the expansion of public funding for science while not 
threatening the religious values of the decision-makers and publics who held the purse 
strings), in the McLean trial they attempted to distinguish ‘creation-science’ from ‘real 
science’ and brand the former as false science, thus pitting science and religion against one 
another as competing epistemologies (thus staking claim to the single pot of funding available 
for education).  The relationship between science and religion was strategically constructed 
differently in each case, illustrating that ‘ideological demarcations of science and religion in 
public science are contextually and historically contingent.’  In this study, the authors make a 
compelling case that what scientific knowledge means in a particular time and space is heavily 
shaped by scientists’ own professional agendas and how they respond to threats to their 
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professional legitimacy and access to resources.  For another model of the ‘market model of 
professionalisation’ approach to boundary–work, see Camic and Xie’s (1994) study of the 
simultaneous appearance of statistics in four social science disciplines at Columbia University 
in the early twentieth century.
 
17 These dimensions have been extracted from a longer list of factors that Torres (1999: 108) 
argues should be taken into account when evaluating the ‘ideology framework’ of particular 
policies of educational reform.  
 
18 This I discovered through the ‘accidental’ acquisition of a whole variety of materials—
journals, conference proceedings, unpublished papers and reports, raw data, and personal 
collections of newspaper clippings—from individual informants who, having little faith in 
official record-keeping systems, have maintained their own personal archives.   
 
19 Some (though by no means all) state archivists and librarians in Bishkek work to control 
knowledge rather to disseminate it.  A good example of this is my experience in the National 
Archives, where I quite optimistically hoped to see documents related to the formation of state 
and Communist Party policies on social science during the 1980s.  Permission to enter the 
archives required a precisely formatted and stamped letter from a respectable figure, and 
access to the materials required an ‘application’ on which one must specify the exact topic of 
inquiry, including the time period of interest.  I was denied catalogues from 1969 because I 
had specified 1970–89.  Furthermore, there are no catalogues in the archives.  One requests a 
‘record book’ from a particular year and searches randomly through chronological entries for 
something of topical interest (a process that can take hours), items which can then be delivered 
(in more hours or even days).  I quickly learned that the information which was available 
through this process was no more than the bare-bones, logistical public records of Communist 
Party meetings—dates, times, those in attendance.  I was told once (and only once) that the 
proceedings of the meetings did indeed exist, but that they were not available for public use.  
 
20 The term ‘epistemic negotiation’ is borrowed from Reeves (2003a) and reflects a more 
sophisticated understanding of the way in which knowledge structures and power relations 
underlie what some anthropologists refer to as cultural ‘misunderstanding.’ 
 
21 For more on the importance of ‘situating ethnography within its historical and geographical 
context,’ see Buroway (2000: 25). 
 
Chapter 3 
 
22 There were approximately 4,000 students in higher education in Central Asia in 1927, 
compared with 228,900 in 1960 (Nove and Newth 1967: 79). 
 
23 Articles have recently begun to appear on regional differences in Soviet sociology.  See, 
e.g., Zborovskii (2001).  
 
24 For a full discussion of Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, see Panarin (1994). 
 
25 For example, during the nineteenth century, Central Asian historians produced some fairly 
radical scholarship about the history of Turkistan, particularly the history of Islam.  However, 
those that received training in newly established Soviet universities in Russia in the early 
twentieth century re-branded these narratives as reactionary, and the Communist Party 
eventually banned the use of the name ‘Turkistan’ after the Turkistan ASSR was dissolved in 
1923 (Allworth 1998: 70; Shahrani 1994: 64).  At its most extreme, the attack on Islam 
involved the physical destruction of Central Asian Muslim scholars, educational and social 
institutions, libraries and texts (Shahrani 1994: 65).  Gradually, favourable or politically 
neutral references to Islam and all mention of ‘national’ events and heroes were abolished 
from Central Asian history, as were local styles of narrative, and replaced with Marxist–
Leninist theories of historical development and Soviet events and figures.  Later, in 1968, an 
Uzbek scholar was reprimanded by the Communist Party for publishing work on Tamerlaine 
(Allworth 1998: 72).  Soviet secularization propaganda began to incorporate ‘scientific’ 
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theories about the relationship between Islam, feudalism and imperialism (Ro’i 1995: 18).  
Throughout the 1980s, in fact, the Communist Party conducted research in Muslim regions to 
determine what type and degree of ‘religious prejudices’ still existed among the populations 
(Ro’i 1995: 14). 
 
26 The Soviet system of academic degrees progresses from bakalavr (the equivalent of a 
bachelor’s degree) to magistratura (master’s) to kandidatura (similar to the PhD) and finally 
to doktor (conferred after completion of a second major dissertation).  Those studying for a 
magistratura are called aspirant, while those studying for the kandidatura are called 
candidate and for the doctorskii stepen' doktor.  For convenience, I will use English variants 
of these terms throughout this dissertation: bachelors, masters, candidate and doctoral.  Those 
studying for a candidate degree will be called candidates, and those for a doctoral degree, 
doctorants. 
 
27 The Institute of Public Opinion, sponsored by Komsomol'skaia pravda, sponsored opinion 
surveys as early as 1961 (Simirenko 1969a: 398).  The Institute of Concrete Social Research 
was founded in June 1968 (Mandel 1969: 44).  Before this, there was a Division of Concrete 
Social Research (paired with a Division of Historical Materialism) located within the Institute 
of Philosophy at the USSR Academy of Science (Simirenko 1969a: 397).  
 
Chapter 4 
 
28 ‘Laboratories,’ or unofficial groups of scholars, teachers and students set up in lieu of (or in 
addition to) academic departments or institutes, were historically the most common type of 
sociological establishment in the Soviet Union and remain widespread in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan even today.  See Matthews and Jones (1978: 8).   
 
29 For more detail on the practice of vospitanie, see note 55 below. 
 
30 Others give this recognition to Rakhat Achylova, who defended a thesis in sociology in 
Leningrad during the Soviet period (Asanova 2003). 
 
31 The production of hydroelectricity, specifically for use in the defence industry, was one of 
the Kirgiz Republic’s specialised functions in the Soviet economy, along with shepherding 
and wool and cotton production.  See Dabrowski et al. (1995).  
 
32 Inkeles (1958: 41-43) defines propaganda as the ‘elucidation of the teachings of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the history of the Bolshevik party and its tasks,’ which was 
directed toward the ‘more “advanced” segments of society, the party members and the non-
party intelligentsia; to leaders, directors and responsible officials in all sphere of national life.’  
Agitation, on the other hand, meant the ‘chief means for the political education of the broad 
working-class masses in the spirit of communism.’  This focused mainly on explaining party 
decisions and mobilising participation.  ‘Propaganda develops the more advanced members 
and natural leaders of the masses, the agitators and organisers, who in their turn bring the 
party’s message to the people through agitation.’  All intellectuals and party members were 
responsible for agitation and ‘political education.’   
 
33 Translation compliments of Nienke van der Heide. 
 
34 The crackdown on empirical research in Kirgizia was part of a larger u-turn throughout the 
Soviet Union, most notably the infamous 1972 ‘Levada affair’ in which a number of 
sociologists (including Yuri Levada, then secretary of the USSR Institute of Concrete 
Sociological Research) were dismissed for attempting to ‘separate’ sociological research from 
historical materialism and producing theories that were potentially damaging to the party’s 
official image of social reality.  See Hahn (1977: 40). 
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Chapter 5 
 
35 Although there are earlier references to a ‘Central Asian and Kazakhstan’ division of the 
SSA (Sovietskaia Sotsiologicheskaia Assotsiatsiia AN SSSR 1977), there are no records that 
this was ever functional in Kirgizia. 
 
36 Public criticism and self-criticism were part of the socialisation of Soviet morality and the 
creation of group consensus and self-censorship (Bronfenbrenner 1969: 290).  In Kyrgyzstan, 
during early perestroika, this took the form of enforcing conformity; ‘naming and shaming,’ 
and discouraging nationalism in social science.  For example, in his article on the ‘highest 
mission of sociology,’ Sherstobitov (1987: 4) criticised Kirgiz social scientists for writing 
revisionist histories that did not acknowledge the class-based nature of social conflicts, for 
being seduced by the practice of writing in ‘idyllic tones’ about ‘reactionary-nationalistic and 
religious survivals,’ all of which were ‘against our ideology, the socialist way of life, and the 
scientific world view.’ 
 
37 See also Shalin (1990: 1020-25) for a discussion of how Soviet sociologists renegotiated the 
balance between scholarship and advocacy during this period, and Brym (1990: 213) on the 
‘ambiguous relationship to power’ and ‘ongoing tension between ideological commitment and 
scientific distance.’ 
 
38 Shaimergenova (2000: 8) define engineering sociology, one branch of applied sociology, as 
the use of ‘large-scale, inexpensive surveys, series of field experiments and the development 
of social projects for the social transformation of small communities working on planning and 
design.’  This is contrasted to the second branch of applied sociology, clinical sociology, 
which is used ‘to create a diagnosis and suggest alternatives’ as well as to suggest alternatives 
and outline ‘therapeutic measures.’ 
 
39 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go into detail about this event.  Interested 
readers may consult Elebaeva and Dozhusunova (1991) for a detailed analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 
 
40 An ‘open society,’ according to the Open Society Institute, is a society in which no 
individual holds claims to absolute truth, and which is ‘characterized by the rule of law, 
respect for human rights, minorities and minority opinions, the division of power, and a 
market economy.’  From the OSI web site, ‘Concept of Open Society,’ 
http://www.osi.hu/index_files/promo.html.      
 
41 Genov (1989) distinguishes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ definitions of national sociology.  
The first refers to the ‘specificity of intellectual and institutional development in a given 
national social and cultural context,’ while the latter means ‘outstanding contribution to the 
development of world sociology.’  In Kyrgyzstan, the term is used somewhat differently: it 
incorporates elements of both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ definitions and adds to them a moral 
imperative of national service in the face of colonial power. 
 
42 The concept of ‘national sociology’ is also common in other Central Asian republics.  For 
Kazakhstan see Toschenko (1998) and for Uzbekistan, Luk'ianova (1990). 
 
43 See also Abdyrashev (1994), who proposed to create a centralised research centre to replace 
the system of ‘separate and uncoordinated services in various organisations, which from time 
to time conduct studies of public opinion on isolated issues.’    
 
44 Isaev (Baibosunov 1998) identifies the main ‘directions’ in sociology as being family 
sociology, cultural sociology, conflictology, national customs, social structures and 
institutions, the study of the elite, national reforms and the middle class.  These fields, 
however, cover the range of topics addressed by well-known sociologists working within the 
state system of government universities, research centres and the Academy of Science, and 
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exclude the interests of sociologists working in private universities and non-governmental 
organisations. 
 
45 Bekturganov et al. (1994) have expressed similar concerns, stating that ‘Kyrgyz sociology 
does not have its own requisite theoretical-methodological equipment that corresponds with 
local conditions…[there is] no language about new social phenomena…no specialists who can 
understand new methods…[and] individual scholars who, while you might think from their 
writing struggle only for truth and pure science, [also] celebrate the strengthening of their own 
position and cheap popularity.’  To this they added the dominance of ‘percent-o-mania’ and 
‘anket-o-mania,’ or the fetish of survey research, over more sophisticated advancements in 
statistical analysis.  
 
46 Most work in the field takes ‘Soviet sociology’ as its primary unit of analysis.  When 
institutions are mentioned, it is generally by way of narrating the institutional development of 
Soviet sociology.  The importance of regional and local variation within Soviet sociology is 
intimated by critics such as Shlapentokh (1987) and Popovsky (1979), who look at qualitative 
inequalities within Soviet science, and revealed more explicitly in post-Soviet analyses of the 
social sciences in discrete former communist republics (Keen 1994; Toschenko 1998) and 
institutional histories (e.g., Boronoev 1999; Grigorev 1999).  Beliaev and Butorin (1982) have 
theorised the role of institutional actors and power relationships in the development of Soviet 
sociology; however, there are still few resources on the development of sociology in the 
Soviet Union at the level of individual or national institutions. 
 
47 For more on the diversification and decentralisation of the Soviet educational system during 
perestroika, see Kerr (1992), Sutherland (1992) and Tomiak (1983). 
 
48 A colleague once demonstrated this for me visually.  First he drew a straight line to indicate 
linear time.  He made a mark at the bottom of the line to represent pre-Soviet sociology and, 
after a brief journey up the line, abruptly diverted it to create a parallel line.  This represented 
Soviet sociology—a deviation of what might have been.  He then rejoined the lines and made 
a mark at the top of the original one to represent post-Soviet sociology: a discipline ‘back on 
the correct path of development.’ 
 
49 However, those working in the state system tend not to recognise AUCA as a legitimate 
educational institution and therefore know little about its sociology department.  Omuraliev 
(2003), for example, argued that there are three ‘centres’ of sociology in the republic—the 
Centre for Social Research in the Academy of Science, the Sociology Department at KNU (re-
established in 1999), and the laboratory at BHU.  ‘Perhaps it is possible that they have a 
laboratory or centre at AUCA,’ he said in an interview, ‘but I don’t think they do.’  Similarly, 
in a meeting at BHU, university Vice Rector Soltan Kurmanbaev asserted that BHU was the 
only university in the country to offer a full sociology programme.  When the head of the 
Faculty of Socio-Political Sciences pointed out that AUCA also had a sociology department, 
he dismissed it by clarifying that he was talking about gosudarstvennye (state) schools. 
 
50 These four categories are largely reiterated in a report by the Council of Europe called 
Social Sciences and the Challenge of Transition (1997), which also added inexperience in 
organising autonomous research projects (drafting proposals, negotiating with funders, etc.) 
and the ‘lack of rational management of teaching and research.’ 
 
51 For more on competition from more ‘marketable’ disciplines see Reeves (2003: 11) and 
Raiymbekova, K. (1999: 51-56), cited in Reeves. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
52 There is some ambiguity about the exact date that this department was established—1989 
(Osmonalieva 1995) or 1991 (Baibosunov 1998). 
 
53 A ‘faculty’ in Kyrgyzstan is a unit of departments.   
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54 For example, in August of 2002 the faculty met to discuss a proposal to amend the Kyrgyz 
constitution.  Records indicate that ‘all members of the department welcome the initiative to 
balance the three branches of power and in particular the transfer of authority of the president 
and parliament.’  They did take a view that it was ‘necessary to exclude statutes such as the 
subordination of government work except that of the president and parliament’ and that 
‘parties also need to participate’ in order to avoid the return to a Soviet-style single-party 
system.  ‘But we know,’ it continued, ‘that the government stands outside all parties and 
movements and protects the rights of all’ (BHU 2002b).  A year later, it met again to discuss a 
proposed referendum on the same issue.  At this meeting, faculty members publicly affirmed 
their intention to vote in the referendum, which was defined as ‘fully natural in all civilised 
societies,’ and one member shared the results of a recently conducted survey which suggested 
that the opposition was shaping public opinion in ‘dangerous’ ways (BHU 2003a). 
 
55 From 1995–98, annual reports specified that ‘teachers of the department have conducted 
definitive work toward obtaining grants.’  These included a Soros grant won through 
competition by A. I. Ismailov to produce a textbook in sociology (1995), a MacArthur grant 
awarded to Ibraeva (1996), a grant from a Russian organisation awarded to aspirant 
Alamanova (1996), and travel grants for Asanbekov to attend a conference in Moscow (1996) 
and Isaev to attend the World Congress of Sociology in Korea (1997). 
 
56 Here, vospitanie refers specifically to social and moral education, or socialisation.  It 
includes activities as diverse as supervising students, mentoring and ‘curating’ groups of 
students, encouraging them to participate in educational and departmental activities, taking 
them on fieldtrips to libraries and museums, training them for academic olympiads, helping 
them to plan and participate in holiday celebrations (such as Nooruz and student balls), and 
evaluate their thesis defences.  This definition is from a list of vospitatel’naia rabota 
[upbringing work] listed in BHU(1997). 
 
57 Many programmes for educational or research exchange set age limits, often thirty or thirty-
five, on applicants. 
 
58 ‘Politology’ can be translated as ‘political science.’  However, the Soviet politological 
tradition is distinct from American and British forms of political science.  It was oriented 
primarily toward training in practical diplomacy.  According to Isaev (1999b: 10), political 
science was underdeveloped in the USSR because ‘problems of power were on the whole 
reduced to [questions about] the leadership of the Communist Party in all aspects of state and 
social life, which found expression in the special discipline of partinoe stroitel'stvo.  The 
problems of state administration were looked at primarily through this prism.’ 
 
59 The Russian term distsiplin refers to a specific body of knowledge attached to a 
specialisation, e.g., demography, social statistics, social anthropology, social psychology.  The 
more general term napravlenie (literally ‘direction’ but also used to mean field of interest) is 
more analogous to the English understanding of an academic ‘discipline’ like sociology.    
 
60 Elective courses at BHU are courses offered by the department which are not required by 
the Ministry of Education.  They are selected either by the department or a cohort of students 
who make a collective decision about which courses to take. 
 
61 According to Tishin (1999: 6-7), these functions ‘determine the significance and role of this 
science in modern society life.  Precisely they answer the question why and for what do 
people need this science.’  They are: (1) theoretical–cognitive (‘accumulates knowledge and 
synthesises it, strives to present the fullest picture of the structure and processes of 
contemporary society’), world view (‘gives a general representation about the world of 
people’), ideological (‘sociological research is often used in political struggles either for 
kindling or overcoming social tensions; sociological data is not seldom seen as a means for 
stabilising society; sociological concepts are for various groups of people  tools for the 
argumentation and struggle in preserving their interests and goals’), humanistic (‘expressed in 
the development of goals for social development, programmes for scientific-technological, 
socio-economic and cultural improvements in society; sociology can mediate the improvement 
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of human life’), predictive (‘on the basis of data gathered, [it] can determine the prospects for 
the regularities of life and development of society’), communicative, economic (‘studies the 
state and dynamics of economic life of various categories, that is the living components of the 
social structure’), administrative (‘work out and help to realise social policies, oriented either 
toward the hastening or inhibiting of social-economic development of the state, which 
cooperates in the hands of one political force to form a homogenous society, and others to in 
the differentiation of society into unequal socio-economic classes and groups’), critical (‘warn 
politicians about deviations in the laws of the development of social phenomena and processes 
and possible consequences of these violations’), applied (‘directly participate in developing 
and even realising various social recommendations, projects and experiments’), Informational 
(‘give primary data about individuals and groups of people, their needs, interests, value 
orientations and motives of behaviour, about the public opinion and concrete conditions and 
situations’), activisation (‘form public opinion, to induce groups of people to act as someone 
needs, as it is advantageous’).  
 
62 The use of the categories of ‘concepts, topics and skills’ to analyse the construction of 
disciplinarity in sociology is adapted from Wagenaar (2003). 
 
63 The national standards for sociology were developed as a more flexible alternative to the 
Soviet institution of uchebnye plany, which were created to institutionalise conformity in 
higher education across the USSR.  Under the Soviet regime, faculty working in state 
universities were expected to implement centrally-issued uchebnye plany in all of their 
programmes.  As Ryskulueva (2003) remarked, ‘everything went through one Soviet Ministry 
of Education in Moscow.  We were sent documents that we had to implement and deliver, and 
everything had to be done according to form: we either had to give them to people or 
transform and adapt them and then give them to people. […] They created them in Moscow 
[where] they had scientific institutes, large-scale administration, state structures…and 
everyone in the Soviet Union simply had to approve them; they had to implement these pre-
prepared plans.  Therefore, the [Kirgiz] Ministry of Education didn’t have any sort of 
influence on the development of sociology during this period. […] You could go anywhere 
and you would find that sociology was the same in all…the republics of the Soviet Union.’ 
 
64 For more on this agreement, see Aidaraliev (1995: 8), who argues that the republic is 
developing a form of education that will ‘enable us to preserve all our past successes and 
master new technologies of instruction.  This will depend on our integration into the world 
community.  The scale and level of connections with foreign countries in the sphere of 
education is constantly growing.  The most important direction is the Russian Federation and 
the CIS. […] In the framework of the CIS, on 10 June 1992, there was an agreement of 
cooperation to set up a single educational space, based on the principles of sovereignty and 
integrity of national educational systems.’  However, this agreement had little practical effect 
on the development of the discipline of sociology in Kyrgyzstan during the time period under 
consideration. 
 
65 Many students, however, feel that the diploma itself is worth less than personal and family 
connections, which are often required to gain employment (Personal communication with final 
year sociology students, BHU, 19 March 2003). 
 
66 Whereas the 1994 version of the standards stipulated eleven required disciplines, the revised 
version requires that students study in five: history, physical culture, philosophy, foreign 
language and Kyrgyz or Russian.  Individual universities are free to determine whether 
students must take courses in the humanities and social sciences, in accordance with the 
overall structure and philosophy of particular degree programmes.   
 
67 These figures are from 2003 departmental records which specify the number of courses 
taught by each member of the department. 
 
68 While Tishin’s own textbook received both positive and critical reviews from the faculty of 
BHU, it was argued that he included only national research projects in which he had 
participated while excluding the research of others (BHU 2001). 
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69 During 1995, the third theme was changed to ‘the social-spiritual face of the people of 
Kyrgyzstan.’  
 
70 Aspirant dissertations on social groups: A. Alimanova, ‘Ways of life of Germans in 
Kyrgyzstan,’ supervised by Isaev; Zh. Bokontaeva, ‘Farmers as a social-professional group,’ 
supervised by Isaev; G. Gorborukova, ‘The Russian diaspora in Kyrgyzstan: the historical-
sociological aspect,’ supervised by Isaev; A. Aldasheva, ‘The socialisation of women in 
mountainous conditions,’ supervised by I. S. Boldzhurova; S. Zhunusheva, ‘Problems of the 
formation of an entrepreneurial class among young people, on the example of Kyrgyzstan,’ 
supervised by Isaev; S. Osmonov, ‘Students as a social-demographic group,’ supervised by 
Isaev; Zh. Aitbaeva, ‘Entrepreneurs as a social-professional group,’ supervised by Isaev.  
Dissertations on the elite: A. Zhigitekov, ‘Particularities of the formation of the political elite 
of Kyrgyzstan,’ supervised by Isaev; B. Saitbaev, ‘The influence of family relations on the 
establishment of a Kyrgyz national elite,’ supervised by Isaev.  Dissertations on the general 
theme: M. Mamirkanov, ‘Problems of modelling humanitarian education in Kyrgyzstan,’ 
supervised by A. Elebaeva; Ch. Goshoeva, ‘Particularities of the national integration of 
Kyrgyz society in the conditions of democracy,’ supervised by Isaev. 
  
71 A. Tsarov, ‘Tendencies of change in the standard of living of the urban population as a 
settler community,’ supervised by Nurova; N.; Iu. Tserbak, ‘The value orientations of the 
young people of Kyrgyzstan,’ supervised by Omuraliev; G. Plakhotnikova, ‘Problems of 
social stratification in Kyrgyzstan in the conditions of the transition to the market,’ supervised 
by Isaev. 
 
72 G. Zhumabekova, ‘The democratisation of Kyrgyz society: national and general human 
values,’ supervised by Isaev; B. Kachikeeva, ‘The role of women in the democratisation of 
Kyrgyzstan,’ supervised by Boldzhurova; and T. Sharshembieva, ‘Education and young 
people’s value system,’ no supervisor listed (Annual report 1996–97); B. Satkynaliev, 
‘Deviant behaviour of minorities: the status and ways of prevention,’ supervised by Isaev 
(Report 1997). 
 
73 E.g., A. Beishembieva, ‘Non-governmental organisations as institutions of civil society,’ 
supervised by Isaev; M. Aripov, ‘The open society: creation and development in Kyrgyzstan,’ 
supervised by Nurova. 
 
74 Botoeva ultimately wrote a dissertation entitled The Social Causes of the Internal Migration 
of Youth in Kyrgyzstan (BHU 2002). 
 
75 This insight emerged during a Soros-sponsored sociology summer school course in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, which dealt specifically with issues of the disciplinary canon in classical 
sociology and whether is can or should be reconsidered in the Central Asian context. 
 
Chapter 8 
 
76 For more on the history of the university, see Reeves (2003) and Sharshekeeva (2001). 
 
77 In 1998, in addition to sociology, programmes also appeared in psychology, economics and 
international relations. 
 
78 During the early years of AUCA’s existence, there were few discrete departments within the 
university.  Instead, two major departments—one of English language and another general 
department—housed a diverse array of degree programmes, ranging from mathematics and 
culture to ethics.  Sagynbaeva taught sociology in the latter. 
 
79 Information about the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) can be found at 
http://www.irex.org.  The American Councils for International Education (ACTR/ACCELS) is 
online at http://www.americancouncils.org, and the Soros Foundation Higher Education 
Support Program HESP) at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/hesp.html.  
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80 In the 2002–03 academic year tuition fees were $1800; however, the vast majority of 
students receive some sort of financial aid and do not pay full fees (Reeves 2003: 19-20). 
 
81 In 1998, the library of the Kyrgyz-American School held 43 titles in sociology, 
approximately one-quarter of which were in English and had been donated by visiting 
professors.  By 2000, this had expanded to include 55 English titles, 62 Russian titles and 17 
non-sequential numbers of Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia dating from 1997–99.  All of the 
books were donated or purchased through special one-off grants given by the Soros 
Foundation for instructional materials.  This collection was supplemented by 72 English titles 
donated by faculty members and housed in the newly-established International and 
Comparative Politics Library. 
 
82 According to the Civic Education Project’s 2001 brochure, the organisation, funded 
primarily by the Open Society Institute (OSI), was ‘founded in 1991 [as] a private, non-profit 
educational organization that helps to educate a new generation in Central and Eastern Europe 
and Eurasia in the principles and habits of democracy.  Believing that critically minded and 
informed individuals are fundamental to a thriving democratic society, CEP works with 
universities throughout the region to bring western-trained social science academics and 
lawyers to their institutions.’  The programme was dissolved in 2003 and reorganised by the 
OSI’s Higher Education Support Program that would place more emphasis on institution 
building and streamline CEP activities into other HESP projects (CEP 2000, 2003). 
 
83 This is a long-standing problem in the republic.  In the 1960s, for example, the pro-rector of 
the Kirgiz State University wrote an article on the ‘preparation of teachers for Central Asian 
VUZy’ (Islamov 1964).  He argued that apprenticeships did not work because ‘few research 
institutes or universities were willing to cooperate with young researchers in reality, and 
pressured them into work instead.’ 
 
84 He and a number of others from the Sociology Department also initiated a faculty–staff 
union, which had a strong start but dissolved during the autumn of 2003 as a result of the 
university’s administrative crisis.   
 
85 While a 2003 report on the centre lists seven local and foreign full-time staff and two 
research assistants, most of these are on paper only.  The vast majority of the work in 2003, 
for example, was in actuality conducted by Ablezova, Botoeva and research assistant Kanybek 
Konokbaev, with assistance from foreign researchers who were once part of the on-site team 
and who are now living abroad. 
 
Chapter 9 
 
86 For a full listing of the papers in which articles on sociology appear, see Appendix E. 
 
87 For a different interpretation of sociology in the media, in particular its ‘destructive effects’ 
and efforts to regulate the publication of sociological work, see Fond zaschiti glasnosti (1996).  
 
88 Many individuals and organisations that have conducted and published public opinion 
surveys in Kyrgyzstan during the last decade are unregistered, and many groups or centres are 
short-lived and dissolve within a few months or years.  There have been no regularly produced 
academic periodicals in the republic since the early 1990s and studies are often published in 
newspapers; these articles, however, often lack even the author’s name or are printed under 
pseudonyms.  Furthermore, many research centres do not keep accurate accounts of the 
studies they themselves conduct, and those that do are often unwilling to share their archives 
with outsiders. 
 
89 Prikhvatizatsiia is an ironic pun on ‘privatisation,’ stemming from the Russian verb 
prikhvatit’, or ‘to seize up.’  It translates loosely into ‘crony capitalism’ and refers to the fact 
that after independence, state land in Kyrgyzstan was simply redistributed to wealthy 
apparatchiki and oligarchs rather than genuinely privatised. 
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90 Isaev 1994, 1994a, 1994b; Isaev, Abagynova and Abylgazaieva 1994; Isaev and 
Abylgazaieva 1994; Isaev and Asanbekov 1994; and Osmonalieva 1994.  
 
91 Under the VPP, or Voucher Privatisation Programme, each Kyrgyzstani citizen could 
request a voucher that could be used toward purchasing either the property s/he lived in or 
shares in collectives, joint-stock companies, or other properties which were being privatised.  
For more, see Dabrowski (1995: 287).  
 
92 It must be noted that ‘national-level’ sociological studies in Kyrgyzstan are not necessarily 
based on representative samples of the entire national population; in fact, many use localised 
samples and generalise them to the ‘nation.’  The somewhat different practice of using 
proportional as opposed to representative samples in sociological research, and its justification 
as being superior for studies in the largely rural republic, will be discussed in more detail later 
in the chapter. 
 
93 This set of twenty articles is comprised of Bakir Uluu (1994, 1997); Bekturganov (1994, 
1995); Isaev (1996b); Isaev and Ibraeva (1996); Isaev, Ibraeva and Madalieva (1995); Isaev et 
al. (1993b, 1994b, 1994d, 1994e, 1994f, 1994g, 1994h, 1996, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1997a); 
Razguliaev (1995); Zhorobekova et al. (1995).  
 
94 It is unclear when exactly these surveys began; one source traces them back to 1991 (Isaev 
1991b), another to 1992 (Isaev and Ibraeva 1995), and yet another to 1994 (Isaev et al. 1997). 
During 2003, political ratings were regularly published in the weekly newspaper 
Obschestvennyi reiting (Social rating). 
 
95 It is worth noting that Propagandist i agitator Kirgizstana (Propagandist and agitator of 
Kirgizstan) regularly published articles about sociology or written by sociologists during the 
1980s. 
 
96 The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) was founded in 1990 and ‘served as an 
umbrella for a number of pro-democracy and nationalist groups.  [It] backed the election of 
Akaev to the presidency in 1991, but later withdrew its support.  The Democratic Party of Free 
Kyrgyzstan (Erkin or ERK) was ‘founded in 1991 as a splinter group of the DDK on a 
platform of moderate nationalism and support a liberal market economy.’  From Swiss 
Agency (2000). 
 
97 Quote excerpted from Bakir Uluu (1994). 
 
98 While Merton’s (1942) ‘Ethos of science’ is often accepted as a descriptive model of the 
culture of western science, sociologist of science Mulkay (1976, 1979) reinterprets it as a 
normative prescription for scientific practice, one which is tied in with the professional and 
societal conditions of modern science.  See also Gieryn (1983: 783). 
 
Appendices 
 
99 Each discipline has an extremely detailed list of topics that are to be covered in each.  For 
example, the history of sociology must include ‘the stages of development of sociological 
thought, the socio–historical preconditions for the emergence of sociology as a science, the 
institutionalisation of science, the general characteristics of positivism, the Durkheimian 
sociological school, the sociology of P. Sorokin in [both] the Russian and Harvard periods, T. 
Parsons’ theory of social action, functional concepts of the sociology of action, 
psychoanalytical concepts including A. Adler, S. Freud, developments on the ideas and 
paradigms of S. Freud and tracts of S. Freud’s sociological understanding; the understanding 
of sociology, naturalism and Marxist sociology, the general orientation of sociology, and 
schools and subjects of contemporary sociology.’  For convenience, the more detailed 
descriptions of what each discipline should include have been excluded from this summary. 
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